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A b strac t:
Few, if any scholars have seriously investigated whether Kierkegaard had a theory o f  the 
political or not. This thesis questions the absence o f  this literature. The central argument o f  this 
thesis is that Kierkegaard developed a theory of  the political which was principally grounded in 
his existentialist concerns and commitments.
I shall argue, furthermore, that Kierkegaard’s existential theory o f  the political is; systematically 
laid out; intriguing and original; comprehensive and detailed; theoretically grounded; consistent 
throughout the authorship (and with other key concepts o f  Kierkegaard’s philosophy); justifies 
an existentially-motivated kind o f  political activism; and hence that is non-trivially responsive to 
external change; and that is inextricably linked with Kierkegaard’s social theory.
These arguments contribute to Kierkegaard scholarship by clarifying exactly what the ‘political 
elements’ o f  Kierkegaard’s thought are. Furthermore, the thesis responds to numerous critics of 
the political dimension to Kierkegaard’s work, who would claim that either Kierkegaard’s 
political insights are ‘scattered’ and unsystematic, ‘essentially individualistic’, or ‘impotent with 
regards to worldly change’. I also contribute to Kierkegaard scholarship by arguing that any and 
all o f  Kierkegaard’s involvements with politics can be seen as deriving from his principal 
existentialist concerns.
Aside from contributing to Kierkegaard scholarship, this thesis also opens up the possibility of 
bringing Kierkegaard into contemporary debates concerning theories o f  the political. ‘How 
might Kierkegaard’s existential theory o f  the political inform contemporary political thought’ is 
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Kierkegaard’s Existential Theory of the Political: 
Introduction. 1
Few, if  any scholars have seriously investigated w hether K ierkegaard had a theory o f 
the political or not. This thesis questions the absence o f  this literature. In fact, the 
central argum ent o f  this thesis is that Kierkegaard developed an existential theory o f 
the political.
To be fair to the excellent work o f contem porary Kierkegaard scholars, many have 
convincingly argued against the tradition o f believing that Kierkegaard is an apolitical 
theorist. Yet even am ongst this contem porary literature the idea that there might be 
theoretical foundations for K ierkegaard’s political thought is still a highly contested 
position. If  many contem porary Kierkegaard scholars fail to attribute a ‘theory o f  the 
political’ to Kierkegaard, one could be forgiven for assum ing that this must be 
because Kierkegaard does not have one. In opposition to this interpretation, however,
I argue that Kierkegaard does develop a theory o f the political - one that it is 
fundam entally based on his prim ary interest in the spiritual and existential 
developm ent o f the individual.
1 1 w ould  like to express m y sincere thanks to both Dr. G raham  M. Sm ith and to P rofessor A lison Stone 
for their help and guidance, the result o f  w hich is v isible throughout this thesis. This thesis has also 
greatly  benefited  from  the helpful com m ents and suggestions o f  Dr. C lare Carlisle, and Dr. G avin 
H ym an. I w ould also like to thank the ESRC for granting  me a generous studentship, w ithout which 
this thesis w ould  not have been possible.
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That Kierkegaard was first and forem ost interested in existence [tilblivelse] is not an 
uncontroversial view. K ierkegaard’s existential com m itm ents are well-known and 
arguably occupy his entire authorship. But I would also argue that Kierkegaard has 
much to say about the legitimate scope and role o f politics. In fact, I shall argue that 
Kierkegaard explicitly delineates a theory o f  the political - an ontological 
characterisation o f what should be considered as ‘political’ entities and by implication 
non-political entities, as well as a theory o f  how the two ought to relate. Additionally, 
I argue that this theory o f the political is based on K ierkegaard’s prim ary comm itm ent 
to the existential developm ent o f each and every single human being, and hence it is 
an existential theory o f the political. Aside from delineating his theory o f the political, 
Kierkegaard also outlines a variety o f different ways that individuals might become 
existentially impoverished if  his theory o f  the political is not im plem ented and 
respected.
In extreme circum stances, when political decisions put the existential developm ent o f 
citizens at great risk and nothing but political action could rem edy the situation, 
K ierkegaard even advocates a kind o f existentially based political activism. Hence, 
whilst it is fair to say that Kierkegaard does not develop anything like the kind o f 
political program m e that typifies political theorists (nor, for that matter, does he give 
us much in the way o f a theory o f governm ent), K ierkegaard does nevertheless 
provide us with a detailed account o f  when governm ent policies can and ought to be 
challenged upon existential grounds. Hence, K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the 
political also provides a theoretical justification for ensuring that policy alterations are 
kept in check, as well as a guide as to the kind o f political activism that is an 
appropriate response to illegitimate policies. K ierkegaard’s involvement with politics
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focusses on ensuring that individuals have the ability to pursue unhindered existential 
developm ent. Kierkegaard endorses political activism  when this basic human function 
is put at jeopardy.
Aside from his theory o f  the political, Kierkegaard also delineates a social theory. It 
turns out that in order for genuine sociability to flourish between individuals each 
person must be perm itted the space to develop spiritually and authentically. Therefore, 
the justification for existential activism that K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political 
warrants is also a vital component o f ensuring the possibility o f genuine sociability 
and authentic comm unity. Hence, whilst K ierkegaard’s theory o f  the political often 
em phasizes the developm ent o f  the single individual it is nevertheless a necessary 
com ponent o f  K ierkegaard’s social theory and so (the former) cannot properly be 
considered as ‘individualistic’.
I will pursue the argum ent that Kierkegaard has an existential theory o f the political 
throughout all eight chapters o f this thesis. In chapter one, I outline what I mean by a 
‘theory o f the political’; and in chapter three I specifically outline Kierkegaard’s 
‘existential’ theory o f the political. I maintain that K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f 
the political occupied, in some way at least, his entire authorship in a coherent m anner 
that also incorporates m any o f his well-known, key philosophical tenets (chapters four 
through seven). This reading implies that K ierkegaard’s thought, as expressed in his 
pseudonym ous and non-pseudonym ous works alike, was far more socially reflexive 
than has often been believed. I shall also argue that K ierkegaard’s theory o f  the 
political justifies a kind o f existential activism (chapters five through seven). 
Furthermore, I maintain that K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political is non-
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trivially responsive towards external socio-political change (chapters five through 
seven). (This argum ent is made in opposition both to contem porary scholarship which 
is examined in chapter two, as well as Theodor A dorno’s renowned critique o f 
K ierkegaard examined in chapter seven.) Finally, I also argue that K ierkegaard’s 
existential o f the theory goes hand-in-hand with an existentially m otivated social 
theory (chapter seven).
In short then, my central thesis is that Kierkegaard defends an existential theory o f the 
political (chs. 1&3); that is consistent throughout the entire authorship (4); that 
justifies a kind o f  political activism (5-7); and hence is non-trivially responsive to 
external change (5-7); and finally that contributes towards his social theory (7).
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Outline o f the thesis.
C h a p te r  1
The prim ary focus o f ‘Chapter 1’ is to define the phrase ‘theory o f  the political’. In 
doing so, I shall differentiate the notion o f a ‘theory o f the political’ from that o f  a 
‘political theory’, as well as from a ‘political program m e’. I will provide a working 
taxonom y o f  these and other sim ilar political terms. I will also examine the works o f 
some canonical political theorists (and theorists o f  the political) to test the 
intuitiveness o f  the taxonom y I present, as well as to help clarify some o f the 
distinctions I seek to make. In examining these canonical political thinkers, I will also 
attempt to identify which aspects o f their respective theories can properly be 
considered as contributing to ‘political theory’ and/or which contribute towards a 
‘theory o f the political’.
One o f  the central arguments o f this thesis is that scholars have sometimes deemed 
Kierkegaard ‘apolitical’ because he does not provide a theoretical basis for selecting 
which policies a governm ent ought to implement. W hilst I agree with the latter part o f 
this claim, I shall argue that providing a program me o f  positive policies is only a 
requirem ent o f one who is considered a political theorist. I think it is quite fair to say 
that Kierkegaard lacked a theory o f real-world, positive policy implementations. 
Additionally, I also believe that Kierkegaard has very little to say about the form s  that
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a governm ent might or ought to adopt, i.e., whether it should be democratic, 
monarchical, or republican, etc. For both o f these reasons, I believe that Kierkegaard 
is not properly speaking a ‘political theorist’. Nevertheless, we should not hastily 
conclude from this that Kierkegaard ought not to be considered as a ‘political thinker’ 
at all. On the contrary, I shall argue that Kierkegaard is a theorist o f  the political. 
W hen appreciated as a theorist o f  the political K ierkegaard has much to say about 
how the political realm legitim ately relates to the non-political realm, and about the 
kind o f  political activism we should endorse when the form er is not being practised in 
an authentic way. Hence, ju st because Kierkegaard is not a political theorist this does 
not warrant us in thinking that he is therefore either an ‘apolitical’ thinker, or that his 
political contribution is fragm entary and/or lacking theoretical foundation.
M istaken views about K ierkegaard’s political thought m ight have thus been 
perpetuated by the fact that a ‘theory o f the political’ and a ‘political theory’ have not 
previously been clearly distinguishing between in the literature concerning 
K ierkegaard’s political thought.2 Hence, the conceptual clarification that I undertake 
in ‘Chapter 1’ is part o f my attempt at valuing K ierkegaard’s political importance for 
his particularly novel theory o f the political.
Through examining the intellectual contribution o f the political theorist John Locke, I 
also attempt to set the ground for defending K ierkegaard from another critique. I 
pursue an increasingly popular interpretation o f Locke which sees his political theory 
as a direct result o f  his primary, theological interests. In a sense then, Locke’s political 
theory is an attempt at implem enting G od’s will on earth, by arranging political
2 I f  it w as not for the insight and guidance o f  Dr. G raham  Sm ith, P rofessor A lison Stone, Dr. C lare 
C arlisle, and Dr. G avin H ym an, I also w ould not have becom e aw are o f  this conceptual difference.
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institutions in a way that accords with Locke’s interpretation o f the Bible. W hether 
this interpretation affords us with the most ‘correct’ way o f understanding Locke’s 
political theory is not my principal interest here though. W hat is important for this 
thesis is the following query: //L o ck e  was interested first and forem ost in theological 
concerns and political ones only secondarily, would this affect our judgem ent o f 
considering Locke to be a political theorist? I argue that the content o f  Locke’s 
political theory is valid as such in its own right independent o f its origins, or o f the 
intentions o f the historical figure John Locke.
The reason for considering this line o f argum ent is that a scholar has recently argued 
that K ierkegaard ought properly to be considered an ‘a-political’ thinker, because his 
political comm itm ents are only secondary to his principal theological concerns (Garff, 
1999). In response, I argue that Kierkegaard ought to be considered as a ‘theorist o f  
the political’ for the same reasons that ‘John-Locke-as-principally-theologian’ ought 
to be considered a political theorist: the content o f  K ierkegaard’s thought, irrespective 
o f its origins or intentions, is such that it justifies us in calling him a theorist o f  the 
political. The fact that K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political is grounded in ( ‘non­
political’) existential commitments does not change the fact that a theory o f the 
political is nevertheless presented.
This opening chapter therefore gives a cursory definition o f  what K ierkegaard’s basic 
political position is. An analysis o f other canonical political philosophers highlights 
how K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political is sim ilar in some respects to the thought o f 
other accepted theorists o f the political, as well as how it is differentiated from 
traditional political theory.
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C h a p te r  2
The prim ary focus o f  ‘Chapter 2 ’ is to outline the leading trends in contem porary 
Kierkegaard scholarship. For roughly one-hundred and twenty years now scholars 
have scarcely found anything politically interesting in K ierkegaard’s authorship. 
Much o f  the lack o f  a political interest in K ierkegaard’s works could be due to lack o f 
availability or quality o f available translations. W hat I refer to as the ‘m odem  period’ 
o f  Kierkegaard research has, however, had access to complete collections o f 
K ierkegaard’s works in dom inant languages. Furthermore, contem porary scholars are 
blessed with the ability to engage in international collaboration and cross-referencing 
to a degree that has never before been possible.
N evertheless, even amongst contem porary Kierkegaard scholars who specialise in his 
political thought, the idea that Kierkegaard provides us with a theoretical basis for 
politics is still a m inority opinion which is open to controversy. I outline some o f  the 
key trends in this contem porary Kierkegaard scholarship. The most frequent form o f 
criticism charged against Kierkegaard is that he fails to provide an in-depth account o f 
what kinds o f policies we should endorse and establish. Later on in the thesis I will 
come back to this point, arguing that Kierkegaard has theoretical reasons for 
purposely resisting to provide such an account. In ‘Chapter 2 ’, however, we will see 
that many contem porary scholars judge this absence as a ‘lam entable’ loss (rather
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than a necessary aspect o f  K ierkegaard’s political thought), or even as evidence that 
Kierkegaard should not be considered as a political thinker.
C h a p te r  3
In ‘Chapter 3 ’ I will outline K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political. M any o f 
K ierkegaard’s explicit references to his theory o f the political can be found in two o f 
his works - An Open Letter, and The Point o f  View o f  my Work as an Author -  as well 
as with his on-going interest in Luther’s reformation (which is noted in scattered 
comm ents in some o f  his later works but also in m any journal entries). M any o f  these 
texts, incidentally, were not fully published within K ierkegaard’s own life-time, and 
translations o f  these works have also been historically late. Furthermore, 
K ierkegaard’s more ‘sensationalistic’ pseudonymous works have been given more 
historical attention than these obscure references to politics. This might partially 
explain why, historically speaking, many have failed to find a theory o f  the political in 
K ierkegaard’s authorship.
‘Chapter 3 ’ provides the textual grounds for my argum ent that Kierkegaard developed 
a theory o f the political. In the three areas o f K ierkegaard’s work under examination, 
K ierkegaard explicitly defines what he takes to be the proper scope, purpose, and 
m ethodology o f  the political realm. In short, K ierkegaard believes that the political 
realm  has legitim ate authority over the temporal (psychical and physical) wellbeing o f 
human beings; as long as the individual’s existential and spiritual livelihood is not
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also jeopardised. Understanding what are properly speaking ‘tem poral’ concerns 
(which politics can legitimately regulate), and what are ‘spiritual’ concerns (which 
genuine politics ought not to attempt to govern) is a pivotal part o f  K ierkegaard’s 
theory o f the political. Therefore, I will also provide an outline o f  K ierkegaard’s 
anthropological beliefs since they detail what the ‘tem poral’ and the ‘spiritual’ aspects 
o f hum an life are.
In doing so, we see that Kierkegaard separates entities into those which are fit for the 
political realm to legislate (given the means that are also appropriate to the latter), and 
those that are not (for sim ilar reasons). K ierkegaard therefore engages in a kind o f 
political ontology, separating areas o f life that are properly speaking ‘political’, and 
those that are ‘non-political’. Furthermore, Kierkegaard gives frequent and 
com pelling argum ents for this categorisation as well as convincing justifications o f its 
enforcement. Finally, Kierkegaard describes how the political and the non-political 
ought to relate to one another. Hence, in the various texts under consideration, 
Kierkegaard outlines his theory o f the political. The fact that the latter is mapped out 
in order to preserve the sanctity o f the existential developm ent o f  persons (i.e., is 
grounded in a ‘non-political’ comm itm ent) does not detract from the fact that 
K ierkegaard provides com pelling argum ents and justifications in defence o f a theory 
o f  the political.
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C h a p te r  4
In chapter four I take my first detailed look at one o f  K ierkegaard’s works to see how 
his theory o f  the political informs other aspects o f  his authorship. The work in 
question is a purported review o f Hans Christian A ndersen’s third novel Only a 
Fiddler [Kun en Spillemand, 1837]. Despite being a review, however, the text is filled 
with references to key concepts that are later elucidated throughout K ierkegaard’s 
entire authorship. From the Papers is also one o f the earliest works to show 
Kierkegaard thinking about political issues. It is likely that Kierkegaard had not 
thoroughly worked out his theory o f the political at the tim e o f publishing From the 
Papers. Nevertheless, the early engagem ent with key concepts which relate both to 
K ierkegaard’s existential and political views is insightful and worth exam ining for a 
num ber o f reasons.
For one thing, K ierkegaard’s early attempt at highlighting the respective boundaries 
between the political and the existential realm highlights that Kierkegaard was not 
m erely interested in social and political issues in his later, signed writings. That 
K ierkegaard m ight have been exam ining the relationship between the existential and 
the political in this early work also provides partial evidence for the view that he 
m ight have had existential/political concerns in mind throughout the entire authorship 
- pseudonym ous as well as signed.
Page 12 o f  354. Kierkegaard’s Existential Theory o f  the Political. Thomas Wolstenholme.
From the Papers argues that Hans Christian A ndersen’s impoverished existential 
developm ent was partly a ‘product o f the tim es’. This in turn creates the possibility o f 
interpreting K ierkegaard’s other portrayals o f  impoverished existential life-views 
(exam ples o f  which are frequently found the pseudonym ous authorship) as 
highlighting ways in which various social phenomenon m ight be partly to blame for 
fostering those existentially inauthentic ways o f life.
K ierkegaard’s analysis o f Andersen evidences an early interest in theorising about the 
various ways that socio-political institutions affect the existential and spiritual 
developm ent o f  the individual. Hence, From the Papers could signal K ierkegaard’s 
early interest in issues which would later inform his existential theory o f  the political.
C h a p te r  5
In chapter five I look at another o f K ierkegaard’s works, namely Two Ages. 
Incidentally, this work is also a purported review. But the review (which is alm ost as 
long as the original work itself) is again used by Kierkegaard as a point o f departure 
for an exposition o f his own political principles; and especially for another (more) in- 
depth discussion o f  how the political and the existential ought to relate.
In this chapter, I will also examine the concept o f  an ‘aesthetic’ age (5.1), a term not 
infrequently found within Kierkegaard scholarship. W hilst K ierkegaard does not use 
the phrase ‘[ajesthetic age’ as such he makes very sim ilar statements; calling ‘the age’
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one o f ‘esthetic d isin teg ra tio n ’, for example. On the basis o f these comments, I 
analyse what it could mean for Kierkegaard to call an age aesthetic, especially in light 
o f  the fact that this existential term had previously only been used to describe a single 
individual.
An analysis o f K ierkegaard’s review also shows that Kierkegaard once more 
delineates the boundaries o f  the political realm  with the existential; a point which has 
been recognised in recent K ierkegaard scholarship. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard also 
uses the w ork to outline the legitimate scope o f political activity that one can 
undertake whilst faithfully being com m itted to a principal concern with the existential 
developm ent o f others. Thus whilst arguably being K ierkegaard’s most political work, 
in Two Ages we are nevertheless rem inded o f the lim itations o f resorting to political 
activity in solving existential problems. In differentiating between legitimate and 
illegitim ate political engagem ent, Kierkegaard outlines the beginning o f a theory o f 
existentially grounded political activism. Recognising that K ierkegaard’s works 
contain the justification for a kind o f political activism  also lends support to the notion 
that K ierkegaard’s theory o f  the political is more concerned with bringing about 
external changes than scholars have typically believed. This critical point is more 
thoroughly exam ined in the sixth chapter o f  this thesis.
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C h a p te r  6
In the sixth chapter I analyse K ierkegaard’s ‘attack on C hristendom ’ (as pursued in 
various different journal articles, but recently and posthum ously com piled into one 
book -  The Moment) (6.1). I argue that K ierkegaard’s ‘attack’ is an example o f  his 
existential theory o f the political being used to justify  (a negative) political change 
(6.2). Hence, an analysis o f  this part o f K ierkegaard’s authorship provides an example 
o f  both the prom otion and justification o f a political change due to the infringem ent o f 
prim arily existential interests.
K ierkegaard also provides additional information about when ‘existential activism ’ is 
not only appropriate but required o f each o f  us. Briefly put, when a governmental 
policy is causing existential harm, and when there are no other feasible ways o f curing 
the existential problem  than through existential activism, the latter is justified.
In the concluding rem arks to the sixth chapter (6.3), I look back at the critiques that 
some o f  the contem porary Kierkegaard scholarship had made with respect to 
K ierkegaard’s political thought (which had been briefly outlined in chapter two). As 
we shall see, some o f these scholars have claimed that K ierkegaard’s theory o f the 
political is im potent with regards to real-world changes. Yet in chapter six I shall 
argue that, far from being incom patible with real-world, political changes, 
K ierkegaard’s existential political theory and anthropological beliefs imply a theory 
o f  political activism.
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C h a p te r  7
Kierkegaard has historically been considered by many as an essentially 
‘individualistic’ theorist. In fact, much o f our own analysis o f  K ierkegaard’s 
existential theory o f  the political supports the idea that he was enorm ously interested 
in the spiritual welfare o f the single individual. Theodor Adorno made a num ber o f 
insightful and prescient criticisms o f K ierkegaard’s entire authorship including the 
charge that it is essentially individualistic; and his criticism s certainly apply to 
K ierkegaard’s social and political thought here. Unlike some contem porary theorists, 
Adorno does not accuse Kierkegaard o f lacking a social or political theory altogether. 
Instead, Adorno raises a pressing criticism o f K ierkegaard’s theory o f  the political 
precisely because the latter is existentially grounded. In other words, Adorno 
recognises that K ierkegaard’s primary political com m itm ent is to the spiritual 
developm ent o f each single individual, instead of, for example, his or her social 
equality -  but this is precisely where he encounters problem s with K ierkegaard’s 
political and social thought.
Adorno forwarded these criticisms throughout his authorship, and especially in his 
debut work ‘Kierkegaard: Construction o f the A esthetic’. Nevertheless, I choose not 
to dedicate the seventh chapter to an analysis o f  this first work. Throughout this thesis 
I apply an interpretation o f Kierkegaard that takes what is said in the signed 
authorship as K ierkegaard’s own view o f  matters, unless m itigating circumstances 
suggest otherwise. This reading is in quite direct opposition to the hermeneutical
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practice that Adorno uses in Kierkegaard: Construction o f  the Aesthetic. Rather than 
engage in a debate about why I think that the interpretation I pursue might be a ‘truer’ 
interpretation o f  K ierkegaard’s works, however, I examine A dorno’s second major 
engagem ent with Kierkegaard: his Kierkegaard’s Doctrine o f  Love.
This work is preferable to study for a num ber o f reasons. Firstly, it analyses a work o f 
K ierkegaard’s which was originally published in K ierkegaard’s own name and (in line 
with the interpretation o f Kierkegaard that I defend throughout the thesis) is therefore 
one which I claim is representative o f K ierkegaard’s own social theory. Hence, 
A dorno’s critique is more pertinent in this second work partly because one cannot 
now claim that Adorno is merely attacking the view o f  a pseudonym. I believe that in 
A dorno’s second work he is in fact directly attacking the social and political thought 
that K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political justifies.
The second reason for examining A dorno’s Kierkegaard’s Doctrine o f  Love is 
because this work addresses K ierkegaard’s book Works o f  Love. I shall argue that 
Kierkegaard best highlights the unity between his social and political thought in this 
same work. Hence, I can attempt to sim ultaneously show how K ierkegaard’s 
existential theory o f  the political necessarily informs his social theory, as well as 
respond to A dorno’s criticisms o f  the two, by centring on the debate(s) found between 
K ierkegaard’s Works o f  Love and A dorno’s Kierkegaard’s Doctrine o f  Love.
In short, chapter seven will continue the central thesis that K ierkegaard’s existential 
theory o f the political is not impotent with regards to external change (7.1.1), as well 
as making the additional claim that the former is a necessary elem ent o f Kierkegaard’s
Page 17 o f  354. Kierkegaard’s Existential Theory o f  the Political. Thomas Wolstenholme.
social theory (7.2). In outlining K ierkegaard’s social theory, I also hope to refute 
readings o f Kierkegaard that take his thought (including his theory o f  the political) to 
be essentially individualistic. These two sub-sections additionally provide ways o f 
responding to A dorno’s central criticisms o f  K ierkegaard’s theory o f  the political; 
criticisms so insightful that even contem porary K ierkegaard scholars have pursued 
sim ilar lines o f argument.
C h a p te r  8 - C onclusion
In the concluding chapter I summ arise the central claims o f  this thesis, as well as 
gesture towards the contributions they m ight make for contem porary debates and for 
future scholarship. In drawing together key elements o f  each o f the other chapters, I 
surmise that K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political is: system atically laid out; 
intriguing and original; com prehensive and detailed; theoretically grounded; 
consistent throughout the authorship (and with other key concepts o f K ierkegaard’s 
philosophy); non-trivially responsive to external change; and supportive o f both 
individual existential improvement as well as genuine sociality. This proves that 
K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political is far more substantive than merely fragmented 
and scattered political remarks or insights. I prim arily seek to contribute to 
Kierkegaard scholarship; to clarify what it might mean to recognise that there are 
‘political elem ents’ to K ierkegaard’s thought; and to em phasise that all and any o f 
K ierkegaard’s involvements with politics are derived from o f  a principal commitment 
to existentialist concerns.
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N evertheless, my conclusion shows that K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political is 
substantive enough to be a feasible alternative to contem porary m ethods o f theorising 
about the political. W hilst I could not hope to give sufficient attention as to such 
questions as whether K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f  the political might be a 
preferable alternative to contem porary theories o f the political or not, I hope to have 
at least facilitated future scholarship in this area. Aside from aiming at contributing to 
K ierkegaard scholarship, therefore, I also hope that this work opens up discussions 
concerning existential theories o f  the political more generally, and the importance o f 
K ierkegaard’s thought within contem porary debates about the political more 
specifically.
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CHAPTER ONE: 
Theory of the political.
Introduction.
Giving definitions to concepts such like ‘the political’, ‘theory’, ‘political theory’, and 
‘theory o f the political’, are notoriously difficult. In spite o f  this, it is necessary to 
clarify what I mean when I employ these terms; since the thesis I will defend is that 
Kierkegaard is a theorist o f  the political. Thus, in this chapter I will attempt to provide 
a working definition o f some o f  these key concepts. My aim is not to attempt to re­
define a concept in a novel way, but is far more pragmatic. I seek to make some 
conceptual clarifications in order to avoid potential m isunderstandings. Thus, for 
example, I believe that Kierkegaard is a theorist o f  the political; but I will not argue 
that he is a political theorist. K ierkegaard’s reception has often involved theorists 
believing that Kierkegaard is not the latter, and therefore is not the former. I take this 
position to be incorrect and largely founded upon conceptual m isunderstandings with 
regards to the two terms. Hence, I will differentiate between the concepts ‘political 
theorist’ and ‘theorist o f  the political’ (as well as a third: ‘political program m e’),
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m aking clarifications and distinctions as I go along in order to minimise 
m isinterpreting what I take to be K ierkegaard’s (adm ittedly rather novel and in some 
senses radical) position.
In my attem pt to differentiate a ‘political theorist’ from a ‘theorist o f  the political’ I 
will be juxtaposing the theories o f two canonical ‘political theorists’ (i.e., John Locke 
[1632-1704], and Jean-Jacques Rousseau [1712-1778]) with K ierkegaard’s theory o f 
the political. This juxtaposition could be seen to make a strong case against 
K ierkegaard being considered a ‘political theorist’. This claim is inadvertent but also, 
given the restrictions o f my project, must unfortunately remain relatively 
undeveloped. W hether Kierkegaard is also a ‘political theorist’ is an interesting 
question that I think deserves more academ ic study. Unfortunately, however, to 
faithfully undertake such a task would require the kind o f detailed analysis that I 
cannot hope to offer in the space o f  this piece given my other aims.
The central task for this chapter is simply to make a start at highlighting why I shall 
consider Kierkegaard a theorist o f  the political; and an important part o f  that task is to 
make sure the reader does not think that by this I mean a ‘political theorist’. As I will 
go on to show in chapter 2 where I deal with the reception o f K ierkegaard’s work, 
some o f the m ainstream reasons for believing Kierkegaard to be ‘apolitical’ altogether 
has been due to the fact that his work does not (in any obvious sense at least) present 
us with a clear ‘political theory’. Nevertheless, K ierkegaard’s work is politically 
relevant, I shall argue, because it affords us an insightful and novel ‘theory o f the 
political’ that is timely because it challenges many o f the m ainstream assumptions 
that contem porary ‘theorists o f the political’ practise today.
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In what follow I will be m aking use o f a wide variety o f interrelated but different 
terms. This ‘taxonom y’, if  you will, is laid out on the next page and could serve as a 
useful point o f  reference. Most, if  not all o f  the concepts and the statements I make 
about them are uncontroversial - or so I hope. Despite the fact that I take these 
definitions to be unproblem atic I will nevertheless highlight some o f the distinctions 
between the term s as I engage in conceptual clarification below. W henever this is 
done, I will make a reference back to the following table (e.g.., that ‘O ntology’ 
‘classifies entities into groups’ will be cited as ‘#1 .1’):




’O n to logy’ Definition: Defining what there is, or could be, and the relations
between such entities.
Characteristics:
#1.1 Classifies entities into groups.
# 1.2 Hence can demarcate certain entities from others.
#1.3 Can include things that are even opposed to the political 
(anti-political)
#1.4 Can explain why and/or how distinct entities or different 
classes o f entities relate.
#2
T heo ry  o f the  Definition: An ontology specifically directed towards
political ‘political’ (and by implication, non-political) entities.
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Characteristics:
#2.1 M ust differentiate the political from the non-political.
#2.2 M ust say why or how  the two classes are distinct.
#2.3 M ust describe how the ‘political’ and the ‘non-political’ differ
-  but also how they relate.
#2.4 Can delineate entities which are ‘properly’ ‘non-political’ -  
i.e., entities which should not be treated as if  they were 
political because o f the possibly undesirable effects o f doing so.
#2.5 Similarly, can delineate entities which are ‘properly’ ‘political’
-  i.e., entities which should  be treated as if  they were political 
because o f the possibly undesirable effects o f not doing so.
#2.6 Hence, can be informed by an understanding o f  what is 
desirable and undesirable.
#2.7 Hence can be informed by non-political commitments.
#2.8 The ‘political’ can be valued higher, lower, or equally to these
non-political commitments.
#2.9  Despite #2.4 and #2.5, need not specify how the political and 
non-political ought to be arranged.
#2.10 Need not include an understanding o f  what the purpose or 
goal o f the political is -  but m ight contain an understanding 
o f what the political ought not to do (perhaps ever).
#2.11 Hence, can include a theory o f  the legitimate and illegitimate 
scope o f  the political realm.
#3
Political T heo ry  Definition: An account o f  how we should arrange political 
entities.
Characteristics:
#3.1 M ust give a theoretical account o f how political entities are 
to be practically arranged in real-world situations (i.e., this is 
no longer ju st an account o f the ontological relations between 
entities that may or may not exist in reality.)
#3.2 Can be a normative account or a descriptive account.
#3.2 An example o f a descriptive political theory might be H obbes’:
i.e., given the descriptive account o f how people are, 
and o f what sovereignty is, political entities ought to be 
arranged in such-a-such way as to reconcile these facts.
#3.3 An example o f a normative political theory might be Mill or 
Rousseau: i.e., given the normative account o f how people 
could be, and o f what sovereignty is, political entities ought
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to be arranged in such-a-such way as to promote some value 
or pursue some good.
#3.4 M ust, therefore, give an account o f  the goal or purpose o f 
politics.
#3.5 Norm ative political theories are concerned with how
arrangements should be made given an empirical situation 
(i.e., is no longer ju st an ontological account o f the relations 
between entities that may or may not actually exist).
#3.6 Hence they must be responsive to real-w orld changes.
#3.7 Therefore, they ought to be implem entable.
#3.8 Since a political theory specifies how we should arrange 
political entities in relation to non-political entities, it 
m ust include an account o f  the legitimate and illegitimate 
scope o f  the political realm.
#4
Political policies Definition: Recom m endations for political action or change 
using the means (executive and/or administrational power) 
o f  a political entity.
Characteristics:
#4.1 Can be *negative' - i.e., highlight an area where change is
required without necessarily providing a workable alternative.
#4.2 Can be 'positive' - i.e., provide a practical solution given
the nature o f  the problem, the empirical conditions o f the time 
and place, and the restrictions o f  governm ental power 
(which could be theoretical restrictions derived from a theory 
o f the political).
#4.3 Can be, or at least possibly become, a programme o f  change. 
This would require a theory (o f the political, or political 
theory) for one to faithfully and feasibly derive a program me o f 
policies from. A political program me could, in turn, be a 
'negative political program m e' -  whereby a governm ent or other 
political entity is system atically held in check; or it could be a 
‘positive political program m e’ - where real world changes could 
be advocated in response to alm ost any empirical circumstance.
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1.1 Political policy: John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
1.1.1 John Locke.
To clarify some key concepts that I shall be employing (i.e., ‘political theory’, ‘theory 
o f the political’, and ‘political policies’) I will look at the work o f  some canonical 
political thinkers and examine how various concepts are used within their thought. 
John Locke is canonically recognised as a political theorist. M any o f Locke’s 
concepts and ideas are also well-known and hopefully uncontroversial. Thus an 
overview o f  Locke’s arguments should help us begin clarifying what is meant by the 
term ‘theorist o f  the political’ (as well as other concepts).
John Locke provides us with a theory o f what Governm ent is, and what it ought to do. 
The governm ent is a voluntarily entered agreem ent established to provide security for 
the preservation o f ‘lives, liberties and estates’ -  what Locke also calls more generally, 
‘property’ (Book II, ch. 9, §123). Locke also claims that the best way to safeguard 
property is to enact laws (Book II, 19, §222). When it comes to the practice o f 
safeguarding property, there are three positive roles that the governm ent involvement 
is necessary for; ‘law -m aking’, enacting a ‘judiciary system ’, and law ‘enforcem ent’.
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Locke’s theory o f the role o f  the governm ent - what it should do and provide - leads 
him on to more specific discussions o f both the legitimate practices that the 
governm ent should engage in, what the best governm ental form  is, and what activities 
are legitim ately political (or civic) and what are not. Thus Locke also makes a 
distinction between what he claims are genuinely political issues, and other ‘non­
political’ areas o f life (satisfying condition #2.1 in figure 1.1 above). Thus, Locke 
provides us with a theory o f governm ent (its origin, role (#2.3), and ideal form) as 
well as a theory o f  the political (#2).
Concerning the legitimate scope o f the political, Locke recognises that governmental 
action o f  any sort requires some form o f  taxation. This in turn relies on the consent o f 
the citizenry to ‘trade’, as it were, what Locke calls ‘natural rights’ for ‘civic rights’. 
The limiting condition o f appeasing the tacit consent o f  the m ajority (in questions o f 
bartering natural rights for civil rights, at least) is one way o f  determ ining whether a 
governmental action is legitimate or illegitimate. But there are additional conditions 
than this.
For example, even if  we were to imagine that laws are enacted and that the majority o f 
the citizenry tacitly consent to them, there would still be conditions above and beyond 
majority consent for these laws to be legitimate. M ajority consent is, as it were, only a 
necessary condition for legitimate governm ent activity for such activity must still 
follow natural laws (and more o f this below. Note that here Locke is going some way 
to satisfying condition ‘#2 .4’ in figure 1.1 above). Thus, regardless o f  consent, laws 
m ust fulfil three additional criteria. Firstly, they must be ‘com m on’ (II, 9, §124). This 
means that laws must be general enough to apply to all equally, and must be easily
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known, accessible, and as regular as possible. Secondly, they must be arbitrated by an 
indifferent, third-person judge (II, 9, §125) to ensure fairness and equality. And 
finally, they must be well enforced (again, by a third-party organisation) (II, 9, § 126).3
Thus, Locke has presented 1) a theory o f the role o f the governm ent or the state, based 
on the origination o f it as a voluntary establishment, 2) a description o f  the (albeit 
minimal) role o f governm ent, and what its prim ary functions are and 3) a theory o f the 
political more generally (since Locke differentiates ‘political’ from ‘non-political’ 
entities).
The actual im plem entation o f  Locke’s theory o f the political and o f his theory o f 
governm ent leads him to considerations o f contingencies that the general theory o f the 
political does not. How should we make sure that laws are com m only understood, for 
example? Perhaps by providing adequate translations to comm unities where a 
minority language or dialect is prevalent. This requires real-world knowledge o f 
historical and geographical contingencies. Practical considerations about how a theory 
o f  governm ent or a theory o f  the political could be im plem ented, given these 
contingencies, are ‘political principles’ (#3). Locke does not ju st limit h im self to 
‘calling out’ against political action or inactivity (i.e., only to developing ‘negative 
political principles’ #3.1). Locke also presents some examples o f proposals that 
political entities could implement (i.e., ‘positive political’ principles ‘#3 .2’), such as 
his requirem ent that the law be comm only understood by all. Locke’s thought also 
leaves us with a detailed enough account o f a theory o f the political and o f
3 T hat the consent o f  the m ajority  is not a sufficient condition for a legitim ate law is m ade, albeit quite 
am biguously , later on in the text. L ocke provides four reasons for ju s tifiab ly  opposing a m ag istra te’s 
law. The law is illegitim ate (m y term : L ocke’s original is sim ply ‘illegal’) w hen the citizenries ‘estates, 
liberties, and lives are in danger, and perhaps their religion to o ’ (II, 18, §209). N o m ention o f  consent is 
m ade, im plying it is not in itse lf a sufficient condition for p roviding laws that cannot be opposed.
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governm ent that a contem porary reader could still use it as a theoretical basis for 
suggesting positive political changes. Such a reader could, in fact, develop a 
m anifesto o f ‘Lockean’ positive political principles fit for contem porary times but 
system atically in-line with Locke’s basic theoretical comm itm ents. That is, we can 
develop a positive political programme from Locke’s works.
A positive political programme might include principles, or at least guiding rules 
about how to apply Locke’s general political theory given the conditions of, for 
example, 21st century England. Such a program me could provide guidelines to day- 
by-day adjustments to governmental bills and policies by uniting both Locke’s 
general political theory with the real-time changes in various contingencies -  interest 
rates, unemployment rates, social trends, and so on. It is also conceptually possible, 
however, that a political programme be given without any (unified or intentional at 
least) underlying theory o f the political or even theory o f governm ent.
Locke’s political programme is (mostly) a ‘positive political program m e’. A 
‘negative’ political contribution could be where the problems o f  a current policy or 
form o f governm ent are highlighted, without necessarily offering the case for a 
practical alternative or workable change. A positive political statement, on the 
contrary, would be one which either actively seeks to avoid a given political situation; 
by suggesting the implementation o f a new policy, or an am endm ent o f  an existing 
one, for example. A positive political program me may advise us how to put into 
practice general ontology, normative, or descriptive comm itm ents, or a ‘theory o f 
governm ent’ or ‘theory o f the political’, or some variation o f these things, or neither.
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A positive political program me need not necessarily be constructed from either (or 
both) o f  these latter two theories.
Locke provides us with a thorough account o f a positive political programme. In order 
to understand the nature o f a ‘negative’ policy, or a political program m e that is not 
program matic, however, we will have to tem porarily abandon Locke’s thought. An 
examination o f another canonical political theorist, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, will help 
further elucidate characteristics o f political policies that L ocke’s thought cannot.
1.1.2 Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
Rousseau, it is often argued (e.g., Robinson, 1984; Schaeffer, 2012) takes a casuistic 
approach to specific aspects o f a theory o f  governm ent -  namely, to what actual, 
positive principles any given governm ent ought to enact.4 Rousseau has an account o f 
the human that is quite different from Locke’s. If Locke’s (le t’s call it ‘static’) view o f 
the human is that they share certain universal facts, irrespective o f social and 
historical facts, Rousseau’s account is far more ‘anthropological’. Since Rousseau 
believes that the characteristics o f people are highly sensitive to environmental and 
historical facts, Rousseau believes that people are far more divergent than Locke
4 R ousseau appears to confirm  this w ith his considerations on the m ost suitable form o f  governm ent for 
Corsica. He w rites there that the form  o f  governm ent is m ost appropriate for a citizenry ultim ately 
depends on external factors such as the ‘qualities in the nature and the soil o f  each coun try ’ (R ousseau, 
2005, 127). I take this to refer to geographical facts, as well as historical and facts about how  the people 
o f  a nation have been socialised. This w ould confirm  his claim  on the sam e page that the m ost suitable 
form o f  governm ent is often ‘the w ork o f  chance or fo rtune’ rather than deliberate choice {ibid.). This 
view  is also found in the Social Contract, w here R ousseau’s ideal law giver: “ [ ...]  does not [just] start 
by drafting  laws that are good in them selves, but first exam ines w hether the people for w hom  he 
destines them  is suited to bear them ” (R ousseau, 1999, 157).
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allows for (see n.4 above). Hence, Rousseau thinks that policies must be sensitive to 
the citizenry that they are applied to, or else they may risk doing more inadvertent 
harm than good. That is not to say that governm ents will not recognise that there are 
some rather tim eless and universal facts about humans. For Rousseau, these might 
include essential elements o f human nature such as the fact that we have free-will and 
perfectibility (and are hence consequently also corruptible).5 Other factors that policy 
makers ought to consider might, on the other hand, be far more contingent and short­
lived than these former conditions. An example could be whether Geneva has the 
requisite social and economic conditions to support a theatre or not.
Rousseau therefore does not (and indeed cannot, due to the restrictions o f  his own
theory o f the political, and theory o f governm ent) provide a full-fledged  account o f  a
positive political program me that could be enacted in any situation. But Rousseau
does not leave us entirely in the dark either. Rousseau provides such a thorough
anthropological account and theory o f the political that we might nevertheless have
enough details to quite confidently reconstruct positive policies that are faithful to
most, if  not all o f  R ousseau’s central theoretical comm itm ents. R ousseau’s theory o f
the political might even be especially useful for contem porary application; because it
provides political principles that can be applied in many varying times and
circumstances. Despite the fact that Rousseau favours a casuistic approach to
answering questions about which policies ought to be advocated at a specific time and
place, Rousseau nevertheless leaves sufficient details for a contem porary reader to
apply aspects o f his theoretical comm itm ents to guiding policy-making. Hence, I
suggest that Rousseau develops a theoretical basis for deciding how political entities
* N ote that R ousseau’s view s about the nature o f  hum ans form part o f  a general ontology (#1) that 
inform s his theory o f  the political. In fact, as 1 interpret R ousseau, it is his ‘non-po litica l’ an thropology 
that ultim ately leads to a theory o f  the political that rather starkly rivals L ocke’s.
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should be practically arranged in real-world situations, i.e., for positive political 
policies. Yet these same theoretical comm itm ents sim ultaneously ensure that 
Rousseau does not and cannot provide a substantive positive policy programme.
I have interpreted Rousseau as an essentially casuistic theorist with regards to positive 
policy suggestions. Despite this particular theoretical comm itm ent, Rousseau still has 
much to say about the nature o f politics and o f  hum an beings. Such theoretical 
comm itm ents, though they fail to provide an explicit and universally applicable 
positive political programme, can still be informative in providing general political 
recom m endations that would apparently be applicable to any society. When it comes 
to specific policy suggestions, however, we m ust look at each society individually. 
Therefore, Rousseau leaves us with theoretical guidelines about how to effectively 
govern human beings given their nature, but does not offer us a full-fledged 
program me for positive policy implem entations that could be applied to any age.
Nevertheless, because a reader can potentially develop policies that are faithful to 
Rousseau’s theoretical commitments, including his theory o f the political and theory 
o f governm ent, I argue that Rousseau provides us with the theoretical foundation  for a 
program me o f positive policy change. Rousseau might not explicitly articulate a fully- 
fledged account o f  how we ought to arrange political entities, but he does at least 
provide us with the sufficient theoretical means to do so. It is this contribution that 
warrants us in considered Rousseau to be a political theorist. (Note that Rousseau 
satisfies conditions #3.1 and #3.5, as well as #2.1 in the taxonom y above.)
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Hence a political theorist m ight be a thinker who presents a theory o f the political as 
well as a positive policy program. Yet I would suggest that to be considered a political 
theorist one only needs to provide a comprehensive enough theoretical foundation  for 
developing policy alterations in differing social and historical conditions. Given the 
nature o f policy alterations, I suspect that defending some kind o f theory o f the 
political would also be a necessary requirem ent; to inform us, for example, o f when 
state coercion is legitimate and when it is not. The important conclusion for this thesis, 
however, is that canonical political theorists such as Rousseau and Locke are 
recognised as such because they, where Kierkegaard does not, provide us with a 
sufficient enough theoretical basis for m aking positive policy alterations. Hence, I will 
not argue that Kierkegaard is a ‘political theorist’. Nevertheless, K ierkegaard is 
certainly far from uninterested in political affairs and ought to be, as I shall go on to 
argue, rightfully considered as a ‘theorist o f  the political’. Before this argum ent can be 
forwarded, however, it would be beneficial to engage in some further clarification o f 
the analytic fram ework we set out above (in figure 1.1).
1.2 Theory o f the political and ontology.
In the examinations o f the above theorists, we have highlighted some aspects o f 
‘political policies’ (#3). Clearly, however, Locke’s description o f positive and 
program matic policies does not exhaust his political contribution. For one thing, more 
background work can be made (and indeed, is made by Locke) to explain why 
governm ent is needed at all. An important part o f Locke’s argum ent is that the
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establishm ent o f a governm ent is voluntary. This claim is far from uncontroversial; 
yet Locke’s justification for it also importantly informs his political thought.
Thomas Hobbes [1588-1679] had argued that the establishm ent o f  governm ent was 
more o f  a rational necessity than a voluntary choice. Other political thinkers might 
argue that the original inception o f the establishm ent o f governm ent was an event that, 
whilst perhaps necessarily remedial to the conditions o f an archaic era, is now not 
only unnecessary but perhaps even a hindrance to present-day society.6 Thus, many o f 
Locke’s claims about the origins o f the establishm ent o f  governm ent, and even o f  the 
pre-political state o f  affairs that preceded the latter, also inform aspects o f his political 
thought. In what follows, I hope to examine this relationship more precisely.
M uch o f what is o f specifically ‘political’ worth in Locke’s principal political work, 
The Two Treatises o f  Government, is not obviously a prima facie  account o f positive 
policies, or a theory o f government. Locke spends much time and effort elucidating 
topics such as human nature and moral matters. Humans, for Locke, are essentially 
beings with the capacity to be rational and to produce. Locke does not see these traits 
as inherent within us without reason: humans are supposed to (we may say, designed 
to) deduce what the improvement o f their earthly life would entail, and to reify that 
vision through laborious alterations to nature. This is the basis for our God-given, 
natural right to property (II, 5, §§26, 31, and 32). Locke argues that other animals are 
part o f ‘the com m ons’. As such, they are part o f the material which can become the 
property o f  a human. Hence, Locke’s theory o f  property also makes a value-laden
6A gain, w hether or not a specific political theorist has argued this (i.e., w hether or not Karl Marx 
[1818-1883] could and should be read in this w ay) is not relevant here. The point is sim ply to highlight 
that a range o f  d iffering  accounts o f  the origination o f  governm ent can clearly be given as alternatives 
to L ocke’s.
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distinction between human and non-human creatures. Finally, Locke also makes 
comm ents about what the relations between human beings are like. Locke argues that 
each human being is a creature o f God and must be treated as such. Hence we cannot 
destroy ourselves or each other as we are also G od’s property (II, 2, §6). This informs 
a theory o f the natural sociability between hum ans that exists both prior to and after 
the establishm ent o f government.
As this discussion has shown, much o f what comes to inform Locke’s political 
position is theological or otherwise ‘non-political’ in nature. ‘Natural law s’, for 
example, a key com ponent o f Locke’s political thought, are given to us by God and 
according to His will (II, 2, §8). Nevertheless, it is also undeniable that Locke’s 
theological comm itm ents end up being politically relevant as well. The former inform 
Locke’s notion o f  natural law, and hence frame his political enterprise.
As we have seen, Locke provides a broad but in-depth account o f the ontological 
status o f many aspects o f human life, political and non-political alike, as well as the 
proper relations between them. Locke’s ontology deals with a num ber o f entities that 
are, at least prima facie  not necessarily political at all (as I will argue shortly). 
Locke’s ontology includes, for example, a description o f how it is that humans are 
social, and what it is for a human life to fare well. But Locke’s ontology also involves 
an explanation o f  subjects that can more obviously be translated into political 
principles. For example, it might explain when the use o f power can be perm issibly 
exerted by some human beings over others (if  ever).
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To give a fuller analysis o f Locke’s ontology, I will pursue an increasingly popular 
reading o f Locke which argues that he was first and foremost interested in theological 
comm itm ents. According to this reading, Locke’s theological comm itm ents, whilst 
not political in and o f themselves, nevertheless completely inform his political 
thought. To what extent these comm itm ents should therefore be called ‘political’ 
comm itm ents at all will be assessed. Furthermore, I will explore what it means to 
ground one’s political thought in theological concerns, as well as whether this should 
affect our judgem ent o f  such a thinker as a ‘theorist o f  the political’, or ‘political 
theorist’, or not.
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1.3 Locke: Politics and Theology.
Introduction
In the following section I shall attempt to engage in some conceptual clarification in 
area o f political thought that I think leads to some m isunderstandings regarding 
political thought in general, but K ierkegaard’s political thought more specifically.7 
This confusion revolves around whether a theorist is prim arily theological or political. 
It also brings up questions about whether we can justifiably term a body o f thought a 
‘theory o f the political’, or a ‘political theory’, even if  that theory is prim arily 
grounded in (a) non-political commitment(s). The following section will also 
therefore help to clarify more specifically what I mean by ‘theory o f the political’.
Once again, I shall examine John Locke as an example o f  a fam iliar and well 
recognised political thinker. I shall, however, pursue a reading o f Locke that takes his 
works, his political thought included, to be the result o f  a prim ary interest in biblical
o
interpretation. I shall conclude that even if  Locke’s theory o f the political, and
7 I shall use the m ore general term  ‘political th ough t’ w henever political aspects o f  K ierkegaard’s 
thought: 1) have not yet been identified by the taxonom y above (in figure 1.1) by either m yse lf or by 
another author, or; 2) involve various d iffering concepts from the taxonom y above, or; 3) cannot 
adequately be sim ilised by one or m ore o f  the concepts above.
8 T he literature for (and against) this position is vast. As such, I shall redirect the reader to four recent 
w orks w hich detail and in som e cases assess the m ost prom inent defenders o f  the view  that Locke is 
engaged in ‘political theo logy ’. All in all, the follow ing four references cite fifteen prom inent and 
contem porary  Locke theorists that defend this position (in m ultiple d ifferent w orks): C orbett, 2012, p. 
27, n.2; De R oover & B alagangadhara, 2008, pp. 545-56, notes 4, 5, & 6; M yers, 1995, p. 630, n.2; and 
Schw artzm an, 2005, p. , n .I . The sam e w orks also assess the equally prom inent but opposing position: 
that Locke designed his political thought so that it could be defended on entirely secular grounds. In 
w hat follow s, I will prim arily  concern m yse lf w ith Joshua M itchell’s recent articulation o f  the ‘Locke 
as political theo logy ’ position.
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political theory are grounded in primary theological comm itm ents, the latter does not 
detract from the former. In other words, having prim ary theological ( ‘non-political’) 
comm itm ents that necessarily inform one’s political thought does not warrant us in 
claiming that the latter cannot therefore be considered as defending a theory o f the 
political, or a political theory.
This is important because I take K ierkegaard’s theory o f  the political to be very 
sim ilar to the theologically grounded theory o f  the political that this prominent 
interpretation o f Locke - as ‘political theology’ - does. Hence, an examination o f 
Locke’s views as ‘political theology’ should draw a parallel between Locke’s already 
well-known political views and the far less mainstream  account o f  K ierkegaard’s 
existential theory o f the political that I will defend.
1.3.1 Locke as ‘political theology’.
Locke, we had briefly noted above, makes m any assertions that appear to be 
theological. We have a right to property because God designed us in such a way that 
we could improve our earthly existence by exerting labour over nature (II, 5, §§26, 
31-32). We have a right to punish others only insofar as they have violated G od’s 
good will (II, 2, §§6-8), etc.
In fact, we could see all o f  Locke’s political thought as an exercise in attempting to 
enforce G od’s will on earth (albeit Locke’s God is somewhat non-denom inational). It
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could therefore be argued that what Locke is doing in his most ostensibly political 
works (e.g., the ‘Two Treatises o f G overnm ent’ and ‘A Letter Concerning Toleration’) 
is in fact first and forem ost theological. M any Locke scholars have argued for this (or 
a very similar) position (see n.8 above). Joshua M itchell, for example, argues that 
‘Locke’s position is best understood as political theology’.9 By this, Mitchell means 
that Locke’s political endeavours are an attempt at interpreting what the Bible decrees 
our place on Earth is (after the Fall but before the Final Judgment), and what we can 
and ought to do to put the scriptures into practice. In this ‘interim ’ (M itchell’s term) 
‘The human task before God is [...]  to establish governm ent that respects the s e lf  
(M itchell, 1996, 97).
For our interests, however, we need not worry about whether M itchell’s novel reading 
is a correct and faithful interpretation o f John Locke’s works and intentions or not. 
W hat now concerns us is the following: / /M itc h e ll’s reading is correct then would 
John Locke still warrant the title ‘political theorist’; or ‘theorist o f  the political’?
For the sake o f investigating this question let us suppose that M itchell is correct that 
Locke’s primary interest was theological. Let us suppose that Locke was embroiled in 
biblical interpretation because he was first and foremost concerned with finding out 
what G od’s will was and how God desired His will to be practised on earth. On this 
reading, Locke’s political theory and principles would be secondary interests derived 
from these primary, theological ones. Locke might even posit certain political 
principles for the sake o f an interest that is not prima facie  political at all. Thus, Locke 
m ight think that the government ought to reform a certain bill - e.g., one concerning
9 M itchell, 1996, 73. M itchell’s term ‘political theo logy’ (or at least my understanding o f  it) will be 
developed in m ore detail in w hat follows.
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religious dress-code - because it jeopardises what Locke interprets to be a more 
important, theological concern - e.g., the God-given right that each individual has for 
the catering o f his or her soul. (Incidentally, this does appears to be Locke’s position 
in On Toleration, at least). Let us suppose that all o f  Locke’s canonical political 
contributions follow from primary theological com m itm ents and are ultimately 
framed by them. Let us also still assume that the political principles that we had 
attributed to Locke above are maintained, but are derivative from, and answerable to, 
prim ary theological commitments. The question that now remains is: “Would 
interpreting Locke as engaged in ‘political theology’ be sufficient evidence for the 
belief that his thought now no longer defends a ‘political theory’, or a ‘theory o f  the 
political’?”
A ccording to our initial taxonom y above (figure 1.1) having a prim ary theological 
comm itm ent does not make a difference to the theoretical content o f  either a ‘political 
theory’, or a ‘theory o f the political’. Perhaps, one might retort, this only highlights a 
limitation in the taxonomy. W hether or not this is the case, we can still m eaningfully 
ask: should the Locke o f M itchell’s political theology cease to be regarded as a 
political theorist or a theorist o f  the political?
One argum ent in favour o f thinking that M itchell’s reading o f Locke ought no longer 
to be considered political theory might be because this theological Locke is no longer 
primarily concerned with the political. We might argue that such a reading presents a 
picture o f Locke as now only a theologian that perchance happens to have some 
political principles. We might also argue that this political theologian is precisely 
‘apolitical’ because Locke’s principles would become only secondarily or incidentally
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political. The m otivating force behind any recom m ended political change would be a 
com m itm ent to something that is altogether outside o f  the political, i.e., the 
theological (or more specifically for M itchell, scriptural interpretation). Take our 
example o f fighting against a dress-code for the sake o f the salvation o f the soul in our 
previous example. Such a ‘policy’ is only political in a derivative sense. According to 
a theological interpretation o f Locke, he is (no longer) prim arily interested in securing 
civic liberties or political rights. The ‘dress-code policy’ o f Locke as political 
theology now appears to be a specifically religious interest that ju st happens to have 
political ramifications.
We can take this conceptual clarification a step further. Suppose for the sake o f 
argum ent that the political realm has in fact been well ordered by civil servants for the 
sake o f m aximising civil liberties. Assume that there were no theological 
considerations at all in the ordering o f the political realm. Suppose, furthermore, that 
the regulations o f the political realm are such that they do not conflict with the biblical 
interpretation o f Locke’s political theology. If  such a state o f affairs were to come 
about we might think that the theologically-inspired Locke o f the interpretation we 
have been pursuing would no longer have anything politically interesting to say. 
Given M itchell’s understanding o f Locke, Locke might afford us with biblical 
justifications to condone the way we have ordered our political affairs -  but it is at 
least possible that such justifications could have been independently afforded to us by 
strictly civil and secular considerations o f  rights and welfare. The union o f the 
theological reasoning and the secular would be a neat (but unintended) coincidence.10
10 M itchell’s reading o f  Locke as political theology im plies, how ever, that Locke w ould see the 
potential unification o f  the theological and the secular w orld not as coincidental but as designed. Below  
I pursue a hypothetical reading o f  Locke w hich is ‘p rio rita rian ’ -  it argues that theological
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In such a situation it would appear as if  Locke’s political theology is purely restricted 
to ensuring that theological commitments are not disturbed by civic ones. But we 
might then worry about considering this political theology a political theory. For it 
would appear is if  this reading o f Locke as political theology could only grant 
remedial, interventionist policies. Furthermore, these principles would be based on 
interests that are, prima facie  at least, different to interests in the political per se. 
Finally, having remedial or interventionist political principles does not in and o f itself 
necessitate having either a theory o f the political or a political theory (as our 
taxonom y above - and perhaps our intuitions too - also suggest).
Remedial political principles typically take the form o f  hypothetical imperatives. If 
you want to achieve ‘x ’ (which may not be prima facie  political) you have to do ‘y ’ 
(which might be prima facie  political, and vice-versa). Such remedial interventions 
might not rely on a working theory o f  the political. Sometimes all that is needed is 
knowledge o f empirical data: if  you want unem ploym ent to fall then, given all o f  the 
empirical facts about the current state o f  the economy, you would be best to do ‘x ’ -  
or to adopt ‘policy y ’. Generally speaking, remedial interventions do work with some 
kind o f theory o f the political: but they need not, and even when they do, they might 
work with a bare, general, and possibly logically inconsistent one.
Remedial interventions cannot in and o f them selves supply us with a general theory. 
A remedial intervention only seeks to make a single change using whatever means are 
afforded at the particular time. Once that alteration has been made the justification for
com m itm ents are prim ary  to political ones. 1 m ust em phasise that this is not M itchell’s understanding 
o f  Locke as political theology.
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that change can disappear along with the problem. We need not be left with anything 
o f lasting, theoretical substance that we could apply to other times and places. 
Remedial interventions alone, even if  we were to catalogue an entire manifesto o f 
coherent ones, would not necessarily give us a theoretical fram ework with which to 
use beyond their immediate case(s).
Coming back to our original example, we might think that M itchell’s interpretation o f 
Locke as political theology actually lacks a political theory because Locke’s 
theological justification for a given way o f doing politics might become redundant in 
the face o f civic, secular justifications. Locke’s political theology would then only 
serve the purpose o f  providing remedial political principles. Having political 
principles is not a sufficient condition for having a theory o f  the political. Furthermore, 
an involvement in the political realm might be seen as an unwanted but necessary by­
product o f  Locke’s not obviously political (here theological) concerns.
Locke’s Biblical interpretation might lead him to suggest a particular political change. 
Still, might we not worry that once this concern had been resolved so would Locke’s 
involvement in political affairs? If remedial (theological) interests were the only 
reasons for Locke-as-political-theologian to become involved in political affairs then 
w ouldn’t we be left with no real long-standing theory o f the political (or political 
theory)?
It is clear, however, that even given M itchell’s theological understanding o f Locke’s 
politics, Locke would still have long-term theoretical interests guiding his political 
thought. These interests might not be primarily political. The involvement in politics
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might also be an unwelcome but necessary evil, derived from the wish to keep one’s 
primary, non-political interests sanctified. Furthermore, such interests might be
expressly admitted as not properly belonging to the class o f the political at all.
Kierkegaard, for example, would explicitly argue that religious interests are, properly 
speaking, non-political by nature. Nevertheless, a theory about how the political and 
the non-political ought to relate and about how each ought to respect the legitimate
regions and actions o f the other is, I contend, an integral part o f a theory o f the
political. Such a theory has long-lasting value - beyond any immediate instantiation o f 
its specific application. For such a theory provides justifications for always ensuring 
that the relation between the political and the non-political are recognised and 
sanctified. Particular, remedial cases only serve as useful examples o f exactly how the 
political and the non-political can fall out o f unison, and perhaps o f the dangers and 
solutions experienced if  they do. In other words, rather than being necessarily short­
lived, remedial political interventions can highlight an underlying theory o f the 
political.
I contend that an understanding o f Locke’s thought as political theology would still 
justify  us in calling Locke a theorist o f  the political.11 To be justifiably considered as a 
theorist o f  the political, given the conceptual clarification I have been engaging with, 
one must only have to provide a long-lasting, theoretical justification o f how the 
political and the non-political authentically relate. Holding a non-political 
commitment, even if  one prioritises it above the political, is not enough justification 
for deeming that thinker to be ‘apolitical’, or one who does not have a genuine ‘theory
II I should also note that o f  those w ho have read as engaged in ‘political theo logy ’ none, as far as 1 am 
aw are, believe that this interpretation w arrants us in ceasing to ju d g e  Locke a ‘political theo rist’. John 
Perry, on the contrary, frequently pairs the two, arguing that the form er is necessary  for our judgem ent 
o f  Locke as the latter (e.g.,: Perry, 2011, 13, 78, 81, 106, 117, 124-5, 206. That the two ought to be 
paired in this w ay is the central aim o f  his book, as explicated on p. 13).
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o f the political’. Defined in this way we can now also see why a theory o f the political 
need not provide a clear and substantive positive political programme. (The theorist 
could leave it up to others more suitable to the task to do this, for example.)
I wish to note that Locke is not a particularly exceptional case in this regard. It has 
been argued that many theorists, including numerous who are canonically considered 
to be political theorists, have been interpreted as being engaged in the tradition o f 
political theology. If these thinkers were in fact prim arily concerned with theological 
comm itm ents, the taxonom y I presented above would still give us grounds for 
acknowledging whether or not these theorists provide us with a new theory o f  the 
political, or political theory. Hence, theorists ranging from Socrates [469 BC -  399 
B C E ],12 Saint Augustine [354 -  430],13 Thomas Aquinas [1225 -  1274],14 Thomas 
Hobbes [1588 -  1679],15 Baruch Spinoza [1632 -  1677],16 Giam battista Vico [1668 -  
1744],17 Jean-Jacques Rousseau [1712 -  1778],18 Alexis de Tocqueville [1805 -  
1859],19 Fyodor Dostoyevsky [1821 -  1881],20 Carl Schmitt [1888-1985],21 and
12 See for exam ple: Pangle, 2007, pp. 1-16. The textual evidence for this interpretation is P la to ’s 
A pology  (37e-38a, cited in: ibid., 1).
13 See for exam ple: Sandoz, 1972, 2 (original: A ugustine, D e civitafe D ei, 6.6, cited in: ibid.).
14 See for exam ple: B auerschm idt, F., C., 2008, pp. 48-61; and H oelzl, M., & W ard, G., 2006, pp. 37- 
48. (The textual evidence for this interpretation is: A quinas, (excerpts from ) D e regim ine {D e regno), 
cited in: ibid.).
13 See for exam ple: Pangle, 2007, 6; H oelzl, M., & W ard, G., 2006, p. 107; and Sandoz, 1972, 2 
(original: H obbes, D e Cive, (1642), cap. 15, art. 15; id., Leviathan  (1651), chs. 31, 32, and 42 to end, 
cited in: ib id .) .
16 See for exam ple: de V ries, 2008, pp. 232-248; and Sandoz, 1972, 2 (original: Spinoza (d. 1677), 
Tractatus theologico-politicus, chs. 14, 16, 19, 20; and Tractatus politicus, chs. 3, 6.40, 8.46, cited in: 
ibid.).
17 See for exam ple: Sandoz, 1972, 2 (original: V ico, New Science  (3rd ed., 1744), pars. 334, 342, 360, 
364, 366, 385, 390, 990, cited in: ibid.).
18 See for exam ple: Sandoz, 1972, 2 (original: R ousseau, Du C ontract Social (1762), bk. 4, ch. 8, cited 
in: ibid.).
19 See for exam ple: H oelzl, M., & W ard, G., 2006, pp. 149-160. T he textual evidence for this 
in terpretation  is (excerpts from ) D em ocracy in Am erica  (cited in: ibid.).
20 See for exam ple: Sandoz, 1978, pp. 648-674.
21 See for exam ple: H ollerich, 2008, pp. 107-122; and H oelzl, M., & W ard, G., 2006, pp. 190-202. 
(O riginal: (excerpts from ) Schm itt, P olitical Theology, cited in: ibid.).
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Emmanuel Levinas [1906 -  1995],22 (to name just a few) could be plausibly 
interpreted as engaging in political theology. Some o f these theorists have, I think 
deservedly, been recognised as political theorists; some deservedly not; others perhaps 
undeservedly not. Given the fact that some canonical political theorists could be 
interpreted as prim arily engaged in political theology, I would tentatively suggest that 
the justifications for term ing a given theorist a ‘political theorist’ and/or a ‘theorist o f 
the political’ do not lie in whether or not he or she has prim ary theological 
comm itm ents or not, but simply whether the content o f his or her thought outlines the 
respective theory or not. Hence, primary theological (or otherwise ‘non-political’) 
comm itm ents are irrelevant in this respect.
I also want to note that even if  one disagrees with the interpretation o f John Locke (or 
any other o f the canonical political theorists listed in the preceding paragraph) as one 
engaged in ‘political theology’ this does not affect my interest here. My aim here is to 
show why, all things being equal, a theory o f political theology (fair representation o f 
the views o f Locke et. al., or not) might still warrant being considered a theory o f the 
political (if  only certain conditions, such as those outlined in the taxonom y above, are 
satisfied). Giving only secondary importance to civil liberties, and/or believing them 
to be only grounded in prim ary theological interests does not imply that a theory o f 
the political is not also presented. W hether Locke was first and forem ost interested in 
protecting civil liberties or not -  whether Locke personally thought o f his project as a 
political one or a theological one -  are historical facts that do not bear upon the 
theoretical content o f Locke’s thought. Such facts do not rule out the possibility that
22 See for exam ple: de V ries, 2008, pp. 232-248.
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Locke provided a theory o f  the political. To disregard the latter in light o f the former 
would be to comm it a version o f the genetic fallacy.
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1.4 Kierkegaard’s political contribution.
I believe that I can now situate where K ierkegaard’s thought sits in this schema. 
Kierkegaard has prim ary interests in what he deems to be existential questions. A 
large part o f this primary, existential comm itm ent is with the religious way o f  life. 
Kierkegaard also believes (I shall argue in more detail throughout the thesis, but most 
specifically in chapter three) that the existential and the political are, properly 
speaking, logically distinct entities.
It must be admitted that the cases o f  K ierkegaard’s political interventions, e.g., his 
defence o f disestablishm ent, are so infrequent that one might (I think correctly) 
consider them to be merely remedial interventions. Nevertheless, I would argue that 
K ierkegaard’s very limited political activity rests upon a theory o f  the political: i.e., a 
theory o f what ought and ought not to be considered as legitim ately political concerns; 
what the genuine scope o f political power is; and how the political realm authentically 
relates to the non-political. Hence, K ierkegaard’s remedial interventions into political 
topics are not short-lived or fragmentary but rather evidence a long-lasting and 
coherent theory o f the political.
K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political describes what things are and ought to rightfully 
be considered political and what are not. Briefly put, Kierkegaard believes that some 
questions, or areas o f life, can be answered quantitatively and some only qualitatively.
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Kierkegaard believes that politics is exceptionally fit and justified in addressing 
quantitative matters. If politics attempts to solve problems that are essentially 
qualitative, however, it only causes disorder and potential harm. This textual evidence 
(examined further in chapter three) provides the justificatory force for my argum ent 
that Kierkegaard provides us with a theory o f the political. With regards to some 
questions that other canonical political theorists pursue, such as how to successfully 
implem ent this theory o f the political, I believe that Kierkegaard has little to 
contribute. This can be rather unnerving and may have led many to hastily assume 
that Kierkegaard ought to be considered an ‘a-politicaf theorist. Yet I do not believe 
that this move is necessitated; and in the next chapter I will examine a case o f this 
argum ent (2.3.), concluding that the charge is unwarranted.
To summ arise then: I do not believe that Kierkegaard offers us a positive program me 
for policy change, nor even the theoretical basis for such a program me (i.e., I do not 
believe that Kierkegaard is a political theorist). I also do not hold that Kierkegaard 
offers us a substantive theory o f government. Kierkegaard does not, for example, give 
a detailed account o f what form o f governm ent (dem ocratic, aristocratic, etc.) might 
best implement his existential interests. Finally, the primary thesis defended within 
this work is that K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political is based upon existential 
comm itm ents -  commitments which even Kierkegaard argues are non-political by 
nature. Nevertheless, despite the fact that these ‘existential’ commitments are not 
necessarily political concerns, non-political comm itm ents can be wholly informative 
of, and inextricably tied to a theory o f the political. We developed this argument 
above with the case o f a theological reading o f Locke’s politics (1.2). I believe that 
this is just the case with Kierkegaard. K ierkegaard’s existential concerns wholly
Page 48 o f  354. Kierkegaard’s Existential Theory o f  the Political. Thomas Wolstenholme.
inform his theory o f the political, without detracting from the theoretical content o f 
the former. In short, my argum ent is that Kierkegaard is a theorist o f  the political, but 
not a political theorist.
Here, however, a few things are in need o f qualification. Firstly, we have stated that 
K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political is wholly based upon his existentialist interests. 
These interests, furthermore, are in-and-of-them selves apolitical and ought to be kept 
so - according to K ierkegaard’s own testimony. One more caveat in K ierkegaard’s 
thought can now be highlighted. Kierkegaard, I shall argue in more depth below 
(chapter three for example), does not think that existential issues can even conceivably 
be solved by the establishm ent o f a positive political programme. For whilst 
K ierkegaard believes that truly political concerns can be resolved by properly political 
means (such as majority vote for example), properly political means cannot 
conceivably solve existential concerns. To put it another way, existential concerns are 
o f a qualitatively different nature to political means. The latter has no positive effect 
on the former. Hence, K ierkegaard’s existentially motivated theory o f  the political is 
such that it could not even plausibly ever offer a substantive program me o f  positive 
policies.23 I believe that it is even conceptually impossible to reconstruct such a 
program me from K ierkegaard’s works whilst rem aining faithful to the theoretical 
comm itm ents o f the latter. (As we saw above, this was not even the case with a 
casuistic reading o f Rousseau. This is why I believe that Kierkegaard cannot properly 
speaking be considered a ‘political theorist’.)
23 A ccording to m y reading o f  K ierkegaard then, he did not ju s t accidentally  fail to provide sufficient 
details for a program m e o f  positive policy-m aking -  rather, he could not provide such details due to the 
theoretical restrictions o f  his theory o f  the political.
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The second qualification I want to make, however, is that this by no means restricts 
the politically informative nature o f K ierkegaard’s thought. The examination o f other 
political theorists above aimed to highlight this. A theory o f the political is 
conceptually different and so separable from a theory o f governm ent and/or a positive 
political programme. If  Kierkegaard lacks the latter two (as I believe he does) this 
does not imply that he therefore lacks a theory o f the political -  nor that he lacks any 
political contribution whatsoever.
On the contrary (and thirdly), K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political is not insignificant. 
K ierkegaard’s radically challenging political thought could serve as a constant 
impetus for re-evaluating contem porary ways o f theorising about the political. 
Furthermore, a central task o f this thesis is that K ierkegaard’s theory o f  the political is 
non-trivially responsive to external change (chapters four through seven).
K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political provides us with justifications for seeing certain 
policies as illegitimate. Furthermore, Kierkegaard uses his theory o f the political to 
fight for political reform in some o f his later writings. Hence, whilst K ierkegaard does 
not (and cannot) provide a positive political programme, he does outline a theory o f 
when and how fighting for ‘negative’ policy alterations are appropriate (#3.1). One 
example o f such a case, the disestablishm ent o f church and state in Denmark, will be 
examined in depth later in the thesis (chapter six). K ierkegaard, for the most part, 
believes that policy-m aking ought to be left to politicians (who ought to be, after all, 
experts in the area). Nevertheless, Kierkegaard does justify  existentially-m otivated 
political activism in the case where politicians are getting things wrong (again, this 
will be argued in detail in chapter six below). K ierkegaard’s own, public polemic
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against the marriage o f church and state in Denmark during his times is a prime 
example o f his willingness to use his authorship as a rallying cry for political change.
Finally, examining K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political is important because his 
account is both novel and timely. K ierkegaard’s theory o f  the political is based upon 
his existentialist principles and thus affords us with a unique (and most likely, the first 
in-depth) existentially based theory o f  the political. M any political thinkers or 
activists work with a pre-established theory o f the political (however vague and 
perhaps even logically inconsistent it may be). M ore often than not, these theories o f 
the political are based on the efforts and works o f political theorists or theorists o f  the 
political. W hat has often made these latter theorists historically notew orthy is their 
originality and (what often comes as a direct result) their ability to make us question 
anew our political ideologies and practices.
K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political allows us to do ju st this. 
K ierkegaard’s original thought rejected both the growing liberal as well as the 
conservative ideology o f his times (Kirmmse, 1998). The ideological views that 
K ierkegaard challenged in his times are undoubtedly different theories o f the political 
than that o f contemporary, western liberal democracies. Nevertheless, K ierkegaard’s 
existential theory o f the political also challenges many ideological comm itm ents that 
are endorsed within the contem porary era. Thus, K ierkegaard’s own theory o f  the 
political is not only novel but is o f contem porary relevance because it contests the 
m ainstream theory o f the political that we work with today and that most o f our 
political principles are based upon. Rather than basing a theory o f the political upon 
m aximising civic rights, K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political is framed by, and built
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upon, a com m itm ent to existential concerns. As such, much o f K ierkegaard’s 
existential literature which is often considered as politically disinterested should 
actually be seen as contributing to his unique theory o f the political.
Some o f the confusion with the concepts that have been clarified here could account 
for why the reception o f K ierkegaard’s works has, historically speaking, frequently 
judged it to be non-political. If I am to argue against this trend and show that 
K ierkegaard does in fact develop a theory o f the political it will be necessary for me 
to account for this one-sided reception. Historically speaking, K ierkegaard’s works 
have not been judged apolitical simply because K ierkegaard’s theory o f  the political 
was not recognised - although I do think that this has played a significant part. The 
m ajority o f  the reception o f Kierkegaard has instead argued that K ierkegaard’s 
philosophy is essentially individualistic and anti-social.
I will take into consideration the charge that K ierkegaard’s philosophy is essentially 
anti or a s o c ia l  later on in the thesis (section 6.3; and chapter seven). Nevertheless, 
there is another key reason for thinking that K ierkegaard’s political thought is 
deficient, a reason that specifically marks contem porary Kierkegaard scholarship. 
This reason stems from a potential confusion o f concepts. I believe that contemporary 
scholars have frequently failed to see that Kierkegaard developed a theory o f the 
political. W hat often fuels this mistake, however, is that K ierkegaard’s political 
thought is m istakenly judged as a political theory. Qua political theory, I think that it 
is fair to say that K ierkegaard’s political contribution is indeed deficient. To dismiss 
K ierkegaard’s entire political contribution on these grounds, however, is to throw out 
much o f K ierkegaard’s thought that is valuable; including his theory o f the political.
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As I understand it, some o f the contem porary literature on K ierkegaard’s political 
contribution has in effect judged Kierkegaard’s theory o f the political as a political 
theory and, finding that given these criteria it fails, has m istakenly deemed 
K ierkegaard’s political thought to be defective.
An examination o f  the contem porary reception o f K ierkegaard’s politics in light o f  the 
distinctions made in this chapter is thus in order. I will argue that the problem o f not 
distinguishing a political theory, a political programme, and a theory o f the political, 
has been the bane o f much contem porary Kierkegaard scholarship. The following 
chapter therefore seeks to address some o f the criticisms that have recently been made 
against K ierkegaard’s political thought in general. After this reception has been 
outlined, I will give the textual support for arguing that Kierkegaard should in fact be 
considered as a theorist o f  the political (chapter three).
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CHAPTER TWO:
Kierkegaard’s Politics and Contemporary Reception
Introduction.
The first one-hundred and twenty years o f Kierkegaard reception scarcely found 
anything politically interesting in K ierkegaard’s entire oeuvre. (Quite the opposite 
view, in fact, has frequently been drawn -  that Kierkegaard is an apolitical or even 
anti-political theorist). The one-hundred and twenty year readership o f  K ierkegaard’s 
views spans from K ierkegaard’s immediate contem poraries to recent Kierkegaard 
scholars. That such an extensive audience finds nothing political in K ierkegaard’s 
thought demands an explanation.
Historically speaking, there have been two different ways that this claim has been 
justified. The first reason for thinking Kierkegaard to be apolitical, individualistic, 
asocial, or even anti-social/political, has to do with the philosophical content o f 
K ierkegaard’s thought. K ierkegaard’s philosophical emphasis on that ‘single 
individual’ and his apparent disdain for com m unity and political reform have often 
been taken as evidence that Kierkegaard is a m isanthrope; and this misanthropy is 
thought to be at the heart o f his philosophical (and hence social and political) beliefs. I
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will address this charge in many forms throughout this thesis (but especially in 
chapter seven below).
A brief response to this claim is that, historically speaking, such interpretations have 
frequently relied on unfaithful and incomplete translations o f K ierkegaard’s works 
(and most importantly, his more socially and politically oriented ones). Yet 
magnificent advances in the quality and quantity o f K ierkegaard’s texts into 
mainstream  languages has characterised the contem porary reception o f  Kierkegaard 
scholarship. Despite this, there are still many contem porary Kierkegaard scholars who 
do not consider K ierkegaard’s works to contain anything more politically substantial 
than fragm entary comments (however insightful they might admit the latter to be).
This, then, is the second (and historically more recent) way in which K ierkegaard’s 
political contribution has been called into doubt. Generally speaking, the 
contem porary interpretation o f the political aspect o f K ierkegaard’s authorship has 
suffered from lack o f conceptual c larity .24 So, for example, a ch ief reason for 
believing that Kierkegaard only has fragmented political ‘principles’ is that he lacked 
a positive political programme. A charge made by another scholar is that 
K ierkegaard’s work must be considered ‘a-political’ because K ierkegaard’s theory o f 
the political is grounded in commitments that are not properly speaking ‘political’ 
entities.25
241 shall state w hat I m ean by the ‘m odern ’ reception presently  below . (N evertheless, I should point out 
that in no place in this thesis does the term  ‘m odern ’ refer to the historical period ‘m odern ity ’.)
25 This charge will be exam ined below  in section 2.3. N ote also that G arff uses the term ‘a-po litica l’ 
rather than the closely linked ‘apo litica l’. The difference betw een these term s is also explained below  
(see n.32 below ).
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Given the taxonom y above, I argue that these charges are frequently unwarranted. We 
have already hinted at the idea that one can have a theory o f the political without 
necessarily also providing a positive political programme, for example. If K ierkegaard 
does develop a novel theory o f the political (to be argued in chapter three below) then 
it should be conceded that he not only gives us more than ju st fragm entary political 
principles, but that he also leaves us with a theory that is o f  contem porary value.
Hence in what follows I shall assess what I call the ‘m odern’ reception o f 
K ierkegaard’s political thought. I shall examine what I take to be the ch ief argum ents 
for the view that Kierkegaard does not give us a substantial theory o f the political and 
in doing so I will situate my own view within this scholarship. I should note that I will 
often agree with claims and even some o f the charges that contem porary scholars have 
levelled against Kierkegaard; including, for example, that Kierkegaard leaves us with 
no positive political programme. W here I differ from such scholars, however, is in the 
subsequent view that this loss creates a deficiency with regards to K ierkegaard’s 
political contribution.
Before assessing the literature o f these ‘m odem ’ Kierkegaard scholars I will briefly 
mention some defining features o f what I call the ‘m odem ’ period o f Kierkegaard 
research.
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2.1 The ‘Modem’ Period.
From 1967 onwards, Howard and Edna Hong began publishing K ierkegaard’s 
Journals and Papers [hereafter simply; JP]. From the 20 volumes o f  Journals and 
Papers available in Danish, ‘the H ongs’ would come to publish six volumes o f 
selections o f these into English, with a seventh volume as an index. The project came 
to completion in 1978. All seven volumes published by Indiana University Press. 
From 1980 onwards, the Hongs then went on to publish a twenty-six volume 
‘K ierkegaard’s W ritings’ series, which consisted o f what could be considered as all o f 
K ierkegaard’s ‘stand-alone’ books, based again on the Danish originals. The twenty- 
six volume publication was completed in May, 2000, with the publication o f a 
Cumulative Index to Kierkegaard's Writings, volume XXVI.
All in all this unified, thirty-three volume collection, filled with cross-references, 
supplem entary materials, introductions and extensive footnotes, is magisterial. To 
want more than is available in English would imply a level o f interest or scholarship 
that would necessitate one to read the originals in Danish anyway. As a friend o f  the 
late Hongs commented, we can put the scope o f this project ‘negatively’: ‘[...] there 
are no uniform translations o f the works o f Kant, Hegel, N ietzsche or Heidegger. But 
we do have a uniform translation into English o f the enorm ous output o f K ierkegaard’ 
(Elveton, 2009, 68).
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In the editor’s note to the translations o f the journals, we are told that the Hongs 
consulted and cross-checked their translations with other scholars throughout the 
world.26 ‘In this w ay’, we are further told, ‘the multiplicity o f  judgm ents has served as 
mutual corroboration and extension o f selection’ (Hong, H. & Hong, E., 1967, xix). 
Early translations o f Kierkegaard simply could not engage in an international level o f 
collaboration and cross-referencing available to modern translators. Additionally, the 
Hongs also set up an editorial committee that decided which English words (or 
expressions) were best suited to the Danish originals.27 The absence o f the availability 
o f  such an internationally prestigious level o f translation could account for some o f 
the m isunderstandings in the early reception o f K ierkegaard’s authorship. However 
imperfect earlier translations and understandings o f K ierkegaard’s works m ight have 
been, however, they still played an important formative role in contem porary 
translations (as footnote 26 suggests).
Howard and Edna Hong cheerfully referred to the journals and papers as ‘the key to 
the scriptures’ (i.e., to K ierkegaard’s other works) {ibid., xxii). W hilst this might be a 
little optimistic, it is certainly true that K ierkegaard’s unpublished, personal 
comments on, for example, his church attack have allowed scholars to understand his 
thought at a deeper level than previously available. W hat Kierkegaard says in private
26 A m ong those collaborated w ith include: Em anuel H irsch, N iels T hulstrup, T orsten B ohlin, Per 
L onning, G regor M alantschuk, Paul H olm er, Edward G eism ar, R eidar Thom te, D avid Sw enson, W alter 
Lowrie, H ow ard Johnson, T. H. Croxall, Leo Sjestov, Regis Jolivet, H elge U kkola, Johannes Slok, 
Jam es C ollins, V alter L indstrom , and Per W agndal. A m ong the w orks o f  scholars used but not 
collaborated w ith include ‘Hayo G erdes, Peter Rohde, Knud Ferlov, Jean J. G ateau and C om elio  Fabro 
for the judgm en t and know ledge em bodied in their m ultivolum e editions o f  selections from the Papirer 
in current G erm an, D anish, French, and Italian editions o f  se lec tions’ (H ong, H. & Hong, E., 1967, 
xix).
27 R oger Poole, incidentally, thinks that this tactic is perhaps the translations only flaw. This is due to 
the fact that K ierkegaard often used the sam e key term in m ultiple contexts. T ranslating  a term into one 
fixed English w ord (or phrase) risks losing the plasticity that one could gain if  the term  w as instead 
translated anew  w ith each varying context consulted (Poole, 1998, 61). Poole raises a good point. 
W hilst 1 shall rely on the translations o f  the H ongs for the m ost part, I will also consult scholarly 
debates o f  key term s and their potential am biguities. T hroughout the thesis, I shall attem pt to cite the 
D anish originals o f  key phrases in parentheses.
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about his politically minded published works is intriguing and has afforded many 
contem porary scholars a closer understanding o f K ierkegaard’s political position.
The modern period is marked by a high quality o f both Kierkegaard scholarship and 
study materials, as well as an international collaboration between scholars at a level 
that has never been available before. And yet, even amongst present day scholars 
working on K ierkegaard’s political thought who are adequately armed with the 
material needed for such an endeavour, there are still those who deny Kierkegaard has 
anything politically relevant to say. In fact, even amongst those who think 
Kierkegaard has a valuable political contribution there is still widespread 
disagreem ent as to what exactly that contribution is. The argum ents o f  some o f  these 
modern Kierkegaard scholars will be the focus o f the following sub-section.
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2.2 Kierkegaard’s lack of a positive political programme.
Introduction
The charge that Kierkegaard ought not to be considered political because he offers us 
no positive policy is initially plausible. For if  Kierkegaard indeed has no 
recom m endations for an actual policy, why should we consider him to be a political 
thinker at all? W hat use is K ierkegaard’s ‘political thought’ if  it fails to help us decide 
what actual policies we might establish?
M any scholars recognise that K ierkegaard’s thought frequently contains a social or 
political aspect. O f those who do, it must be admitted that not many explicitly 
comm ent on the role that positive political decisions play in K ierkegaard’s authorship. 
This limited response is perhaps itself a sign that Kierkegaard has little to nothing to 
say on the issue. Nevertheless, the response to K ierkegaard’s lack o f concern for 
policy making is frequently negative -  perhaps even rather unduly so. M ost scholars 
lament the fact that Kierkegaard fails to leave us with an account o f a political 
programme. But many also see this absence as a ‘deficiency’ in K ierkegaard’s 
political thought, rather than an integral and necessary aspect o f  it.
I shall state my affiliations and differences with this literature here in brief. I agree 
with most scholars that Kierkegaard does indeed fail to leave us with positive policies. 
However, I disagree with most in that I refuse to see this as lamentable, as a
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deficiency, or even as accidental. In fact, I argue in the rem ainder o f this thesis that 
K ierkegaard’s refusal to map out how his theory o f the political could be translated 
into positive policies was intentional (primarily argued in chapter three; but also 
partly in chapters five and six). I shall argue that K ierkegaard’s quietism with regards 
to external policy-making is an integral part o f his theory o f the political. I believe 
that much o f the scholarship that evaluates K ierkegaard’s political contribution fails to 
recognise that Kierkegaard’s novel theory o f the political gives him reasons for not 
ascribing positive policy changes. Thus my position in the literature is to accept that 
Kierkegaard has no positive political programme, but to reject the claim that this is a 
deficiency in the totality o f his political thought. Since this integral aspect o f 
K ierkegaard’s thought is partly responsible for its theoretical novelty, K ierkegaard’s 
refusal to provide a positive programme for policy change could even be seen as 
something o f a prodigious insight.
Despite the fact that nearly every scholar finds the lack o f positive political 
program me lamentable there is certainly a spectrum o f opinions with regards to how 
detrimental to his political contribution this might be. This spectrum is rather 
continuous, making it relatively hard to categorise the opinions into specific groups. 
Nevertheless, there are some meaningful distinctions to be made. Firstly, some 
scholars are sympathetic to the idea that a positive political theory can be 
reconstructed from, and in line with, K ierkegaard’s authorship. The fact that 
Kierkegaard him self did not do this is a little lamentable: but this scholarship takes the 
view that it is not hard for a contemporary reader to fill this gap in and so the absence 
does not have serious consequences with regards to the on-going value o f
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K ierkegaard’s political thought. I shall call these views ‘sym pathisers’ o f 
K ierkegaard’s political thought.
Many other scholars agree with the ‘sym pathisers’ that Kierkegaard lacks a positive 
political programme but are less optimistic about the project o f reconstructing one. 
M any also reproach Kierkegaard for not him self providing such an account. After all, 
given K ierkegaard’s complete absence o f considerations for positive political 
suggestions w on’t all attempts at ‘reconstructing’ such a program me ultimately boil 
down to guesswork, and to the interpretations o f differing scholars? Given that 
Kierkegaard only leaves scant comments with regards to positive political changes 
can we really use K ierkegaard’s thought to try and find solutions for combatting real- 
world political problems - or should we not just turn elsewhere? Kierkegaard, it is 
assumed, could have dispelled these interpretive problems if  he had provided more 
information on what kinds o f policies he would have condoned; in absence o f this we 
are left with unresolvable hermeneutical problems.
Furthermore, K ierkegaard’s own writings are often highly critical o f attempts at even 
providing  positive political programmes. Thus, it is questionable whether Kierkegaard 
would have condoned any ‘reconstruction’ o f a positive political program me from his 
works. If  this sentiment is indeed true, then no reconstructed program me for political 
change could be considered as completely faithful to K ierkegaard’s authorship.
Such nuances in opinions ought to be kept in mind as I proceed to evaluate the wide- 
ranging opinions on K ierkegaard’s lack o f political suggestions. In a general way, 
however, I shall start with those who see a lack o f political programme in
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K ierkegaard’s work as not too notable a loss before examining those who see this 
absence as evidence o f the fact that K ierkegaard’s political thought is ultimately 
deficient beyond salvage.
2.2.1 Lack o f a positive political programme -  a sympathetic approach.
Even sympathetic readers o f K ierkegaard’s political thought lament what they take to 
be his indifference with regards to external political changes. Examples include 
Robert Perkins and M erold W estphal. Perkins particularly regrets the fact that 
Kierkegaard neglected to give a positive account o f politics since he not only thinks 
that such an account would have been entirely consistent with K ierkegaard’s political 
thought but even argues that the latter entails the former. Perkins argues that a faithful 
reading o f K ierkegaard’s existentially authentic individual necessarily results in an 
individual ‘evoked’ into ‘[...] political and social activism ’ (Perkins, 1997, 154). So 
resolute is Perkins’ belief that a truly authentic Kierkegaardian individual ought to 
practise ‘heroic effort for worldly change’, that he suggests a reading against 
K ierkegaard’s own, judging K ierkegaard’s own political quietism as ‘a serious short­
com ing’ {ibid.).
Perkins does not seem to be alone in this regard. Stephen Crites, for example, has 
convincingly argued that the apparently individualistic outlook o f one o f 
K ierkegaard’s pseudonyms (Anti-Climacus) in the work Sickness Unto Death 
[hereafter simply; SUD] is unjustified and so ought to be ignored. Crites notices that a
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social reading ot the text is entirely consistent with the philosophical argum ents 
forwarded in SUD, and therefore that the pseudonym ’s own individualistic 
conclusions present a philosophically unjustified bias (Crites, 1992, 150-151). One 
might object that the work was written under a pseudonym, and therefore says nothing 
about any individualistic biases Kierkegaard might have harboured.
Two things complicate the issue, however. The first is that the work was alm ost 
printed in K ierkegaard’s own name, a fact which Crites is well aware o f  {ibid., 145. 
See also: JP VI, 6517). Crites also recognises that Kierkegaard considered the 
pseudonym, Anti-Climacus, to be an ‘exem plary’ Christian. The teachings o f SUD  are 
so strict in adherence to the Christianity o f the New Testam ent that Kierkegaard did 
not believe he could claim authorial responsibility for the philosophical and 
existential position the work demanded. In this sense, the pseudonym  ‘Anti-C lim acus’ 
was established because Kierkegaard did not think he lived up to the esteemed 
teachings o f SUD  and another book Anti-Climacus pseudonym ously authored, 
Practice in Christianity.
Kierkegaard later came to revoke the use o f the pseudonym, however, and accepted 
authorial responsibility for the views that Anti-Clim acus expressed in SUD's 
counterpart Practice in Christianity (TM, 67-68). Bruce Kirmmse argues that the 
reason Kierkegaard revoked the pseudonym was because Kierkegaard finally felt that 
‘[ ...]  he did not need to have authority to speak as one adult to others; being a ‘person 
o f character’ was sufficient” (Kirmmse, 1996, 270). If Kirmmse is correct, then might 
we not assume the same o f SUD? Nothing in K irm m se’s justification prevents such a 
reading, apart from the fact that Kierkegaard did not explicitly revoke the pseudonym
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of the SUD .~8 If  the pseudonym is revoked (or at least a candidate to be revoked), then 
C rites’ argum ent would also be attributable to Kierkegaard himself: Kierkegaard 
authors a work which is entirely consistent with being read as a social philosophy and 
yet nevertheless shows an obvious and philosophically unjustified bias for an 
individualistic reading. W hether the viewpoint o f the SUD  can be called 
K ierkegaard’s or not, Crites at least joins Perkins in criticising the (here 
pseudonymous) author o f one o f the works in K ierkegaard’s oeuvre for not supplying 
a positive account o f sociability (or for ruling one out), though such an account would 
be entirely consistent with that work.
On sim ilar lines, M erold W estphal does not think that K ierkegaard’s position entails 
fighting for ‘worldly change’ but nevertheless notes that even sympathetic readers o f 
K ierkegaard wish that Kierkegaard ‘[...] had given greater thought to the link 
between responsibility and solidarity, had given us more o f a positive politics to go 
with [his] critique o f violent and complacent politics’ (W estphal, 2008, 178, n.54). 
The idea that a positive social or political program me might be at odds with 
K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political is not entertained by any o f these three thinkers.
Daniel Conway takes somewhat o f an intermediary position. Despite acknowledging 
the fact that Kierkegaard exhibited ‘critical acuity [...]  o f  social trends and issues’ 
Conway continues, however, to argue that K ierkegaard’s works (especially Two Ages) 
contains only ‘various scattered remarks and observations from which one might 
plausibly reconstruct something resembling a Kierkegaardian social philosophy’
28 K irm m se does not pose the question in his work. But from personal correspondence, K irm m se has 
c larified: ‘I don 't suppose he [K ierkegaard] w ould have had any great objection to rem oving 
pseudonym ity from Sickness, but doing so w as not im m ediately relevant to his project in 1854-55 and 
m ight even have distracted from it.’
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{ibid.). The assumption is that these ‘scattered rem arks’ are not theoretically sufficient 
enough to justify  a ‘social philosophy’. Conway explicitly links W estphal and 
Perkins, along with other Kierkegaard scholars like James M arsh, John Hoberman, 
and Alistair Hannay, as ‘notable’ examples in the trend o f reconstructing this social 
philosophy {ibid., n.3).29
Yet Conway ends with the insightful warning that ‘one must always approach such a 
project under the caution that Kierkegaard him self neither executed nor attempted 
anything like it’ {ibid.). Once more, Conway does not argue that this ‘reconstructed 
Kierkegaardian social philosophy’ would be contradictory to anything else in 
K ierkegaard’s opus but merely that it is a project that Kierkegaard him self avoided. 
Thus, any such ‘Kierkegaardian’ project must simply rem em ber to keep separate the 
‘reconstructed’ elements, and the original.30
2.2.2 -  Lack o f  a positive political programme -  a deficiency.
According to the above theorists, the lack o f a positive political program me in 
K ierkegaard’s work does not entail that K ierkegaard’s thought has no social or 
political importance. Each o f the above thinkers recognises that K ierkegaard’s
29 It should be noted that here C onw ay is only m entioning those w ho have developed a K ierkegaardian 
social philosophy from the w ork ‘Tw o A ges’. If  we w ere to expand the selection to all o f  K ierkegaard ’s 
w orks, w e could expect m any m ore ‘reconstructions’.
30 C onw ay does not explicitly state why these tw o elem ents ought to be kept separated, yet I assum e it 
is for the interest o f  K ierkegaard reception, rather than because o f  any logical contradiction  w ith such a 
project. The failure to keep separated the ‘reconstructed’ and the ‘o rig inal’ elem ents o f  K ierkegaard’s 
thought w ould only obfuscate K ierkegaard’s prim ary texts by superim posing contem porary notions 
upon them  -  m odern-day notions that K ierkegaard could not conceivably be expected to have 
considered or know n of.
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emphasis on the single individual could be a conceptual tool which is used to keep 
illegitim ate political principles in check; and they each see this as politically valuable. 
O ther scholars are less optimistic, however. Some scholars think that the fact that 
Kierkegaard him self never developed a positive political program me is a sufficient 
reason for concluding that Kierkegaard’s political thought is seriously deficient in 
some sense.
An example o f this is found in David Bruce Fletcher’s excellent but under-cited 
dissertation Social and political perspectives in the thought o f  Soren Kierkegaard. 
Fletcher notes that K ierkegaard’s social and political thought leaves ‘the door open 
for activity o f a political nature by granting that appropriate decisions o f policy can be 
legitim ately made by associations o f concerned individuals’ (Fletcher, 1982, 73). ‘His 
[K ierkegaard’s] own ro le’ Fletcher continues directly on ‘complements this practical 
activity by providing social change with a “soul” ’ {ibid.).
Fletcher also frequently praises the political value o f K ierkegaard’s ‘own ro le’. 
Fletcher notes that: ‘K ierkegaard’s position focuses on the underlying ethical 
positions and views o f human nature which ontologically ground various social and 
political organizations’ {ibid., 71); that: ‘Kierkegaard was indeed concerned greatly 
for the social and political welfare o f society throughout his career’ {ibid.); and that: 
‘Kierkegaard saw his task as pointing out the centrality o f the relation o f the 
individual to society and to political authority. His [K ierkegaard’s] position has the 
unique strength o f seeing genuine equality and individual responsibility as the 
m etaphysical grounding o f any well-ordered sociopolitical entity’ {ibid., 73). (And
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these are but ju st a few o f the important political implications that Fletcher recognises 
in K ierkegaard’s works.)
Despite accepting all o f  these numerous political insights, however, Fletcher joins the 
scholars above in lamenting the fact that Kierkegaard rem ained silent with regards to 
issues concerning political changes. Fletcher goes so far as to call K ierkegaard’s 
position *[...] a political perspective that is severely defective in its minimization o f 
the essential ingredient o f activism ’ {ibid., 72), as well as stating that K ierkegaard’s 
‘[ ...]  approach to concrete political and social problems [is deficient] in that it is 
idealistic and im practical’ {ibid., 73). K ierkegaard’s ‘quietistic philosophy o f 
resignation’ is ultimately termed an ‘im potent’ response to ‘to concrete realities’ 
{ibid., 71-2).
Fletcher postulates that K ierkegaard’s lack o f positive political suggestions implies 
that any attempt to consider Kierkegaard a ‘political philosopher’ is undermined: ‘The 
indifference with which the spiritually oriented citizen is supposed to regard political 
authority certainly appears not to be an adequate basis for a truly well-rounded 
political philosophy’ {ibid., 72). Furthermore Fletcher explicitly avoids ever term ing 
K ierkegaard’s thought ‘political theory’, ‘political philosophy’, or ‘theory o f the 
political’. Flecther argues instead that Kierkegaard gives us ‘a great deal o f positive 
content to [...]  social and political thought’, with his ‘social and political perspective’, 
‘insight’, or ‘outlook’31.
31 Such rem arks are scattered around the concluding pages o f  the d issertation, the title o f  w hich itse lf 
follow s this trend: ‘Social and political perspectives  in the thought o f  Soren K ierkegaard’ (m y 
em phasis) (See Fletcher, 1982, 70-74).
Page 68 o f  354. Kierkegaard’s Existential Theory o f  the Political. Thomas Wolstenholme.
Indeed, many o f the scholars working on K ierkegaard’s political thought fail to 
consider whether Kierkegaard might have a ‘theory o f the political’. Michele 
Nicoletti, for example, apparently follows Fletcher’s cue in stating that: ‘In 
K ierkegaard’s thought it is not really possible to find a true philosophy o f politics. 
Politics itself is considered as something outside his interests [ . . . ] ’ (Nicoletti, 1992, 
184).
I believe that many o f these authors are partially correct. Later on in this thesis, for 
example, I shall argue for a position that appears to be similar to N icoletti’s: that 
‘politics’ is ‘something outside [Kierkegaard’s] interests’. Nevertheless, it rem ains to 
be clarified exactly what Nicoletti means by ‘politics’. If  we define ‘politics’ 
extremely narrowly and take it only to mean ‘providing a program me for positive 
political change’ then I am in full agreement with Nicoletti. If, however, we take 
‘politics’ to include the relation that political entities have with non-political entities, 
then I must disagree (as will be seen in more detail in chapter three below).
Perhaps it can be seen from some o f  the differing rem arks from the scholars cited in 
this section that those working on K ierkegaard’s political thought frequently fail to 
clarify what they mean by such terms as ‘philosophy o f  politics’, ‘well-rounded 
political philosophy’, ‘a coherent, fully articulated social theory’, ‘positive politics’, 
or ‘fight for’ ‘worldly change’. Such ambiguities contain partial truths but can also 
unfortunately hinder us in our understanding o f precisely how K ierkegaard’s thought 
should be considered as politically valuable or defective. In every case, however, we 
can note that K ierkegaard’s lack o f a positive political program me has been judged as 
a deficiency or otherwise a lamentable loss.
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In the next chapter I shall outline K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political. I will offer an 
alternative reading to the opinions o f the scholars examined in this chapter. Rather 
than being a ‘missing ingredient’, as it were, I shall argue that K ierkegaard’s failure to 
suggest positive policies is in fact an integral aspect o f  his theory o f  the political. A 
large degree o f the novelty and value o f the former rests on the fact that Kierkegaard 
was philosophically committed to refraining to provide positive political principles.
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2.3 Concluding Remarks.
The general trend in the contem porary scholarly literature is a recognition that 
Kierkegaard says things that appear to be political by nature. These comments are 
thought to be ultimately quite fragmentary in nature, but it is at least recognised that 
Kierkegaard engaged in some kind o f political ontology (however successfully or 
not). Kierkegaard argued that some parts o f life are political and ought to be 
acknowledged and dealt with as such, and others are not political and so ought to be 
treated differently. M any authors also note that some o f the more political statements 
that Kierkegaard makes might be interesting, applicable, or pertinent -  as Bruce 
Fletcher’s dissertation highlights.
Other contemporary scholars might hold that K ierkegaard’s political insights could be 
held together by a general theory, but that this theory is only accidentally ‘political’. 
For example, it m ight be thought that Kierkegaard has a religious theory that ju st so 
happens to incorporate aspects that are more ostensibly political.
In the previous chapter we had an in-depth discussion o f  a political-theological 
reading o f John Locke. There we concluded that even if  the entirety o f John Locke’s 
‘Second Treatise’ had been written for prim arily theological reasons this alone would 
not be adequate grounds fo rjudg ing  that the latter contains no theory o f the political.
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As it happens, however, a similar criticism has recently been levelled against 
K ierkegaard’s thought.
Joakim G arff has recently termed K ierkegaard’s political thought ‘a-political’ because 
K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political is grounded in comm itm ents that are altogether 
outside o f  the political realm (such as religious beliefs).32 Since K ierkegaard’s theory 
o f the political ultimately relates itself to non-political (existential or theological) 
commitments, K ierkegaard’s political thought, G arff argues, often ‘[...]  does not 
relate itself to the factual, political circumstances at hand’ (Garff, 1999, 144). G arff 
also notes that Kierkegaard admits to having no time for political questions. G arff 
cites K ierkegaard’s own testim ony as evidence o f this attitude, when he had said to 
his contemporary, Janus Lauritz Andreas Kolderup-Rosenvinge [1792-1950]: "No, 
politics is not for me. To follow politics, even if only dom estic politics, is nowadays 
an impossibility, for me, at any rate" (cited in: ibid., 139. Original from K ierkegaard’s 
Letters and Documents [hereafter: simply LD]: Kierkegaard 1978a, 253).
If  we relate G a rff  s criticism to the theological interpretation o f Locke examined 
earlier we might want to ask why we should deem such a position ‘a-political’ rather 
than ‘political’. I believe that K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political does ultimately
32 G a r f f s  com m ents are concerned w ith K ierkegaard’s Two Ages and his (nine) letters to Janus Lauritz 
A ndreas K olderup-R osenvinge, the latter o f  w hich w ere w ritten betw een 1847 and 1850. D espite this, 
G arff appears to intend this analysis o f  K ierkegaard’s political view  to extend throughout the 
authorship.
N ote also that the term  ‘a-po litical’ is om inously close to the term  ‘apo litica l’; but we can assum e that 
the tw o are not to be confused. In a sim ilarly confusing vein, A nselm  K yongsuk Min has term ed 
K ierkegaard’s politics a ‘[ ...]  m oralistic, apolitical p o litics’ (M in, 2000, 293, n.10); and M artin J. Beck 
M atustik  has read K ierkegaard in a postm odern way, arguing that K ierkegaard ’s thought can best be 
term ed ‘N onpolitical po litics’ (M atustik, 1998, 6-7). Finally, Ingrid Basso has term ed at least som e o f  
K ierkegaard ’s political expressions as an “apolitical religious point o f  v iew ” (B asso, 2009, 104). I 
suspect that m any o f  these scholars recognise that K ierkegaard’s critical judgem ents o f  various political 
trends are both ‘politically  d irec ted ’ (i.e., concerned w ith ‘po litica l’ questions such as the extent o f  
freedom  o f  speech) and yet religiously m otivated. 1 think that there is som ething to be said for this idea, 
and hope to clarify w hat I take to be the correct intuitions behind these otherw ise quite puzzling terms.
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relate back to prim arily non-political interests. W hether or not it nevertheless defends 
a theory o f the political is a separate issue (and the subject o f  the next chapter). 
According to G a rff  s definition, we would have to argue that readings o f Hobbes, 
Locke, Rousseau, de Tocqueville, and Schmitt, as theorists engaged in ‘political 
theology’, could risk becoming ‘a-political’ if  they did not ‘not relate [to] the factual, 
political circumstances at hand’.
The great majority o f canonically recognised political theorists ground their theories 
in ‘non-political’ interests -  in the perfectibility o f the individual person, for example. 
For most political theorists, political entities are m erely additional (even if  
exceptionally beneficial) means to some other, non-necessarily political good, such as 
the individual’s pursuit o f  the good life. W here political theorists differ in respect to 
Kierkegaard is with their willingness to engage in and use politics - and here politics 
is more narrowly construed as practical policy-making -  as a feasible means to 
implem enting their non-political goals. Kierkegaard is not, as he occasionally 
testifies, interested in political matters narrowly construed (Kierkegaard 1982, 54; 
Kierkegaard 2009, 60; LD, 253). Yet this does not imply that Kierkegaard does not 
consider ‘the factual, political circumstances at hand’ at all. K ierkegaard might not 
foster an interest in the narrower mechanisms o f party politics, but he does have an 
especially perceptive grasp o f the social conditions o f any given situation. 
Kierkegaard is not such a detached idealist, and his existential and theological 
commitments are important enough for him to recognise that an understanding o f any 
given political circumstance might be a necessary requirem ent for successfully 
enacting his principal, non-political interests. Hence, I shall argue in the following 
chapters that K ierkegaard’s principally existentialist concerns are in fact responsive to
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‘the factual, political circumstances at hand’ -  and hence that Kierkegaard is no more 
‘a-political’ than any other theorist o f  political theology.
G a rff  s understanding o f Kierkegaard, I would argue, has many similarities with other 
contem porary scholars that were examined above. G arff makes some points that are 
perfectly valid. K ierkegaard’s theory o f politics is necessarily grounded and informed 
by non-political commitments. Both G arff and the theorists examined in section ‘2 .2’ 
above also correctly identify that Kierkegaard lacks a positive political programme. 
Nevertheless, I want to challenge the idea that K ierkegaard’s thought can be singled 
out as ‘a-political’ (or ‘defective’) because it is grounded in ‘non-political’ 
commitments; because it lacks a positive political programme; or because it could not 
be responsive to factual circumstances, owing to the fact that Kierkegaard lacks both 
knowledge o f  and interest in party politics. Instead, I would argue that K ierkegaard’s 
political thought can only rightly be judged as ‘deficient’ for these reasons if  one 
already expects it to be a political theory rather than a theory o f  the political.
If  what Kierkegaard presents us with is taken to be a political theory then, given the 
requirem ents o f what a political theory ought to be [#3.1] I would also have to agree 
that it is a rather deficient one. Given that a political theory must provide a 
theoretically robust basis for how political entities ought to be practically arranged, 
K ierkegaard’s ‘political thought/contribution’ is indeed deeply deficient - qua 
political theory. It seems to me that much o f the current literature on K ierkegaard’s 
political thought judges it to be deficient qua political theory; but extends the 
criticism o f the latter to apply to Kierkegaard’s political thought in toto.
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In short then, I claim that two misconceptions have clouded much o f the literature on 
K ierkegaard’s political contribution. The first is to assume that since Kierkegaard 
lacks a positive political programme, and that since such a programme would be by 
definition un-Kierkegaardian, K ierkegaard’s political contribution (on the whole) 
ought to be considered as deficient. The literature often explicitly refrains from calling 
Kierkegaard a ‘political philosopher’ and I know o f no instances in the literature 
where it has been noted that Kierkegaard defended a theory o f the political.
The second misconception, which is exemplified by G arff but also affects m any o f  the 
other scholars m entioned in this chapter, is the tendency to judge K ierkegaard’s 
theory o f the political as if  it were a political theory. Judged in light o f the latter, 
K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political would quite rightly be deficient. Nevertheless, 
the critical reception o f K ierkegaard’s political thought that has, in a large respect, 
been inadvertently perpetuated by both o f these m isconceptions cloud the fact that 
Kierkegaard develops an interesting and novel theory o f the political. It would still be 
an open question as to whether K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political, judged as such, 
would be deemed deficient. (For example, I will pursue A dorno’s criticism that even 
qua theory o f the political K ierkegaard’s thought is deficient in chapter seven.) I am 
inclined to think that it would not. Still, the point is that some aspects o f 
K ierkegaard’s political thought have been misconceived and hence improperly judged 
in recent work. I aim to address this shortfall.
In the next chapter I will outline K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political. I believe that 
K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political was developed from some o f  his earliest works 
and ran throughout his entire authorship. Indeed, this is a prim ary goal o f this thesis
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and will be argued for in more depth in chapters three through to six (but especially in 
chapter four). Despite the fact that it informed his authorship, Kierkegaard only 
explicitly sets his theory o f the political down in writing quite some way through his 
authorship (i.e., between 1846 and 1851). Hence, in attempting to explicitly articulate 
K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political I will first examine these writings before going 
on to show in what ways K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political has informed some o f 
his earliest and latest works.
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CHAPTER THREE: 
Kierkegaard’s Theory of the Political.
Introduction.
Despite the fact that I argue that a theory o f the political runs throughout 
K ierkegaard’s authorship, Kierkegaard only really explicitly outlines his political 
position part way through it. Even then, K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political is only 
discussed in small sections o f some o f his works (many o f which were not published 
during his lifetime): in An Open Letter [1851], The Point o f  View o f  My Work as an 
Author [1859-posthumously - hereafter simply; TPV], and in various journal entries 
and scattered remarks that examine Luther’s reformation.
In each articulation o f his theory o f the political Kierkegaard maintains certain crucial 
elements. (These are detailed in a table on p. 139 below.) Nevertheless, the differing 
texts emphasise different aspects o f his theory and so provide additional information 
to, or arguments for, K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political. Hence it will be useful to 
look at each o f these works in turn.
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3.1 An Open Letter
K ierkegaard’s first clear explanation o f his political thought was prompted by a 
m isunderstanding by one o f  his contemporaries. In 1851, Andreas Gottlob Rudelbach 
[1792-1862] published a book called ‘On Civil M arriage’ [original: Om det 
Borgerlige /.Egteskab]. In the work, Rudelbach appears to suggest that Kierkegaard 
would endorse establishing civil marriages in Denmark. Rudelbach makes two claims 
in this tract that Kierkegaard specifically responded to. The first is that the highest 
interest o f  the Danish church is ‘[...] to become emancipated particularly from what is 
rightly called habitual and State Christianity’ (cited in Kierkegaard, The Corsair 
Affair, [hereafter simply; COR], 51. Original emphasis). The second claim that 
Rudelbach makes is that ‘[...] for this emancipation civil marriage is an important, 
perhaps indispensable, instrument, a necessary link in [...] the ushering in o f religious 
freedom ’ {ibid.).
With regards to the first claim (that the Church needs to be emancipated and 
particularly from the state), Rudelbach writes in a footnote that the same point has 
been made by ‘[...] one o f our outstanding contem porary writers, Soren Kierkegaard 
[...]’ {ibid.). Rudelbach does not explicitly state that Kierkegaard shares the same 
sentiments with regards to the second claim (that a good way for religious 
emancipation to occur is via the introduction o f civil marriage). Nevertheless, 
K ierkegaard was still eager to ensure both that no one mistakenly took his thought to
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contain recom m endations for positive political policies (as with the second claim 
Rudelbach makes), as well as clarifying specifically how he only partially agreed with 
the first claim.
R udelbach’s understanding o f K ierkegaard’s authorial project, the latter states, is only 
‘fairly’ accurate -  a ‘half-truth’. Yet even this evaluation seems generous; for 
Kierkegaard goes on to argue that Rudelbach’s first claim is only partly  true, whereas 
the second claim is completely false {ibid.). In a footnote, Kierkegaard importantly 
clarifies that despite the fact that he does talk about ‘the Church’ in much o f his 
authorship, he only writes about the emancipation o f the church because o f  his 
forem ost interest in the emancipation o f ‘the single individual’. K ierkegaard is not 
concerned with Church issues per se, but only insofar as he is concerned with the 
existential (and specifically ethico-religious) developm ent o f  each person {ibid., n .l).
Kierkegaard importantly believes this to have been the obvious, authorial task o f his 
entire authorship (or at least the authorship since Either/Or [hereafter simply; E/O I, 
for volume one; E/O II, for volume II]) -  pseudonymous and upbuilding alike. This 
point provides the textual evidence for a key tenet o f this thesis: K ierkegaard’s 
authorship is aimed at helping ‘that single individual’ become aware o f the 
requirem ents necessary for one’s ‘inward deepening’. Many o f  the obstacles to 
spiritual deepening are the individual’s own failings, but some might be caused by 
external parties. Kierkegaard believed that some o f the external hindrances to the
33 For K ierkegaard’s own assessm ent o f  the true beginning o f  his authorship, see n.78 below . N ote 
also that this piece contains the first published instance in a self-signed w ork o f  K ierkegaard using 
the term  ‘Forfatter-Virksom hed' (authorship), a concept w hich becom es the central them e o f  the 
later w ork The Point o f  View o f  M y Work as an Author, and w hich is the second m ajor w ork to 
clarify K ierkegaard’s political thought. (The term is even em ployed in the full, original title o f  
TPV: Synspunktetfor min Forfatter-Virksomhed. En ligefrem M eddelelse, Rapport til Historien).
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individual’s spiritual progression could be circumvented via his (K ierkegaard’s) 
authorship. In later writings, however, Kierkegaard highlights that his authorial task 
was unable to circumvent some obstacles to spiritual progressions. In such a situation, 
obstacles to spiritual progression must be removed. This self-ascribed authorial task, 
articulated both in An Open Letter but also throughout most other works in the 
authorship, ultimately justifies K ierkegaard’s call for the separation o f D enm ark’s 
State-Church marriage in his final publications; or so I shall go on to argue. A central 
interpretive stance that I shall defend throughout this thesis, thus, is that the authorial 
task that Kierkegaard here explains to Rudelbach -  that o f helping ‘that single 
individual’ attain ‘inward deepening’ -  both motivates K ierkegaard’s (later) call for 
political reform, as well as unites this later work with his earlier pieces. In other words, 
I maintain that helping ‘that single individual’ attain ‘inward deepening’ is the 
prominent goal o f K ierkegaard’s entire authorship -  and even o f some o f his non- 
authorial activities.
Sticking with the text in question, however, one would be forgiven for initially 
thinking that Kierkegaard has no concern for political change and/or civil liberties. 
Kierkegaard follows up his point (o f being interested not prim arily with church 
concerns but only o f the single individual) by explicitly stating that he has a deep 
suspicion o f ‘politically achieved free institutions’ {ibid, 54). Later on the same page, 
Kierkegaard claims that he has never fought for the political emancipation o f any 
specific group or cause (bar that o f the single individual). Furthermore, he argues that 
he has never even sought the emancipation o f the single individual in external, 
political changes (as opposed to ‘inward deepening’. We will examine Kierkegaard’s 
notion o f ‘inward deepening below when we look at the specifically existential aspect
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o f his theory o f the political.) Thus, Kierkegaard clarifies that despite his support for 
the emancipation o f ‘the C hurch’, he has not actively sought this emancipation any 
more than he has ‘ [...] fought for the emancipation o f Greenland commerce, o f 
wom en,34 o f the Jews, or o f anyone else’ {ibid.). This I take to be evidence o f the fact 
that whilst K ierkegaard had constantly sought the existential emancipation o f the 
individual from the church throughout his authorship, he had never (hitherto) fought 
for this comm itm ent in a specifically political way - by balloting for policy change, 
for example. N or had Kierkegaard ever sought emancipation for specifically political 
reasons, such as for securing civil liberties or political rights.
One could be forgiven for taking such assertions as evidence that Kierkegaard 
disdained any attempt at securing civil liberties. One would, after all, be slightly 
correct. But K ierkegaard’s view is a little more complex than simply condemning or 
condoning this pursuit. K ierkegaard’s worry, as his careful response to Rudelbach 
highlights, is that people would seek to remedy problems that are existential in nature 
through purely political means. Kierkegaard sees this as an error that could have 
disastrous consequences.
Proof o f this can be seen in two statements that Kierkegaard makes about civil 
liberties. Both statements, it should be noted, vastly inform Kierkegaard’s theory o f 
the political w ithout necessarily receiving a detailed explanation in this text. The first 
declaration Kierkegaard makes is that he has nothing against civil liberties per se.
34 An interesting parallel in fem inist interpretations o f  K ierkegaard’s thought yields sim ilar findings to 
our political exam ination. W hilst fem inist interpreters o f  K ierkegaard m ight lam ent the fact that 
K ierkegaard offers no apparent structural solution to obvious and w idespread gender inequality (e.g., 
W alsh, 2000, 17), som e still find his em phasis on the essential equality  o f  all w ith regards to existential 
developm ent to be a useful tool for the fem inist cause (e.g., Berry, 1997a, 51-53; 1997b, 25-48; 
B ertung, 1997, 51-67; W alsh, 2000, 17; W atkin, 1997, 69-72).
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Kierkegaard quite simply states that: ‘If at a given time the forms under which one has 
to live are not the most perfect, if  they can be improved, [then] in G od’s name do so ’ 
(ibid, 53). The second key tenet o f K ierkegaard’s political philosophy is that the 
specifically political side o f the quest for human emancipation is best ‘[ ...]  entrusted 
to those who are regularly appointed and trained for such th ings’ (ibid, 54. At the 
bottom o f the same page Kierkegaard implies that those appointed for such things are 
the ‘politicians’. See also: The Moment [hereafter simply; TM ], 60; LD, 253). So 
Kierkegaard does not have an issue with improving our lot on earth via political 
alterations per se, but simply does not see his own authorship as contributing anything 
to this undertaking. Throughout his authorship, Kierkegaard generally allows 
politicians to suggest and supply the policy changes that improve temporal welfare.
The picture painted thus far is, however, a little incomplete. It is certainly true that 
Kierkegaard is often very suspicious and even critical o f political change that seeks 
religious emancipation. In An Open Letter Kierkegaard most informingly states why 
he maintains this ambivalent attitude. For one thing, he appears to believe that politics 
and the existential are very separate entities. In fact, Kierkegaard first publicly states 
his political ontology, and his theory o f the political, in An Open Letter. Kierkegaard 
argues that politics properly only concerns itself with the ‘external’ (ibid.). Politics 
alters the external or worldly ‘form s’ or institutions that a ‘single individual’ will find 
him or herself living in. Christianity (more specifically, but existential developm ent o f 
any kind more generally) is, on the contrary, ‘inwardness, inward deepening’ (ibid, 
53), or ‘inward developm ent’ (my term).
35 K ierkegaard m ight be being a little ungenerous in this text, for as his jou rna ls  reveal, he explicitly 
states that he also “ [ ...]  fight[s] for hum an righ ts” (JP IV: 4131). K ierkegaard, how ever, w ishes to 
em phasise is that not all ( if  any) existential problem s can be solved by cam paigning for rights; a point 
he believes his contem poraries have often dangerously missed.
Page 82 o f  354. Kierkegaard’s Existential Theory o f  the Political. Thomas Wolstenholme.
For Kierkegaard, the existential necessarily requires subjective and qualitative change. 
The political, on the other hand, works by altering externalities. But alterations to 
externalities cannot in and o f themselves positively contribute to a single individual’s 
existential development. This is because any external change would still require ‘the 
single individual’ to inwardly relate to those changes in an authentic way in order to 
fully accommodate the latter. Since existential developm ent requires the individual to 
subjectively or inwardly appropriate, authentically relate to, and/or take responsibility 
to his or her external conditions, existential development must include some degree o f 
attention to the given external conditions. Hence, K ierkegaard’s authorship is an 
attempt at guiding the ‘single individual’ towards existential (inward) development; 
but for precisely this reason, K ierkegaard’s theory must also be responsive and 
reflexive to external change. A central argum ent o f this thesis is that K ierkegaard’s 
thought evidences his on-going reflexive understanding o f external, social, political, 
and ideological, trends and changes (- argued throughout chapters four through to 
seven). As his comments to Andreas Rudelbach suggest, Kierkegaard is personally 
engaged with dispelling the illusion that one can achieve existential developm ent 
through alterations to external forms (which include political reform) alone. 
K ierkegaard’s preferred method o f inspiring existential developm ent is in using his 
authorship to guide the individual towards spiritual deepening despite the fact that the 
political environment the single individual finds them selves in might not be perfect.
Kierkegaard says as much about Christianity as a particular existential ideal in An 
Open Letter. He makes the very bold, and not immediately justified claim that since 
Christianity is essentially inwardness, and that since politics is fundamentally
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concerned with externalities, Christianity can exist ‘[ ...]  in any climate [... even] in 
the most imperfect [external] conditions and form s’ (ibid, 54). Furthermore, 
Kierkegaard claims that political action in favour o f bolstering the single individual’s 
appropriation o f the Christian faith may even result in the downfall o f  the latter:
Christianity will not be helped from the outside by external institutions 
and constitutions, and least o f all [...]  in a social and amicable way, by
elections or by a lottery o f num bers.36 On the contrary, to be aided in this
way is the downfall o f  Christianity, (ibid, 55.)
W hilst it m ight be conceptually plausible for Christianity, or existential authenticity 
more generally to exist in any kind o f political system, this is not the case empirically. 
Later on in his authorship, Kierkegaard argues that the existential developm ent o f  a 
typical individual can be seriously thwarted. In fact, external alterations can render 
some ways o f life completely ineffectual. (I shall assess this claim in more depth 
below, in chapters five and six.) Even here, in his first explicit articulation o f his 
theory o f the political, Kierkegaard is quick to em phasise that just because 
Christianity is essentially inwardness this does not imply that ‘[...]  Christianity 
consists purely and simply o f putting up with everything in regard to external forms, 
w ithout doing anything at all [...]  if  worse comes to worst. But my entire activity as 
an author’, Kierkegaard continues directly on, ‘has had nothing to do with such an 
eventuality’ (ibid, 56). We could om inously add to the end o f  this quote: yet -  for 
K ierkegaard does arguably encounter a situation where his ‘existential-corrective to 
the established order’ (ibid.) is no longer a sufficient answer to the existential
disasters that the latter is causing. In chapter six below we shall see that when his
36 By w hich I assum e K ierkegaard m eans voting.
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authorship fails to provide the required ‘existential-corrective’ to the Danish state- 
church marriage, Kierkegaard directs his authorial task towards working with the state 
at eradicating political obstacles to existential developm ent (i.e., to proposing and 
fighting for negative policy alterations).
Seemingly prophesising the situation that he would later encounter, Kierkegaard had 
already written in An Open Letter that: ‘There are situations, therefore, in which an 
established order can be o f such a nature that the Christian ought not to put up with it, 
ought not to say that Christianity means precisely this indifference to the external’ 
(ibid.). Just because Christianity, conceptually speaking, is indifference to external 
change it still might (and perhaps should) nevertheless be highly reflexive towards the 
external in actual practice. Even when the established order can no longer be accepted, 
however, K ierkegaard does not obviously suggest political change as the remedy. In 
fact he appears to advocate the opposite. In such situations Kierkegaard suggests that 
one simply let ‘[...] the established order stand -  not a word, not a syllable, not a 
letter directed toward an external change [ . . . ] ’. One can only consult one’s 
consciousness and do what one sincerely believes to be authentically religious. As if 
responding to Rudelbach’s own suggestion for civil marriage becoming 
institutionalised, Kierkegaard mentions (in a footnote) that Luther’s own marriage as 
a priest (despite papal decree) and to a nun (despite public opinion) was an affront to 
the established order but in a completely different way to the political methodology o f 
taking petitions to parliament (ibid, 58, n .l.). Rather than fighting for worldly change, 
Luther’s activism (in this example at least) involved staying stead-fast to his own 
quest for authenticity irrespective o f the threats o f  martyrdom from the established 
order.
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Why does Kierkegaard apparently prefer martyrdom to political reform? In An Open 
Letter Kierkegaard makes surprisingly insightful claims with regards to political 
attempts at solving religious problems. Kierkegaard disdains political reform because 
he argues that it is typically both futile and harmful. Political reform is futile, 
Kierkegaard argues, because a change in the external forms o f things (a change in the 
official state church, for example) has no effect in and o f  itself on religious 
inwardness. Hence, if  political change attempts to solve a problem that is actually the 
m anifestation o f a lack o f religious inwardness the political change, qua political 
change, will have no effect. An historical example o f a failed political solution to a 
religious problem could be Luther’s involvement with the reformation. (This will 
soon be examined in more depth in section 3.3 below.)
If Kierkegaard believed some political reforms to be futile, what is more worrying is 
that he argues that they are often harmful too. This is because a religious (or otherwise 
existential) problem is mistakenly assumed to have been remedied by the external, 
political change. This gives the illusory impression that existential impoverishment 
has been diagnosed and cured when in fact it remains. K ierkegaard calls this second 
issue the result o f a ‘disastrous confusion o f politics and Christianity’ - and it is this 
‘disastrous confusion’ that he is at pains to clarify and avoid (ibid., 53).
Kierkegaard seems to think that political change is a natural response to widespread 
existential impoverishment, and it certainly can be carried out in good faith. 
Nevertheless, this concern, in and o f itself, will be unending. The political reformer 
will constantly be seeking to employ external reformations to solve a problem that is
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best solved in a completely different way. Hence politics, with regards to solving 
existential problems at least, will necessarily become engaged in a ‘Tantalus like 
busyness about external change’ (ibid, 54); a tempting but futile and never-ending 
quest to solve religious problems with political means. Such an engagem ent only 
catalyses the ‘disastrous confusion o f politics and C hristianity’ through perpetuating 
the illusion that a political alteration had solved an essentially existential problem, and 
hence compounds the very problems that it sought to solve. K ierkegaard’s views on 
external reform as a solution to existential problems therefore highlight why he is so 
eager to distance him self from Rudelbach’s own suggestion o f emancipating the 
church by introducing the institution o f civil marriage. For Kierkegaard, the 
existential emancipation o f the individual can be secured without necessarily resorted 
to political emancipation such as, in this case, the right to civil marriage. Diverting 
attention from the existential emancipation o f the single individual towards political 
reform might potentially only lead us astray from the root problem.
As we saw above, Kierkegaard does not oppose the pursuit o f  securing civil liberties 
when they do not risk causing more existential harm than good (ibid, 53). Kierkegaard 
does, however, object to the unduly optimistic belief (which he perceived to be 
widespread in his day) that all problems could be solved politically.37 As Kierkegaard 
highlights, some problems, including existential ones, can often only be compounded 
by a resorting to political change. With regards to existential issues then, Kierkegaard 
prefers to employ his authorial method o f helping people become authentic 
individuals despite the fact that the times they live in might not be optimal at 
accom modating for such a task. W hilst it does not come through in the text,
37 This phenom enon will be exam ined in m ore depth below  (in sections 3.3, and 4.1.1. See also n.82)
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Kierkegaard seems to reserve resorting to ‘external’, political change for the extreme 
circumstance where ‘the single individual’ is so existentially impoverished that the 
authorship itself becomes ineffectual at providing existential edification.38
Nevertheless, it should now hopefully be clear from An Open Letter that 
K ierkegaard’s reluctance to provide positive political change is a result o f  his specific 
theory o f the political. According to the latter, the existential realm and the political 
realm are categorically different entities. Rather than attempting to remedy religious 
problems with political means, one gets the impression that existential interests would 
be best aided if  the political realm stuck more stringently to answering ‘genuinely’ 
political questions about ‘external’ affairs -  such as whether the building o f a new 
road would be in the public interest or not (see: For Self-Examination [hereafter 
simply; FSE], 19).
Kierkegaard predom inately directing his authorship towards aiding the existential 
development o f the single individual, but feared that his works might m istakenly be 
interpreted as defending a political programme. This false reading would both detract 
attention from K ierkegaard’s true authorial interests as well as risk having the reader 
accidentally confuse the logically distinct categories o f the existential and the political. 
K ierkegaard’s refusal to be allied with a project o f endorsing ‘free institutions’ as a 
way o f securing civic liberties or political rights, promoting policy changes or bill 
amendments, or providing guidelines for external, political change in general, could 
therefore be seen as a purposeful attempt at resisting to add to the ‘disastrous 
confusion’ o f the genuinely political with the properly non-political.
38 This w ill be a key argum ent o f  chapter six below.
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This political philosophy, far from being quietist, is K ierkegaard’s existential theory 
o f the political in action. K ierkegaard’s authorship is a remedy to the harmful 
religious, political, and existential consequences that the single individual might be 
subjected to by various external factors (and these can include political decisions that 
have failed to respect Kierkegaard’s theory o f the political). K ierkegaard’s theory o f 
the political is a nuanced but well thought out argum ent that takes seriously into 
consideration the fact that positive political reform can sometimes be (existentially) 
counter-productive. As a result, K ierkegaard’s reluctance to provide guidelines for 
external change can be seen as a direct consequence o f an interest in m inimising 
political turmoil and the resulting suffering each ‘single individual’ m ight incur from 
the former.
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3.2 The Point o f  View fo r My Work as an Author.
Introduction
The second primary source o f an explicit articulation o f  K ierkegaard’s theory o f the 
political is found in the posthumous work The Point o f  View o f  my Work as an Author. 
The Princeton University Press edition o f The Point o f  View is a collection o f various 
pieces. All but one o f the pieces were originally published posthum ously in 1859 by 
Soren’s brother, Peter Kierkegaard. The Princeton edition o f these pieces is split into 
two parts. Part one is called ‘The Equivocalness or Duplexity in the W hole 
Authorship, W hether the Author Is an Esthetic or a Religious A uthor’; and part two is 
named ‘The Authorship Viewed as a Whole, and from the Point o f View that the 
Author is a Religious A uthor’. Our focus is prim arily on a collection o f material 
supplementing ‘part tw o’ which itself is given the sub-heading ‘"The Single
39Individual" Two "Notes" Concerning My W ork as an A uthor’ , as well as the final 
(stand-alone) piece in the Princeton collection ‘Armed N eutrality’. In both o f these 
latter sections, Kierkegaard further outlines his theory o f the political.
Despite the fact that the material was published in 1859, it was written much earlier
(between 1846 [TPV, 112, n .l]  and 1848) and thus predates the work previously
39 This collection contains the follow ing pieces: ‘P reface’; ‘No. 1 For the D edication to "That Single 
Ind iv idual"’; ‘N o .2 A W ord on the Relation o f  My W ork as an A uthor to "The Single Ind iv idual"’; 
‘P ostscrip t’; ‘Postscript to the "Two N o tes"’; and ‘A rm ed N eu tra lity ’. N one o f  the parts o f  the texts we 
will exam ine (i.e., those that contain K ierkegaard’s theory o f  the political) w ere published during 
K ierkegaard’s lifetim e.
Page 90 o f  354. Kierkegaard’s Existential Theory o f  the Political. Thomas Wolstenholme.
examined: An Open Letter. This may explain why K ierkegaard’s position is close in 
both works. Nevertheless, an investigation into the theory o f the political contained 
within The Point o f  View has its own reasons for being highly fruitful. This is because 
Kierkegaard purposely held o ff publishing the material because he thought it m ight be 
m isunderstood by his contemporaries. Kierkegaard had pedagogical reasons for 
carefully considering what (and how) he published. Perhaps Kierkegaard worried 
about his contemporaries reading his authorship in an over-politicised manner. Such a 
misinterpretation might be akin to the m isreading that Kierkegaard believed Andreas 
Rudelbach to have made three years later. W hatever the reasons for holding back the 
publication o f this material, in it Kierkegaard elaborates upon his theory o f the 
political in more depth than in his response to Rudelbach and brings other important 
topics into discussion.
3.2 The Point o f  View.
In The Point o f  View Kierkegaard m aintains his position that there is a categorical 
difference between the worldly -  which is partly legislated by the political realm -  
and the spiritual, which is qualitatively different from the former (TPV, 103, 121, 
130). Interestingly for our purposes, Kierkegaard gives additional reasons for thinking 
that the spiritual and political are irrevocably different in The Point o f  View than he 
had in An Open Letter. When it comes to spiritual developm ent -  and whilst this 
might include any form o f existential development, it is especially clear with regards 
to religious developm ent for Kierkegaard -  each person must essentially consult their
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own conscience. A person does not achieve spiritual or existential developm ent by 
comparing them selves with others. W hilst such a comparison with another may well 
inspire one to undertake spiritual development, one still must eventually consult one’s 
own conscience if  the latter is to be achieved. This gives Kierkegaard another reason 
for believing that existential questions cannot be answered politically, e.g., by 
majority vote. With respect to existential questions, in contrast to political ones, 
K ierkegaard says that one ‘[...] should be careful about becoming involved with “the 
others”, [and] essentially should speak only with God and with him self -  since only 
one reaches the goal’ (TPV, 106; see also p. 123). (For non-Christian existential 
development, ‘one’s conscience’, or ‘one’s deities’ might replace ‘G od’ in this quote.) 
In his religious, signed works, in fact, Kierkegaard states that the ability to consult 
God and one’s consciousness and to develop existentially is just what makes us a 
human being -  a spiritual being with a ‘kinship with the divine’ (ibid., cf., Upbuilding 
Discourses In Various Spirits [hereafter simply; UDVS], 193).
Spiritual development is thus not a case o f being in a ‘developed’ position relative to 
others. One would not progress spiritually even if  all other beings were to 
sim ultaneously become spiritually destitute. Perhaps this is why Kierkegaard defines 
the ‘the single individual’ as ‘the category o f spirit, o f  spiritual awakening [ . . . ] ’ (TPV, 
121, my emphasis). Yet being a single individual does not entail individualism (as I 
shall argue in more depth below: 7.3.1; 7.4). One still relates to other people in a 
genuine way, respecting both their differences as well as their fundamentally 
universal human dignity. Here, being a single individual simply means that one does 
not judge one’s existential progression relatively to others, or ignore it by being swept 
along by ‘the crow d’. N or does one let majority views wholly dictate the course o f
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one’s spiritual development. Being a ‘single individual’ is thus a sort o f task and a 
responsibility which also has some ethical connotations because it is something each 
person owes to them selves and to others (ibid., 123.). It can be daunting to consult 
one’s conscience about the course o f one’s life, especially if  one thinks that it might 
fall short o f a standard that one would wish to attain, and yet it is one’s responsibility 
to do so anyway. Furthermore, being a responsible ‘single individual’ does not in any 
way alleviate one’s ethical and existential duties to one’s fellows. On the contrary, the 
former may inform and even heighten the latter responsibilities.
From what Kierkegaard says about the category o f the spiritual, it should be clear why 
he believes that it is in some ways ‘[...] as diam etrically opposite to politics as 
possible’ (ibid., 121.). For one thing, each single individual’s spiritual developm ent is 
a personal and somewhat isolated task. Hence, the task developing existentially could 
not be solved on a large scale by a third-person entity using external reform. Similarly, 
one could not appeal to a majority vote to answer questions o f how existential 
developm ent ought to be undertaken by the community; even if  a community 
happened to be entirely composed o f ‘single individuals’. Furthermore, acquiring 
‘worldly gain’ -  such as ‘power, honor’ (ibid.), and we might add civil rights and 
liberties, will not necessarily promote existential developm ent either. None o f these 
political measures in and o f themselves will necessitate the single individual to 
consult his or her conscience and wilfully and responsibly choose to undertake 
existential development. Hence, Kierkegaard argues that political entities, by 
definition, cannot solve existential problems; and, for reasons which we shall shortly 
examine (as well as for some that were examined above), they should not attempt to 
answer spiritual and existential matters either.
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As with An Open Letter, Kierkegaard does not just think that the confusion o f the 
political with the spiritual is simply a logical confusion, or a category error. W hilst he 
does believe this to be the case, what is more troubling for him is that he once again 
argues that this confusion is ‘disastrous’ in its consequences. In fact, Kierkegaard 
gives his possibly strongest criticism o f the ‘disastrous confusion’ o f the two logically 
distinct categories in this work. Kierkegaard argues that majority opinion (or vote) can 
have decisive authority when answering some genuinely political questions (see also: 
JP IV: 4168, 4199, 4201, 4208).40 That is to say, some issues are rightfully solved by 
putting the matter to majority vote. In such instances, the numerical weight o f the 
majority opinion alone might legitimise the latter. This often happens in ‘genuinely’ 
political matters. With regards to political questions such as ‘Ought we to raise the 
taxes o f the citizenry in order to build more roads; and if  so, by how m uch?’, there is 
no ‘righ t’ answer (it might be argued) above and beyond what the given majority o f 
the voting citizenry decree. The ‘correctness’ o f such a proposition is simply one and 
the same as the outcome o f the voting procedure.
With spiritual matters, as we have shown, this is not the case. As we saw above, 
spiritual matters are decided on an individual basis and only by the single individual 
who is involved. Kierkegaard goes on to argue that if  the solutions o f spiritual
40 This is not to say that K ierkegaard sim ply w ants to m inim ise the scope o f  the political realm . In fact, 
since K ierkegaard argues that the state has legitim ate rule over a ll th ings secular, he argues that it 
therefore has governance over areas such as ‘art, scholarship, and sc ience’ (JP IV, 4168). Hence, 
K ierkegaard is w illing  to let the state regulate things that a contem porary  liberal w ould probably take 
issue w ith. Furtherm ore, w hilst ‘m ajority v o te ’ can have legitim acy in som e political m atters, in a more 
abstract sense the ‘num erica l’ is given legitim acy in areas that extend beyond purely political matters. 
H ence, K ierkegaard argues that the num erical ‘is entirely  trustw orthy, yes, the only possible 
trustw orthiness, and [a] genuine trustw orth iness’ w ith regards to ‘everything  finite and tem poral’; and 
‘all kinds o f  secular activity and com m erce in this w orld ’ (JP III, 2892, my em phasis). Far from having 
an unreservedly  negative opinion o f  practices such as balloting and voting, therefore, I w ish to 
em phasise that K ierkegaard only refuses the use o f  these m eans w hen they are used to answ er 
genuinely existential questions.
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questions are sought by appealing to the numerical weight o f majority opinion, we 
risk losing ‘humankind’s kinship with the divine’ (TPV, 107, original emphasis). Such 
a situation would also risk religious tyranny if  the majority predom inately believed in 
only one religion. If  religion becomes a political matter, then people might take this 
dom inant religion to be the only true religion (since the correctness o f a proposition is 
decided by majority vote on many political matters), and this would risk it being 
enforced upon all individuals and regulated by the state. Each person would ironically 
lose the prerequisite requirements for being genuinely religious. In fact, w ithout the 
capacity for independently relating to spiritual, ethico-religious matters, the human 
would cease to be the responsible, developmental human being that they are otherwise 
suited to be, and risk instead becoming ‘[...] a specimen to a race endowed with 
understanding’ (ibid., 107.). In other words, the confusion o f the political and the 
existential risks making individual, existential development impossible. The category 
o f the ‘single individual’ is at risk o f being abolished and replaced with an 
assim ilationist view o f the person. The only ‘developm ent’ possible in such a 
situation would be the development o f the entire race that one partakes in. Genuine 
(non-assim ilationist) ethical or religious activity would become altogether ineffectual. 
Kierkegaard worried that the very things which enable one to become a responsible 
human being are put at jeopardy, which is to say that existential developm ent would 
be completely ignored.
As we shall see in more depth below, Kierkegaard believed that the majority o f the 
people in his age suffered from a form o f spiritual and existential crisis, and that this 
was largely a result o f  various social, ideological, but also political trends (chapters 
five and six). Briefly put, the principal cause o f these problems was a confusion o f the
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legitimate roles o f the spiritual and the political. This ideological confusion was 
m anifested in D enm ark’s state-church marriage, and the ensuing ideological 
viewpoint that it fostered -  that existential and religious matters could be solved by 
political means and institutions -  was what Kierkegaard termed ‘Christendom ’. One 
o f K ierkegaard’s principal objections to developing positive political proposals for 
solving this spiritual sickness was that the latter could not possibly provide a cure for 
the former; only the illusion o f a cure. The problem here is therefore twofold: not only 
does the initial spiritual sickness inevitably remain, but the supposed cure also 
produces illusory beliefs o f betterment in its ‘patients’.
In his letter to Rudelbach, Kierkegaard presented arguments for believing that the 
over-zealous busyness o f various political endeavours might inadvertently put the 
spiritual and existential capabilities o f the typical individual o f that period at risk. 
Kierkegaard had noted that political activists were taking it upon them selves to 
attempt to solve spiritual matters with political means. The categorical difference 
between the two meant, however, that any spiritual problem could not possibly be 
rem edied by political means. Kierkegaard had emphasised that such political zeal 
towards external reforms only brought about an additional ailment; namely, the 
pernicious illusion that one’s existential development could be taken care o f by 
another person. W hilst political reforms might be able to temporarily cover up the 
external symptoms o f an existential sickness, the spiritual sickness would necessarily 
still remain. In the long-run, the spiritual sickness that individuals experience will 
only manifest itself in some other form unless they are honestly faced up to by the 
single individual. An on-going refusal to properly address existential concerns mixed 
with the erroneous belief that political entities could solve the problem would
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ultimately only prolong or even deepen any existential impoverishment that a person 
or society at large was experiencing. In other words, as long as political reform is 
adopted as the methodology for curing existential impoverishment the latter will be 
perpetuated. This is the vicious cycle that Kierkegaard had called a T an talus like 
busyness about external change’ (COR, 54) and that he sought to avoid compounding.
In the final section o f The Point o f  View, Kierkegaard importantly goes into more 
detail about his own, largely authorial solution to the political turmoil he witnessed 
around him. In ‘Armed Neutrality: or My Position as a Christian Author in 
Christendom ’, which was originally intended to be an appendix to ‘The Point o f  View 
for My W ork as an A uthor’ (TPV, 296), Kierkegaard writes that: ‘From the very 
beginning my work has not been [...] an impetuous amendment to the total confusion 
or a new patch on an old garm ent’ {ibid.., 131). By this, Kierkegaard re-emphasises 
the fact that his authorship is purposefully intended to not add to the disastrous mixing 
o f the existential and the political by advocating external reforms.
In contrast to over-optimistically advocating political reform, Kierkegaard argues that 
what his times need is rather for someone to re-emphasise the existential, the religious, 
and the spiritual aspect o f life by creating a faithful representation o f the spiritual 
ideal -  New Testam ent Christianity. In this way, every single individual ‘if he [or she] 
has a mind to, in quiet solitariness can compare his [or her] own life with the ideal’ 
{ibid.). This alternative vision o f reform is rather radically at odds with politically- 
minded reform, and indeed ‘[...] has no proposal to make and does not lean toward 
any decision in the external, in the secular w orld’ {ibid., 133). Furthermore, no aspect 
o f the project involves an activist struggle for purely political goals {ibid., 134).
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Kierkegaard informatively admits that this idea o f reformation has always been his 
own {ibid., 133), and represents the position he has taken up throughout his authorship 
{ibid., 129. See also; 115.). Hence, Kierkegaard (once more) claims that his own 
authorship is an attempt at aiding existential -  or minimally, at least, religious -  
edification and improvement in the individual whilst yet sim ultaneously avoiding 
politically-minded reform. K ierkegaard’s authorship, I would once more contest, is an 
on-going attempt at helping to cure the maladies o f the ‘disastrous’ mixing o f the 
political and the spiritual realms whilst also refraining from accidentally adding to the 
confusion by proposing specifically political reform. If this reading is correct, then it 
implies that Kierkegaard had been practising his theory o f the political throughout the 
entirety o f what he considered to be his proper authorship, i.e., since the publication 
o f Either/Or. K ierkegaard’s self-ascribed solution to the political turmoil o f his times 
was to advocate a kind o f spiritual reform or existential corrective rather than political 
movement; and he admits to having pursued this task (in varying and complicated 
ways) throughout his entire authorship {ibid., 133-34; see also, 115).41
41 K ierkegaard’s self-confessed plan o f  the preceding authorship has been scrutinised by som e 
contem porary scholars. O f those that doubt the sincerity  o f  K ierkegaard’s ow n point o f  view  o f  the 
authorship (as he elaborates it in The Point o f  View, at least), tw o d ifferent strands o f  argum ent have 
been m ade. Some scholars believe that K ierkegaard’s own justifica tions o f  the authorship are insincere, 
and are an attem pt at deliberately deceiving the reader for som e other u lterior m otive (see for exam ple: 
Fenger (1980, xiii); M ackey (1986, 163-66); and Poole (1993)). O ther scholars are m ore post­
structuralist in arguing that K ierkegaard only ever presents his readers w ith m ultiple and often 
contradictory perspectives on life; his own point o f  view  o f  the authorship included (see for exam ple: 
G arff (1998, 2003, 552); and W estfall (2007)). For scholars w ho tend to agree w ith K ierkegaard’s 
retrospective judgem ent o f  the authorship, see for exam ple: K irkconnell, 2010; Plekon, 1992, 3; and 
W atkin, 2000b, 3, passim . I side w ith those w ho argue that w orks signed in K ierkegaard’s name 
represent his real view s, for the m ost part at least, and from w ithin the specific contexts in which they 
w ere w ritten. (I briefly discuss my interpretation o f  K ierkegaard’s authorship in section ‘7 .1 .1 .2’ 
below .)
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3.2.1 Politics as ‘sensate’ authority.
Just as with An Open Letter, however, Kierkegaard is not entirely critical o f all 
political activity. On the contrary, Kierkegaard thinks that the political realm has an 
important role to play with regards to catering for our temporal (as opposed to our 
spiritual) welfare. There has been a small amount o f attention in Kierkegaard 
scholarship to the question o f the extent to which Kierkegaard values genuine political 
activity.
Pia Soltoft, for example, has convincingly argued that Kierkegaard places a great 
degree o f  value in the political realm. Soltoft argues that since, for Kierkegaard, the 
political realm legitimately regulates the ‘worldly’ aspect o f life, it is therefore 
responsible for regulating between the external, worldly, (economic or otherwise) 
differences between individuals. Soltoft explains that in K ierkegaard’s thought ‘The 
political seeks precisely to regulate these [worldly] differences and bring them within 
a framework that makes it possible for people to live together despite their 
differences’ (Soltoft, 1999, 1 17).
According to Soltoft’s reading, politics certainly has a significant role in the 
existential life o f the individual, especially with regards to fostering sociability and 
inter-personal relationships (as her previous quote illuminates). When it comes to 
developing genuine sociability, Soltoft concludes that both ‘[...] the political and the
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religious’ are equally necessary (ibid.).42 If Soltoft recognises that both the political 
and the religious are necessary for genuine sociability, then she also correctly 
identifies that a failure to recognise the legitimate roles and limitations o f the political 
and the non-political might result in the inadvertent hindrance o f genuine sociability. 
W hile I agree with her on many points, I do think, however, that Soltoft slightly 
overem phasises the role that genuine politics has in an individual’s pursuit o f  genuine 
sociability (i.e., Soltoft’s view that the former is a necessary constituent o f the latter). 
I shall assess a special case below where Kierkegaard does indeed imply that a 
political change is a necessary requirem ent for the establishment and developm ent o f 
genuine sociability (chapters six and seven). For the majority o f the time, however, 
Kierkegaard argues that inward development alone is often all that is required for 
genuine selfhood and sociability. To say the same in a different way, the political 
realm can often be organised illegitimately (i.e., in a way that does not respect 
K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political), and single individuals can still be genuinely 
sociable. There is nothing in K ierkegaard’s thought which would appear to contradict 
this position.43
Robert Perkins has also noted the social aspect o f politics in K ierkegaard’s theory o f 
the political but has recognised that politics is not necessary for the former. Hence, 
Perkins says that Kierkegaard is ‘fundamentally concerned with how we organize 
ourselves into communities and societies in a sense that includes but is not limited to
42 The original reads: ‘[ ...]  betw een the political and the religious, neither sphere can be elim inated ’.
43 On the contrary, in Two Ages, for exam ple, K ierkegaard explicitly  states that a political or worldly 
idea o f  sociality, an idea o f  sociality that has ‘validity w ith respect to m aterial in terest’, is not really 
sociality at all. K ierkegaard continues on, arguing that the single individual can indeed attain genuine 
sociability  w ithout the need for political intervention: ‘It is very doubtful, then, that the age will be 
saved by the idea o f  sociality, o f  association. [ . ..]  In our age the principle o f  association (w hich at best 
can have validity w ith respect to m aterial interest) is not affirm ative but negative; it is an evasion, a 
dissipation, an illusion [ ...]  N ot until the single individual has established an ethical stance despite  the 
w hole w orld, not until then can there be any question o f  genuinely uniting [...]  {Two Ages, 106, my 
em phasis).
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narrower concepts o f everyday politics’ (1995, 167). Here politics is attributed the 
more modest role o f ordering worldly affairs. I would argue that this task can aid but 
never necessitate genuine sociability (- not even if the political realm was to 
legitim ately act in conjunction with the religious).
A final class o f Kierkegaard scholars have outlined the benefits o f  (proper) politics 
entirely in terms o f worldly benefits. Bruce Kirmmse, for example, defines 
K ierkegaard’s view o f politics as the ‘manipulation o f objects in the material world 
for the sake o f convenience and com fort’ (1990, 474. See also: Kirmmse, 1992, 170). 
In a sim ilar manner, M ichele Nicoletti has defined politics rather neutrally as that 
which ‘plans, regulates, and governs human life in and for tem porality’ (1992, 184- 
85). Such scholars outline the benefits politics can bring to aiding the ordering o f 
worldly affairs without necessarily being committed to any additional existential 
benefits this may bring.
From the examination o f K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political, I do not think that it is 
an over-statem ent at all to say that Kierkegaard believes that the political realm can 
play an extremely important role in human affairs. If the single individual is capable 
o f spiritual development, then he or she is also capable o f temporal improvement; and 
catering for the temporal aspect o f the single individual is both an important task as 
well as one that could not and ought not to be ignored. (This anthropological 
understanding o f the importance o f the temporal aspect o f the person will be argued 
for in more depth shortly in section 3.3.1.) In The Point o f  View, as in An Open Letter, 
we once more find that Kierkegaard maintains his typically distanced but still 
noticeable praise for the worldly benefits that political reform can bring. In The Point
Page 101 o f  354. Kierkegaard’s Existential Theory o f  the Political. Thomas Wolstenholme.
o f  View, however, Kierkegaard goes on to confirm that properly political means are 
entirely appropriate ways o f achieving genuinely political goals. Hence, Kierkegaard 
writes that it is:
[ ...]  perhaps most appropriate to mention once and for all something that 
is self- evident and something I certainly have never denied —  namely, 
that with regard to all temporal, earthly, worldly goals, the crowd [read: 
majority vote44] can have its validity, even its validity as the decisive 
factor, that is, as the authority. But I am not speaking about such matters, 
no more than I occupy m yself with such things, I am speaking about the 
ethical, the ethical-religious [...] and I say that from the ethical-religious 
point o f  view the crowd [majority vote] is untruth if  it is supposed to be 
valid as the authority for what truth is {ibid., 106).45
In fact, Kierkegaard shares a similar sentiment a little later on in the text: ‘To repeat 
again, whatever may at times have complete, at times partial, legitimacy in politics 
and similar areas becomes untruth when it is carried over into the realms o f the 
intellectual, the spiritual, and the religious’ {ibid., 109). K ierkegaard’s second re­
emphasis o f the legitimacy o f political means for securing political ends also 
highlights two more interesting points. The first is that Kierkegaard separates the 
‘religious’ from the ‘spiritual’ (and indeed, ‘intellectual’) realm in a way that informs 
my reading o f ‘the spiritual’ to be more than merely synonymous with ‘religious’. At 
times, K ierkegaard’s concept o f authentic, existential development may be very 
closely tied in with his personal belief that the demands o f the Christian religion (and
44 The concepts o f ‘the crow d’, in this part o f  K ierkegaard’s authorship, does extend beyond my rather 
sim ple rendition o f ‘m ajority v o te ’. It includes ‘popular op in ion’, for exam ple, w hich is not necessarily 
synonym ous w ith ‘m ajority op in ion’. For the present discussion, how ever, it is sufficient for us to focus 
on one subset o f  K ierkegaard’s rather general concept, ‘the c row d’ to h ighlight its specifically political 
use. O ther fruitful distinctions that this concept contains will be m ore thoroughly exam ined in 
subsequent chapters (e.g., sections ‘5.2.1 ’, and ‘7 .4 ’).
45 See also the follow ing journal entries: “All finite m atters are suitable for voting” (JP IV: 4199); “ [... 
and] if  the m atter is o f  such a nature that it is suitable for settlem ent by voting, then I am w illing to vote 
[ . . . ] ” (JP IV, 4201).
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a particular interpretation o f it at that) best accommodate this existential striving (JP I, 
46; JP IV, 4333, Walsh, 1994, 226; cf., JP III, 3102, 3681). Nevertheless, this quote 
highlights how the two are still importantly separate concepts; a point that weaves its 
way through much o f K ierkegaard’s authorship.46
An additional point the quote makes is with the juxtaposition o f ‘intellectual’ with 
‘spiritual’ issues. Kierkegaard thinks it would be absurd to say that political means 
could decide whether any propositions whatsoever were true or false. The proposition 
‘the world is flat’ is not made either more or less true or false by majority opinion. 
Political means can do nothing to affect the integral truth or falsity o f  some 
propositions. The fact that Kierkegaard allies intellectual issues with spiritual ones 
serves to highlight the extent to which he thinks that it is absurd (and a category error) 
to attempt to solve spiritual questions with political means.
With regards to ‘sensate authority’ (Hyde, 2010, 99, passim), K ierkegaard does not 
say anything critical with regards to majority voting. We had seen above that 
Kierkegaard had no qualms with the pursuit o f civil liberties per  se (both in sections
3.1 and 3.2). Kierkegaard similarly has nothing critical to say about political 
endeavours per se in The Point o f  View. On the contrary, Kierkegaard explicitly states 
that political means can have ‘validity’, ‘authority’ and ‘complete legitim acy’ when 
pursuing goals that respect the proper scope o f the political realm, i.e., the catering o f 
the temporal welfare o f the single individual or the citizenry. K ierkegaard’s principal 
worry, to repeat, is that the political and the spiritual realm become ‘disastrously 
confused’ -  in other words, that K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political not be respected.
461 will briefly outline the way that the concepts o f  the ‘sp iritua l’, ‘ex is ten tia l’, and ‘re lig ious’ interact, 
and how  they are sim ilar and different to each other below  (section 3.3.1).
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In the two works examined above we have outlined K ierkegaard’s theoretical view o f 
the nature o f the political and its relation to other aspects o f life. In the following sub­
section, we will examine K ierkegaard’s assessment o f M artin Luther’s reformation. 
Kierkegaard reads Luther’s reformation as originally being intended towards solving a 
religious matter o f  an existential kind (i.e., not just ‘church policy’ but individual’s 
relation to the religious as a way o f life). Luther’s reformation therefore served for 
Kierkegaard, I shall argue, as a historical case-study in spiritually-motived political 
reform. Kierkegaard later became directly involved in a political m atter o f his own 
which stemmed from a religious commitment. It is therefore perhaps only natural that 
he studied the benefits and deficiencies o f Luther’s world-renowned reformation. 
Ultimately, Kierkegaard judged Luther’s reformation to have failed its original 
intentions. Nevertheless, K ierkegaard’s study o f Luther’s reform vastly informs, and 
brings additional nuances to his own theory o f the political. K ierkegaard’s reasons for 
believing that Luther’s reformation was not ideal, as well as his descriptions o f the 
deficiencies that it ultimately brought about are well worth examining, especially 
since they highlight additional aspects o f his own theory o f the political. 
K ierkegaard’s examination o f Luther’s reformation will therefore be the central focus 
o f the next sub-section.
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3.3 Luther: Reform and Counter-reform 
Introduction
K ierkegaard’s journals and papers reveal that from the period o f 1849 to 1850 (and 
once again near the end o f the authorship -  from 1854-55), Kierkegaard read and 
annotated much o f  Luther’s writings. I shall argue that the content o f K ierkegaard’s 
notes, which primarily revolve around how Luther’s spiritual revolution was 
politically implemented, show that Luther’s reform served as a case study for 
K ierkegaard’s own theory o f the difference between spiritual and political reform.
Kierkegaard’s view o f Luther is certainly ambivalent. Kierkegaard understands that 
Luther was reforming against a specific manifestation o f ‘secular-m indedness’ 
[verdslighed] (JP III: 2504, 2528, 2898; FSE, 17; JFY, 193). For Kierkegaard, 
secular-mindedness is one specific way o f reacting to, and ultimately denying, the 
spiritual task o f  becoming a self. Secular-minded people seek to immerse themselves 
in short-term, worldly, and finite pleasures or activities. In doing so, secular-minded 
people shirk the demands o f spiritual developm ent -  part o f which includes facing up 
to the fact that one partakes in the infinite. Directing some o f ones activities towards 
the prospect o f eternal life after death; or coming face to face with the idea that the
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human being is created by a God, are some ways in which the eternal aspect o f the 
se lf is recognised.47
K ierkegaard’s analysis o f Luther’s reform and its, in his view, subsequent failure, 
shows that secular-mindedness is a constant temptation away from (and hence 
constant threat to) spiritual development. K ierkegaard’s main source o f acclaim for 
Luther was that he showed an unprecedented insight into the spiritual laxity that his 
contemporaries entertained (e.g., JP III, 2898). Nevertheless, K ierkegaard’s chief 
accusation against Luther is that he was naively unaware o f the ever-present threat o f 
secular-mindedness with regards to spiritual development. Kierkegaard ultimately 
concludes that the political aspect o f Luther’s reform became a temptation away from 
inward, spiritual reform and towards a secular-minded zeal for policy-making. Hence, 
Kierkegaard claims that after his insightful diagnosis o f the spiritual laxity o f his 
peers, Luther inadvertently replaces one medium for spiritual negligence (falsely 
practised religion) with another (the false belief that zealous engagem ent in political 
affairs could cater for one’s own and/or other’s spiritual welfare).
K ierkegaard’s critique o f Luther is partly based on K ierkegaard’s anthropological 
view o f the human being and the role o f the spiritual aspect o f the self. In this critique, 
Kierkegaard elucidates both the role that the spiritual has with respect to the political, 
as well as the role it plays with regards to existential development. Hence
47 K ierkegaard, it should be em phasised, presupposes, or takes as a m atter o f  faith, that the se lf  is partly 
constituted by an eternal elem ent. K ierkegaard is not exceptionally  interested in securing knowledge or 
p r o o f  o f  the eternal aspect o f  the self, how ever. N ot only does K ierkegaard think that this know ledge 
that could never be attained by hum ans even in principle but he also thinks that such know ledge 
attribution w ould be irrelevant w ith regards to o n e’s existential developm ent even if  the form er was 
possible. Thus, for exam ple, K ierkegaard dism isses the task o f  seeking know ledge about the afterlife as 
irrelevant w ith regards to o n e’s existential task o f  becom ing a se lf  (CD , 202-213). Presupposing, or 
taking as a m atter o f  faith, that the se lf  contains an infinite aspect is all that is needed for existential 
authenticity  and/or religious practice.
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Kierkegaard’s anthropological views highlight additional aspects o f his existential 
theory o f  the political, as well as inform his critique o f Luther’s reformation. A brief 
examination o f this anthropology will thus be pertinent (in section 3.3.1). Once 
K ierkegaard’s anthropological views have been assessed we will return to address 
K ierkegaard’s ambivalent evaluation o f Luther’s politically implemented spiritual 
reform (in section 3.3.2).
3.3.1 K ierkegaard’s Anthropology
M any o f K ierkegaard’s critical comments about Luther express misgivings with the 
latter’s understanding o f the dialectical and existential nature o f the single individual, 
or humans more generally (JP II, 1484; JP III, 2470, 2474, 2512, 2514, 2522, 2541, 
2543, 2556, 3218, cf. JP I, 710, 711; JP III, 2898). Kierkegaard claims that Luther did 
not sufficiently consider the existential repercussions o f the political enforcement o f 
his spiritual reform. K ierkegaard’s anthropological views, on the other hand, point out 
how and why spiritual forfeiture is an ever-present and attractive temptation for 
human agents. Luther is partly criticised for not understanding or for overlooking 
these basic anthropological and existential facts. This key anthropological tenet is in 
the background o f K ierkegaard’s critique o f Luther; but it also importantly informs 
his theory o f the political. To gain a fuller understanding o f K ierkegaard’s 
anthropological and existential critique o f Luther’s reform we must therefore take a 
temporary detour and provide a cursory account o f K ierkegaard’s anthropology. The 
relation between Kierkegaard’s anthropological views and his understanding o f
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Luther’s reform (and hence, o f a theory o f the political more generally) will therefore 
be tem porarily suspended in this section, but returned to in the following sub-section.
K ierkegaard’s most fundamental anthropological belief is that all humans contain a 
physical, a psychical, and a spiritual aspect.48 As K ierkegaard’s pseudonymous author 
Vigilius Haufniensis puts it: “The human being is a synthesis o f the psychical and the 
physical; however, a synthesis is unthinkable if  the two are not united in a third. This 
third is spirit” {The Concept o f  Anxiety [hereafter simply; CA], 43). David J. Kangas 
notes that there is no given ‘determinate or intrinsically ordered relation’ between the 
physical and the psychical (Kangas, 2007, 177). The healthy relation o f the two must 
be determined by each single individual. But it is precisely because the spiritual 
aspect o f the self transcends the tem porally contingent aspects o f  the se lf (e.g., 
biological determinations, cultural upbringing, and so on) that the single individual 
can freely  engage in the task o f becoming a self. Freedom is manifested when the 
individual, exercising the spiritual aspect o f the self, attempts to harmonise the 
differing aspects o f the self in a way that is individually suited to them. The spiritual 
aspect o f the self does not ju st ‘unite’ the other aspects o f the self then but also 
constitutes and sustains the psychical-physical synthesis {ibid.\ CA, 81).
W ithout the spiritual aspect o f the self, Kierkegaard states that there would be no 
freedom. Each human would essentially be determined by the psychical and physical 
aspects o f the self -  both o f which are ultimately determined by historical 
contingencies which lie outside o f the human agents control. If the spiritual relation
48 JP I, 52, 55, 56, 75, 78, 80, 83, 87; SUD, 176; The Concept o f  Anxiety, 43 (passim ). See also, G ran;
[  ]it is generally recognised that the definition o f  man as a synthesis is an essential -  if  not the
essential -  point in K ierkegaard’s an thropology’ (G ran, 2000, 27); and Com e, w here the ‘basic 
anthropological concep t’ that the hum an being is this tripartite synthesis is ‘[...] one o f  the ruling 
concepts in all o f  K ierkegaard’s w ritingsffrom  1844 through to 1850]’ (2000, 34. See also p. 33).
Page 108 o f  354. Kierkegaard’s Existential Theory o f  the Political. Thomas Wolstenholme.
did not exist to freely appropriate and take responsibility for these contingencies then 
the person would ultimately be driven by circumstances for which he or she could not 
be held responsible for. As such, existential development would also cease to exist. 
The only developm ent the individual would have would be in physical or psychical 
terms. Kierkegaard says that in such a scenario each individual would only develop as 
an instance or, to recall the original term used above, a ‘specim en’ o f the human race.
But Kierkegaard claims that the human being is not merely a psychical-physical one. 
Each single individual has the capability to develop spiritually and existentially in 
ways that go above and beyond even the advancement o f the race. As we hinted at 
above, however, Kierkegaard also believes there is a widespread tendency in humans 
to neglect the spiritual side o f the self. If  the spiritual aspect o f the personality is 
responsible for providing us with freedom and the ability to authentically develop as 
an individual then why is it so commonly ignored?
One possible anthropological account o f why the spiritual aspect is typically neglected 
might be due to the developmental nature o f the human being. As Kierkegaard 
him self recognises, one needs consciousness and earnestness to be or become a 
spiritual person. Yet Kierkegaard also recognises that these faculties are only 
developed in the later years o f a hum an’s life .49 Hence, before one reaches the age 
where the prerequisites for becoming a spiritual being can be attained, one will have 
already been primarily dominated by the ‘tem poral’ aspects o f the self which govern 
the child -  the physical and the psychical. Since the human being must necessarily
49 B elow  w e touch upon K ierkegaard’s view s on infant baptism  and confirm ation (section 6.2). There it 
is explicitly  revealed that K ierkegaard thinks that the cerem ony o f  confirm ation, for exam ple, should 
only take place betw een adults w ho are tw enty-five years or older (see JP I, 494); precisely because one 
w ho is younger than this age cannot conceivably be expected to have the requisite faculties for 
genuinely accepting the religious way o f  life (see also: The M om ent, 243-44).
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pass through infancy and adolescence before arriving at adulthood, we might say that 
the physical element o f the self originates and dominates first (in the infant); then the 
psychical (in the toddler/adolescent); and that the spiritual aspect o f the self is the last 
to be developed (in the adult). The dominant role that the physical and psychical 
aspects o f the se lf have in the formative years o f a hum an’s life could provide a 
plausible explanation for why the majority o f adults may continue to be governed by 
non-spiritual interests.50
It must be admitted that Kierkegaard does not give such an anthropological account, 
or at least does not explicitly state it in such a way. K ierkegaard’s anthropological 
account o f the se lf is largely informed by Christian dogma. At times, for example, 
K ierkegaard’s anthropology is informed by an interpretation o f the Old Testam ent 
account o f the creation and the subsequent fall o f  man. W hilst his ‘Old Testam ent 
anthropology’ is evident throughout the authorship, it tends to play a more dominant 
role in later journal entries. K ierkegaard’s ‘Old Testam ent anthropology’ also 
typically provides a scriptural account o f psychical-physical difference (for example, 
between the two sexes).51 Nevertheless, Kierkegaard also relies upon an interpretation
50 K ierkegaard also hints at the fact that social contingencies m ight bias the ind iv idual’s v iew  o f  
selfhood tow ards the tem poral. This will be exam ined in depth below  in chapter five. See also: Judge 
For Yourselves! [hereafter sim ply; JFY ], 138) w here o n e ’s relationship tow ards C hristianity is 
(negatively) affected by a social change.
W hen I quote K ierkegaard’s use o f  the term  ‘m an’ in this thesis, 1 shall alw ays understand it to mean 
m ankind in general. K ierkegaard does offer a scriptural anthropology that seeks to explain the different 
‘natural qualifications’ (JP IV, 5008) that belong to each sex, and that is based on the Biblical account 
o f  G od’s creation o f  m an (A dam ) and subsequent creation o f  w om an (Eve) from m an ’s side (JP IV, 
5003, 5005). I will never be referring to this latter account, how ever; firstly because I do not believe 
that K ierkegaard’s essentialist account o f  w om en is either inform ative or contradictory to anything I 
w rite in this thesis (including the genera! anthropological account that I shall sketch here). But 
additionally , I believe that K ierkegaard’s O ld-T estam ent anthropology is unfortunately irreparably 
sexist, even to the point o f  contradicting  his N ew  T estam ent anthropology. W hilst I cannot hope to treat 
this subject w ith the attention that it deserves here, I can point the reader to tw o excellent w orks that 
pursue these argum ents. Celine Leon has w ritten an im pressive and detailed treatm ent of the inherently 
sexist aspect o f  K ierkegaard’s anthropological thought: (Leon, 2008); and W anda W arren Berry has 
convincingly argued that the essentialist aspects o f  K ierkegaard’s are in stark contradiction to the 
existential, spiritually edifying aspects (Berry, 1997a, 53).
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o f the New Testament, and especially with the latter’s emphasis on the spiritual 
equality between all humans. Furthermore, according K ierkegaard’s interpretation o f 
the New Testament, becoming a Christian is attained by ‘becoming spirit’. Despite 
ultimately being scripturally-informed, K ierkegaard’s anthropology is also fully 
complementary to the developmental account traced above -  a point which I think he 
might find in favour o f his scripturally based anthropology. (We shall see below that 
whilst K ierkegaard’s frequently takes Biblical passages concerning anthropological 
questions as a matter o f faith, he is nonetheless not shy o f pointing towards what he 
takes to be reasonable empirical evidence to support those claims if  and when he 
thinks that it can be provided.)
A key tenet o f  K ierkegaard’s own anthropology then, one that is radically different to 
the account I postulated above, is that we are ‘created by G od’ (JP I, 65). God 
originally composed us, Kierkegaard writes elsewhere, with a harmonious 
relationship between the temporal and the spiritual (JP I, 68, cf., Sickness Unto Death 
[hereafter simply; SUD], 16). Kierkegaard also believes that the human being has a 
purpose or a Telos, and this is to return to the state o f our original creation where we 
enjoyed a balanced relationship both between the various aspects o f the self, and with 
God (JP I, 65).
In worldly existence, however, we experience a misrelationship with God (e.g.: JP III, 
2418) and must strive to claim it back.53 ‘M an’, Kierkegaard writes in another journal
32 N ote then that K ierkegaard claim s that the hum an being had a tem poral aspect even before The Fall. 
God, on the other hand, is and alw ays will be ‘sp irit’ ( U pbuilding D iscourses in Various Spirits 
[hereafter sim ply; U DV S], 192; JFY , 95; JP 111, 2446, 2907. Som etim es K ierkegaard also calls God 
‘pure sub jectiv ity ’ (e.g.: JP 111, 2992)).
53 K ierkegaard later gives an account o f  how  man m ight once m ore ‘resem ble’ God, through w orship 
(U D V S, 193).
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entry, ‘is a fallen spirit who by way o f punishment was degraded to being anim al’ (JP 
IV, 4349, cf.; JP VI, 6881, 6898). In one sense, the human being is quite obviously an 
animal. For Kierkegaard, however, the human being is also more than ju s t  an animal 
because spirit exists in the former but not in the latter. I f  a human was merely an 
animal they would not be able to feel humbled or humiliated by the fact that they are 
an animal (which, after all, is part o f the punishment that God inflicts in the Genesis 
account o f The Fall. See Genesis 3:10). Only a being that is both an animal and spirit 
can suffer such emotions as embarrassment (JP IV, 4349).54 A purely animal being 
could not experience phenomena such as embarrassment, bashfulness, envy, shame, 
despair, or anxiety. It is, however, an irrefutable anthropological fact that human 
beings can and often do suffer such emotions. This can only be accounted for, 
Kierkegaard argues, by recognising that the human is both a spiritual and animalistic 
being.
Despite the fact that we were originally created by God in an ordered relationship we 
are bom  into the world in a state o f misrelationship. In another journal entry 
Kierkegaard shows how his anthropology o f ‘m an’ is not entirely based on the 
account o f the expulsion o f Adam and Eve from the Garden o f Eden. For Kierkegaard 
also notes that: *[...] according to the New Testament, no man is bom  as spirit, and 
after the natural birth to be man is to be body and m ind’ (JP IV, 4363, my emphasis, 
cf. JP IV, 3996 (“ [...] men are primarily anim al.”); 3967). By the time that the single 
individual reaches the requisite age to become spirit it is likely that the finite aspects 
o f the se lf will have already governed and overburdened the spiritual side o f the
54 O nce again, I believe that K ierkegaard w ould be pleased to see that his scripturally based 
anthropology accounts for brute, em pirical facts about the nature o f  hum an life, as well as unites these 
facts w ith C hristian dogm a. K ierkegaard’s com m ents about the nature o f  other phenom ena such as 
bashfulness (JP I, 78; CA, 43-44), despair (SU D, 16) and envy (JP III, 2986) continue the argum ent 
that these experiences could only exist in a being who is both spiritual and part anim al.
Page 112 o f  354. Kierkegaard’s Existential Theory o f  the Political. Thomas Wolstenholme.
individual. Hence, the decision to ‘become spirit’ is a radical break to the physical- 
psychical developm ent that will have dominated the single individual’s experience o f 
the world hitherto. In addition to this, satisfying one’s spiritual demands can 
potentially involve physical-psychical ‘suffering’. For this reason, the realisation that 
one ought to ‘become spirit’ is one that puts the single individual into a state o f 
‘crisis’ (JP IV, 4363, cf., JP III, 2915, 2917 (“By nature man is against the 
Christianity o f the New Testam ent.”), 2919, 2920, 2921).
We can now understand why attempting to achieve the harmonious relationship that 
we were originally created in (and which is, after all, the Telos o f  the human being) 
might be difficult. It is both unnatural - given our ‘natural’ upbringing from infancy to 
adulthood - as well as difficult and potentially painful. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard 
believes that becoming an authentic self is not just a possibility for each single 
individual but also the very purpose o f existence. Aside from the religious 
implications o f becoming the self that God designed us to be, becoming an authentic 
self also has ethical implications. The only way that a person can become an ethical 
agent is to exert one’s spirit and to choose to refrain from being governed by 
tem porality alone. The ethically responsible human being must cease to be solely 
governed by factually given psychical and physical determinants. The responsible 
agent recognises that rather than being the only possible cause o f human behaviour 
(which would otherwise lead to a deterministic outlook), temporal factors and 
contingencies can be transcended by the freely willing and responsible ethical agent. 
Kierkegaard believes that the possibility for free action, and perhaps the phenomenal 
evidence for it too, provides the individual with the first intimation that they are a 
spiritual being as well as a psychical-physical one. Becoming spirit is therefore an
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ethical and religious ‘task’ - or a ‘claim ’ that is asked o f each one us as a single 
individual.55
To take stock then: the natural state that the individual finds his or herself in is one 
where the temporal aspects o f the self, the psychical and physical, are inharmoniously 
domineering. To continue to live in such a state, despite reaching the age where 
spiritual developm ent becomes a possibility (and a ‘task’) is to live as a ‘natural-m an’, 
or as Kierkegaard puts it in another, even more derogatory way, as a merely ‘animal- 
creature’. Individuals that live in this way, however, do not and indeed could not ever 
become only animals (- not even very cognitively advanced animals). If a human was 
ever only an animal then there could be no question o f existential and spiritual 
development. There is, however, always the potentiality to develop existentially 
because asserting the spiritual aspect o f the self to overcome any temporal 
determinant is an ever-present potentiality o f every human being. Hence, Kierkegaard 
states that the spiritual aspect o f the self is dormant in the ‘natural-m an’. No matter 
how hard one might try to ignore the spiritual aspect o f their se lf they will fail, 
because it simply cannot be extirpated.56
When, in the mature stage o f each single individual’s life, the potential requisite level 
o f self-consciousness, willpower, and understanding are present in the single 
individual, he or she will be endowed with the ability to willingly and mindfully 
undertake the spiritual task o f becoming a self. The single individual will then have to
55 R eferences to the task o f  becom ing spirit abound K ierkegaard’s authorship, both explicitly and 
im plicitly. For exam ples o f  the form er, see CA, 49; Christian D iscourses , 254; SUD, 176; JP I, 65, 78, 
84, 86; JP 111,2907.
56 N ote also that the tem poral aspects o f  the se lf  (the psychical and physical) cannot be extirpated 
either, as I will discuss shortly.
Page 114 o f  354. Kierkegaard’s Existential Theory o f  the Political. Thomas Wolstenholme.
address the fact that they have hitherto been largely governed by the psychical- 
physical aspects o f the self.57
Overcoming the tyrannical rule o f the psychical-physical aspects o f the se lf is 
unfortunately an exceptionally difficult task. Kierkegaard understands this, and also 
recognises that being one-sidedly ruled by the psychical-physical aspects o f the se lf is 
the most primal condition that the mature single individual will find his or herself in. 
This is only made increasingly difficult by the fact that being governed by the 
psychical-physical aspects o f the self is also the most sensuously preferable and easy 
form o f existing (JP IV, 4359, for example). An individual living in such a way 
wishes to deny (consciously or not) that the self partakes in an infinite, spiritual aspect 
and hence wishes to forfeit the task o f becoming an authentic self.
One o f K ierkegaard’s most famous philosophical tenets is his theory o f the three
c  o
existential spheres or stages o f life: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. In 
line with forfeiting existential development, neglecting the spiritual aspect o f the self 
(again, consciously or unconsciously) entails that the single individual remains within 
the aesthetic state o f existence. We might say that this way o f existing is the ‘default’ 
state that an individual finds his or herself in. But it is also the most inauthentic and 
spiritually deficient way o f life. Such an individual refrains from becoming a truly
37 As the above paragraph highlights, how ever, the spiritual aspect o f  the se lf  is ever-present. Since 
ignoring the spiritual part o f  the se lf is also one way o f  relating to it, the individual who thinks that she 
or he is solely governed by the psychical-physical aspects o f  the se lf  is, in fact, still relating to the 
spiritual (see, on this note, SUD, 25; JP 1, 749). In this case, the spiritual aspect o f  the se lf  is still, from 
a C hristian point o f  view , ‘govern ing’ the ind iv idual’s actions from ‘behind the scenes’, as it w ere. I 
thank Dr. G raham  M. Sm ith for bringing this point to my attention.
58 As they are a crucial underlying tenet o f  his philosophy, K ierkegaard’s theory o f  the stages is 
discussed extensively throughout his literature. For a full list o f  references in K ierkegaard’s w orks to 
the theory o f  the stages see Hong, H., and Hong, E .’s list o f  references in the notes to the section 
‘S tages’ that is found in K ierkegaard’s Journals and P apers , vol. IV: p. 702.
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ethically responsible agent, desiring instead to be governed by the historically 
contingent and temporal.
This anthropological view therefore links K ierkegaard’s view o f the spiritual aspect o f 
the se lf with existential development. Gregor M alantschuk has excellently summed up 
the relationship between K ierkegaard’s anthropology and existential development in a 
way that is a fitting conclusion to the account I have sketched above. Hence, I quote at 
length:
A human being begins his life as a natural entity, inasmuch as he [or she] 
is completely bound by the givens o f nature that constitute him [or her]. 
He [or she] lives in the now and reacts altogether spontaneously, ignorant 
o f good and evil. This is [a hum an’s] innocent condition. By reflection he 
[or she] rises above the now and begins to form a concept o f past and 
future. It is on this level that anxiety awakens in a [person]; it is a sign that 
he [or she] is about to lose his [or her] secure anchoring in nature and find 
the first intimations o f his [or her] freedom. This is the beginning o f the 
esthetic stage. Characteristic o f this stage, [the person] still hangs on 
continually to the external, to the temporal. [The person] is living in what 
the pseudonymous writer Vigilius Haufniensis calls a ‘synthesis o f the 
psychic and the physical’ [CA, 39, ed. tr.]; the spiritual is still present only 
as possibility. In the esthetic stage heredity and milieu play the important 
roles, because on that level the individual lacks spirit as the guiding 
factor.” (Malantschuk, cited in: JP I, p.696. Original emphasis.)
From an analysis o f K ierkegaard’s anthropological view we see how the spiritual and 
the existential are linked -  a relation that has only been hinted at hitherto. It is only 
because the spiritual aspect o f the self exists and provides the single individual with 
the ability to freely establish a relationship between the physical, psychical, and 
spiritual aspects o f the self that existential development is made possible. How one
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regards and relates to the spiritual aspect o f the self will determine whether one 
remains living an aesthetic way o f life, or whether one develops ethico-religiously.
K ierkegaard’s anthropological account o f the self also informs his views regarding the 
relation o f the spiritual to the temporal and the political -  something that we saw was 
an important factor o f his existential theory o f the political discussed above. Finally, 
K ierkegaard’s anthropology explains some o f his criticisms o f Luther’s politically 
implemented reform and highlights as to why Kierkegaard diverges from this position 
with regards to spiritual or existential reform. Hence, an analysis o f K ierkegaard’s 
ambivalent reception o f Luther’s reform will highlight aspects o f K ierkegaard’s 
existential theory o f the political that have not yet been examined.
3.3.2 Luther: K ierkegaard’s case study o f spiritual reform.
K ierkegaard’s opinion o f Luther’s reform is ambivalent but largely negative. On the 
one hand, Kierkegaard thinks that Luther’s understanding o f Christianity is excellent. 
Kierkegaard praises Luther for detecting the spiritual laxity in his own contemporaries 
and highlighting the need for spiritual reformation. Ultimately, however, Kierkegaard 
argues that Luther lacked awareness o f the existential ramifications o f his own 
attempt at solving the spiritual crisis he had so expertly identified. This failing led 
Luther to condone a political solution to a spiritual or existential problem which 
ultimately resulted in a situation as dire (perhaps even more so) than the one Luther 
had originally intended to remedy (JP I, 711; JP II, 1135; JP III, 2682; cf., JP II, 2125).
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The problematic relationship between the political and the spiritual that Kierkegaard 
discovers in Luther’s reform informs K ierkegaard’s views o f the legitimate means and 
ends o f politics, and on the proper methodology and solution to an existential 
shortcoming. Hence, K ierkegaard’s examination o f Luther’s own failed attempt at 
existential reformation via political means informs K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f 
the political.
As has been mentioned, K ierkegaard’s appraisal o f Luther is highly ambivalent. In 
one o f his earliest comments on Luther, Kierkegaard approvingly cites Luther’s 
distinction between Christ as the ‘pattern’ [Exempel] (or prototype) and Christ as the 
redeemer (JP III: 2503). The M iddle-A ge’s relation to the religious, Kierkegaard 
believed, was one too narrowly focussed upon the notion that Christ is to be emulated 
(i.e., Christ as the ‘pattern’). W hilst this aspect is certainly an important element o f 
the Christian tradition, Kierkegaard believed that over-emphasising this aspect o f 
Christ led Christians in the M iddle-Ages to neglect a second, equally important aspect 
o f Christ (i.e., Christ as the redeemer).
Kierkegaard accuses the M iddle-Ages o f believing that if  one lived in a way that 
imitated Christ’s then, like Christ, one would secure an eternal life after death. 
Kierkegaard notes that living a life o f monasticism, or giving a specific amount o f 
money to charity were examples o f ways that people in the M iddle-Ages thought that 
they could achieve religiosity. As these examples show, however, this ‘M iddle-Age 
m entality’ neglects the need to pursue inward and spiritual development. The Middle- 
age approach to religious improvement implied that it could be attained by increasing 
the quality or quantity o f the ceremonious activities one did in G od’s name; or by
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increasing the amount o f charity one gave to one’s church or neighbour. One need not 
consult one’s conscience about spiritual matters but only authoritative sources. 
K ierkegaard believes, however, that being a truly spiritual being requires much mental 
anguish and diligence. That the Christians o f the M iddle-Ages lacked this altogether 
is proof for Kierkegaard that they (inadvertently or not) ignored at least some o f their 
essential spiritual demands.
Luther’s revolution was in highlighting the fact that religiosity cannot be secured by 
external practices alone (JP III; 2504, 2528). For Kierkegaard, Luther re-emphasises 
the fact that one does not become eo ipso religious by undertaking practices that are 
deemed by external sources to be religious. In fact, Kierkegaard goes farther than 
Luther in extenuating the fact that true emulation o f Christ would also entail all o f  the 
hardships that Christ suffered including martyrdom; and almost no person is willing 
or able to emulate Christ to that degree (e.g., JP III; 2504, 2974). Given the fact that 
human beings are at least in some regard temporal, finite beings, we must also 
rem ember that we could never live up to the infinite demands that God makes o f us; 
{Christian Discourses [hereafter simply; CD], 299; UDVS, 151; Works o f  Love 
[hereafter simply; W OL], 132, 190).59 Due to G od’s infinite love, however, we can 
hope for G od’s forgiveness. That is to say, Christ is also our redeemer. Both aspects 
o f Christ are important aspects o f the Christian tradition in their own right - but over­
emphasis on either could also inadvertently serve as the medium o f spiritual laxity.
59 This problem  o f  living up to the ‘infinite dem ands’ that a b e lie f in a D eity entails is defined as ‘guilt- 
consciousness’ and is a necessary feature o f  all genuine religions Concluding Unscientific P ostscript -  
Volume I [hereafter sim ply; CUP], 526, passim ; see also M ulhall, 1994, 74; Lee, 2006, 191-194, 217). 
The notion that God dem onstrated his infinite love and interest in our salvation, by becom ing a finite, 
h istorical being (C hrist) and suffering for us in this w orld, is a concept that is specific to C hristianity. 
The individual who recognises that one stands in this relation to the C hristian God is said to suffer ‘sin- 
consciousness’ w hich is a specifically Christian  phenom enon (see: CUP, 584; P ractice in Christianity, 
68; SUD, 120; TM , 238, JP 1, 452, 926; JP III, 2461; JP IV, 4020, 4021, 4026, 4035, 4039, 4472).
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This latter fact informs us about why a healthy balance between the two must be 
maintained.
With regards to these two aspects o f Christianity, Kierkegaard approvingly cites an 
epigram that he attributes to Luther: ‘The world is like a drunken peasant; if  you help 
him up on one side o f the horse, he falls o ff on the other side’ (FSE, 24).60 The 
epigram is from ‘Table Talks’ [Tischreden], a collection o f fragments from some o f 
the conversations that took place in Martin Luther’s household. As is rather typical 
with the ‘Table Talks’ collection as a whole, and even more so o f  Veit D ietrich’s 
recordings (especially this one), no clue to the context o f the epigram is given, bar the 
date. Hence Kierkegaard has more freedom than ever to appropriate the quote for his 
own purposes; an activity that perpetually characterises K ierkegaard’s style o f reading 
and annotation. (Noting this trend, Heiko Schulz has amusingly characterised 
K ierkegaard’s unique reading style as ‘appropriation by productive m isunderstanding’ 
(Schulz, 2010a, 81).)
‘Productively appropriating’ this epigram, Kierkegaard takes it to mean that the world 
is like a drunken peasant.61 At one moment the peasant is falling to the left -  someone
60 H oward and Edna Hong, the translators and editors o f  the tw enty-six  volum e publication edition o f  
‘K ierkegaard’s W ritings’ (m entioned above, §2.1), note that they could not find the original source for 
this epigram . The original is piece #630 o f ‘Table T a lk s’. Entry #630 was recorded by Veit D ietrich in 
the A utum n o f  1533. The English version given is: ‘The w orld is like a drunken peasant. I f  you lift him 
into the saddle on one side, he will fall o ff  again on the other side. O ne can ’t help him no m atter 
how  one tries. He w ants to be the D evil’s ’: in vol. 54, p. 111 o f  the 55 volum e ‘C oncordia Publishing 
H ouse and Fortress P ress’ edition o f  Luther's C ollected w orks. N ote that K ierkegaard m isquotes 
slightly -  the original does not m ention a ‘h o rse’. A dditionally , K ierkegaard explicitly attributes the 
quote to ‘L uther’. In all likelihood it was stated by Luther but this is not certain beyond a doubt. In any 
case, Luther never wrote the epigram  him self, strictly speaking. Perhaps this is w hy H oward and Edna 
H ong failed to trace K ierkegaard’s translation o f  the quote w hen their editorial w ork is otherw ise m ost 
frequently m agnificent.
61 I w ill assess w hat K ierkegaard takes to be Luther's use o f  the epigram  below . It is im portant to note, 
how ever, that K ierkegaard extends the use o f  the epigram  for his own purposes. In fact, in taking the 
epigram  its logical conclusions K ierkegaard ultim ately uses it in form ulating a critique o f  L uther’s 
attem pt at reform , as I shall show below.
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puts him/her straight again -  and now he/she is falling to the right. We might think 
that the potentiality for the peasant to fall one way or the other is the constant threat o f 
the temptation that the single individual faces to forfeit their spiritual task. As we saw 
above, the constant threat o f a temptation away from spiritual progression is a 
fundamental aspect o f K ierkegaard’s general anthropological view o f the self.
In the first part o f the work Judge fo r  Yourselves!, Kierkegaard links the epigram with 
his anthropological view. Kierkegaard explains that the majority o f people are ‘drunk’ 
with worldliness and need to become sober. Individuals are drunk, Kierkegaard argues, 
because they become so immersed in activity that relates to externals (as opposed to 
inward development) that they fail to relate to the spiritual, infinite aspect o f the self. 
In K ierkegaard’s words:
In any other knowledge [than earnestly understanding the relation o f 
the self to God] you are away from yourself, you forget yourself, are 
absent from yourself. [...] To forget oneself, to come, not to, but to go 
away from oneself [...]  [f]rom the Christian point o f view, this is 
intoxication.62 Indeed, is it not so, do we not say that the person who is 
addicted to the use o f strong drink forgets himself, is drowning him self 
or his self?’ (JFY, 105).
62 In this context, as in m any o f  K ierkegaard’s com m ents pertaining to religiosity, K ierkegaard 
specifically  d iscusses C hristianity. For K ierkegaard, som e features o f  C hristianity, w hilst having 
conceptual counterparts in other religions, are nevertheless qualitatively different and specific to 
C hristianity. Such concepts include the inherent sinfulness o f  the hum an, and the notion o f  G od’s 
grace. K ierkegaard believes that these exclusively C hristian concepts best account for the 
anthropological account o f  the hum an and its existential task o f  becom ing a se lf that K ierkegaard 
describes elsew here. N evertheless, m any o f  the statem ents that K ierkegaard d iscusses with C hristianity 
explicitly in m ind, this one included, can also be applied to his view  o f  spiritual progression in general. 
1 w ill note when concepts specific to C hristianity and not religiosity in general are being discussed. 
W hen no such qualification is made, how ever, it will be because 1 take w hat K ierkegaard says about 
C hristianity  to apply to religiosity m ore generally as well.
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As the text continues Kierkegaard implies that this ‘drunkenness’ (read as: ‘secular­
m indedness’, I argue) is a fundamental part o f being human (ibid., 113). W hat does 
Kierkegaard mean, however, when he says that a person could ‘drown his or her s e lf?  
The full implications o f the quote only make sense, I suggest, by recalling 
Kierkegaard’s anthropological account o f the self. Kierkegaard seems to be arguing 
that the temporal, physic-psychical aspect o f the self overpowers and hence ‘crowds 
ou t’ the spiritual part o f the self. For Kierkegaard, however, exercising the spiritual 
part o f the se lf (in the right way) is what allows an individual to become a genuine, 
authentic, or ‘true’ self. Hence, becoming drunken with tem porality drowns out the 
(true) self.
In the quote, Kierkegaard also restates the argument that engagements in temporal 
(and this includes ‘w orldly’) affairs are sensuously pleasurable and perhaps even 
soothingly so. Engagement with political affairs need not be an exception, and can 
indeed be a kind o f aesthetic enjoyment (JP VI, 4359). Engrossment in worldly affairs 
o f any type, however, (rather than mere engagement) necessarily distances the single 
individual from spiritual development. Such a person neglects the spiritual aspect o f 
the self and (consciously or not) allows his or herself to be overcome by the temporal 
part(s) o f his or her self. In such a situation the spirit fails to constitute, sustain and 
harmonise the temporal and spiritual aspects o f the self, and so the ‘drunken’ person 
is, consciously or not, engaged in a misrelation o f the self. Hence, an individual who 
is constantly ‘drunken’ with worldliness is systematically failing to be or become a 
true self. The temporal part o f the self crowds out, or ‘drow ns’ out (to stick with the 
epigram) the spiritual aspect o f the self.
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Despite the fact that Luther’s comment about the world being a drunken peasant 
would appear to lend itself to K ierkegaard’s anthropological belief that the default 
position for an individual to find his or her self in is ‘drunkenness’ (read: spiritual 
poverty or laxity), it must be admitted that Kierkegaard does not actually use the 
epigram in this way. Notwithstanding the fact that it is not explicitly mentioning it in 
this context, however, the epigram does lie at the heart o f K ierkegaard’s view o f the 
relationship between the spiritual and the temporal. Ironically then, the epigram 
contributes to one o f K ierkegaard’s arguments against Luther’s reform. We will 
examine this aspect o f the epigram in more detail below. For now I will pursue the 
occasions where Kierkegaard does explicitly link the epigram with Luther’s reform 
and with Luther’s view o f Christianity.
Kierkegaard believes that Luther’s use o f the epigram (for we have examined 
Kierkegaard’s use above, and will return to it once again below) is that the world 
( ‘drunken peasant’) may lean too far towards ‘one side’ (aspect) o f Christianity - the 
notion o f Christ the example -  or too far to the ‘other side’ - o f  Christ the redeemer. 
According to this reading Luther believed that the imitative aspect o f Christ, ‘Christ 
as exam ple’, became too one-sidedly emphasised in M iddle-age conceptions o f 
Christianity. The biased conception o f Christianity allowed for spiritual laxity that 
nevertheless maintained the illusion that true Christianity was being practised. 
Luther’s corrective reform to this situation consisted in emphasising the other aspect 
o f Christianity -  that o f Christ the redeemer.
K ierkegaard’s view o f true Christianity is one where both o f the two aspects o f Christ 
are maintained and emphasised:
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C hristianity’s requirem ent is this: your life should express works as 
strenuously as possible; then one more thing is required -  that you humble 
yourself and confess: But my being saved is nevertheless grace. (FSE, 
17).63
In other words, Kierkegaard believes that true Christianity requires both that one 
whole-heartedly apply ones’ religion in external practices including rituals and 
Christian works, but also that one admits that this alone will not guarantee safe 
passage into heaven. The problem with the M iddle-age conception o f Christianity was 
that it believed that Christian works were judged meritoriously, so that so many works 
secured eternal bliss. Such a judgem ent is, according to Kierkegaard, actually a 
‘secular’ way o f thinking. As Kierkegaard notes, a secular-minded approach to 
meritorious works would most likely think the following; ‘if  the works are no 
guarantor for eternal bliss, if they must inevitably fail to meet the infinite 
requirements that G od’s love demands, and if  one must ultimately rely on G od’s good 
grace no matter what, then why would the single individual undertake Christian 
w orks?’ Seen from a worldly perspective, undertaking such works would be 
‘foolishness’.
Seen from this light, Luther actually battled against a specific manifestation o f 
‘worldliness’, ‘secular-m indedness’, or a widespread over-emphasis o f the ‘tem poral’ 
aspect o f life. The M iddle-age concept o f Christianity (read: spirituality) was one
63 See also JP II, 1482: “ I f  I w ere to define Christian perfection, I should not say that it is a perfection 
o f  striving but specifically  that it is the deep recognition o f  the im perfection o f  one's striving  [and I 
w ould add the ‘success’ o f  o n e ’s w orks also], and precisely because o f  this a deeper and deeper 
consciousness o f  the need for grace, not grace for this or that, but the infinite need infinitely fo r  grace  
[ . . . ] ” (original em phasis).
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where inward developm ent was neglected and where religiosity could be attained by a 
matter o f quantitative calculation; so many ‘w orks’ making the afterlife more or less 
guaranteed. The idea that ‘religious’ works were ostensibly practised with an 
expectation o f the reward o f an afterlife is, according to Kierkegaard, not actually 
evidence o f religiosity at all though.
In response to this false understanding o f Christianity Luther emphasised G od’s grace. 
The fact that one only achieved the eternal life by receiving G od’s grace thereby 
opened up the possibility o f producing religious works simply for their own sake. It 
also encouraged the single individual to strive inwardly, to attempt to become as 
worthy as G od’s grace as one could be, and to work to interpret G od’s word and apply 
it in one’s own life, rather than thoughtlessly following established, ceremonious 
practices.
If  Luther was struggling against a kind o f secular-mindedness that passed itself o ff as 
spirituality then Kierkegaard believed that his own age was equally in need o f a 
reform -  albeit, Kierkegaard was fighting against an over-emphasis o f ‘inward grace’ 
rather than ‘external action’ (JP II, 1135, 2125, 2127; JP III, 2359. cf. JP II, 1226, 
2119). Luther’s reformation, Kierkegaard lamented, had ultimately only resorted in 
K ierkegaard’s contemporaries over-emphasising the aspect o f Christ as ‘the redeem er’. 
Luther’s emphasis on grace was accommodated by worldly shrewdness and taken to 
the opposite extreme which resulted in a version o f Christianity that was just as untrue 
as the false religion o f the M iddle-age. In K ierkegaard’s times, making Lutheranism 
the state religion only led to a situation where people emphasised grace so much that 
practising religious works became completely ignored. People too hastily admitted the
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futility o f human endeavour with regards to securing the afterlife. Hence, one’s 
religious salvation, it was (over)emphasised, was solely secured by practising self- 
effacem ent before God and seeking His good grace. It was erroneously thought that 
Luther’s reform had shown that practising works o f faith, or imitating Christ, were 
futile performances because they could never secure religious salvation on their own. 
Kierkegaard would agree that works alone are no guarantor for salvation (e.g., JFY, 
193); but he would disagree with the conclusion that this therefore makes them 
altogether futile. K ierkegaard’s vision o f true Christianity is one where the individual 
is continually asked to perform religious works that are nevertheless no guarantee o f 
the afterlife (FSE, 17; JP II, 1482).
K ierkegaard’s discussion o f Luther’s reform hence presents us with one more 
argument for resisting a politically implemented solution to a spiritual problem. As 
we have touched upon above, and as Kierkegaard openly states, ‘There is always a 
secular m entality’ that is willing to pass itself o ff for religiosity when really it is 
worldliness (FSE, 16). That is to say, there is a widespread tendency in humans to 
shirk from spiritual development and instead to seek to cater for the temporal aspects 
o f the self. If  a spiritual reform is ever needed then it is likely to be because the typical 
single individual encountered is neglecting the spiritual aspect o f the self. Politics, 
Kierkegaard maintains throughout his authorship, works with finite, quantitative 
means and affects worldly change. As we have seen above, Kierkegaard does not 
believe that politics is fitted for or capable o f instituting spiritual reform.
W hat K ierkegaard’s anthropology and his examination o f the faults o f Luther’s 
reform show is that a secular mentality will always prefer to engage in political
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(worldly) affairs than in spiritual development. Attempting to solve a spiritual 
problem with political means is likely to fail for an additional reason then. If 
individuals are in need o f spiritual deepening then the natural reaction to a call for 
spiritual reform that is being implemented politically is to become engrossed in 
political issues. Hence Kierkegaard criticises Luther for turning to political means to 
solve a spiritual problem. The result o f  the political element o f Lutheranism only led 
K ierkegaard’s own contemporaries to adopt an over-zealous view o f the powers o f 
politics in solving existential matters. An individual in need o f spiritual deepening is 
likely to see political alterations in external affairs (in the official state religion for 
example) as a cure to their spiritual sickness. Since the problem stems from spiritual 
laxity, a view that external changes have cured one’s sickness is ironically likely to 
tempt the individual away from a true cure o f inward, spiritual deepening.
As we might expect from an analysis o f Luther, K ierkegaard’s concluding comments 
are frequently concerned with Christianity. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard does also (if 
only rarely) consider religion more generally in his examination o f  the reformation. In 
fact, much o f Kierkegaard’s analysis o f Christianity (including Danish Lutheranism) 
also applies to spirituality more generally, especially with regards to the relationship 
between the spiritual and the political.
W hilst highlighting the difference between Christianity and secular shrewdness, for 
example, Kierkegaard frequently emphasises that all religiosity essentially works in 
the opposite direction o f worldly shrewdness (JFY, 99-100, cf. JP I, 75; JP IV,
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4348).64 Hence, Kierkegaard concedes that religiosity, or spirituality in general, is 
conceptually differentiated from practical, temporal care and wellbeing (JP IV, 4336, 
4348, 4354, 4359). K ierkegaard’s case-study o f Lutheranism shows how the remedy 
to a particular manifestation o f spiritual impoverishment was sought in institutional, 
political changes rather than authentic, inward development. Luther’s spiritual reform 
failed because it was implemented in the wrong way, i.e. politically, and without 
continual attention to the expected existential appropriation o f the reform. (In other 
words, Luther’s reform was ‘undialectical’.) That the same dialectical relationship 
between spirituality and worldliness is to be found in all cases o f spiritual negligence 
-  not ju st Luther’s -  is highlighted by both K ierkegaard’s anthropological tenets and 
his existential theory o f the political. Hence, attempts at solving existential problems 
with political means is likely to only lead the impoverished individual into further 
over-engagement with worldly affairs at the risk o f neglecting spiritual deepening.
As mentioned above, Kierkegaard did think that his own age had erroneously over­
emphasised the redeeming aspect o f Christ. One might think it contradictory for 
Kierkegaard to have used much o f his later authorship to re-emphasise the imitative 
aspect o f Christ. Is this not just a case o f ‘pushing’ the peasant in the opposite 
direction to which he/she presently slumps? Did Kierkegaard not him self recognise 
that political reform cannot be the cure for spiritual impoverishment? An external
64 In a late jou rnal entry K ierkegaard pushes this point: “ Every call from G od is alw ays addressed to 
one person, the single individual;!?..] E verything w hich m akes its appearance statistically  is not from 
above;[i.e., not from G o d ...]  you can be sure it is from below . This statistical approach is a slyness 
w hich w ants to escape from rigorousness, the spirit-rigorousness o f  being spirit, and, using num bers, 
operates m aterialistically  [i.e., psychic-physically] (JP I: 238). See also: JP III, 2997, w here: “The life 
o f  the religious person [i.e., not ju s t the Christian] is the m ost intensive agony” sim ply because 
“becom ing involved with G od” in any genuine way is excruciatingly difficult. Finally: JP IV, 4340 also 
em phasis that all form s o f  the spiritual life require ‘self-renunciation’. K ierkegaard even supposes that 
if  one genuinely practices self-renunciation to ‘a false conception o f  G od’ one still m ight have more 
spirit than the person w ho ‘has the m ost correct scholarly and speculative know ledge o f  [the true] God 
but w hose know ledge exercises no pow er at all over his life’ {ibid.).
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reform that ‘pushes’ the drunken peasant ‘upright’ is surely only a temporary solution 
- the peasant will inevitably only slump over to the other side, m aking the reform 
ultimately ineffective.
How does Kierkegaard respond to the spiritual impoverishment that he believes his 
own contemporaries to be affected by then? If  we look at K ierkegaard’s work Judge 
fo r  Yourselves! we see that the second part o f the book is named ‘Christ as the 
Prototype, or No One Can Serve Two M asters’. As is to be expected, Kierkegaard re­
emphasises the prototypical aspect o f Christ in light o f the fact that he sees the 
negligence o f this aspect o f Christianity as the biggest obstacle to spiritual 
development in his particular time and place. What is worth noting, however, is that 
the first part o f the work is called ‘Becoming Sober’. Though Luther’s epigram is not 
explicitly mentioned, the analogy has been appropriated and is at the heart o f the text. 
Thus we find that near the end o f the text Kierkegaard writes, in a way that I have 
hoped by now to have shown is characteristic o f his thought, that in order to halt the 
spiritual impoverishment o f his times what is needed is not external reform but an 
inward change -  or sobriety.
As Kierkegaard developed his theory o f the political, he learned from his examination 
o f Luther that a spiritual reform must be directed to producing inward development in 
the ‘single individual’. For Kierkegaard, political reform will not tackle the ever­
present risk o f spiritual forfeiture using external means, and on masse. Political 
reform itself is a secular affair that ultimately risks becoming one more temporal 
‘pleasure’ or worldly ‘profit’ for the spiritually impoverished individual to enjoy (JFY, 
131).
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Instead, Kierkegaard frequently notes that his own task must be one o f producing 
‘inward reform ’ (JP III: 2510, 2515, 2546, 2552; cf., 2929). Rather than wanting to 
amend the spiritual laxity present within a given situation with altering externals (i.e., 
to ‘push’ the drunken peasant aright), K ierkegaard’s task is in attempting to make his 
readers become aware o f  the fact that the spiritual laxity exists as a perpetual threat to 
authentic development. In other words, Kierkegaard wishes to ‘sober up’ the single 
individual by first highlighting their spiritual impoverishment before asking the single 
individual to make an honest consideration and admission o f the extent to which 
spiritual laxity exists in his or her own life.65
In the section o f Judge fo r  Yourselves! titled ‘Becoming Sober’, Kierkegaard calls for 
an admission from the reader that the current state o f affairs in Denmark has strayed 
somewhat from the ideally Christian. Therefore, Kierkegaard asks the reader to admit 
that the degree to which ordinary Danish citizens imitate Christ is far from the New 
Testam ent ideal. Despite the fact that Kierkegaard believed the M iddle-Ages 
conception o f rituals and works to have ultimately been misguided, he nevertheless 
respects the earnestness and degree to which M iddle-age Christians were willing to at 
least try to imitate Christ. In fact, Kierkegaard laments that this crucial aspect o f 
Christianity is lacking in his own tim es.66 A ‘secular-m inded’ (mis)interpretation o f 
Luther’s reform had been used to justify temporal welfare instead o f an engagement in 
spiritual deepening.
65 Cf., JP III, 2881: “The m ethod [that K ierkegaard’s spiritually destitute contem poraries used to attain 
‘re lig iosity ’] is to leave out the existentially strenuous passages in the N ew  Testam ent. [...] I think that 
it is better to take them  along, to acknow ledge that these qualifications are found in the N ew  Testam ent 
- and then m ake confession o f  our w eakness.” C f ,  ibid., 2886, 2902.
66 K ierkegaard’s em phasis on the necessity o f  ‘W orks o f  L ove’ is analysed in chapter seven below , and 
is part o f  my central argum ent that K ierkegaard’s political and social thought is not im potent with 
regards to external change.
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It can be seen that K ierkegaard’s suggested solution to the spiritual impoverishment 
he perceived in Demark is in-line with the theory o f the political that he had 
previously developed. Kierkegaard gives an additional reason for believing that the 
m ixture o f spirituality and politics is likely only to be ‘disastrous’. Kierkegaard shows 
how it might always be tempting to advocate spiritual reform with political means. 
But K ierkegaard’s analysis o f Luther’s own reform, as well as his anthropological 
view o f the spiritual and temporal aspects o f the human self, led him to see political 
means as ultimately inept solutions to spiritual and existential problems.
It should be noted that just as in the previous two sections we saw that Kierkegaard 
does not condemn politics per se but more accurately the catastrophic mixing o f  the 
political and the existential, a reform like Luther’s is likewise not considered 
blameworthy simply because it tempts people into an engagement with political, 
worldly affairs. If  this were the case, then Kierkegaard would presumably have to 
criticise any and every call for political activism. This view o f K ierkegaard’s position 
is untenable firstly because Kierkegaard plainly sees any increase in our temporal 
wellbeing as ceteris parabus a good thing, as we have seen above; and secondly, 
because Kierkegaard him self called out for a political change in his final writings. We 
will analyse the justifications that Kierkegaard gave for such political involvement in 
chapter six below.
A final reason that Kierkegaard could not disagree with political action per se is to do 
with his anthropological beliefs. As we noted above, Luther’s call for reform could be 
seen (inadvertently or not) as a rallying cry for involvement in worldly, political
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affairs. We also noted that becoming engrossed in catering for the temporal aspect o f 
the self is an ever present threat to spiritual development. Nevertheless, nowhere in 
K ierkegaard’s anthropology is an engagement the temporal aspect o f the self in and o f  
itself criticised. On the contrary, Kierkegaard is always concerned with keeping a 
healthy relation between the varying aspects o f the self, the temporal aspect included. 
There is no reason not to think that a single individual could not be constantly 
engaged with the demands o f being a spiritual self as well as maintaining an interest 
in political reformation (for the security o f temporal goods such as civil liberties for 
example). Kierkegaard would only criticise an engrossment in temporal affairs.
In fact, in his most detailed work on anthropology, Sickness Unto Death , 
K ierkegaard’s pseudonymous author ‘Anti-C lim acus’ has a section called 
‘Infinitude’s Despair Is to lack Finitude’. The same author calls despair ‘a sickness o f 
the spirit, o f  the s e lf . Hence, to lack finitude is a form o f a sickness o f the self or o f 
the spirit (SUD, 30-32).67 The desire to ignore or extirpate the temporal, finite aspect 
o f the self will therefore also only lead to an imbalanced and unhealthy relationship to 
one’s self.68
67 It should also be noted that despair, the sickness o f  the spirit, takes three forms: ‘in despair not to be 
conscious o f  having a self; in despair not to will to be oneself; [and] in despair to will to be o n e se lf . 
The text clearly states that ‘not to be conscious o f  having a s e l f ,  in particular, in having an eternal 
aspect o f  the se lf  [spirit] is also a form o f  despair o f  the self. A n ti-C lim acus’ exam ple o f  this form o f  
despair highlights how  w idespread secular-m indedness is not only evidence o f  a large-scale spiritual 
sickness but can even ‘d rag ’ other people into despair: This ‘kind o f  despair [despair not to be 
conscious o f  having a self] seem s to perm it itse lf to be tricked out o f  its se lf  by "the others." 
Surrounded by hordes o f  men, absorbed in all sorts o f  secular m atters, more and m ore shrewd about the 
w ays o f  the w orld— such a person forgets him self, forgets his nam e divinely understood, does not dare 
to believe in him self, finds it too hazardous to be him self, and far easier and safer to be like the others, 
to becom e a copy, a num ber, a m ass m an ’ (SU D, 32).
68 This m ight inform  K ierkegaard’s criticism  o f  m onasticism  (see his journal entries on the matter: JP 
III, 2745-2765. See also: W O L, 144, 146; JFY , 15, 192-3). S tephen Evans has also argued that 
K ierkegaard’s criticism  o f  m onasticism  is directly related to his disapproval o f  the practice o f  
C hristianity  in the M iddle-A ges (1989, 166).
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Similarly, Kierkegaard frequently maintained that even aesthetic ‘sensuousness’ could 
be unified with the spiritual, if the single individual brought the two aspects o f the self 
into a well-balanced relation. Hence, Kierkegaard later writes that the Christian 
practice o f neighbour love is “specifically intended [...] for transforming sensuous- 
love and friendship” -  transforming, we should note, in such a way that neither the 
sensuous nor the spiritual aspect are annihilated but both preserved in union.69 Thus 
Kierkegaard also writes: “ [...] in loving yourself, preserve love for neighbour; in 
sensuous-love and friendship, preserve love for neighbour” (WOL, 62, my emphasis; 
cf., 112).
69 See also (CA , 80) w here H aufniensis describes how  ‘sensuousness is transfigured in spirit [so, not 
ann ih ila ted]’ (Cited in: Com e, 2000, 27). A rnold Com e cites and discusses both these two references 
and the next, and so serves as an im portant source o f  inspiration for my interpretation.
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3.4 Concluding remarks.
I have attempted to use three distinct areas o f K ierkegaard’s authorship to highlight 
K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political. Some o f the claims we have seen 
Kierkegaard make above are essential components o f his theory o f the political and 
are, as such, constantly defended throughout his authorship. A list o f  such claims will 
be a helpful reference point and will be given below. From this list, a re-assessment o f 
K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political (drawn from constant theoretical commitments 
within the three bodies o f text examined above) will also be provided (immediately 
below in section 3.4.1).
Despite the constancies o f his theory o f the political, Kierkegaard also gives many 
nuanced and differing arguments about the importance o f  m aintaining his theory o f 
the political. Kierkegaard outlines numerous dangerous consequences o f ignoring the 
pivotal tenets o f his theory o f the political; and these unfortunate consequences are 
highlighted with regards to numerous differing social and political circumstances. I 
hope to have highlighted some particularly illustrative nuances o f K ierkegaard’s 
theory o f the political whilst lamenting the fact that not all such subtleties could have
70been addressed.
70 I f  the reader is fam iliar w ith K ierkegaard’s authorship and has felt as though som e o f  the discussion 
above could tie in to other aspects o f  it I w ould not be surprised. I would tentatively suggest that this 
supports my be lie f that K ierkegaard w as too active a mind not to have been considering how every 
aspect o f  his thought related to questions regarding the political.
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3.4.1 Key tenets o f K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political
From the above analysis o f some o f K ierkegaard’s works we can identify the essential 
components o f K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political. Firstly, we saw that in each work 
Kierkegaard clearly identifies between matters that are properly political from those 
that are strictly ‘non-political’. Included in the latter are concerns that are not purely 
temporal, such as the spiritual aspect o f the self which is in turn related to questions 
regarding existential development. Kierkegaard argues that the political and the non­
political are logically distinct concepts and hence are radically different in both the 
categories and the means that they respectively employ. As such, neither can nor 
ought to try to legislate the other. If the categories are mixed, e.g., if  sensate power is 
exerted to cure a spiritual sickness, there is conceptual confusion which more often 
than not results in greater harm being done than good. In this case, for example, the 
spiritual problem remains uncured. In addition, the spiritual sickness is also falsely 
diagnosed as cured which only risks further spiritual impoverishment.
In-line with his theory o f the political, K ierkegaard’s unique solution to the malady o f 
the mixing o f the political and the non-political has, in all three cases, been authorial. 
Kierkegaard diagnoses the particularly troublesome categorical confusions o f his 
times and highlights them in his authorship. In opposition to political reformation, 
K ierkegaard’s authorship directs itself not to a populace but to a single individual 
(reader). Kierkegaard asks each individual reader to honestly admit that a spiritual 
problem is evident and that wilful, inward development is needed on their part in
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order to alleviate the sickness. Kierkegaard then uses his authorship in various 
differing ways (e.g., as ‘upbuilding’ literature, as ‘psychological investigation’, etc.) 
to guide his reader back to existential security via emphasising the need for inward, 
spiritual deepening (in addition to catering for one’s temporal wellbeing).
Following this note, K ierkegaard’s authorship, at least up until An Open Letter o f 
1851, does not make proposals o f external re fo rm .71 That is not to say that 
Kierkegaard is against political reform altogether. Kierkegaard is not critical o f 
political reform that seeks to increase a citizenry’s temporal wellbeing per se?1 The 
attempt to cure non-political problems with political means is, however, considered to 
be an over-zealous and illegitimate application o f the latter. Ironically enough, the 
best way for politics to aid a non-political problem might simply be to continue to 
regulate genuinely political issues -  to not cause additional problems that are tied to 
the disastrous mixing o f the political and the non-political.
As we saw above, Kierkegaard is not averse to politics per se. I hope to have shown 
that Kierkegaard would not condemn a political programme that both respected his 
theory o f the political as well as brought about temporal benefits (decreasing 
unemployment, securing civil liberties, etc.) without disrupting non-political entities. 
Kierkegaard him self refrains from politics as much as he can and, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, this trait might have frustrated some o f his readers. But Kierkegaard
71 Even though K ierkegaard’s attack against the press (w hich is w ell-docum ented in the Princeton 
edition o f  H oward and Edna H ong’s The C orsair Affair) could be seen as a religious call for reform , 
K ierkegaard does not explicitly call for changes in the regulation o f  the press. I shall argue below  
(chapter six) that K ierkegaard’s polem ical encounter with the press differs from his later call for reform 
(in the so-called ‘attack literature’) in that the latter does explicitly seek to m ake external changes.
72 It should be noted, how ever, that K ierkegaard’s prioritisation o f  existential concerns over civil 
liberties is in my opinion occasionally a cause for genuine concern. K ierkegaard has been criticised, for 
exam ple, for his consistent prioritisation o f  w hat he deem s to be the existential im provem ent o f  wom en 
over securing civil liberties for their political em ancipation. On this subject, see notes 138 below , and 
51 above.
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abstains from providing positive political programmes for two ch ief reasons. The first 
reason is practical, whilst the second is theoretical and informs K ierkegaard’s theory 
o f the political.
The first, practical reason for Kierkegaard to refrain from providing a positive 
political programme is simply that he is not confident that he is adequately ‘trained’ 
for the task (TM, 60, cf., COR, 54). Hence, Kierkegaard spells out a theory o f the 
political but leaves it to politicians to work out which policy changes are most 
beneficial to the temporal wellbeing o f the majority o f the citizenry. K ierkegaard’s 
own talents lie in catering for the spiritual wellbeing o f the single individual. 
Therefore, K ierkegaard’s authorial task is directed towards helping the single 
individual develop existentially. This task is fully complimentary to a ‘genuine’ 
political order (i.e., one respecting his theory o f the political); since the former caters 
for the spiritual (and infinite) aspect o f the se lf and the latter cares for the temporal 
aspects o f the self by promoting temporal wellbeing.
If  a social-political situation is one where K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political is not 
respected, (or perhaps where individuals are failing in their existential task for other 
reasons) then Kierkegaard takes it upon him self to provide an additional authorial task; 
providing an ‘existential-corrective’ to the established order. This existential- 
corrective also seeks to aid the reader qua single individual back to existential 
development without resorting to external reform.
The second, more theoretical reason for Kierkegaard to abstain from policy-making is 
due to the fear o f adding to the very problem he so expertly diagnoses in his
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authorship. From Kierkegaard’s works, it is clear that he often addresses his polemical 
thought to a perceived political over-zealousness with regards to non-political issues. 
As stated above, Kierkegaard was primarily interested in and skilled at spiritual 
edification. Given this, it could be easy for a reader to accidentally mix K ierkegaard’s 
existential (non-political) commitments with any policy recommendations he might 
have provided. Such a confusion o f two logically distinct parts o f life would only risk 
counter-productively adding to the spiritual destitution that Kierkegaard was 
addressing with his authorship.
Despite the categorical difference between the two realms Kierkegaard had 
nevertheless explicitly stated that his ideal Christian is ‘responsive’ to external -  and 
these could include political - changes. K ierkegaard’s ideal individuals, similarly, are 
not political quietists, religious zealots, or asocial individualists. On the contrary, 
K ierkegaard’s ideal individual cares for both the spiritual, existential betterment o f 
their fellow neighbours, as well as for their temporal wellbeing (though I do think that 
the former is to be prioritised over the latter). Kierkegaard highlights this in his 
authorship by publishing works which are ‘existential correctives’ to perceived social 
problems. In a wider sense, Kierkegaard actively encourages people to take an interest 
in the spiritual development o f their neighbours. (This point will be argued for in 
more detail in chapter seven below.)
Part o f K ierkegaard’s authorial project is therefore existential. Kierkegaard saw 
him self as providing existential aid in response to external (including political) 
changes. Some o f K ierkegaard’s thought is also political. Kierkegaard outlines a 
theory o f the political which seeks to ensure that existentially harmful situations do
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not come about in the first place. But Kierkegaard has a third element to his 
authorship, a social one. K ierkegaard’s social contribution is in diagnosing what 
happens to social relations when the sanctity o f the non-political is violated by 
illegitimate political action. K ierkegaard’s authorship provides guidelines on how we 
might nevertheless help one another when ‘ungenuine’ politics is practised.
In sum, there are four key aspects o f K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f  the political 
that are constant throughout the authorship. We have already looked at the first three, 
and will examine the fourth below (in chapter six):
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Table o f Key tenets of K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political:
1. There is a distinction between entities that ought properly to be considered 
political, and between those that are non-political.
2. Political entities ought to cater for the temporal aspects o f the citizenry, and 
ought to apply legitimately political means to do so (such as taxation, majority 
voting, etc.)
3. One aspect o f the non-political -  the spiritual and the existential -  is a matter 
o f individual conscience and inward development. Kierkegaard believes that it 
is justifiable for one individual to prompt another in the direction o f spiritual 
development -  but spiritual reform ought never to turn into a concern for 
political goods alone.
4. A final part o f K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political (to be examined in chapter 
six below) is that individuals can call for the removal o f external obstructions 
to the attempts o f single individuals to bring about spiritual, existential 
development in their contemporaries. Such ‘obstacles’ might include policies 
that do not respect K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political. 
K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political therefore also provides the basis for 
existentially grounded political activism, and for a negative political program.
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In response to K ierkegaard’s basic theoretical position, one might argue that 
Kierkegaard sets up something o f a false dichotomy. Clearly religious issues are, and 
indeed must be decided upon in a ‘political’ way on a daily basis. An example might 
be the following consideration: ‘W hat aspects o f religious education should be taught 
on the national school curriculum ?’ Given the fact that religious and political entities 
do often mingle, what might Kierkegaard have meant by claiming that the two are 
logically distinct categories -  or was he simply incorrect?
In response to this claim, and to clarify K ierkegaard’s position, I would argue that 
Kierkegaard would see the example o f the school curriculum as a political matter. 
Despite the fact that the matter ostensibly appears to be concerned with religiosity, it 
actually relates to (or ought to at least) the well-being o f the majority. In such an 
example, the members o f the governing body or committee ought not to base their 
decision on an ‘existential qualification’ -  on their respective views about what the 
existentially ideal way o f life is, for example. Rather, the members ought to decide the 
matter politically by attempting to calculate which curriculum material would 
maximise the overall wellbeing for the affected people (school children, parents, 
teachers, and so forth). Questions o f what the genuine or ideal form o f existential life 
is must ultimately be left for each single individual to decide for his or herself. Any 
attempt to decide this question for them only risks tempting the single individual into 
outward conformity and hence away from genuine conviction.
In the chapters to come I will spell out the final caveat o f K ierkegaard’s theory o f the 
political: i.e., why and how Kierkegaard comes to condone external political change 
given his hitherto only disparaging remarks about employing external reform to solve
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an existential problem. I will highlight further the relation between existential 
impoverishment and ‘ungenuine’ politics that is addressed in various places 
throughout K ierkegaard’s authorship. I will also endeavour to verify K ierkegaard’s 
self-ascribed report that his authorship is an attempt at remedying politically caused 
existential impoverishment. The next three chapters will engage in these tasks by 
examining three more o f K ierkegaard’s principle works: From the Papers, Two Ages 
and The Moment (respectively). It will be seen that the key tenets o f  Kierkegaard’s 
existential theory o f the political can be traced in each o f these works; which is to say, 
from Kierkegaard’s earliest writings to his latest ones.
The following works will therefore take a much deeper investigation into the 
specifically existential aspect o f K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political. We will see the 
existential effects o f violating Kierkegaard’s theory o f the political; firstly with a case 
study o f a ‘single individual’ (in From the Papers)', then by a closer examination o f 
the spiritual destitution illegitimate policies might have on an entire age (in Two Ages); 
and finally in a situation where spiritual impoverishment is so threatened by 
externalities that Kierkegaard calls for reform (in The Moment). The culmination o f 
the ideas in the third work will also provide a textual justification for the forth aspect 
o f K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political -  its use in justifying negative political change.




Having outlined K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political this chapter seeks to show that 
K ierkegaard’s theoretical understanding o f the relation between existential and 
political issues existed throughout his authorship. Hence, the first text we will look at 
is one o f K ierkegaard’s earliest writings -  From the Papers [of One Still Living].
An analysis o f this text will show that some aspects o f K ierkegaard’s theory o f the 
political, as elucidated in his later writings, were not fully thought out in this former 
text. Nevertheless, this early work shows the genesis o f K ierkegaard’s theory o f the 
political. Despite the fact that some aspects might be re-worked, then, there is a large 
amount o f consistency between From the Papers and K ierkegaard’s later articulations
73o f his theory o f the political.
73 O ther scholars that have seen From the Papers as a starting point for som e o f  the central concepts 
that run throughout K ierkegaard’s oeuvre include: K irm m se (2006, 11); M alantschuk (1971, 182); 
V erstrynge (2006, 54, 55); and W estfall (2006, 47). V erstrynge connects this early work, in particular, 
w ith the political expressions o f  two other books: the Book on A dler and Two Ages. W hilst I will not 
look at the Book on A dler 1 will exam ine a sim ilar practice to the phenom enon which interests 
V erstrynge, the present ag e ’s use and abuse o f  divine authority, in the sixth chapter, looking instead at
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This being the case, we have good reasons for suggesting that Kierkegaard was, far 
from being apolitical, working with and developing a theory o f the political from his 
earliest works. Furthermore, we would have grounds for inquiring as to whether 
Kierkegaard’s early, pseudonymous writings (many o f which might not appear to be 
ostensibly ‘political’ at first glance) also evince an engagement with the political 
topics that help to formulate his theory o f the political. Since this thesis seeks to argue 
that a political strand o f thought runs throughout K ierkegaard’s entire authorship, a 
look at this early political work will be informative.
K ierkegaard’s The Moment. The fifth chapter o f  this thesis will also exam ine K ierkegaard’s w ork Two 
Ages.
Page 144 o f  354. Kierkegaard’s Existential Theory o f  the Political. Thomas Wolstenholme.
4.1 The Review of Only a Fiddler.
Introduction.
In the previous chapter we identified a theory o f the political in three bodies o f 
Kierkegaard’s works that largely span the period o f 1846-1851. How, if  at all, do 
these later works relate to K ierkegaard’s earliest and pseudonymous writings? As o f 
yet, it might be argued that Kierkegaard’s theory o f the political is more o f an 
appendage to, rather than an integral aspect o f the entire authorship. To argue that a 
political line o f thought runs throughout K ierkegaard’s entire authorship, therefore, it 
will be necessary to examine at least one o f his early works. Before his dissertation 
proposal (The Concept o f  Irony) and five years before the publication o f Either/Or, a 
book which Kierkegaard regarded as the true beginning o f his au thorsh ip ,74 
Kierkegaard had written a little article called From the Papers o f  One Still Living (in 
Early Polemical Writings [hereafter simply; EPW], pp. 53-102), intended for 
publication in a scholarly journal. The journal folded, however, and so Kierkegaard 
published his article as a self-standing book. I believe that a primitive form o f 
K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political is already at work in this very early work.
74 See n.78 below.
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4.1.1 An analysis o f From the Papers
In From the Papers, Kierkegaard develops his theory o f aesthetics by reviewing a 
work by Hans Christian Andersen - poet, novelist and writer o f  children’s fairy-
75tales. This ostensibly literary examination nevertheless brings up many o f 
K ierkegaard’s most prominent philosophical themes, albeit in an embryonic form. An 
examination o f these principles is a fruitful addition to an understanding o f the theory 
o f the political that has been examined thus far.
Despite this, the work presents many hermeneutical problems from the outset. From 
the Papers is not signed by ‘S. K ierkegaard’ as so many o f the works in 
K ierkegaard’s ‘signed’ authorship would come to be. From the Papers is signed by 
one ‘S. K jerkegaard’. What are we to make o f this subtle variant? That it is just a 
mistake appears an untenable position since K ierkegaard’s journal entries [of 1834] 
show evidence o f him practising signing his name in this fashion (Cappelom , G arff & 
Kondrup, 2003, 40, 50).
Scholars o f the work have drawn differing conclusions from this peculiarity. Some go 
ahead and talk o f the views expressed in the book as nevertheless belonging to those
^  A m ong the fairy-tales A ndersen authored are: T h e  Little M erm aid’, ‘The Ugly D uckling’, ‘The 
E m peror’s N ew  C lo thes’, ‘The Princess and the P ea’ and ‘The Snow  Q ueen’.
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o f S. K ierkegaard .76 Others have designated the work as pseudonymous (e.g., 
Kirmmse, 1990b, 265-66).77
Interestingly enough, discussion as to how close the pseudonym ’s ‘K jerkegaard’s ’ 
views are to ‘K ierkegaard’s ’ is lacking within the scholarship o f this book. For other 
pseudonyms in K ierkegaard’s authorship such discussions are commonplace. This is 
most likely because, with regards to the other pseudonyms, Kierkegaard elaborates on 
the differences between his position and theirs. In his later works, Kierkegaard has a 
clearer idea o f the authorship as a whole. Thus, Kierkegaard later distinguishes where 
each pseudonym stands in relation to the views expressed in the entire authorship, and 
to which views Kierkegaard personally advocates. Kierkegaard later decides not to 
include these early works as part o f his ‘entire authorship’.78 The failure to include 
them could be because the earlier works are test projects o f concepts and techniques 
that Kierkegaard would employ once he had a definitive idea o f the objective o f his 
authorship. Julia Watkin, the translator o f K ierkegaard’s Early Polemical Writings, 
takes this stance. Watkin believes that Kierkegaard could be described as
76 W hether intentionally or not is som etim es uncertain. G arff, for exam ple, does not m ention this 
variation in his studies on the w ork and so w hether he believes the view s expressed in the w ork to be 
K ierkegaard’s despite  the publisher ‘K jerkegaard’, or in light o f  it, is ju s t not stated (in; G arff, 2007).
77 A lthough K irm m se appears to have revised his view , for in an earlier w ork he spoke o f  the view s o f  
From the P apers as belonging to ‘S K ’ -  a term he uses throughout his work to refer to Soren 
K ierkegaard (K irm m se, 1990b, 261). M alantschuk takes a rather unique interm ediary position betw een 
‘pseudonym ous’ and ‘self-au thored’. For M alantschuk says that From the P apers is edited by 
K ierkegaard, but that the view s expressed are that o f  another ‘I’ (M alantschuk, 1971, 187). Perhaps this 
is akin to how K ierkegaard later publishes Concluding Unscientific Postscrip t w ith h im self as editor 
but Johannes C lim acus as the author o f  the main body o f  text? For my own part, I find the debate about 
w hether the editor, ‘K jerkegaard’ is an alternative spelling o f  ‘K ierkegaard’ or a pseudonym  to be 
rendered irrelevant by the fact that the main body o f  the text is delegated by this ‘K jerkegaard’ to 
another, anonym ous author anyw ay. Thus ‘K jerkegaard’ or ‘K ierkegaard’ -  neither accept authorial 
responsibility  for the view s we shall be assessing, and so the work may as well be treated, for all 
intensive purposes, as though it w ere pseudonym ous.
78 See for exam ple: JP VI, 6770, 6238; CUP, 625-30; TPV, 5-6; Without Authority, 165.
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‘experim enting’ with literary devices, such as pseudonymity, that will come to play a 
central role in his authorship (Watkin, 1990, vii).79
If Watkin is correct, then perhaps Kierkegaard was also using his earlier works to 
experiment with concepts that would likewise come to form an invaluable part o f his 
authorship. I shall also argue for this thesis, focusing first on K ierkegaard’s review o f 
Andersen’s Only a Fiddler. For now, however, the discussion o f pseudonymity 
quickly complicates issues once again. For the preface o f the book explains that whilst 
that small part, at least, is written by ‘S. K jerkegaard’, the rem ainder o f the book was 
written by some other anonymous author80 and was even ‘published against his w ill’ 
by this ‘S. K jerkegaard’. If Kierkegaard was indeed experimenting in the art o f 
bemusing his readers, he was o ff to a good start.
That the preface o f the book begins with a surreal account o f the origins o f the book 
could give us further grounds for treating it as if  it were pseudonymous. Rather than 
simply communicating directly what Kierkegaard wishes to tell us, an elaborate scene 
is instead portrayed. The surreal, literary account o f the origin o f the work, as well as 
the use o f a pseudonymous editor, is typical o f K ierkegaard’s later, recognised
O I
aesthetic writings. If  he was only going to expound upon his own views, 
Kierkegaard could presumably have begun his communication as directly as he does 
in his other signed works. Since he is delineating the ideas o f another person instead,
79 W estfall also defends this view  (2006, 47), albeit m ore tentatively than W atkin does. David Cain has 
argued that som e o f  the them es o f  K ierkegaard’s ‘o ffic ia l’ authorship w ere already evidently being 
w orked through in his earlier w orks (Cain, 1999, 131, passim ).
80 For the sake o f  sim plicity I shall refer to this ‘person’ as ‘the rev iew er’, rather than by a more 
inform ative but cum bersom e term.
81 For other surreal and gratuitously fictive accounts o f  the origin o f  som e pseudonym ous work, see for 
exam ple: E/O, 3-15; and Stages on L ife ’s Way, 3-6, & 187-91.
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Kierkegaard ensures that the pseudonymous views are not mistaken for his own by 
establishing an elaborate, fictional scenario.
To add to the peculiarity o f the work, ju st as the preface to the book ends (and with it, 
the writings o f  ‘S. K jerkegaard’) the reviewer begins their discussion examining the 
use o f a preface. At heart, the essay starts out by addressing a Hegelian-inspired m otif 
- that o f preventing philosophy from starting from an arbitrary or contingent point 
with an ‘attempt to begin with nothing’ (EPW, 6 1).82 This debate was one o f the main 
focal points o f Hegel-influenced thought in Denmark at that time, and was initiated 
and perpetuated by Johan Ludvig H eiberg’s [1791 -  1860] ongoing attempt at 
popularising Hegel-influenced philosophy.83 That K ierkegaard’s reviewer starts the 
work by joining in on the debate could be seen as an attempt to appear schooled in the 
area, as well as a possible attempt at siding with H eiberg’s philosophy.
82 Presum ably a reference to H egel’s Science o f  Logic  (H egel, 2004, 70, for exam ple). It m ight be 
w orth noting that N iels T hulstrup believes that K ierkegaard is in fact criticising  Hegel here. 
Furthem ore, Thulstrup argues that K ierkegaard’s understanding o f  Hegel on this point is ‘sim ply 
incorrect’ (Thulstrup, 1980, 168). In the introduction o f  the Science o f  Logic  Hegel does state that logic 
starts w ith nothing. But Hegel also argues that logic starts w ith ‘pure be ing ’, ‘pure be ing ’ and ‘no th ing’ 
being interchangeable in this way. I f  K ierkegaard is indeed criticising H egel(ianism ) for beginning with 
‘n o th ing’, m eaning nothing at all (not even pure being) then K ierkegaard’s criticism  w ould be based on 
a m isreading. But I do not think K ierkegaard is criticising the H egelian attem pt at beginning with 
nothing here. N or do I think K ierkegaard particularly  cares if  logic attem pts to start w ithout 
presuppositions. From an analysis o f  K ierkegaard’s com m ents tow ards ‘beginning w ith no th ing’, 
how ever, it becom es clear that K ierkegaard is only troubled w hen existential problem s are attem pted to 
be solved w ith a presuppotionless beginning -  i.e., by an objective system  o f  philosophy that fails to 
take the individual’s subjective and existential situation into account first. See for exam ple: CA, 81; 
CUP, 111 ,113; W O L, 218; JP III, 3281, 3299; cf. ibid., 2910.
83 H eiberg had, in fact, published the first ever full com m entary on H egel’s Logic in either G erm an or 
D anish w ith his 1832 text: Outline o f  the Philosophy o f  Philosophy or Speculative Logic (Stewart, 
2007a, 388). In S tew art’s thorough analysis, he concludes that this sam e work is ‘the m ost significant 
w ork in the D anish Hegel reception up until this po in t’ (ibid., 373). H eiberg would have fronted the 
intended third issue o f  Perseus, the issue K ierkegaard was here attem pting to be published in, with an 
article defending his position that philosophy begins with pure being (Stew art, 2007b, 272-273).
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The reviewer shows admiration for ‘the most respectable’ form o f beginning with 
nothing - H egel’s original ‘great attem pt’ {ibid., 6 1).84 H egel’s form o f attempting to 
begin with nothing, within the context o f his work on logic, is considered 
philosophically justifiable since the attempt is ‘only a movement with the [logical] 
system ’s own lim its’ {ibid.). In other words, Hegel is presumably delineating a set o f 
logical relations between entities which may or may not exist. Hegel is involved in a 
kind o f ontology -  and ‘beginning with nothing’, in such a case, is perfectly 
acceptable. W hat the reviewer finds problematic, however, is that this Hegel- 
influenced methodology had been misapplied by some Danes to other matters, namely 
those which are said to involve existence. ‘Beginning with nothing’ within a 
philosophical system is acceptable. The idea that existence itself does or can ‘begin 
with nothing’ is both philosophically unjustifiable as well as existentially harmful 
though.
The reviewer thinks that there are two chief problems with this misapplication o f 
H egel’s logical claim. The first is that the reviewer fears that Denm ark’s leading 
intellectual figures were illegitimately applying this logical claim to historical 
development. As such, K ierkegaard’s peers developed an inclination to neglect the 
fact that their age was the result o f  a long and arduous historical development. A 
second, related problem with this is that K ierkegaard’s age subsequently developed ‘a 
great tendency, on the one hand, to convince itself o f its activity and significance and, 
on the other... [to make] itself the true starting point o f world history’ {ibid.).
84 H egel’s Logic is also directly cited on the subsequent page in a footnote. O nce m ore it is praised, this 
tim e as a ‘m aster’s im m ortal w ork ’.
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The reviewer continues to argue that this second problem is itself dangerous for two 
additional reasons. Firstly, the reviewer claims that an existential rupture occurs when 
an individual holds a political ideal that is radically at odds with actuality. This leads 
to the second problem: that the individual responds to the schism between the political 
ideal and historical actuality by closing him or herself up within his or herself. This 
response to an existential rupture (which we might briefly note was caused by a 
misapplication o f  two logically distinct spheres: logic as a system o f thought, and 
actuality) is existential impoverishment; since the self-enclosed individual will 
become unable to properly relate both to the world, as well as to other people.85
Despite the initial praise that the reviewer gives to Hegel then, they worry about a 
misapplication o f Hegel’s logic and/or his theory o f world history. The reviewer 
worries that his or her contemporaries were practising a Hegelian-inspired theory o f 
world history which has negative effects when it is applied to concrete times and 
places (despite the fact that as a speculative theory about historical progression it 
might be philosophically sound). With the publication o f H eiberg’s The Significance 
o f  Philosophy fo r  the Present Age [published in 1833] many o f K ierkegaard’s 
contemporaries believed that the age was in a stage o f fermentation but that a more
O/C
glorious age was sure to come. This was coupled with the idea that the previous ages 
were either ignored, or else seen as an embarrassing but necessary step in historical 
progression {ibid., 61).
8:1 W e will exam ine K ierkegaard’s view s about authentically relating to others below , in section 7.3 and 
7.4 below.
86 One contem porary for exam ple, Carl W eis, openly attested to the fact that the age w as in a ‘crisis’ 
(Stew art, 2007b, 262). A nother, Eggert C hristopher Tryde, thought that the age was also in a crisis but 
that only religion, not philosophy, could cure this problem  (Stew art, 2007a, 437). Finally, Frederik 
S ibbem  also openly adm itted that the age was bordering on a crisis, but differed from both H eiberg and 
W eis in his b e lie f that it w as the application o f  H egelian-inspired thought that was nourishing (rather 
than curing) the problem s o f  the age (Stewart, 2007b, 206).
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This mentality is completely at odds with the review er’s. More cynical about the age 
and where it was going, the reviewer agrees that the Danish state was undergoing “a 
period o f fermentation [Gjoerings-PeriodeY\ but emphasises that this implies that it is 
“not a period o f action [Gjerings-Periode]” {ibid., 71). Furthermore, the reviewer 
argues that even if  the age w asn’t stuck in this inactive, fermenting period, a 
Flegelian-inspired optimism that the age will necessarily develop in a positive way is 
still not necessarily justified. In fact, the reviewer appears to hold the opposite view .87 
The reviewer admits that whilst other historical periods o f transition did lead to ages 
that were as concrete and long-lasting as the formation o f granite, the m odem  period 
is best described as ‘deeply absorbed in the formation o f peat’ {ibid., 72). That is, 
even if  we were to escape this transitory limbo, the state o f affairs that we are 
currently heading towards is less desirable than that o f previous ages.
Another, far more devastating consequence o f this problem is that the political 
misapplication o f this Hegel-influenced logic causes serious existential harm. The 
reviewer argues that the notion that one can ‘begin from nothing’ seriously neglects 
the fact that the political sphere must first take the “condition[s] o f life” as their 
starting point {ibid., 65). The reviewer claims that their fellow contemporaries and 
politicians believe in an unduly idealistic picture o f the future state o f the country. 
This idealised, philosophical view o f the state o f the future will only create problems 
when it encounters actual political conditions.
87 In holding a reserved criticism  o f  the future state o f  the age, the review er appears to be in line with 
the view  H eiberg expressed in his The Significance o f  Philosophy fo r  (he Present Age. H olding a 
cynical attitude tow ards the ag e ’s developm ent seem s to be the tw o’s only m ajor sim ilarity, how ever. 
For in H eiberg’s work, he warned that the future state o f  the age w ould be corrupt i f  it failed to 
em brace a H egel-influenced philosophy and if  it abandoned the idea that certain m em bers o f  the 
populace ought to be m aintained as representatives o f  culture. The view s o f  the review er are in no clear 
sense sim ilar in this regard.
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Apart from the indirect consequences a political neglect o f actual conditions is likely 
to have on the average person, the dissonance caused between the philosophical ideal 
and actuality will negatively affect the individual -  especially, the reviewer warns us, 
the individual o f the ‘younger’ generation. The individuals o f the ‘younger’ 
generation had received an education that was highly influenced by a combination o f 
a ‘Golden A ge’ understanding o f romanticism, Hegel-influenced philosophy, and 
ethico-religious beliefs. The reviewer argues that these teachings, by and large, only 
re-instate an undue optimism in both the logical necessity o f political progress as well 
as the idea that non-political problems could eventually be solved with political means.
Faced with such a marked rupture between an idealistic view o f the world and 
actuality, the reviewer notes that the individual would have to make an existential 
choice: either give up the idealistic philosophical conclusions and adapt oneself to the 
real, experienced conditions o f actual life; or else hold on to an unjustified 
philosophical idealism and live a life that fails to reconcile existence with actuality.
  0 0
The latter kind o f attitude entails an existentially inauthentic life, but the reviewer 
claims that the idealistic philosophies that the younger generation were educated in 
and became infatuated with most likely means that they will not give up their 
philosophical optimism. That is to say that the majority o f the younger generation 
suffer existentially. Hans Christian Andersen is an archetype o f the younger 
generation who the reviewer studies in depth.
88 A very sim ilar criticism  against som e versions o f  the rom antic way o f  life is pursued three years later 
in K ierkegaard’s doctoral dissertation The Concept o f  Irony and sim ilar criticism s o f  both living an 
‘aesthetic’ way o f  life and a philosophically idealised one are pursued in subsequent w orks throughout 
the authorship. U nfortunately we cannot hope to faithfully highlight the sim ilarities and differences 
betw een these positions here though.
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Andersen is described as “a possibility o f a personality wrapped up in such a web o f 
arbitrary moods and moving through en elegiac duodecimo-scale o f almost echoless, 
dying tones just as easily roused as subdued, who, in order to become a personality, 
needs a strong life-development” {ibid., 70). This life-development, however, is to be 
won by honestly confronting the reality o f one’s situation and given age: one’s given 
reality. A ‘battle-won confidence in the w orld’ {ibid., 65), which typifies those who 
have undergone this life-development, suggests that one must face the fact that the 
world, and one’s desires, conflict. Rather than shirk away from the unwanted aspects 
o f the world, however, one must learn to grow despite them and even to 
transubstantiate them into the poetically beautiful.89
This tendency to lose oneself in ideality is summed up as a typical attitude o f the 
‘younger generation’. The older generation, by contrast, is marked by an honest 
combat with actuality. Part o f what makes the older generation so able to face up to 
the problems o f actuality is simply that they had  to. Lacking any pre-established, 
popularised life-view, or idealistic philosophy, the older generation were forced to 
develop their own, to think and act for themselves. An author from this period with 
whom the reviewer contrasts Andersen is Thomasine Gyllembourg, whose novels 
describe a previous age where people more readily became eminent people. By 
strength o f character and conviction an eminent person could formulate a life-view 
that was truly their own. Despite the fact that Thomasine Gyllembourg wrote her 
novels anonymously our anonymous reviewer regards the author o f those novels as an
89 O ne’s ability to develop in spite o f  external circum stances is w hat also inform s K ierkegaard’s view 
o f ‘gen iu s’ (w hich, as we will see, rem ains consistently throughout his authorship). In an early journal 
entry [1839] K ierkegaard curtly writes that: ‘G enius, like a thunderstorm , goes against the w ind’ (JP II; 
1290). N ear the end o f  his life, K ierkegaard once more gives a description o f  genius that is alm ost 
identical to his earlier view: ‘G eniuses are like a thunderstorm  [Tordenveir]: they go against the wind 
[ . . . ] ’ (w ritten in his journal in 1849 [JP II; 1298], but published in the 6 th installm ent o f  The Moment in 
1855 (TM ; 204)).
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exemplar, a person who can show us how to survive the “student graduate prose” 
{ibid., 67) o f modem politics.
It is important here to spell out what a life-view is and why the reviewer thinks that 
Andersen lacks one. This crucial concept -  a concept that will run through 
K ierkegaard’s entire authorship -  is given a lengthy and informative definition by our 
reviewer. Accordingly, a life-view is:
‘...more than a quintessence or a sum o f propositions m aintained in its 
abstract neutrality; it is more than experience, which as such is always 
fragmentary. It is, namely, the transubstantiation o f experience; it is the 
unshakeable certainty in oneself won from all experience’ {ibid., 76).
This concept is then further clarified. For though it is admitted that Andersen has in 
fact an unshakeable principle around which all other experiences in life gravitate, this 
centre is an inadequate one for a life-view. Andersen suffers from the fact that the 
central concern o f his life is his “merely phenomenological personality” {ibid., 82); 
and this in turn contains an ‘untruth’ {ibid., 80).90
The reviewer continues to explain that the existential problems Andersen encounters
can be resolved by addressing one o f two possible problems. The origin o f A ndersen’s
existential disunity is either caused by a “misrelation to h im se lf’ which is willingly
perpetuated by the individual, despite the fact that they are provided with all o f the
details o f their situation; or by the individual simply not having the necessary “fund o f
90 It m ay be w orth m entioning the sim ilarity betw een the aesthete ‘A ’ o f  Either/Or, who is described by 
Judge W illiam , in sim ilar term s as A ndersen is by the review er, as having not a life-view  but som ething 
w hich resem bles one (E/O  II, 202). It m ight also be worth noting that G eorge Pattison explicitly 
connects A ndersen with the aesthetic way o f  life (Pattison, 1992, 132).
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knowledge” to recognise and overcome this misrelation {ibid., 89). In a certain sense, 
the first problem is linked to the second: for one cannot really choose to remain in 
their position o f existential impoverishment if they are not fully informed that they are 
in that situation. A ndersen’s existential impoverishment, the review claims, is largely 
(if  not wholly) caused by the latter problem.
However, the cause o f this existential disunity is a political one. In a telling passage, 
the reviewer explains how the age Andersen found him self in was in part responsible 
for A ndersen’s existential dilemma. Andersen could have developed into an 
existentially sound individual, we are told:
if  the age, through a colossal union o f a large num ber o f forces, each 
significant in itself, amid the motley profusion o f these had pointed 
absolutely undeviatingly to a single goal and had worked with such 
energy toward it that such a striving must grip him [Andersen] for some 
time and yield the life-supplement necessary for him. Such a favour from 
the circumstances o f time, however, did not fall to A ndersen’s lot, because 
his life development proper falls in the so called political period... [and we 
can] certainly be convinced as to how little this period can fortify such a 
temperament [as A ndersen’s] {ibid., 71).
While it is not claimed here that the ‘political period’ is wholly responsible for any 
existential failure on A ndersen’s part, it is at least clear that the political situation 
Andersen found him self is in part to blame for its (purposeful or not) encouragement 
o f an impoverished way o f life. Here, the socio-political establishments inadvertently 
thwart the individual’s pursuit o f the good life by taxing some ways o f life whilst 
subsidising others. That the ways o f life that are subsidised happen to be rather 
impoverished ways o f living only makes the situation worse.
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I shall argue that in works nearer to the end o f his authorship Kierkegaard adopts an 
even stronger position than this. In the later political works, Kierkegaard implies that 
some ways o f living are rendered completely ineffectual by various socio-political 
factors (assessed in chapter five below). In this work, the reviewer is at least clear in 
the assertion that the age is partly to blame for the damaging effect it has on 
individuals’ existential development. That the reviewer believes the age to be 
imperfect is clear from the description o f it as a ‘lukewarm tim e’ {ibid., 82) in which 
‘every day we encounter the most ridiculous combinations o f  individuals shaken 
together like bits o f glass in a kaleidoscope’ {ibid., 72).
With regards to individuals like Andersen, the reviewer makes it clear that the socio­
political environment actively helps to hinder their existential development. A 
hypothetical character quite like Andersen is said to have been ‘tossed about by [this] 
intensely agitated age’ {ibid., 80); and elsewhere it is asserted that though Andersen 
suffers from an unhealthy infatuation with his own internality, and that the age only 
adds to the problem: ‘If  he [Andersen] was wrapped up in him self he was also thrown 
back into h im self {ibid., 73).
Living in a deplorable state o f affairs does not, o f  course, necessarily entail that one
will be existentially crippled. An existential problem is caused by a failure to unite the
‘internal’ and the ‘external’ and is therefore always partly the fault o f  the individual
too.91 But when an age does little to fortify anything but an aesthetic temperament and
when it actively ‘throw s’ individuals back into that aesthetic way o f living it certainly
91 As we shall see in chapters five and six below , K ierkegaard gives a closer exam ination to the 
individual’s relationship betw een ‘ex ternal’ social and political forces than this early and som ew hat 
undeveloped understanding.
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hinders one’s existential development. When the ‘external’ one relates to subsidises 
this existentially impoverished way o f living and hinders one’s ability to authentically 
relate to others it is clear that these external, socio-political factors are partly 
contributing towards existential impoverishment. Despite all o f  the flaws that 
Andersen exhibits, the reviewer claims that the times that Andersen lived in are even 
worse: “A ndersen’s lyric self-absorption [Selvfortabelse] is both more interesting and 
more gratifying than the modem political-epic self-admiration [Selvforgabelse]” {ibid., 
70-71).
This reading has the interesting result o f questioning the preconception o f 
Kierkegaard as a mere subjectivist, wholly uninterested in external goings on. As we 
can already see from this early work, Kierkegaard’s interest with authentic existential 
relations necessarily involves an analysis o f the external situation that an individual 
relates to and which frames (or even hinders) one’s pursuit o f  existential development. 
Any engagement in becoming an existentially authentic individual would require 
analysing and taking into consideration one’s socio-political environment.
From the Papers has another important side-effect. Kierkegaard would later argue for 
the removal o f an external obstacle that he perceived as hindering the ability to 
develop existentially. In this early work, Kierkegaard/the reviewer acknowledges the 
fact that Andersen is in part at fault for his own existential failings. If, or when, the 
socio-political situation changes into one where the onus o f existential 
impoverishment falls almost entirely on external, socio-political obstructions, we see 
that both K ierkegaard’s view o f political activism as well as o f his authorial task also 
change in response (see chapters five and six below). Thus, in later writings
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Kierkegaard argues for the abolition o f the Danish State-Church marriage on grounds 
that it fosters inauthentic ways o f being and creates impoverished individuals much 
like Andersen (6.2). I would argue that Kierkegaard’s authorship is evidently reflexive 
towards external changes, and that this can even be seen in the earliest o f his works.
It has struck many Kierkegaard scholars as a peculiarity that Andersen in particular 
was singled out for attack. M any have also offered plausible justifications, and some 
o f these justifications have been pragmatic by nature. That is, scholars have claimed 
that Kierkegaard attacked Andersen specifically because o f some practical benefit for 
doing so. W ithout entering into whether or not such claims are fair, however, it is 
important to ask why, philosophically speaking, ‘the review er’ might make a case 
study o f Andersen in particular.
A ndersen’s situation is said to be only a typical example o f a particular phenomenon: 
a person that becomes existentially impoverished at least in part because o f a specific 
socio-political background. Hence, examining what facts might be peculiar to 
Andersen (as opposed to existentially healthy individuals), as well as what part 
political entities might have played in affecting A ndersen’s character will help us 
understand the relationship between the political and the existential a little more. This 
will be the focus o f the next section.
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4.2 Why did ‘the reviewer’ attack Andersen?
The anonymous reviewer had argued that from A ndersen’s literary work we can 
deduce that the latter has skipped over his ‘epic’ stage o f development. At first the 
cryptic statement o f Andersen lacking an ‘epic’ stage o f development might appear to 
be a purely aesthetic criticism o f A ndersen’s work. This is because Johannes Heiberg, 
one o f Denm ark’s leading philosophers and aestheticians (and, incidentally, founder 
and editor o f the journal in which Kierkegaard originally intended to publish From the 
Papers) had popularised a variant o f Hegel’s theory o f poetry that employed the 
concept o f an ‘epic’ stage.
Hegel had thought that romantic poetry could be split into three sub-genres: the epic,
0?the lyric and the dramatic. Heiberg, however, reversed the first two elements and so 
chose a ‘lyric, epic, dram atic’ development (Stewart, 2007b, 292-93).93 In one o f his 
journal articles, Kierkegaard questions the variation that Heiberg makes (JP I, 126) 
before tentatively deciding to adopt Heiberg’s distinction. In another journal entry 
Kierkegaard accepts that H eiberg’s alteration is fitting for the present time and place,
92 H egel’s division o f  poetry is quite often discussed in the K ierkegaard literature (i.e., W alsh, 2009, 
33; Stew art, 2007b, 292) but rarely are the precise reference for this taxonom y given. It is found in the 
second volum e o f  H egel’s m agisterial ‘A esthetics: Lectures on Fine A rts’, in the third chapter which 
deals with ‘poetry ’ alone, and in ‘Section C ’ which deals with the ‘genres o f  poetry ’. There, Hegel 
discusses these three genres o f  poetry: the ‘E pic’ (A), the ‘L yric’ (B), and the ‘D ram atic’ (C) (pp. 
1040-1110, 1111-1157, and 1158-1238 respectively). It should be noted, how ever, that Hegel limits 
this taxonom y to poetry alone, and uses different m ethodologies in analysing poetry, including a 
m erely descriptive, historical analysis. Fleiberg’s own use o f  the criteria that Hegel had developed for 
poetry only, is often far m ore different than Flegel’s original. For exam ple, H eiberg applies the theory 
that Hegel had originally only intended for rom antic poetry: ‘independently [i.e., to other areas o f  
aesthetics] to m aterial that is o f  great personal interest to h im ’ (Stew art, 2007b, 294).
93 See also: Fenger (1971, 136); Pattison (1983, 26); T hulstrup (1980, 173); and W estfall (2007, 36, 
n.8)).
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but not (as Heiberg appears to want) when generalised to include all times and places 
(JP II, 1565).94
Since Kierkegaard evidently understood H eiberg’s theory o f aesthetics, and since 
Andersen is accused o f missing his ‘epic’ stage o f development, we could assume that 
‘the review er’ is making an aesthetic criticism o f A ndersen’s work. Further analysis 
reveals, however, that the reviewer is in fact also criticising A ndersen’s personality. 
W hat might the reviewer mean by stating that Andersen as a person lacked the ‘epic 
stage o f developm ent’? The first hint is given when the reviewer addresses the 
prerequisites for the ‘epic stage’. It is said that achieving the epic stage requires:
...a deep and earnest embracing o f a given actuality, no matter how one 
loses oneself in it, as a life-strengthening rest in it and admiration o f it, 
without the necessity o f it ever coming to expression as such, but which 
can never have anything but the highest importance for the individual, 
even though it all went so unnoticed that the mood itself seemed born in 
secrecy and buried in silence. (EPW, 71)
This ‘em bracing’ o f actuality could have come, for Andersen at least, in one o f two 
ways. Either Andersen could have submitted him self to a period o f Pythagorean 
silence, or the age itself could have moved ‘undeviatingly to a single goal’ {ibid.). 
With regards to the option o f ‘Pythagorean silence’, the reviewer lets slip that this 
option is not really tenable for Andersen, for to undertake such a study ‘would be 
rather unlike him [Andersen]’ {ibid.). It seems, then, that Andersen required the age to
94 Here K ierkegaard actually appears to be closer to H egel’s original intention, as Hegel only w anted to 
offer a description o f  som e previous periods in the history o f  aesthetics, not all o f  which follow  the 
sam e triadic pattern. See also M alantschuk, who argues that K ierkegaard’s view  o f  the lyrical, epic, and 
dram atic, not only includes an understanding o f  their ‘respective levels’, but also that each one ‘[...]  
corresponds to the three transactional functions, feeling, cognition, and w ill’ respectively 
(M alantschuk, 1971, 183).
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have been organised differently; to have been unified by an underlying idea or moving 
towards some goal. We will return to this point shortly. For now we will pursue the 
thought that the reviewer had some notion o f A ndersen’s real life person. After all, the 
reviewer had charged Andersen o f being not really the type o f  person that would 
undertake inward deepening.
This reference to A ndersen’s real life person is peculiar, but not infrequent. Indeed, as 
soon as the reviewer has stated that Andersen lacks the ‘epic stage’ o f development 
(whether qua author or qua person was still ambiguous at that stage), the reviewer 
continues to tell us that ‘later considerations will substantiate [this theorem] still 
m ore’ {ibid., 70). The nature o f these ‘later considerations’, we come to find, are 
details about Andersen’s real world person.
The fact that the reviewer appeals to personal details o f A ndersen’s character is 
especially peculiar because a large part o f the critique o f Andersen is that the latter 
does not sufficiently detach him self from his literature. The reviewer complains that 
numerous instances in A ndersen’s fiction are turned into occasions for Andersen to 
insert his own ideas and opinions into the otherwise fictive world o f the work. This is 
the main justification for the review er’s critique o f Andersen’s work and personality.
If  we are to maintain that the anonymous ‘review er’ is simply a fictive creation o f 
Kierkegaard’s, a sui generis persona which does not exist in reality, it appears as if 
details about the life o f real world Danish ‘contem poraries’ should be out o f place. In 
what sense is the fictive persona contemporary with any actual person? If it makes no 
sense to think that the persona could have gathered details about Andersen’s private
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life then we can only conclude one thing: Kierkegaard him self has inserted these 
details into the text and the reviewer is only being employed as a fictive mouthpiece 
for him. But this is precisely the charge that the anonymous reviewer levels against 
Andersen.
This means that the charge made against Andersen by the pseudonymous reviewer is 
internally contradictory. The assertion that Andersen fails aesthetically because he 
fails to detach him self from his fictive works is only viable if  the ‘author’ o f From the 
Papers knows details about Andersen -  not some fictive variant, but the historically 
real person. The only way these details can be known is by Kierkegaard. Thus, when 
Kierkegaard makes this charge against Andersen he falls prey to the same criticism. 
This contradiction has not gone unnoticed within Kierkegaard scholarship. Some have 
concluded that Kierkegaard simply makes a logical error.95 More sympathetic scholars 
believe that Kierkegaard’s argument here is an early example o f the kind o f irony that 
would mark his authorship.96 Further analysis o f both the claims made about 
A ndersen’s person, and why these may be damaging to A ndersen’s authorship, may 
help to solve whether the inconsistency at the heart o f From the Papers is intentional 
or not.
Firstly then, what are the kinds o f things said o f Andersen as a person? Andersen is 
said to lack in genius. Perhaps this can be concluded from a reading o f A ndersen’s 
works. But the reviewer goes on to accuse Andersen o f lacking the offense o f
95 W estfall, for exam ple, cham pions this view. He claim s that the argum ent is ‘un tenable’ (2007, 42), 
and that “The author contradicts h im self throughout the review , m oving back and forth betw een 
statem ents that read like argum ents a d  hominem  and disclaim ers that ‘nevertheless rem ind readers that 
we are dealing w ith A ndersen as a novelist’” (2007, 45. See also: W estfall, 2006, 39).
96 D espite acknow ledging the inconsistency in the review ers criticism  o f  A ndersen, Joakim  G arff 
believes that K ierkegaard has made this inconsistency on purpose, in a reciprocal adm ission that he too 
lacks a life-view  (G arff, 2006, 94; see also: K irm mse, 2006, 8, 14, 19).
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Christianity {ibid., 73). Later, we are told that Andersen is prone to a ‘temptation to 
produce instead o f developing h im self {ibid., 74) and is said to be discontented ‘with 
the actual w orld’ {ibid., 75). It is far harder to see how these personality traits could be 
determined from Andersen’s texts alone: especially given the fact that an author may 
purposely write in a way that suggests that they, qua real world person, have these 
specific characteristics even though they may not.
If  we accept what is said about Andersen as true, this would help us understand why 
Andersen may be so prone to be a victim o f the age. If  these are indeed some o f 
A ndersen’s personality traits then it is not so much the fault o f  the age that Andersen 
is existentially impoverished but at least partly A ndersen’s fault as well. Neither 
A ndersen’s character traits nor the trends o f his age are ideal prerequisites for 
existential development. Nevertheless, neither one is wholly to blame for A ndersen’s 
failure to develop existentially.
A ndersen’s ‘weakly developed tem peram ent’ {ibid., 74) is not given the requisite 
fortification from the age {ibid., 71). Indeed, the political period necessarily affects 
Andersen ‘only discouragingly’ {ibid., 73). But if  we are told o f how the age affects 
Andersen negatively, this talk is mirrored by statements about how Andersen relates 
to the dominating philosophy and literature o f that age. In the discussions o f 
A ndersen’s relations to these institutions, as well as elsewhere, claims are made which
97seem to appeal to the ‘factually actual’ Andersen.
97 W estfall’s (2007) term.
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At the closing o f these observations, however, the reviewer once more notes that they 
are “ ...supplementary proof o f our statement, a statement as much about A ndersen’s 
misrelation to an epic development as about his indeclinability in life” {ibid., 76). A 
little later on in the same page these observations are given even more credit:
When we now say that Andersen totally lacks a life-view, this statement is 
as much substantiated by the preceding [talk o f A ndersen’s literature] as 
this latter [talk o f A ndersen’s character] is substantiated by the statement 
itself verified in its truth, {ibid., 76)
According to this statement, then, knowledge o f A ndersen’s character alone would 
appear to yield sufficient evidence o f whether Andersen has, or lacks, a life-view; and 
this in turn would decide whether his literature does or does not too. Thus, knowledge 
o f A ndersen’s character could just as equally tell us whether his literature will be 
confined to the ‘lyrical stage’ or not.
The reviewer is at least aware o f the possible contradiction inherent in both criticising 
Andersen for inserting him self illegitimately into his fiction, and making claims about 
Andersen’s ‘factually actual’ person though. Just after the claim is made that 
Andersen’s person could alone yield sufficient evidence o f a lack o f a life-view, the 
reviewer reminds us that ‘we are dealing with Andersen only as a novelist’ {ibid., 77). 
A little later this is expanded upon. The reviewer, in fact, thinks it would be ‘only a 
misunderstanding and m isinterpretation’, if  we were to think that they had 
‘overstepped the limit o f [their] esthetic jurisdiction’ by mentioning Andersen’s
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person on so many occasions {ibid., 83). The reviewer assures us that he or she ‘does 
not know Andersen personally’.98
According to the reviewer, it is easy to learn about A ndersen’s personality from his 
authorship, since Andersen has been unable to detach him self entirely from his 
literature. But the reviewer also thinks that this very practice aesthetically damages his 
literature. Examples o f aesthetic limitations caused by Andersen’s entwinement with 
his works include the following. Firstly, Andersen cannot adequately express the 
viewpoints o f characters which are radically different from his own. When Andersen 
describes children, for example, he is so unable to sufficiently detach him self from his 
own mentality that he either plants adult thoughts into the mind o f a character 
supposed to be a child (albeit, childishly so), or he refers back to the fragmentary 
memories o f his own childhood experiences {ibid., 86). In either case, the reviewer 
concludes that the first six chapters o f Only a Fiddler which are dedicated to 
Christian’s childhood experiences are portrayed in an unconvincing and fragmented 
manner.
Other problems occur when Andersen illegitimately implants his own opinions into 
the novel. Andersen mixes up the views o f the central protagonist ‘Christian’ with his 
own. An example is given when, in the novel, two women look at Christian with 
‘foolish eyes’ as he is walking away. Presumably Christian does not see this himself. 
Additionally, the only reason the w om en’s look is deemed to be foolish is because 
they are doubtful o f whether Christian is truly a genius or not (another fact o f which 
Christian him self presumably could not be aware). The w om en’s looks are therefore
98 All though this claim , given the fictive nature o f  the review er, could also be ironically true.
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considered ‘foolish’ by the novel’s narrator. But the reviewer sees no reason for 
A ndersen’s fictive narrator to have drawn this conclusion. The judgem ent upon the 
women must have come from A ndersen’s own view. Thus, the reviewer sees the 
incident as an example o f A ndersen’s inadvertent but meddlesome interception with 
the fictive flow o f the novel - an interference that not only says something o f the 
author but also has aesthetically displeasing consequences.
This links in with another charge made against Andersen. Rather than using his 
literary skill to persuade the reader that Christian should be considered a genius, 
A ndersen’s own opinion is just illegitimately forced into the novel, such as when the 
w om en’s scepticism o f Christian’s gifts were judged by the narrator as ‘foolish’.99 
A ndersen’s presupposition o f Christian’s genius enters the novel from outside o f the 
fictive flow and before the reader has been given any evidence o f Christian’s genius. 
In fact, no evidence is ever given. In this way Andersen ‘begs the question’ with 
regards to his theory o f genius. As the novel concludes, the only way the reader can 
accept the claim that Christian was indeed a genius all along, is if  he or she already 
had accepted A ndersen’s unjustified judgem ent o f Christian’s talents in the first place.
Apart from irregular observations, Andersen is also accused o f going into long- 
winded ramblings about matters which are o f no immediate relevance to the fictive 
flow {ibid., 94). These extra-fictive disputes involve matters to do with the actual 
world and so can only be attributed to the factually actual author. Andersen fails to
99 It could be argued that throughout K ierkegaard’s authorship he attem pts at all costs to avoid ju s t this 
kind o f  abuse o f  authorial ‘authority’. K ierkegaard frequently attem pts to bring the reader tow ards a 
decision, w hereby they m ust then make their own choice with regards to an existential decision. Roger 
Poole, for exam ple, defends this view  o f  the authorship (Poole, 1993). If  this interpretation is correct, 
then K ierkegaard’s attem pts at avoiding having his readers accept his own view point rather than 
develop theirs w ould be in direct conflict with w hat he thinks A ndersen is doing.
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poetically pick out what information would be relevant within the fiction and what 
would not {ibid., 92). Finally, A ndersen’s aforementioned discontentment with the 
‘actual w orld’ {ibid., 75) permeates the views o f each character he introduces {ibid., 
90) despite the fact that Andersen attempts to portray some characters as optimistic 
(occasionally even directly telling us that the character is so).
An author who had attained the epic stage, such as Thomasine Gyllembourg on the 
other hand, would write with an internal consistency around which all other elements 
o f the work would gravitate. This centre would even allow the author to relate real 
world observations to the stable, fictive plot. Only once an author has learned to be 
able to separate themselves fully from their work can they then successfully 
transubstantiate real-world observations into the fictive world and ensure that the 
remarks are completely coherent with the underlying fictive theme. Andersen not only 
lacks the ability to bring his work into unity but also fails to adequately separate the 
extraneous from the fictive.
The reviewer argues that one need not necessarily know anything o f A ndersen’s 
“factually actual” person before reading Only a Fiddler to nevertheless be able to 
make judgem ents o f Andersen as a person. One could, presumably, amalgamate all o f 
the remarks that seem to be extraneous to the fictive story-line and, realising that these 
remarks in and o f themselves have an internal unity, attribute them to an additional 
entity. This additional character is more than just a narrator with a personality o f its 
own (such as we may find in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, for example) - 
for this narrator not only frequently appeals to facts outside o f the fictive world, but
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also positively interferes with the fictive world, directly inserting its own beliefs into 
the character’s mouths and thwarting their own fictive development.
One o f the claims the reviewer makes therefore appears to be just this: that Andersen 
inserts him self into his literature to such an extent that one can adequately draw many 
conclusions about his real person on the basis o f these unintentional interventions. We 
can, for example, draw inferences o f the kinds o f things which Andersen is interested 
in by recognising his frequent, extra-fictive excursions into such topics.
But are such inferences legitimate given the aesthetic theory the reviewer sets out? 
Our understanding so far takes a serious twist when we consider the following: could 
it not be that Andersen has set to task to write a book which investigates what it is like 
to have an author who frequently inserts itself into the text? Could one method o f 
attaining this be to have created a fictive narrator with a (fictive) set o f attitudes about 
(actual) contemporary debates and who frequently oversteps his or her position as 
narrator to discuss such events -  events wholly tangential to the fictive fluidity o f the 
rest o f the book? Could not all o f this be executed under the guise that it was 
inadvertently done by the factually actual author - Andersen?
The thesis is not illogical, however unlikely it might be. It is very doubtful that 
Andersen or indeed anyone would wish to make a piece o f work that included 
aesthetically damaging elements for the purpose of... well o f what? O f duping critics 
into thinking that such aesthetically damaging elements were done out o f carelessness 
rather than intention? Granted, to set oneself the task o f having critics believe that one 
unintentionally produced a poor piece o f work would be a presumably thankless task.
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But the possibility cannot be ruled out. And for that reason, it seems as if 
K ierkegaard’s ‘reviewer’ cannot legitimately infer that the apparently extra-fictive 
elements o f A ndersen’s work can be taken as evidence o f his actual personality.
Recall that the reviewer defines the epic life-view as something which is ‘born in 
secrecy and buried in silence [...] without the necessity o f it ever coming to expression 
as such’: something which could in fact go altogether ‘unnoticed’ {ibid., 71). Given 
this definition it appears as if  no person could ever legitimately claim that another 
lacked the epic life-view. Even if  a person knew the factually actual Andersen 
extremely well it is still far from clear whether they would thereby have adequate 
grounding for saying that Andersen lacked the ‘epic’ element o f life or not. Given this, 
how is it that an anonymous reviewer who ‘does not know Andersen personally’ can 
come to have knowledge o f A ndersen’s life-view, secondarily, through what is said in 
the latter’s novels? Perhaps all we could conclude is that there is no evidence in any 
o f A ndersen’s writings that the epic life-view has been attained -  but this is different 
to asserting that Andersen must personally lack those traits. Those elements, so 
characteristic o f authors like Thomasine Gyllembourg, are merely consistently lacking 
from Andersen’s authorship.
There might be another way in which the reviewer may be justified in thinking that 
Andersen lacks the epic life-view - perhaps Andersen lacks the requisite life- 
development for such a life view .100 A life-view requires a specific life-development, 
and if  it can be shown that Andersen lacks this life-development then it could perhaps 
be deduced that he simply could not have developed a life-view.
,()() H ere I am using Sylvia W alsh’s very helpful distinction betw een a life-view  [Livs-Anskuelse] and a 
life-developm ent [Livs-Udvik/ing] (W alsh, 1994, 37).
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Recall that Andersen was described as “a possibility o f a personality ...who, in order 
to become a personality, needs a strong life-development” (ibid., 70). We are also told 
that Andersen was not given the necessary ‘life-supplem ent’ required to develop his 
personality by the age, because A ndersen’s ‘life-developm ent’ took place in what the 
reviewer calls the ‘political-period’ {ibid., 71). Under this reading it appears as if  the 
reviewer has grounds to suspect that since Andersen lacks a proper life-development, 
having been bom and raised in such negligent times, there can be no possibility that 
he developed a personality which escaped being a mere ‘web o f arbitrary m oods’.
The problem with this reading, however, is that it still implies that the reviewer has 
some knowledge o f Andersen as a factually actual person. Hence, this reading still 
does no better at pulling the reviewer out o f the contradictions outlined above, as will 
be shown below.
The reviewer had argued that authors whose work shows evidence that they have 
reached the epic stage (like Thomasine Gyllembourg for example) yield a ‘life- 
dividend’ from the ‘battle-won confidence in the w orld’ {ibid., 65). W hilst this ‘life- 
dividend’ is not directly mentioned as being that one and the same necessary ‘life- 
supplem ent’ that the age fails to afford individuals like Andersen, I take it that both 
terms describe ways o f gaining the necessary constituent o f an existentially authentic 
personality. The difference in terminology, it appears, is a difference in the way the
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individual comes to claim this constituent. One way is for it to be supplemented to the 
individual; the other for it to be gained  as a dividend through one’s efforts.101
If we recall an all-important passage where it is stated that the only way Andersen 
could have achieved the epic aspect o f personality was either if  he had undergone a 
Pythagorean study in silence, or if  the age had favoured him, it was stated that the 
former possibility was ruled out as unfeasible given what is known o f Andersen {ibid., 
71). It could be, then, that there are two or possibly even more ways o f claiming the 
necessities for a life development. The idea that Andersen could receive a life- 
dividend if he honestly and earnestly faced up to his existential situation is a 
possibility. But it is a possibility which the reviewer, unfortunately, does not even 
entertain.
In fact, the reviewer had already admitted that the two options mentioned for attaining 
a stronger personality are tailored to Andersen’s situation: they are the only options 
for an 4Andersenian’ ‘transition from the lyric to the epic’ {ibid.). Thus we cannot 
really make conclusions about how any person may develop. An ‘extensive discussion 
o f the meaning o f a proper epic developm ent’ is neglected as the focus shifts to 
Andersen’s specific situation {ibid.). The development set forth in the review is not 
helped by the fact that it is already tainted by what the reviewer considers to be an 
accurate understanding o f A ndersen’s character (‘without knowing him personally’!).
Thus, it is plausible that Andersen may have achieved the life-dividend necessary for 
life-development. But this viewpoint is not even been entertained by the reviewer,
101 A part from the change in method o f  attainm ent suggested by the term s ‘d iv idend’ and ‘supplem ent’ 
I have failed to find any notable differences betw een the two terms.
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given the latter’s opinion o f Andersen as a person. If this is correct, then the idea that 
Andersen’s self-development was stunted because the age was one which did not 
foster this development is not strictly true. A ndersen’s development was stunted in 
part because o f the person Andersen is, and these characteristics could have been 
formed for a variety o f reasons, not all o f which are necessarily a fault o f  the age.
Perhaps, it could be retorted, the character traits that Andersen exhibits were 
themselves formed by the negligent age? Even if  this rather deterministic (and hence 
un-Kierkegaardian) position was maintained though, it is clear, for the reviewer at 
least, that one character trait can never be eradicated by the age no matter how corrupt 
it may be - and that is ‘genius’.
A ndersen’s view o f genius elaborated upon in Only a Fiddler and attacked by the 
reviewer is that o f ‘an egg that needs warm th’, a pearl that ‘must await the diver that 
brings it up to the light’ {ibid., 81, n .l), a delicate flame flickering in the wind. The 
review er’s notion o f genius is that, far from being a candle which could be 
extinguished by any whimsical movement the age makes, it is a flame which is only 
incited and blown up by the winds. For Andersen, the genius must wait for the age to 
afford the necessary ‘life-supplem ent’. For the reviewer, a genius is precisely one who 
can and will earnestly battle through external difficulty to gain this life-supplement 
for themselves. The reviewer must conclude that Andersen was therefore no genius, 
an assertion already made multiple times throughout the review.
Another reason why the age might not be able to totally affect the individual’s ability 
to develop existentially is that such a view would give a rather deterministic account
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o f the individual. This would contradict most o f K ierkegaard’s other writings, since a 
basic assumption o f the majority o f the authorship is that humans have free-will. It is 
quite clear, then, that if  the age is partly responsible for A ndersen’s failings, Andersen 
is partly responsible too.
As o f yet, it may still be wondered why we might think o f From the Papers as being 
political. Furthermore, it may be questioned how useful an analysis o f such a 
troubling and pseudonymous(/anonymous) work is. In what sense can we call any o f 
the views expressed in From the Papers Kierkegaard’s given that Kierkegaard him self 
went to great lengths to avoid the claim that the views expressed were his own? Such 
questions will be answered in the following subsection.
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4.3 A political reading of From the Papers
Joakimm G arff used an anecdote to end his discussion o f From the Papers. G arff 
described how, a few years after the collision between Kierkegaard and Andersen, 
Andersen sent Kierkegaard a copy of his latest work. By that time Andersen appeared 
to have taken on board and appreciated some o f ‘K ierkegaard’s’ critical comments 
that were presented in the review. Inside Andersen’s new work was a fairy tale which 
G arff believes was at least partly inspired by the comments from From the Papers. In 
the world-famous tale, later known as ‘the ugly duckling’, the main character battles 
with the opinions o f those immediately surrounding it and in spite o f the views o f the 
latter develops into an epitome o f beauty.
Garff, and most assuredly Andersen also, still took ‘Kierkegaard’s’ review o f Only A 
Fiddler to have meant that whether or not one will develop authentically in life simply 
depended on whether or not one was born a genius. If not, they will succumb to the 
treacherous times. But this is still adhering to a deterministic notion o f being a genius 
by birth: a genius by some divine will or by the pure fortune o f nature. G arff believes 
that Andersen changed his opinion later in life, with the world-famous fairy-tale: ‘The 
Ugly Duckling’. There, Andersen apparently drops the requirement o f hospitable 
surroundings being a requirement for genius. In G arff  s words: ‘[...] it is no problem 
to be hatched by a duck pond -  provided one has emerged from a sw an’s egg’ (Garff,
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2005, 145). W hilst an interesting anecdote, this result o f From the Papers is surely 
not what was intended.
In K ierkegaard’s doctoral thesis, his next large work after From the Papers, he 
expresses worries about what he deemed to be deterministic accounts o f genius and o f 
selfhood. The main focus o f his thesis was an attack upon a false idea o f the self, and 
o f his or her relation to the external world that Kierkegaard thought romanticism 
extolled and popularised. Broadly speaking, for Kierkegaard the romantic placed too 
great o f an emphasis on factors completely outside o f the individual’s control (and not 
enough emphasis on those within the individual’s control). ‘G enius’, for example, 
tended to be thought o f as a divine gift, or as a thing that some were born with but that 
others were not. Andersen, though not a romantic, has an equally passive view o f 
genius. In Only a Fiddler genius is, for Andersen, something both that one is 
necessarily bom with and  that must be catered for by the respective age. Andersen 
may have dropped the second requirement in due o f K ierkegaard’s From the Papers. 
But Kierkegaard would be equally against the idea that one is a genius from  birth.
Against romanticism and Andersen, Kierkegaard’s idea o f genius, a concept that has a 
remarkable consistency throughout his authorship, is always focussed upon those 
factors within the individual’s control. The traits o f a true genius are willpower and 
determination, not only in spite o f but precisely in the face o f unfortunate 
circumstances. And willpower in the face o f external impingements also happens to 
be a large element o f authentic existential development -  especially in politically and 
socially sub-optimal conditions.
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Thus, From the Papers includes a number o f themes that are informative o f 
K ierkegaard’s political position. In From the Papers, a number o f socio-political 
factors that are completely outside o f the individual’s control are acknowledged and 
admitted o f playing a not insignificant role in hindering an individual’s ability to 
develop existentially. In a previous age, that is to say, under different socio-political 
circumstances, Andersen could have had fewer obstacles to his existential 
development and perhaps even communal aid. In From the Papers, however, it is 
clear that socio-political factors alone are never the sole deciding factor with regards 
to existential development. Observations regarding A ndersen’s specific character 
traits frequently remind us that the latter also play a large role in explaining 
A ndersen’s existential impoverishment.
If  we did  believe that socio-political factors wholly determined A ndersen’s 
personality traits, then we would be led into a kind o f logic that limits existential 
development to factors completely outside o f the individual’s control. This kind o f 
thinking would involve a kind o f passivity akin to both Andersen’s and the rom antic’s 
view o f genius, a type o f passivity Kierkegaard fiercely fights against.
Kierkegaard probably did not have a fully worked out theory o f the political when he 
wrote From the Papers. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard does show that he is willing to 
examine the relationship between socio-economic forces and individual, existential 
development. The piece on Andersen therefore provides us with an early case study o f 
the dangerous existential effects socio-political forces might create. Kierkegaard 
would still need to work out what boundaries ought to exist for us to legitimately say 
that a political entity has transgressed its legitimate scope. That is to say, Kierkegaard
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does not yet show evidence o f delineating the role that political entities play in 
legitimately relating to political and hence non-political entities. But this early piece 
shows us why Kierkegaard might have had existential concerns that would prompt 
him to examine this relationship and hence develop a theory o f the political.
We can also note that in Kierkegaard’s later political writings the socio-political 
factors o f the age are quite radically from this earlier piece. With these changes, 
Kierkegaard recognises that the hindrances the age create are much greater than those 
in A ndersen’s case. This prompts a number o f alterations to the early and perhaps 
emerging understanding o f theory o f the political hinted at in From the Papers.
One change, for example, is that the possible relation between A ndersen’s own 
character traits and the socio-political trends o f the age is finally given a little more 
clarification in Kierkegaard’s later political position. Many o f the character traits that 
limit A ndersen’s ability to develop existentially (later classified as traits exemplary o f 
the aesthetic way o f life) are later seen as ones that an age might inadvertently 
subsidise and foster. In this sense, Andersen becomes less o f a case study and more o f 
a representative o f a wider social phenomenon. Thus, Kierkegaard will later examine 
how an illegitimate political action will existentially affect all individuals -  or the 
‘typical’ individual found in a specific age. This allows for a broader theory o f the 
political than can be found in From the Papers. This ‘broader’ theory o f the political 
will be examined in the next chapter. Yet the origins o f it can be seen in this early 
work. This provides at least one good reason for thinking that Kierkegaard was more 
interested in political issues throughout his authorship than is otherwise 
acknowledged.
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K ierkegaard’s late political thought differs with regards to this earlier work in another 
important way. In his final political writings, Kierkegaard advocates the removal o f 
one o f the obstacles to existential development -  the Danish state-church marriage 
solidified by the (then new) constitution o f 1849. Once more, the reflexivity o f 
K ierkegaard’s political position is highlighted, as it evolves in direct response to a 
(socio-)political change. In From the Papers it is not quite worked out how much o f 
the responsibility for not developing existentially is the fault o f  Andersen him self and 
how much is due to the deficiencies o f the age. Throughout his authorship, 
Kierkegaard maintains the optimistic belief that the individual is always still partly 
responsible for existential deepening.
In K ierkegaard’s latest articulations o f his theory o f the political, however, he finally 
adds a caveat to this view. As Denmark undergoes social-political changes that are 
exceptionally debilitating to existential development, K ierkegaard’s authorial task 
also shifts focus. Kierkegaard finally reaches a position where he believes that the 
majority o f people could be helped existentially if  he attacked the legitimacy o f these 
political changes, rather than solely focussing on guiding the individual towards 
inward deepening regardless o f external hindrances. Thus, Kierkegaard’s emphasis 
accordingly changes from one o f producing existentially upbuilding literature to a 
more polemical attack against the established state/church marriage. Nevertheless, if 
Kierkegaard was not sure where the burden o f responsibility lay in From the Papers -  
on targeting an existential impoverishment by improving the inward development o f 
the individual or by changing the external situation -  it was something that appears to 
have been worked out in his mature theory o f the political. We will outline this (and
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more) aspect(s) o f Kierkegaard’s theory o f the political when we examine 
K ierkegaard’s late authorship (in chapters five and six below.)
The consequences o f reading From the Papers politically therefore include the 
following: firstly, Kierkegaard’s final political writings are, far from being an 
anomaly, a central part o f the authorship. Secondly, K ierkegaard’s political view can 
be shown to be highly responsive in nature. This entails that Kierkegaard is more 
interested and aware o f the external socio-political situation than has often been 
thought o f him. And the third result o f this reading is that it opens up the hypothesis 
that Kierkegaard might have been politically minded throughout his entire authorship. 
Not only do some o f the themes in this early work get worked and reworked in 
Kierkegaard’s final writings; but at least one notion, that o f ‘genius’, is held 
consistently throughout the entire authorship (see n.89 above).
All o f this might be true; and yet this is not to say that From the Papers is not still a 
deeply problematic work. The work is, after all, an arguably pseudonymous 
publication o f an anonymous reviewer. All o f the central points o f Kierkegaard’s 
theory o f the political are articulated by this anonymous reviewer. Furthermore, the 
work was intended to be published in a journal with a specialised intellectual leaning. 
The work could also be considered as a corrective to a Hegelian-inspired philosophy 
that had become prevalent. To increase complexity, multiple pragmatic factors may 
have played a role in altering the text. Finally, Kierkegaard does not even
1 09acknowledge this early work as part o f his authorship. Given all this, what, if 
anything, can we take from the review?
102 See note 122 above, and 160 below.
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I think that W atkins’ theory o f this work as being somewhat experimental is an 
essential way o f understanding the text. A large amount o f the above discussion 
centred on the idea that some o f the fundamental claims o f the review were 
philosophically untenable. The reviewer argues that if  the ‘epic-developm ent’ had 
been undertaken then it would leave a trace in an author’s writings. Similarly, a piece 
o f work will reveal tell-tale signs that the author remains within the ‘lyrical’ aspect o f 
writing. Yet, it simply cannot be absolutely ruled out that an author could have 
personally undergone this ‘epic-development’ and yet still have decided to write in a 
way that completely belied that fact. Thus, the central argument o f the work -  that 
from A ndersen’s work(s) we can deduce that he has not passed through the ‘epic- 
developm ent’ -  is not philosophically justified in the text.
In a similar fashion, I do not think that Kierkegaard’s theory o f the political is fully 
formed in this text. As far as this text is concerned, Kierkegaard still needs to give an 
account o f the relationship between the detrimental affects a political practice can 
have on the person and to what degree an individual can be expected to overcome the 
former, in the pursuit o f spiritual development. Nevertheless, From the Papers shows 
that Kierkegaard attempted to formulate a working theory o f the relationship between 
social factors and the existential development o f persons, and so early on in his 
literary career (indeed, in what was arguably his debut piece). Hence, we need not 
concern ourselves with the hermeneutical problems surrounding the intention o f the 
publication o f the piece. The fact would still remain that Kierkegaard engaged with 
certain issues and that he took these issues up and re-worked them throughout his 
authorship.
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We can also disregard, to an extent, questions concerning whether the views that are 
articulated in the piece can properly be said to belong to ‘K ierkegaard’. An answer to 
this question will be given by analysing Kierkegaard’s other works including those 
explicitly written under his own name and seeing what resemblances and 
consistencies the views expressed in the latter share with the former. If From the 
Papers contains only a rough theory o f the political then at least it shows a 
determination to ask questions concerning the relation between the political and the 
non-political. Despite the fact that the theory is far from complete, I will defend the 
claim that it is a fair expression o f K ierkegaard’s own concerns and beliefs by 
showing how the focal concerns o f From the Papers are the same as those that inform 
Kierkegaard’s theory o f the political in his late authorship. This will be shown by an 
examination o f the latter works in relation to the former.
From the Papers is quite possibly one o f Kierkegaard’s most neglected works and is 
even still largely ignored in modern Kierkegaard scholarship. (This is most likely 
partly because o f the numerous hermeneutical complexities involved in a study o f the 
text.) Yet From the Papers shows proof o f the young Kierkegaard interested in social 
questions and evidence that could contradict the claim that Kierkegaard was not at all 
interested in politics. We could even tentatively suggest that the scholarly neglect o f 
political or social readings o f From the Papers and the fact that Kierkegaard is not 
often thought o f as a politically interested philosopher might be related. One o f the 
central claims o f this thesis is that Kierkegaard engaged in political writings 
throughout his authorship, i.e., that it is not just an aberration, but is a central aspect 
o f his thought and o f his principal, existential interests. I also wish to argue that many
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o f the themes in his earlier authorship informed those o f Kierkegaard’s final theory o f 
the political. A failure to appreciate the idea that Kierkegaard was politically minded 
as early on as in 1838 (when he was just twenty-five) could stem from the fact that 
From the Papers is an admittedly troublesome and obscure work, far less read than 
some o f K ierkegaard’s later major works. 1 have attempted to remedy somewhat the 
little attention From the Papers has received by showing that it can be given a 
political reading, as well as by bringing it into relation with K ierkegaard’s more 
popular works (throughout the remainder o f this thesis).
In the next chapter I will look at one o f Kierkegaard’s more popular and more 
obviously socio-political works -  Two Ages. Some o f the political themes that had 
arisen in From the Papers will be worked out in more detail in this later political 
piece. One example will be Kierkegaard’s treatment o f the complexities o f the impact 
o f social and political pressures on the individual’s existential development. 
Furthermore, the theory o f the political that was outlined in chapter three will be more 
obviously at the fore o f this work. Yet despite being an ostensibly quite political work, 
Two Ages contains frequent cautions with regards to the application o f Kierkegaard’s 
theory o f the political. Such cautions against developing a positive political 
programme from his thought were voiced, we recall, with K ierkegaard’s outline o f his 
theory o f the political in the various writings from 1846-1851 (which were the subject 
o f chapter three). Two Ages, published in 1846, was therefore written during or before 
much o f Kierkegaard’s developed theory o f the political. Nevertheless, Two Ages 
adheres to Kierkegaard’s theory o f the political in all respects. Two Ages also 
investigates political issues that are similar to those that were the central focus o f 
From the Papers but develops those issues and thus differs from From the Papers in
Page 183 o f 354. K ierkegaard’s Existential Theory o f  the Political. Thom as W olstenholme.
some important respects. Examining some o f the differences and similarities between 
this later work and Kierkegaard’s debut piece will help further elucidate 
K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political in general, and will therefore be the 
focus o f the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
Kierkegaard’s ‘Aesthetic’ Age and its Political 
Consequences.
Introduction.
That Kierkegaard delineated three existential life-styles, the aesthetic, the ethical, and
I 09the religious, is a well-known tenet o f his philosophy. Despite this, the idea that 
these existential ‘spheres’ relate to changes in the external environment, such as 
political changes, has received little attention. I argue that in his work Two Ages 
[hereafter simply; TA], Kierkegaard shows that the spheres o f existence are in fact in 
large part reliant upon the socio-political establishments and practices o f an age.
A consequence o f this reading is that it gives us insight into why Kierkegaard may 
have called his (or any) age an ‘aesthetic’ age.104 The use o f an existential term for an 
age would otherwise be somewhat o f a peculiarity in the authorship.
There are other consequences o f this reading. One is that it gives us more evidence for 
suggesting that Kierkegaard was not philosophising in complete disregard to changes
103 For a b rie f guide to these ‘spheres’, see n.58 above.
104 O r ‘esthetic’ -  see n .l 10 below.
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in the external world -  i.e., that he was not a mere subjectivist. In Two Ages, 
Kierkegaard highlights how one’s existential development ought to be reflexive to 
external conditions. A change in the objective, political conditions may fundamentally 
alter the way one develops one’s ‘life-view’. Such changes might also render the 
intended effects o f ethico-religious activity ‘impotent’. This could even imply that a 
person engaged in becoming an existentially authentic subject may become required 
to participate in a specific kind o f political action in order to continue their existential 
development.
The final consequence o f this reading is that we may have grounds for rejecting 
political changes that negatively affect the existential development o f the citizenry o f 
its intended policy. Political efforts which hinder one’s religious development are by 
standards o f state neutrality, at least, liable to be revised or rejected on the grounds 
that the political realm and the religious space o f the individual are to be kept separate.
In putting forward these theses I shall also consequently argue against the position 
that Kierkegaard came to neglect the ‘ethical’ aspect o f existential development, a 
thought-provoking view which Daniel Conway has recently advocated (Conway, 
1999). Instead, I shall maintain the thesis that social and political factors influence the 
existential spheres by arguing that the ethical way o f life is actually only rendered 
ineffective (contra Conway’s argument that Kierkegaard neglects it) by those socio­
political practices. I argue that this has existentially crippling consequences in that it 
fosters aestheticism. As such, I argue that this is another reason we might call an age 
an ‘aesthetic’ age.
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5.1 An ‘aesthetic’ age.
Many scholars have noted that near the end o f his authorship, Kierkegaard calls his 
age an ‘aesthetic’ o n e .105 This is somewhat o f a novelty: the authorship that had 
preceded this comment reserved the terms ‘aesthetic’, ‘ethical’, and ‘religious’, 
exclusively for the individual. In general, however, Kierkegaard’s varying aesthetes 
are represented as akin to hedonists, seekers o f pleasure (or at least ‘the interesting’ as 
in the case o f ‘A ’ [E/O I]) with no concern for one o f the most fundamental ethical 
principles: that o f treating others as ends in themselves.
K ierkegaard’s earlier authorship {Either/Or I, Stages on L ife ’s Way [hereafter simply; 
SLW] and Repetition) represented aesthetes as individual people and gave no 
intimation o f using this term to describe an age. In fact, on numerous occasions 
Kierkegaard had expressed the opinion that an age does not develop dialectically in 
the way an individual can.106
Kierkegaard typically thought that the opinion that an entire age had developed 
dialectically was a convenient way o f presenting individuals with an excuse not to 
bother developing themselves ethico-religiously. One bom in an age which is 
inherently ethical or religious was thought to be eo ipso an ethical or religious person,
105 For exam ple, see: D arlym ple (2009, 169, 193); Perkins (1999a, 178; 2009, 318); Pattison (1992, 62; 
1999, 18; 1999b, 16); and Tajafuerce (1999a, 69).
106 A view  point apparently held from the beginning o f  the authorship. See for exam ple, From the 
Papers, the focal work o f  the previous chapter (EPW , 61-65). See also: JP III, 2910: “C hristianly there 
is only the question o f  the N ew  Testam ent, with which every generation has to begin  ’ (my em phasis).
Page 187 ot 354. K ierkegaard’s Existential Theory o f  the Political. Thom as W olstenholme.
so long as one unquestioningly conformed to the ethico-religious practices already 
established. This view, ironically, happens to foster the kind o f mindset that prevents 
the individual from attaining ethical and religious development. For it neglects 
features o f ethico-religious development that Kierkegaard thought necessary: the 
individual’s personal, subjective, and passionate appropriation o f the life-view. Given 
K ierkegaard’s insistence on these latter qualities we may ask again: what sense does it 
make to call an age aesthetic?
Perhaps an age could be called aesthetic precisely because the prevalent practices and 
ideology o f that age are marked by the same elements o f the aesthetic way o f life e.g., 
a dispassionate willingness to go along with the status quo, coupled with an absolute 
aversion to the kind o f personal choice required to lead one into the ethical or 
religious ways o f life. Under such an interpretation, Kierkegaard could still maintain it 
is impossible for an age to be an ‘ethical age’, or a ‘religious age’, (for no ideological 
view or cultural practice could be such that it leads the individual into the ethical or 
religious way o f life, given the requirements o f personal, subjective appropriation, 
unique to these latter two existential spheres), though there would not be anything 
inconsistent in calling an age ‘aesthetic’. Therefore, Kierkegaard could still deem it 
impossible for an ‘age’ to develop, for an age could be aesthetic but could never go on 
to be ethical or religious.
This reading is problematic for two reasons though. The first is that surely an age 
could be an ‘aesthetic age’, as Kierkegaard stated that his was. But if the claim that a 
given age is aesthetic is to be meaningful then any given age also might not be 
aesthetic. Let us assume that the default position o f an age is, as is arguably the case
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with individuals, aesthetic. If the age cannot develop beyond this then K ierkegaard’s 
expression o f his own age as being an ‘aesthetic age’ would appear to be an altogether 
vacuous comment: so is every other age. Presumably then, an age might not be 
aesthetic; and presumably a ‘non-aesthetic age’ is a development in comparison to an 
‘aesthetic age’.
Assumptions aside, the second problem with the above reading is that it appears to 
overlook a key Kierkegaardian theme, namely that o f the absolute priority o f the 
individual to all other categories.107 To call an ‘age’ aesthetic could surely not mean 
that every individual in that age is an aesthete, or even that the majority are. Such a 
generalisation would be a disregard o f the unique development o f every individual in 
that age which is characteristically un-Kierkegaardian. Besides, wholehearted 
engagement in the established cultural norms could not count as irrefutable evidence 
that such a person is therefore an aesthete, given that the bustling ‘tax collector’ who 
has reached the highest state o f religious development could be, from the perspective
1 ORo f outward behaviours, exactly the same in appearance as an aesthete.
107 This notion [in D anish: Den Enkelte] appears in m any places in K ierkegaard’s authorship. In 1846, 
(in w hat K ierkegaard considered to be the beginning o f  the authorship; see n.78 above) K ierkegaard 
dedicates his signed, religious w ork Upbuilding D iscourses In Various Spirits to ‘that ind iv idual’. At 
the end o f  his authorship when K ierkegaard gives an explanation for his w hole opus, he gives three 
successive chapters on the term -  ‘the single individual’ alone, in which he also links the term to ‘that 
ind iv idual’ in the dedication o f  Upbuilding D iscourses In Various Spirits (TPV , 109). The three 
chapters are nam ed: ‘"The Single Individual": Two "Notes" C oncerning My W ork as an A uthor’ (TPV, 
101-104); ‘For the D edication to "That Single Individual"’ (TPV , 105-112); and ‘A W ord on the 
Relation o f  My W ork as an A uthor to "the Single Individual"’ (TPV, 113-123). Thus K ierkegaard’s 
authorial project appears to have been concerned with ‘the single individual’ from the very beginning.
108 Edward M ooney argues that there can be a ‘tes t’ to show  how the knight o f  faith m ight be outw ardly 
distinguishable (from  any mere tax collector or/and, we may add, aesthete). It is this: the ‘knight o f  
fa ith ’ faithfully believes that there will be an elaborate dinner w aiting for him or her at home, despite 
the fact that practical sensibility would tell them that there is absolutely no reason to believe that such a 
meal exists! (M ooney, 1996, 45). But we surely can im agine a person engaging in this behaviour for 
(albeit peculiar) aesthetic fancy. O utw ardly , the two would be im perceptible. In later works, however, 
K ierkegaard argues that true C hristianity will necessarily m anifest itself externally (see, for example: 
JP II, 1120; FSE, 18, c f ,  JP II, 2119).
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Arguably, it is inwardness alone that separates the life-views. Thus, it is doubtful that 
Kierkegaard would diagnose an age as aesthetic based merely on the outward 
appearances o f individuals. When Kierkegaard calls an age ‘aesthetic’, then, I take it 
that he must mean simply this: that the conditions o f the age are such that it tends to 
(inadvertently or not) foster the ‘aesthetic’ existential life-view, or hinder the other 
possible life-views, perhaps simply by removing or making more difficult the 
necessary conditions for these latter two life-views.
What reasons have other Kierkegaard scholars given for suggesting that an age may 
be ‘aesthetic’? The scholarship has presented an interesting array o f mixed and not 
necessarily mutually exclusive suggestions. Perhaps an age may be justifiably deemed 
aesthetic because the supposed ethical and religious practices also covertly espouse 
aesthetic values. In his article ‘Kierkegaard’s “ Instant W riting’” , Perkins defends this 
line o f argument concluding that in Christendom, the state-church marriage that 
occurred in Kierkegaard’s day, aestheticism ‘trium phs’ (Perkins, 2009, 318). In the 
same volume [The Moment and Late Writings: International Kierkegaard 
Commentary], Timothy Darlymple backs this reading up by showing how widespread 
and supposedly ethico-religious sermons and artworks on the sufferings o f Christ 
were also used to provoke aesthetic, not religious, sentiments (Darlymple, 2009; 
especially pp. 169, 193).
In another work, Perkins extends his argument, claiming that K ierkegaard’s criticism 
o f the aestheticism inherent in Christendom is really a critique o f the ‘modern 
hedonism ’ (Perkins, 1999a, 178) inherent in the modern age. The charge here is that
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the aesthetic way o f life is a modem phenomenon. The criticisms o f the aesthetic way 
o f life are in part criticisms o f a distinctive feature o f modernity {ibid., 171).
Begonya Tajafuerce gives a similar reading, claiming that K ierkegaard’s attack on his 
age could be presented ‘in aesthetic-literary term s’ against ‘the aesthetic status quo’ 
(Tajafuerce, 1999a, 69). By this, Tajafuerce means that K ierkegaard’s attack is:
...against aesthetic conventionalism and indifferentism, understood both as 
the paradigmatic expression o f 'apathetic indolence' and as 'stagnation’ 
[Stilstanden] in reflection. It is directed against aesthetic hollowness, 
which eventually turns into the celebrated pattern o f an abstract anything- 
goes... {ibid.)
Finally, George Pattison argues that Kierkegaard might have called his age ‘aesthetic’ 
because his Danish contemporaries were practising a philosophy which assimilated 
both the aesthetic and the political, mixing the two categories indistinguishably 
together. For Pattison, this led to paving ‘the way for the kind o f transfer o f aesthetic 
categories into social and political categories that we find [in] Kierkegaard, both in 
thq Literary Review [TA] and, e.g., in The Point o f  View ’ (Pattison, 1999b, 16).109
In another work o f the same year Pattison correctly remarks that Kierkegaard’s 
designation o f his age as an aesthetic one is “ [...] a strong claim and is not 
immediately or adequately justified in its context in The Point o f  View” (Pattison, 
1999a, 17). Instead, Pattison suggests that a reading across all o f  K ierkegaard’s works 
is necessary to validate this claim. In his informative study, ‘Poor Paris!', Pattison
109 This builds from an earlier work o f  Pattison’s w here he had described K ierkegaard’s experience o f  
Established C hristendom , as well as the age itself as ‘aesthetic’: (Pattison, 1992; 62).
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seeks to show that it is “ [...] the representation o f  the city as an aesthetic phenomenon 
[through Kierkegaard’s entire authorship, that] underwrites K ierkegaard’s claim that it 
is the age as a whole (and not just a random sample o f decadent individuals) that is 
‘aesthetic’” {ibid., 18: my emphasis).
Pattison’s study is both impressive and extensive, and I shall also argue that 
Kierkegaard criticised his age for being as an aesthetic o n e .110 But I take the 
justification o f this claim to be a little simpler. As I see it, we only really have to look 
in one o f  Kierkegaard’s works, Two Ages, to see why Kierkegaard qualified his age as 
aesthetic. For in that book Kierkegaard sets out to do exactly what I have suggested 
would be necessary to judge an age as ‘aesthetic’. Kierkegaard assesses the various 
practices that the ‘present age’ engages in and analyses the impact they have on 
inwardness. In doing so, Kierkegaard highlights the ways that these practices affect 
the conditions required for the ethical and religious life-views: passion, individuality, 
personal space to relate to God and to others, and so forth. The outcome is that the 
present age inadvertently ‘favours’ the aesthetic way o f life and makes more 
demanding, perhaps even ineffective, the ethical and religious ways o f life.
The fact that a state favours an aesthetic over a genuinely religious way o f life by 
inadvertently subsidising the former and taxing the latter may be seen by a 
contemporary reader as a direct infringement o f liberal politics. For one thing, liberal
110 It should be noted that, as far as I know, K ierkegaard never explicitly called his age an ‘aesthetic 
ag e ’ in such terms. But he com es close to it. The closest, albeit scattered rem arks can be found in The 
Point o f  View. H ere K ierkegaard says, for exam ple, that: ‘If in a word I were to express my judgem ent 
o f  the age, I w ould say: It lacks religious upbringing. To becom e and be a Christian has becom e a 
banality. The esthetic plainly has the upper hand ’ and; ‘The m isfortune o f  our age is precisely that it 
has becom e m erely time by its e lf  {ibid.; 78 and 104 respectively: original em phasis). And in drafts o f  
the w ork K ierkegaard lets on to more. K ierkegaard im agines h im self to have been in ‘an age that has 
sunk to [depths] o f  com m onsensicality’; an age that ‘had gone astray and [was] bogged down in “the 
interesting” ... [requiring the help of] an esthetic au thor’; and ‘an age o f  disintegration, an esthetic, 
ennerverating d isin tegration’ (ibid.', 218, 262, and 276 respectively).
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politics typically hold that the state ought to be neutral towards individual’s attempts 
at the good life (given that it does not infringe others o f the same right to do so, and so 
on). A second, related point is that the state ought not to interfere with the individual’s 
freedom to pursue religious development, so long as that religious development does 
not itself violate state laws. Whilst Kierkegaard may have had rather prescient 
forebodings o f the problems that could occur if  these liberal principles were violated, 
it would be anachronistic to attribute these modern liberal ideas to Kierkegaard in 
such a straightforward fashion at least. W hether Kierkegaard did  have (or should  have 
had) supported political action to remedy the ailments o f the ‘present age’ will be 
assessed throughout this chapter. This in turn will link back to the earlier discussion 
o f whether Kierkegaard ought to have a positive political programme or not (i.e., to 
section 2.2 above). In assessing Kierkegaard’s view o f the present, aesthetic age, we 
will also uncover more nuances o f his theory o f the political.
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5.2 The ‘present age’.
Thus far the term ‘present age’ has been given in inverted commas. This is because 
Kierkegaard occasionally used the term to simply refer to his age, i.e. the time period 
and place he lived and wrote in: nineteenth century Denmark. In some ways this is a 
far cry from the present ‘present age’. Yet in his book Two Ages: A Literary Review, 
Kierkegaard also occasionally uses the term ‘present age’ as a philosophical rather 
than an empirical concept. For example, Kierkegaard says that he engages in ‘... an 
analysis o f the present age in terms o f the dialectical category-qualifications 
[‘leveling’, ‘the public’, etc.] and their implications, regardless o f  their being 
factually present at the given moment or n o t’ (TA, 76: my emphasis. See p. 96 for a 
very similar comment).
Kierkegaard’s task is, I take it, twofold. He certainly wishes to delineate ‘the 
distinctive characteristics o f the age’ and to ‘evaluate’ (though not judge) them {ibid., 
32, 110). A great deal o f excellent Kierkegaard scholarship has already helped to 
further delineate the various complex ‘dialectical category-qualifications’ Kierkegaard 
attributes to the present age.111 But the other aspect o f K ierkegaard’s project is to 
undertake a similar exercise that Fru Gyllembourg had in the original novel, ‘To 
Tidsaldre' {Two Ages), here under review by Kierkegaard. Where Gyllembourg
1,1 For the concept o f ‘L evelling’ (H annay’s spelling, with tw o ‘L ’s ’), see for exam ple: I lannay, 2003, 
163-178; for ‘E nvy’, see: Perkins, 1984a, 107-132; ‘Passion’ and ‘R eflection’, see: Roberts, 1984, 87- 
106; for ethical and social relations, see: Soltofl, 1999, 110-129.
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portrayed the effects that the differing ages had on the familial life and social relations 
o f the characters o f her novel, Kierkegaard wished to analyse how the age affects the 
typical individual.
Kierkegaard does not imply that an age will necessarily produce a certain kind o f 
individual. This fatalistic way o f thinking would go against much o f what 
Kierkegaard has to say not only about individual choice but individual self­
constitution too. The individual is in part defined by the age, and vice-versa {ibid., 47), 
but never reducibly so .112 Thus Kierkegaard can concede that:
The most extreme variant can appear in any and every age; for example, a 
man who could be said to belong essentially in the M iddle Ages or in 
Greece could be living in our age.... The question is... [what kind o f 
person may] appear as typical in the present age’ {ibid., 33, original 
emphasis).
Given that the present age is later called an ‘aesthetic’ age (as we noted previously) it 
may be thought that Kierkegaard comes to conclude that the present age is one where 
aesthetic individuals are typically encountered. But what do we (and Kierkegaard 
above) mean here by ‘typical’? We can interpret this in two ways: 1) the aesthetic
112 M uch o f  the literature on K ierkegaard’s political thought has em phasised the ontologically 
necessary relation the individual has to the external w orld it finds itse lf in; be those relations to external 
institutions or social relations. M ooney is a good exam ple o f  the former: "The se lf  is a relation related 
'dow nw ard' to itself, to the pow er that grounds it, and 'outw ard' to its sphere o f  interpersonal activity. 
We m ake sense o f  a se lf  (at any given stage o f  developm ent) by specifying the relational, reflexive 
field it constitutes. This m eans sketching its connections to various persons, institutions and projects 
[...]’ (M ooney, 1996; 95). Plekon also gives a com plim entary reading: "the individual is alw ays located 
or grounded within the confines o f  an array o f  relationships, ranging from those o f  the biological 
species to the social bonds o f  the family, church, and nation." (Plekon, 1982, 70. See also pp. 71 and 
80). For other exam ples o f  scholars who have noted that K ierkegaard’s authentic individual is 
ontologically  com m itted to relating to the external w'orld, see for exam ple: C rites (1992, pp. 150, 155); 
Dunning (1985, 242); Elrod (1981, pp. 74-75 and 188-89); Evans (2006, 268 and on); Hannay (2003, 
68); and Plekon (1992, 11).
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individual is most ‘com m only’ found, i.e., the aesthetic way o f life is the majority 
life-view held, or 2) the aesthetic way o f life is ‘typical’ o f the age in the way that it 
exemplifies, or is a product of, ‘the distinctive characteristics o f the age’.
It does not seem to be merely a matter o f numbers, and so the first interpretation is 
questionable. For it is indicated that in the previous age, the age o f revolution, the 
person one typically encountered was still an aesthetic individual.113 The masses still 
looked to the ethical or religious exemplar for guidance on self-development, the 
latter being a minority. Even if it were the case that the majority o f people 
encountered in the age o f revolution were aesthetes, it still does not appear that this 
alone would warrant us to term the age an ‘aesthetic age’. The reasons an age can be 
called ‘aesthetic’ then, are indeed to do with the way the individual relates to the 
distinctive characteristics o f the age. A study o f the differences in the ethical and 
religious spheres between ‘the present age’ and the ‘age o f revolution’ will, perhaps 
surprisingly given our interest in the aesthetic, nevertheless best highlight what it is 
that warrants us in calling an age ‘aesthetic’.
5.2.1 The distinctive characteristics o f ‘the present age’.
In the ‘age o f revolution’ then, Kierkegaard admits that aesthetic individuals exist, but 
they relate differently to those who have attained the ethical and religious ways o f life. 
Kierkegaard gives a description o f an ice skater to draw a distinction between both
113 The ‘age o f  revolution’ is K ierkegaard’s term for the age which proceeds the present age. See: TA 
(pp. 61-67).
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ages. An ice skater glides perilously close to a point on the ice where it is dangerously 
thin but manages, with expert effortlessness, to make a last second turn back to safety, 
thereby showing the whole thing to have been a deliberate trick {ibid., 72-73). In the 
age o f revolution, this feat would command respect from onlookers. The onlookers 
would, impressed by the performance, be given fresh impetus to pursue their 
prospective tasks, whatever they may be. The commitment which had gone into 
rehearsing such a trick and the bravery o f executing it would be admired and people 
would be inspired to develop themselves ethically in a like-minded manner (ibid., 72).
The present age, however, is marked by an unnaturally high amount o f rationalisation 
in place o f action. (We might call this an example o f a ‘distinctive characteristic o f the 
age’.) Thus, Kierkegaard describes the onlookers o f the present age as prompted by 
the skater into a practical-minded debate about whether or not the action was one 
which should be mimicked. Undoubtedly they would have to agree that whilst an 
interesting spectacle to observe from a safe distance such an action is just not a 
sensible one to imitate. The onlookers would also, if  they reasoned long enough, 
console themselves with the thought that if  they had invested the impractical amount 
o f time and effort into becoming capable o f performing the feat themselves then they 
could just have easily performed the trick as well. Rather than admiring their fellow 
then the onlookers use the display to find admiration in themselves; in the fact that 
they could have performed the trick, but are practical and wise enough to devote their 
time and effort to other more sensible tasks instead. We can see that the passion 
stirred in the individuals o f the present age (and Kierkegaard at least admits that
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passion has not been wholly stifled by an abundance o f rationality114) is not one o f 
personal development in light o f an imitation-worthy project, but is instead an 
indifferent passivism which seeks to justify the status quo.
This explains Kierkegaard’s comment that ‘...the age o f the great and good action is 
past’ {ibid., 71: my emphasis). Occasionally Kierkegaard makes a stronger claim: he 
says that in the present age ‘there is no hero, no lover, no thinker, no knight o f faith 
[...]’ {ibid., 75). As an ontological claim - that such ways o f life are rendered 
impossible by the age - this is not given any philosophical justification. In fact, such a 
reading would be at odds with Kierkegaard’s earlier claim that any variant o f a person 
‘...can appear in any and every age’ {ibid., 33). Therefore, I take it to be the less 
demanding claim that such figures are disabled from having the same kind o f impact 
that they previously did: they no longer inspire ethico-religious development. That is 
to say, even though it is possible that such figures exist in the present age their actions 
are viewed by the majority as further justifications for preserving the status quo o f the 
present age! If we take ‘hero’ to mean one who inspires ethico-religious action, then 
no hero exists in the present age.
Kierkegaard pushes this point in another vivid example {ibid., 86-87). He asks us to 
imagine that three men are maltreating a single fourth one. Outnumbered and 
overpowered by the sheer number o f the assailants, the victim is relatively defenceless. 
Onlookers to this abuse finally become so restless that three o f them lay into one o f 
the original assailants. They justify their actions as so: ‘He had it coming, he him self
114 K ierkegaard, for exam ple, still refers to ‘flashes o f  enthusiasm ’ occurring in the present age (TA; 
74). O ther evidence that rationality has not com pletely ruled out passion is also attested to elsewhere, 
for exam ple: “ That a person stands or falls on his action is becoming  obsolete” (TA; 73, my em phasis) 
and; “actions, rash leaps, can still be taken [in the present age]” (TA; 71).
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had partaken in ganging up against a defenceless individual’, etc. The irony o f the 
situation is strikingly obvious, but the point o f the parable perhaps less so.
Kierkegaard’s claim is that the abandonment o f individual, passionate development 
has gone hand in hand with an unbalanced focus on the numerical in the present age. 
Again, the focus is on imbalance. Just as with rationality, Kierkegaard accepts that the 
numerical has a legitimate scope. Practices such as balloting are acceptable and even 
praise-worthy when the decision in hand is a legitimately political one - whether or 
not a new road ought to be built, for example. (We examined the legitimate use o f 
numerical means in politics, for example, in chapter three above.) When it comes to 
answering ethico-religious questions about what is right and wrong, and how one 
ought to act and live, however, a solution by ‘majority vote’ is out o f place. Acting in 
conformity to a majority vote once again abandons the personal, subjective reasons 
for acting and thus is eo ipso not acting ethically or religiously.
The onlookers’ protest attests to the fact that just because three people think an action 
is morally acceptable it does not necessarily make it so. But their proposed remedy 
instantly betrays that original sentiment as they take matters into their own hands and, 
backed up by the opinion o f two others, think it is just to assail one o f the original 
assailants. In a similar way, Kierkegaard goes on to argue that that the remedy for the 
disproportionate interest in the numerical, which is a distinctive characteristic o f the 
present age, cannot be solved politically, because politics itself is yet another 
numerically guided practice. It would be, so to speak, yet another way o f justifying 
the prevailing opinion that matters in how one ought to live and act are to be
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determined by numerical strength alone. But this is precisely what we were seeking to 
combat! Kierkegaard expresses this point as follows:
...the moment it [politics] wants to halt leveling, it will once again 
exemplify the law [of leveling]. It [leveling] can only be halted if the 
individual, in individual separateness, gains the intrepidity o f 
religiousness {ibid., 86).115
When Kierkegaard complains that the present age is typified by an excessive interest 
in the numerical, this has a second important implication. For Kierkegaard, the ethical 
realm is also involved with the finite, the universal, and the tem poral’16. Presumably, 
the previous quote could also adequately sum up any and every attempt at opposing 
the aestheticism inherent in the present age with ethical action. A single individual 
attempting to combat the inordinate emphasis o f the numerical qualifications so 
characteristic o f the present through ethical action would presumably be as ill- 
received as the example o f the ice skater cited above. Far from being an example o f 
distinction as it was in the previous age, any ethical action would become yet another 
occasion for aesthetic individuals to integrate themselves back into the numerical 
comfort o f the public by scoffing the ethical distinction o f their contemporary as 
ultimately evidence o f an impractical degree o f existential striving.
115 ‘Leveling’, briefly put, is the tendency for the people and institutions o f  an age to attem pt to 
standardise the physical and psychical traits that hum an beings have. Since this concept informs 
K ierkegaard’s view  o f  genuine sociability, it will also be discussed in sections ‘7 .3 ’ and ‘7 .4 ’ below.
116 We ought to note that K ierkegaard had elsewhere argued that one could give a theonomous account 
o f  ethics. He called this system o f  ethics ‘second-eth ics’ (CA, 20-21, passim ). N evertheless, the term s 
‘ethical realm ’, and ‘eth ics’ em ployed here, as in Two Ages, refer to ethics as we ordinarily conceive o f  
it: the attem pt at autonomously becom ing an ethically responsible agent (a project which K ierkegaard 
elsew here argues is ultim ately doom ed to fail).
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All this may be said to neglect Kierkegaard’s so-called ‘second ethics’ though (CA, 
20-21). The ‘second ethics’ is a system o f ethics that realises the inherent failure and 
limitations o f any ethical system that presumes itself to be self-sufficient. The ‘second 
ethics’ presupposes an external other, something outside o f ‘the universal’, a value- 
giver -  God. If  this is the Christian God then this system o f ‘second ethics’ would also 
include Christian concepts such as grace and forgiveness -  notions which are 
otherwise completely out o f place in an ethical system which is thought to be self- 
sufficient and reliant upon the autonomy o f responsible agents alone. Since second- 
ethics is partially reliant on the realm o f  the infinite, it may offer a way o f combatting 
the levelling tendencies o f an age without ultimately only exemplifying them.
Loving one’s neighbour, for example, could be an example o f an action performed 
with an understanding o f second-ethics. Yet whilst Kierkegaard would agree that this 
action manages to challenge levelling without once more exemplifying it, he 
ultimately argues that even this ethico-religious action will have no effect in the 
present age. Loving one’s neighbour, Kierkegaard argues, will be interpreted by those 
entrenched within the crowd as a single individual acting out o f sheer pride {ibid., 90). 
In fact, Kierkegaard argues that in the terrible situation which typifies the present age, 
all action which deviates from that o f the crowd, which includes religious and ethical 
action, will “ ...only be met with indolence” {ibid., 104). Similarly: “intense 
enthusiasm will be misunderstood as grand folly, wholly impractical” {ibid., 111). 
These are very worrying claims. What are we to make o f them, especially given the 
fact that Kierkegaard would go on to portray an ideal society where love o f one’s 
neighbour and genuine sociability are pivotal practices? (This will be looked at in 
depth in sections 7.3, and 7.4 below.)
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The claim that ‘works o f love’ will have no effect in the present age is not only 
disheartening but is also not immediately justified (empirically or philosophically). 
We will examine Kierkegaard’s reasons for making this claim shortly. For now, let us 
note that such claims do at least highlight why Kierkegaard became increasingly 
sceptical o f the possibility that the ‘ethical’ way o f life (including both the ‘first’ and 
‘second’ ethics) would help the typical person encountered in the present age. A 
sceptic might even think that the ethical realm disappears altogether. I shall maintain 
that the ethical still remains the middle term between the religious and the aesthetic. 
Yet I claim that within the context o f the present age, Kierkegaard argues that it 
becomes impossible for an ethical person to teach or be an exemplar for a fellow, 
typical individual. If this is the case, then the ethical way o f life, qua possible way o f 
ordering ones actions does not disappear; but qua method o f addressing and 
existentially improving one’s peers, it becomes inept.
The claim that ethical teaching vanishes does swerve somewhat from the authorship 
hitherto and deserves justification. How, for example, did Judge William attempt to 
help his aesthete friend take the decision to move from the aesthetic to the ethical way 
o f life? - by explaining to the latter that the aesthetic way o f life was self-defeating, 
and that the ethical way o f life was aesthetically superior to the aesthetic way o f life. 
If  the reason the age is termed an ‘aesthetic age’ is, as Perkins has argued, that the 
prevalent mindset o f people in the ‘aesthetic age’ is one geared toward practical 
sensibility and self-concern, an aesthete living in the present age may coolly decide to 
live ethically as simply a more practical way o f living.117 This practically-minded
117 W hether this could really be called choosing a genuinely ‘eth ical’ way o f  life is another matter.
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decision would o f course betray Judge W illiam’s original emphasis on subjectively 
motivated, passionately engaged choice o f the ethical and would not be a movement 
out o f the aesthetic at all.
If  the ethical person cannot teach another what to do, cannot commit a truly ethical 
action, two questions immediately arise. Firstly, what gives such a person the right to 
even be called an ethical person? Secondly, how might one become ethical given that 
no one could teach one how to do so? That is, what, if anything, makes it possible for 
an individual to be pulled out o f the temptation o f the numerical in the present age, or 
(if it is indeed different) out o f the aesthetic way o f life?
Kierkegaard gives one curious and unfortunately under-explained clue. In a passing 
comment he states that if a person was to try and lead the process o f leveling s/he 
would automatically escape leveling {ibid., 84). Leveling is thus escapable... but how,
1 | o
given that within leveling ‘inwardness’ and ‘character’ are automatically ruled out? 
Since Kierkegaard does not expand upon this point further we might be forced to 
make some suppositions. For now, let us suppose that a person is whole-heartedly 
engaged in self-satisfaction. They live comfortably within the numerical mass that is 
the public. Such a person decides that there may be an even better way to satisfy their 
wants than the current widespread practices and makes an attempt to pursue these. 
This differentiation between oneself and the public might mark the first possibility o f 
leaving the latter. In an age concerned with quantity over quality, where it is thought 
that a certain amount o f people make one ‘individual’ {ibid., 85), the recognition that
118 A s Dr. Graham  M. Smith has pointed out to me, this exam ple still ultim ately show s that it is 
im possible to lead  levelling, since the w ould-be leader sim ultaneously escapes levelling with his or her 
attem pt to lead it.
Page 203 o f  354. K ierkegaard’s Existential Theory o f  the Political. Thomas W olstenholme.
one is qualitatively different to the rest may be one which if only temporarily brings 
one out o f the quantitative mindset o f leveling.
W hether or not the person then goes on to merely re-enter the numerical way o f 
thinking is another question. It may be that the individual simply recognises that 
complete forfeiture o f individuality may be the most aesthetically beneficial thing to 
do. But the individual was at least brought to a rupture. And it is from here that a real 
decision could be made. Having (quite accidentally) escaped leveling, we might 
presume that the individual also recognises that he or she is capable o f making a 
personal choice, an existential decision. Hence, the restrictions upon inwardness and 
character which were inherent within levelling are temporarily lifted. The person is at 
least given insight into the fact that it is possible to be an individual, potentially living 
in a way that sets them apart from the crowd, and thus that an alternative way o f life is 
available.
Thus, whilst Kierkegaard does not think that within the present age an ethical 
individual can inform another, he does believe that leveling itself can be educative. 
This, presumably, is what allows for individuals to still develop ethically and 
religiously. What I have described above may be an example o f  ethical development 
in the present age. Although I made certain suppositions, I did not have to presuppose 
that the developing individual had any ethical characteristics. Indeed, I described the 
movement in aesthetic terms: the individual was self-absorbed in a project o f 
increasing their aesthetic satisfaction (which, if  Kierkegaard is correct, will inevitably 
bring the aesthete to a rupture anyhow). The insight o f an alternative existential way
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o f living was brought about not only despite the individual’s interest in aesthetic 
maximisation, but even due to it.
If this is where the ethical resides in the present age, it is indeed quickly superseded. 
For Kierkegaard argues that the person in this position, the individual momentarily 
separated from the crowd, will soon realise that remaining apart from the crowd will 
necessarily entail great hardship. Standing aside from the crowd creates a dichotomy 
which will quickly be noticed by both parties. Remaining there, Kierkegaard insists, 
will inexorably entail ostracism. Additionally, the overburdening numerical force o f 
the crowd will soon be constantly bearing down upon this ‘single individual’; 
enviously seeking to eradicate any distinctions he or she might have with an endless 
string o f lampooning.
Kierkegaard explains that such a person must have religious inwardness to survive 
this state o f affairs and remain a single individual. Some have been sceptical o f this 
solution. The ethical way o f life is suddenly rendered useless and religiosity 
simultaneously replaced as the only possible escape from the problems inherent 
within the present age. One Kierkegaard scholar terms this religious solution a deus ex 
machina (Conway, 1999, 41), brought in, presumably from nowhere, to clear up any 
and all o f the problems that Kierkegaard’s philosophical classifications might have 
otherwise created. It certainly seems as if  the ethical recedes to a vanishing point as 
K ierkegaard’s writings develop into his late authorship. But Kierkegaard does at least 
give reasons for his claims. I have tried to show why Kierkegaard believed that the 
ethical way o f life (both the ‘first’ and the ‘second’ ethics) no longer helps the 
individuals o f the present age. But as stated before, this claim does not entail that one
Page 205 o f 354. K ierkegaard’s Existential Theory o f the Political. Thomas W olstenholme.
cannot act ethically,119 only that ethical action will not have the intended effect and 
would perhaps even be misinterpreted as aesthetic action.
W hat all o f this entails, and whether Kierkegaard has a political solution to the 
problems o f the present age, will be the focus o f the next, concluding section o f this 
chapter.
119 K ierkegaard discusses the fact that one o f  the characters o f  the original novel under review , Dalund, 
had lived in both ages and thus allows for a com parison o f  both ages. In the present age, Dalund is 
satirical o f  the present state o f  affairs, no doubt nostalgic o f  the way things w ere before. (TA; 56) But 
satire, K ierkegaard later tells us, must have an ethical basis (TA; 74). That is, D alund’s satire is in fact 
an ethical criticism  o f  some o f  the characteristics o f  the present age.
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5.3 Concluding remarks
The first thing to note is that the above reading o f Two Ages questions the charge that 
Kierkegaard is a mere subjectivist. K ierkegaard’s ontological view o f the individual is 
that he or she is necessarily related to his or her external situation (see n.l 12 above). 
To inspire ethico-religious action in an individual in the present age requires a 
fundamentally different activity than in a previous age. The individual who truly 
wishes to develop his or herself and to help others develop in a similar fashion cannot 
be blind to the fact that the given socio-political setup imposes certain limitations on 
this project, rendering the activities o f some existential life-views altogether useless. 
Furthermore, contrary to being apolitical, Kierkegaard shows us that developing 
authentically requires some basic knowledge o f the socio-political conditions o f the 
age.
A second result o f  this reading is that it draws links between Kierkegaard’s earlier 
‘pseudonymous’ literature, which is most typically thought o f as being ‘apolitical’, 
and the later, signed works. Judge William, for example, notes both that his age was 
depressed (E/O II, 23 and 189) and that the predominant culture o f the times was an 
aesthetic one (E/O II, 226). As we saw above, in his review o f Only a Fiddler, 
Kierkegaard’s ‘reviewer’ had claimed that A ndersen’s aesthete-like personality (his: 
‘lyric self-absorption’; ‘merely phenomenological personality’; and his ‘personality 
[which was] wrapped up in... a web of arbitrary m oods’ (EPW, 70, 82, and 70
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respectively)) was in large part a result o f the tumultuous political times. 
K ierkegaard’s earlier writings that highlighted the respective shortcomings o f the 
aesthetic and the ethical way o f life could therefore be a seen as a kind o f social 
critique. In his pseudonymous literature, Kierkegaard delineates various existentially 
impoverished ways o f life and shows how they are partly the products o f their socio­
political surroundings. Kierkegaard frequently diagnoses the pseudonyms existential 
failings as being at least partially caused by external circumstances. But Kierkegaard 
also typically uses the same writings to give the reader clues about how they could 
maintain spiritual development even in unfavourable situations.
Another result o f the above reading is that it offers a response to the claim that 
Kierkegaard neglected the ethical way o f life in his later writings. According to the 
reading we have just pursued, the ethical way o f life is radically altered in the present 
age. In other ages, one could quite comfortably exist as an ethical individual, and 
could inspire ethico-religious activity simply by displaying one’s distinctive ethical 
passion and zeal. In the present age, staying in the ethical realm brings with it such 
pressures that one must either buckle and return to the ‘aesthetic’ realm o f the crowd, 
or (and for Kierkegaard this now necessarily requires religious strength) choose to 
remain a single individual. That the ethical way o f life had become a vanishing point 
in Kierkegaard’s late authorship has previously been justified by claiming that 
Kierkegaard became increasingly religious in the later part o f his life. But 
Kierkegaard later published Works o f  Love which was an exercise in portraying what 
a system o f ‘second ethics’ would look like in an ideal age. In this ideal state, a state
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o f affairs where political entities respect the limits appropriate to them ,120 the ethical 
once more has a central role in uniting people in sociability. 1 believe that ethical 
activity is central to Kierkegaard’s thought. The fact that ethical activity wanes in the 
present age is, to my mind, surely one o f the greatest problems o f the present age. The 
ethical way o f life becoming increasingly ineffective has a momentous impact on 
genuine sociability (as we shall see in more depth in chapter seven below). Thus I 
have argued against the reading that Kierkegaard placed less importance on the ethical 
way o f life in his later writings, insisting instead that the inability to remain in the 
ethical sphere o f life can in fact be seen as evidence that external institutions can 
shape the existential spheres, and hinder existential development in various ways. 
That the existential aspects o f the individual can be threatened by social trends and 
government actions is also shown by the fact that the various characteristics o f 
Kierkegaard’s ‘present age’ inadvertently favoured an aesthetic way o f life (whilst 
simultaneously rendering the alternatives difficult to achieve, or altogether 
ineffectual).
I mentioned above that when a state advocates policies that subsidise the aesthetic, 
and tax the religious way o f life this violates two fundamental maxims of 
contemporary liberal democracy thought: 1) that the state ought to be neutral towards 
individual’s attempts at the good life and 2) that the state ought not to interfere with 
the individual’s freedom to pursue religious interests. Our reading o f Kierkegaard 
would appear to open up a contemporary existential as well as liberal basis for 
criticising and evaluating certain policies. 1 think that this is a viable project and I am
1201 adopt the term ‘genuine politics’ from Bruce K irm m se’s work (K irm m se, 1990b; 272) and I shall 
use the term from here on as a synonym  for the rather more cum bersom e phrase: ‘adhering to 
K ierkegaard’s theory o f  the political’. (As I understand it, K irm m se also uses the term to refer to a 
sim ilar notion as this.)
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sympathetic to the idea that when governmental decisions are mapped up, attention to 
how they might affect the existential development o f the people they are intended 
could be taken into consideration. A policy that in some way existentially 
impoverishes the individual, especially if the policy is interested in improving the 
lives o f citizens, may be counter-productive. But the activity o f  evaluating every 
policy decision as to whether or not it may have harmful existential effects is a task 
that Kierkegaard does not engage in.
We can separate two responses to illegitimate and existentially impoverishing policies. 
Firstly, we could claim that the latter either 1) violate state neutrality; 2) illegitimately 
interfere with the individual’s right to pursue the good life; 3) and/or does 
unnecessary harm (perhaps more harm than good) to the well-being o f some citizens 
(or the citizenry as a whole). Any or all o f these claims could be important reasons for 
monitoring the existential effects that policies have with regards to the single 
individual. Such concerns also might permit us to reject certain policies and perhaps 
even condone others. If such concerns are justified from this liberal position, however, 
they would be made from the standpoint o f securing civil liberties and welfare. 
Kierkegaard does not engage in this task. Kierkegaard also does not necessarily value 
civil liberties above existential development, as many liberal theorists would 
otherwise.
Hence, I believe that the second response to existentially impoverishing conditions is 
the one that Kierkegaard would more readily condone; to not become embroiled in 
matters o f politics but to strive to help each other person develop existentially. The 
value o f this task appears to be greater for Kierkegaard than securing civil liberties.
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This is not to say that civil liberties are o f no interest to him whatsoever. In fact, it 
could be argued that respecting Kierkegaard’s own separation between existential and 
civil issues (i.e., his theory o f the political) might actually lead to greater civil liberties 
in the long-run. A truly well-educated and democratic populace might be one which 
consists o f individuals who decide for themselves what things they value. This 
citizenry would ideally consist o f individuals who are not hindered by state enforced 
notions o f religiosity or the good life. If civil liberties are secured by the interaction 
between an ideal democratic populace and a government(/state) that respects its 
limitations and purpose, then it may be the case that not politicising existential issues 
might be the best way of securing existential development as well as civil liberties.
Kierkegaard did not and perhaps would not have ever articulated such arguments. His 
principal commitment was in highlighting the dangers involved in not respecting a 
basic theory o f the political. If Kierkegaard also described the political, civil, or 
liberal benefits o f adhering to his theory o f the political then it might have 
contradicted his own project o f keeping the two separate. Kierkegaard produced 
existentially upbuilding literature and, on the whole, left it to the politicians to order 
political affairs. This could be seen as a purposeful adherence to his emphasis on the 
proper separation between the political and the existential.
But to think that Kierkegaard might have had civic interests in mind might also be 
somewhat anachronistic. Two Ages was written and published prior to the 1848 
revolution that changed Denmark from an absolute monarchy to a democratic 
constitutional monarchy and that expanded the right to vote on all political matters to 
universal (male) suffrage (Kirmmse 1990, 67-8). What would have been considered
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‘liberal’ in Denmark in the nineteenth century and under an absolute monarchy might 
be vastly different from what we mean by the word ‘liberal’ today.121
All this is to say that contemporary political readings o f Kierkegaard’s works are 
certainly viable. Using Kierkegaard’s works as a starting point for the pursuit o f  
securing civil liberties is also a feasible endeavour. Yet I would claim that such 
scholarship should only be termed ‘Kierkegaardian’ if  by ‘Kierkegaardian’ we merely 
mean inspired by the some of the political insights o f Kierkegaard’s works. I argue 
that a faithful ‘Kierkegaardian’ theory o f the political must be one that affords only 
secondary importance to the pursuit o f securing civil liberties; and always primary 
importance to existential commitments.
This is not to say that Kierkegaard’s theory o f the political does not include 
discussions about political entities. On the contrary, the text examined in the next 
chapter will help show that Kierkegaard does believe that a fight for a (negative) 
political change can be justified on existentially motivated grounds. Explaining when 
such a situation is justified will also highlight one more nuance o f K ierkegaard’s 
theory o f the political -  that o f justifying existentially motivated political activism. 
Additionally, an analysis o f this work will forcefully bring into question the criticism 
levelled by some contemporary scholars that Kierkegaard’s theory o f the political is 
ultimately ‘im potent’ with regards to real-world change. The next chapter, on the 
contrary, offers a theoretical argument for when it is legitimate to fight against
121 The separation o f  church and state which was arguably K ierkegaard’s only political contribution to 
the problem s o f  his tim es was still seen by most o f  his ‘liberal’ contem poraries as ‘rad ical’ (K irm m se, 
1992; 175). So radical was K ierkegaard’s proposal that Church and State be separated, coupled with his 
‘A ttacks against C hristendom ’ which railed against a condition that did not separate the two, that one 
contem porary concluded that K ierkegaard must have been ‘secretly in league with the a theists’ (M alik,
1997; 98, n.70. See also p. 126).
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unjustified and existentially impoverishing policies. This is an additional aspect o f 
K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political.
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CHAPTER SIX: 
Kierkegaard and Political Reform.
Introduction.
Thus far this thesis has looked at works that span K ierkegaard’s entire authorship. The 
general account o f Kierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political, it has hopefully 
been shown, is one where Kierkegaard maintains some basic theoretical tenets. One 
such theoretical commitment is the ontological belief that some concepts are logically 
distinct from each other. Such is the case between political entities and non-political 
ones. Politics properly deals with the temporal aspect o f human beings en masse and 
uses means that are appropriate to that task. Spirit, on the other hand, is linked with 
the existential aspects o f the single individual. Confusing the means o f these logically 
distinct entities can cause serious existential impoverishment (as well as political 
turmoil). Consequently, we have seen Kierkegaard opposing to resorting to political 
reform to cure what he perceives to be a spiritual problem.
Nevertheless, I have sought to remind the reader that this is not the complete account 
o f Kierkegaard’s theory o f the political. As I have intimated at, Kierkegaard did 
advocate a change in the political structure o f Denmark as an aid to his task o f
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spiritual reformation. At first glance it might appear as though Kierkegaard’s 
disestablishmentarianism must contradict the core tenets o f his existential theory o f 
the political. Indeed, some Kierkegaard scholars have argued that K ierkegaard’s 
attacks on the Danish state/church marriage is an aberration to his earlier thought. 
Hence, scholars have concluded that Kierkegaard’s ‘church attack’ literature is an 
exception to an otherwise unified authorship.122
I shall offer an alternative interpretation o f these late writings. In fact, I shall argue 
that Kierkegaard’s call for political change is completely compatible with the 
existential theory o f the political that has been elucidated in the previous chapters. Far 
from being an aberration to the rest o f the authorship then, I will argue that 
K ierkegaard’s ‘attack’ literature keeps his core philosophical tenets at the fore -  
philosophical commitments that span the entire authorship. Kierkegaard does not alter 
or contradict any o f these key commitments during his church attack -  not even his 
beliefs regarding the role that political reform has with regards to prompting spiritual 
laxity.
In short, I shall argue that Kierkegaard’s ‘church attack’ is contrary to all appearances 
neither a primarily political movement nor a justification for a positive policy change. 
Nor does Kierkegaard seek to secure a civic freedom or an increase in our temporal 
welfare. I shall argue that Kierkegaard’s church attack is rather an example o f a 
negative policy change that is primarily justified on spiritual and existential grounds.
122 See notes 124-6 below  for a discussion o f  this literature.
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Kierkegaard still recognised that advocating a political reform o f any kind might have 
negative consequences with regards to the interpretation o f his existentialism. That is, 
Kierkegaard understood that his contemporaries (and his future interpreters) might 
falsely take his disestablishmentarianism as proof that his existentialist commitments 
imply a positive political programme. In response to this tempting reading, however, I 
shall argue that a proper analysis o f Kierkegaard’s church attack and the justifications 
he gave for this engagement shows that one can at best only deduce a negative 
political programme from Kierkegaard’s existentialist thought.
The first sub-section o f this chapter will therefore outline and examine K ierkegaard’s 
attack on established Christendom (6.1). In outlining Kierkegaard’s attack against the 
established Church I will also attempt to show that the attack is compatible with the 
preceding authorship. I will emphasise this point by arguing that K ierkegaard’s 
‘political’ reform is actually existentially motivated (6.2). Finally, I shall work out the 
implications that Kierkegaard’s ‘church attack’ has for his theory o f the political (6.3). 
I conclude that the former is an additional nuance o f rather than contradiction to the 
latter. This new facet o f Kierkegaard’s theory o f the political has interesting 
ramifications o f its own. This most finalised expression o f Kierkegaard’s existential 
theory o f the political opens up the possibility o f combatting existentially damaging 
policies (and social trends). Hence, Kierkegaard’s existential and political 
commitments are not as quietist as has often been thought. Indeed, K ierkegaard’s 
theory o f the political allows for responses and revisions to real-world policies.
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6.1 Kierkegaard’s ‘attack’ on established Christendom: 
in-line with the authorship
As has been argued throughout this thesis, K ierkegaard’s prim ary interest Is In the 
spiritual and existential development o f  the single individual. In the previous chapter 
we saw that political entities (accidentally or not) sometimes trespass their legitimate 
scope and (negatively) affect the existential welfare o f  their citizens. The question we 
might now ask is: could the damage to spiritual development that political entities 
inadvertently cause give us sufficient justification for rejecting or revising som e o f  
their policies? I believe that Kierkegaard highlights the conditions for answering this 
question affirmatively. These qualifications highlight Kierkegaard’s advocacy o f  the 
separation o f  church and state - a political suggestion which was perceived as ‘radical’ 
(Kirmmse, 1992, 175) in his own times.
K ierkegaard’s ‘attack’ o f  the state-church marriage, and the latter’s resulting 
phenomenon o f ‘Christendom ’, was both prolonged and vehement. It also appears to 
contradict some o f  the tenets that he had previously defended. In An Open Lifter, for 
example, (a text examined in section 3.1 above) we saw that Andreas Gottlob 
Rudelbach had attempted to use Kierkegaard’s works as aid in bringing about an 
external change. Kierkegaard responded with a challenge for any reader to find in his 
authorship:
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[...] a single proposal for external change, or the slightest suggestion o f 
such a proposal, or even anything that in the remotest way [...] could 
resemble an intimation o f such a proposal or o f a belief that the problem 
[of the emancipation o f the individual] is lodged in externalities, that 
external change is what is needed, that external change is what will help 
us (COR, 53).123
K ierkegaard’s call for political change is so different from statements found in the rest 
o f his authorship that some have found it difficult to see how the former could be 
consistent with the latter. Some have argued that the ‘church attack’ is evidence that 
Kierkegaard lost his mental faculties,124 whilst others have suggested that the attack 
ought to be perceived o f as akin to the pseudonymously authored works (despite the 
fact that Kierkegaard signed each journal piece in his own name). 125 Even 
contemporary Kierkegaard scholars who have closely examined K ierkegaard’s 
authorship differ in opinion as to whether Kierkegaard’s church attack was in line 
with, or a deviation from, the rest o f his thought.126 Yet I believe that a careful 
inspection o f at least some aspects o f the late authorship shows that it is in line with 
the former. Hence, I shall ally m yself with scholars who believe the authorship to be 
consistent, and shall attempt to offer additional support for this interpretation.
123 In fact, even during his ‘a ttack’, K ierkegaard attem pts to clarify that he is not a ‘refo rm er’ (TM , 40) 
and not in any way concerned w ith ‘popular m ovem ents’ or ‘civic d istu rbance’ ( i b i d i 76-77).
124 Tim othy D arlym ple presents, and consequently refutes, many o f  the charges m ade against 
K ierkegaard’s sanity; from K ierkegaard’s contem poraries to ours (2009, 166-67). The reaction o f  
K ierkegaard’s contem poraries goes some way to attesting how  ‘rad ica l’ K ierkegaard’s attack was 
perceived. For other contem poraries that concluded K ierkegaard m ust have lost his mind, see also: 
K irm m se (1998b; 130).
125 O nce m ore, Darlym ple gives a good assessm ent o f  this position (D arlym ple, 2009, 166-67).
126 C ontem porary scholars that hold K ierkegaard’s later political position to be in rupture o f  his earlier 
position include: N. H. Soe (1956); and O. Bertelsen (1999) (both exam ples cited in Law (2009b, 73)). 
Those who think that K ierkegaard’s attack literature is com pletely in line with his earlier w orks include 
B. K irm m se (1990b, 4-5, 410); D. Law (2009b, 84, 97); M. L. Taylor (2009, 200); and N. Thulstrup 
(Thulstrup, N ., & T hulstrup, M., M., 1984, 258-59). David Law assesses som e o f  the literature for and 
against these view s in his defence o f  the consistency o f  K ierkegaard’s ‘a ttack ’ literature with the earlier 
w ritings (Law , 2009b, 73-75).
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Though Kierkegaard’s attack itself was initiated by the sermon H. L. M artensen gave 
in honour o f the then recent passing o f Bishop Mynster, what really prompted the 
attack appears to be a change in Kierkegaard’s views. Prior to his attack, Kierkegaard 
had still wished to refrain from openly engaging in external, political action. In order 
to help clear up some o f the spiritual ailments o f his time Kierkegaard had asked, 
however, that a concession be made by Bishop M ynster (or another leading religious 
figure) that the latter’s preaching was a weakened version o f the true demands o f New 
Testam ent Christianity.127 Kierkegaard explains that when he realised that no such 
concession would be made he initiated his church attack. Note, though, that as 
Kierkegaard also openly admits, his decision to use his authorship as a means o f
fighting for political change was completely in-line with and even necessitated by his
128primary interest in aiding individuals towards existential development (TM, 15).
As long as individuals recognised that Denm ark’s established teaching o f Christianity, 
which was being represented as ‘true Christianity’, was in some respects different 
from the Christianity o f the New Testament, Kierkegaard intimates that he would 
have silently endured the former. This admission was necessary, Kierkegaard argues, 
for his authorship to continue its task o f provoking spiritual deepening in his readers. 
As long as his authorial task could continue unperturbed Kierkegaard would not have 
advocated political reform. Kierkegaard writes as such in his twentieth article for the 
journal ‘Faedrelandet’ (May 16, 1855):
127 For jou rnal entries that relate to this point, see: JP III, 2971, 3335, 3617; JP IV, 4643.
128 Indeed, this statem ent has provided the justification for som e contem porary K ierkegaard scholars, 
such as Robert Perkins, to em phasise the unity o f  K ierkegaard’s late and early authorship (Perkins, 
2009; 307).
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My earlier thought was: if the establishment can be defended at all, this is 
the only way, namely, by pronouncing a judgm ent upon it [ ...]  in the 
sense that Christianity would not be forgiveness merely for what is past, 
but by grace would be a sort o f dispensation from following Christ in the 
proper sense and from the effort properly connected with being a 
Christian. In that way truth would [read also: could] enter into the 
establishment after all. {ibid., 69)
According to this rather compact statement, Kierkegaard would have remained at 
peace with the established Christian State so long as it openly proclaimed that it was a 
less demanding version o f New Testament Christianity. Even with the spiritual 
deficiencies that Kierkegaard believed to have been harboured within it, Kierkegaard 
felt that if  the Danish establishment only acknowledged that it practised a weaker 
version o f New Testament Christianity individuals could still call upon G od’s grace 
and forgiveness for practising this concessionary Christianity. When Bishop M ynster 
had refrained from making any such confession, Kierkegaard attempted to highlight 
the differences between the New Testament and Danish established Christianity with 
the book Practice in Christianity, pseudonymously authored by ‘Anti-C lim acus’. In 
this work, Kierkegaard/Anti-Climacus asks the reader to honestly accept that there are 
vast differences between Denm ark’s established state Christianity and the preaching 
o f Jesus Christ.
But K ierkegaard’s view apparently changed. Kierkegaard came to believe that one 
could no longer sincerely ask for G od’s grace to solve a problem which was caused by 
an abuse o f G od’s grace {ibid., 70). Kierkegaard even argued that if  Practice in 
Christianity was to be republished again the pseudonym should be dropped and the 
work be signed in his own name {ibid., 69). Given that Practice in Christianity was 
nearing a second edition, this was not a distant prospect.
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This event could also be seen as a switch between Kierkegaard’s earlier, indirect 
method at highlighting the differences between established and New Testam ent 
Christianity, and his later, direct method. It is precisely this change in strategy that 
some Kierkegaard scholars see as the link between the earlier pseudonymous 
literature, and the later ‘attack’ on Christendom (see for example: Law (2009b, 77); 
Perkins (2009, 307)). For whilst Kierkegaard’s methodological approach shifts, his 
theoretical commitments remain the same in both parts o f the authorship.
David Law convincingly pursues this argument. Law argues that K ierkegaard’s 
‘attack’ is in line with his earlier thought but represents a shift from an indirect to a 
direct solution to political-spiritual problems. In fact, Law argues that this shift 
highlights how Kierkegaard’s methodology shifts in response to changes in socio­
political circumstances and to (perhaps subsequent) differing existential problems. 
Law makes two slightly different claims about the existential justifications for 
K ierkegaard’s attack, one addressing why the attack had not happened sooner, and 
then one explaining why it came at the time it did. Prior to the direct attack, Law 
states that:
[...] Kierkegaard does not see the need o f a reform o f the Church [in his 
earlier writings], because this would address only unessential externalities 
and distract from the real issue, namely the individual’s inward 
appropriation o f Christianity. (Law, 2009b, 82)
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Kierkegaard had frequently sought to avoid being interpreted as one who was 
interested in external affairs. A misinterpretation o f his true, primary interest in 
inward reform risked causing his contemporaries and future readers to miss the point 
o f  his authorship, or even worse, to attempt to politically implement his existential 
thought. The latter would only engender the problems caused by disastrously mixing 
the political and the existential and so would undoubtedly result in further existential 
damage. Yet there reached a point where the risks o f Kierkegaard becoming engaged 
in political affairs outweighed the existential harm that the Danish state-church 
marriage was causing by promulgating a false conception o f religiosity. At this point, 
K ierkegaard’s attack became the most pertinent response to existential problems. 
Despite this, Kierkegaard still maintained a minimalist attitude towards external 
change even during his attack, since he did not want it to ‘[ ...]  be absorbed into the 
status quo’ (ibid., 93) o f political (over)activism. This would only risk masking its 
true, existential purpose and hence put its effectiveness at jeopardy.
In his earlier authorship, Kierkegaard had thought that attempts at politically 
implemented spiritual reform would only bring about more turmoil than good. Yet it 
was left an open question as to whether this viewpoint was determined by the 
particular socio-political situation that it was articulated in or whether it was a 
theoretical commitment that Kierkegaard wished to always endorse. It might be 
stipulated that Kierkegaard’s earlier protestations o f political quietism were defended 
on the basis that political intervention might have had unwanted and perhaps counter­
productive existential consequences given the empirical conditions o f that specific 
time and place. If this is the case, an argument for external change may be permitted 
under extreme circumstances and if  Kierkegaard’s existential interests warranted it.
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Simply put, the negative existential implications for permitting a harmful state o f 
affairs to continue to exist might eventually become greater than the potential 
existential harm o f having Kierkegaard advocate a policy change. Under this reading, 
such considerations might have finally warranted Kierkegaard in advocating political 
reform.
Nevertheless, this reading is still surely at odds with K ierkegaard’s earlier position. 
For in Two Ages, Kierkegaard had proclaimed that there was nothing politically that 
could be done to solve the existential problems o f the ‘Present A ge’. The work 
concluded with a proclamation o f political quietism and the hope that the ‘Present 
A ge’ will at least educate some o f its populace religiously. Kierkegaard, we noted, 
thought this book to have been a completely neutral evaluation o f his age.
Since Kierkegaard had explicitly admitted having changed his mind about the 
defensibility o f the established State Church, might he have also changed his mind 
about the permissibility o f advocating political reform? Or was, perhaps, 
K ierkegaard’s cry for political change not a political manoeuvre at all, but rather 
another kind o f existentially motivated action? Is the latter activity compatible with or 
contradictory to Kierkegaard’s authorial task o f spiritual deepening? Addressing such 
questions will be the goal o f the next sub-section.
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6.2 Kierkegaard’s ‘attack’ -  political or existential?
K ierkegaard’s fight for the separation o f the Church and State has been seen as an 
undoubtedly political endeavour. Robert Perkins has argued that: ‘Only in the 
newspaper articles and The Moment did Kierkegaard ever make demands for political 
change in a political w ay’ (Perkins, 2009, 316). Earlier on in his examination o f 
K ierkegaard’s ‘Instant W ritings’, Perkins writes that:
[... Kierkegaard’s] involvement in issues involving the sanctity and 
inviolability o f the individual, which began in his critique o f aestheticism 
in Either/Or, has led him via his critique o f Christendom and its political 
establishment to a strong affirmation o f the Enlightenment concept o f 
religious liberty! (ibid., 312)
Kierkegaard is said to be included in the company o f Aristotle, Locke, Rousseau, 
Hegel, the Constitution o f the United States, and the First Amendment in critiquing 
the marriage o f Church and State on the grounds that it violates the sanctity o f the 
individual. Perkins does conclude, however, that he:
would not go so far as to suggest that Kierkegaard's final political position 
is pragmatic or progressive, for those political philosophies are far too 
optimistic and secular in their assumptions about the capacity o f the state 
and the possibility o f human improvement apart from the religious.
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Religious depth as set forth in the writings signed by him self is then, for 
Kierkegaard, the only authentic basis for political and social change (ibid., 
316).
This last line is very important, but also appears strikingly at odds with what Perkins 
had previously stated. For though Kierkegaard and the ‘Enlightenment concept o f  
religious liberty’ come to the same conclusions about the separation o f Church and 
State, and are even possibly in agreement about the sanctity o f  the individual, surely 
they come to these conclusions by radically different methods? The Enlightenment 
concept o f religious liberty, much like the contemporary, liberal idea o f it, is derived 
from a ‘disinterested’ point o f view where existential concerns are factored out as 
mere contingencies.
So though Kierkegaard comes to the conclusion that the Church and State ought to be 
separated, a conclusion which many Enlightenment and modem  thinkers alike have 
also deduced, it is important to note that Kierkegaard does so for very different 
reasons to the former. Whereas most political theorists arrive at the conclusion from 
considerations o f how the religious side might encroach upon the political,
« I ^9Kierkegaard’s conclusions are drawn from the opposite direction. “ Kierkegaard 
believes that the church and state ought to be separated to prevent the political from 
encroaching upon the religious. Unlike Enlightenment theorists then, Kierkegaard’s 
primary interest is not in securing the political rights o f individuals or recommending 
political changes to maximise liberty. K ierkegaard’s political interest, I maintain, is 
secondary to and derivative from his primary existential commitments. Hence,
129 O f  course, there may be exceptions to this rule. O ur exam ination o f  ‘political theo logy’ pursued in 
section ‘ 1.2’ above considers som e possible exceptions - John Locke, for exam ple.
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K ierkegaard’s political interest lies in preserving individual’s existential efforts at 
living and developing in a way which is suitable to each person. If Kierkegaard 
supports political change, it is only in the removal o f political obstructions and 
hindrances to spiritual progression: and even then, only when political activism is a 
last resort.
I think that Perkins is correct to say that for Kierkegaard ‘religious depth’ is the sole 
‘authentic’ basis for political change. But this also clearly sets Kierkegaard apart from 
the Enlightenment and the contemporary understanding o f the separation o f  Church 
and State; both o f which largely give secular, rational justifications for their 
arguments. ‘Religious depth’ is, for Kierkegaard, an existential qualification which 
could entail a description o f the degree to which one religiously loves others; or the 
force o f the subjective relation, and interpersonal correspondence one has with one’s 
religion/deity. If  Perkins is correct, then according to Kierkegaard this existential 
qualification would be the only ‘authentic’ ground for political change.
Given his insight into Kierkegaard’s existential basis for political change, I take it that 
when Perkins says that Kierkegaard sought ‘political change in a political w ay’, he 
must mean that Kierkegaard finally resorted to fighting for a political change by 
directly involving him self with the political system .130 That Kierkegaard undertook 
this political change for a primarily existential (rather than, say, civic) reason is a 
point that perhaps Perkins’ first quote does not adequately express (but which Perkins 
does make sure to emphasise elsewhere). Where Kierkegaard had previously
130 K ierkegaard explicitly justified  his use o f  a popular, liberal journal (w hich he otherw ise personally 
d isliked) on the grounds that it allowed for a more im m ediate and w idespread dispersion o f  his views 
(TM ; 62-63, 68). K ierkegaard’s change in focus, from ‘that single ind iv idual’ to a w idespread 
populace, and his change o f  medium , from books to journal articles, m ight be seen as an exam ple o f  
him acting ‘po litically’ -  i.e., prioritising the numerical appeal o f  those works.
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attempted purely existential ways o f bringing about change, such as using his 
authorship to highlight the gap between Christendom and New Testam ent 
Christianity, he later fought for a change in the political setup o f Denmark. We must 
still bear in mind, however, that Kierkegaard sought for ‘political change (in a 
political w ay)’ only because a political entity was causing a negative effect on 
existential development; one that Kierkegaard’s authorship alone could not address. 
Thus, it is more accurate to say that Kierkegaard came to seek existential change in an 
existentially motivated political - rather than purely authorial - way. Kierkegaard does 
not act here solely for the sake o f political improvement.
The type o f existential problems that Christendom was causing is given a detailed 
analysis in Perkins’ article. By falsely giving ‘religious’ sanction to purely aesthetic 
phenomenon such as comfortable living, the Danish People's Church created the 
illusion that many were living religiously when they were in fact only enjoying 
aesthetic existences. The illusion was apparently so deep and widespread that 
K ierkegaard’s authorial attempts at highlighting the differences between true 
Christianity and that found in Christendom had not been sufficient to break it. In fact, 
aestheticism that did not even recognise itself as such was so widespread that 
Kierkegaard feared that his entire authorship (the attack literature included!) was 
being read with merely aesthetic interest. Hence, K ierkegaard’s attempt at showing 
the reader that they were existentially misguided merely provoked further aesthetic 
indulgence (ibid., 92, 260, 313). Only a direct attack on the political system itself 
might allow some individuals to see they are actually living in an existentially 
impoverished mode -  irrespective o f the fact that the Danish state’s religious leaders 
may sanction that way o f life as representative o f New Testament Christianity - the
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highest degree o f spirituality that Kierkegaard thought a human could exemplify (see 
JP I, 46; JP IV, 4333, Walsh, 1994, 226; cf., JP III, 3102, 3681).
As we noted in the previous chapter, Kierkegaard is not primarily worried about 
aestheticism being the most widespread way o f life. We can imagine an age where 
aestheticism was the most commonly found way o f life. If individuals had 
thoughtfully come to the conclusion that they wished to live aesthetically, though the 
choice to live otherwise was a genuinely unhindered availability, we can only 
conclude that Kierkegaard would have much less concern with political issues. W hat 
made Denm ark’s widespread aestheticism different, however, was that it was fostered 
(intentionally or not) by government policies.
Even after the revolution o f 1848, and the constitution o f 1849, the state and church 
were socially and politically tied. Priests’ sermons, for example, had to follow a rigid 
set o f instructions that accorded with the Church Ritual [for Denmark and Norway, 
1685] as well as with Danish Law (Thulstrup, N., & Thulstrup, M., M., 1984, 89). 
Sermons had to be an interpretation o f a set theme o f the day in accordance with the 
Alter Book (o f 1688), and even then a priest was not allowed to read from a previously 
prepared, hand-written version o f it (ibid.). Personal emotions were not allowed to be 
included, nor political viewpoints and, on the contrary, priests were told to ‘[...] 
restrict [themselves] to urging the congregation to be obedient to the king, to his laws 
and his com m ands’ (ibid.).
Another widespread practice that became a central aspect o f K ierkegaard’s attack on 
Christendom was forced baptism. As Niels Thulstrup highlights, the fourth article o f
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the Augsburg Confession, as well as the Danish Law (2-5-6), insists on infant 
baptism; the latter requiring baptism to *[...] be performed within 8 days o f the birth 
o f a child’ (ibid.). Baptism not only incorporated a child into the Christian religion but 
also simultaneously made one a Danish citizen.131
More political freedom was given to other religions after the 1848 revolution. Socially 
speaking, however, the old ways were still frequently practised. Thus Thulstrup finds, 
for example, that ‘[a] certificate o f Confirmation was often a presupposition for 
employment, just as it was also a precondition for lawful paternity’ (ibid., 91). On 
festal occasions also, ‘[...] the liberty o f the citizens was seriously abridged’ (ibid., 
90) with strict regulations regarding the practice o f business, amusement, and forming 
assemblies, practices that continued even after the revolution.
On paper, the 1848 revolution gave more freedom o f religious practice. But it has 
been convincingly argued the revolution in fact only made the ties between church 
and state stronger. Before the revolution, for example, the state church was simply 
called ‘the Danish State Church’ [den Danske Statskirke]. After the 1848 revolution 
the name was altered to ‘the Danish People's Church’ [den Danske Folkekirke] (as it 
is still called today). Despite the name-change, however, there was little difference in 
the way the new church operated (Kirmmse, 2001b, xvii). As Bruce Kirmmse 
convincingly argues, the revolution only falsely provided the post-1848 state-church 
m arriage with ‘democratic’ legitimacy (ibid.). Prior to this, the officially religious 
practices o f the state had sanctioned *[...] Pietism and theological rationalism [that] 
had been upper-class movements, and by and large [had] not had much effect on the
l3' Special citizenry statuses were given to some minority groups, Christian and non-C hristian alike. 
These include the Reform ed Christians, Catholics, and Jews.
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common people’ (Bukdahl, 2001, 20). In fact, the unofficial religious sects that the 
‘common m an’ followed were often in conflict with the official religion. Kirmmse 
describes the situation as such:
Not infrequently the common people lived in an adversarial relation to the 
official church. They had their own Christianity: their own preachers, 
often arrested; their own prayer books and hymnals, often banned; their 
own religious assemblies, often broken up by the police. They could 
protest against the religious tyranny o f the state church in the name o f true 
Christianity and o f "the people." But now that Denmark had become a 
democratic country, now that the people legally owned the state and the 
government, now that the church had become the People's Church (though 
with no change in personnel and little in policy) —  in whose name now 
could the people protest the religious tyranny (and for Kierkegaard, the 
spiritless mediocrity) o f the established church? (Kirmmse, 2001b, xvii)
After the 1848 revolution, the state and church ties were still as strong as they were 
before. Danish infants would still ‘become Christians’ in conjunction with becoming 
Danish citizens by the time they were nine days old. Kierkegaard eventually saw this 
as a cause for concern. The widespread idea that an individual could be assumed to 
have been initiated into the Christian way o f life for having fulfilled a legal 
requirement at the age o f nine days old was both erroneous and dangerous.
The practice o f infant baptism was erroneous in that it neglected to emphasise the 
personal, thoughtful and subjective commitment that a genuine initiation into 
Christianity (but religion more generally) must entail, but that an infant obviously 
lacks. W hilst many o f his comments on infant baptism are too mocking to be very 
informative (i.e., TM, 165, 243, 336; JP 1, 602; for more informative comments, see:
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JP III, 2630; JP IV, 4344), Kierkegaard does seriously elaborate his position on it in 
two places in The Moment articles. In the first, Kierkegaard explains that ‘every 
reasonable person, [would have to agree] that not until one has reached maturity and 
the age o f discretion does one receive permission to decide what religion one shall 
have’ (TM, 230). Though Kierkegaard is talking o f the specifically Christian practice 
o f [infant] baptism, he opens his discussion up to religion as a whole. From it, we 
clearly see that Kierkegaard’s qualifications for the religious way o f  life are maturity, 
and the ability to choose one’s religion in a careful and informed manner. As he 
returns to the practice o f infant baptism, Kierkegaard concludes that to have a religion 
from this external practice ‘[...] is, spiritually speaking, a comic pitifulness’ (ibid.). 
To clarify: Kierkegaard is only critiquing the practice o f infant baptism, not baptism 
as a whole. Kierkegaard would not have a problem with the practice o f baptism as an 
initiation into the religion o f Christianity undertaken by a mature person who has a 
genuinely informed idea o f what Christianity entails.
A little later Kierkegaard discusses confirmation, but once again elucidates his 
position on religion as a whole. Kierkegaard argues that ‘[...] confirmation is far more 
extreme nonsense than infant Baptism simply because confirmation claims to supply 
what was lacking in infant Baptism: an actual personality [ . . . ] ’ (ibid., 244). Once 
again, Kierkegaard is not critical o f confirmation per se, but o f confirmation taking 
place at the (in his opinion, still too young) age o f fifteen (ibid., 243), and as a
13?ceremony which is all but necessary if one wants to do well in the world.
132 K ierkegaard believes that the person should be confirm ed at the age o f  tw enty-five (JP I, 494). This 
quote in particular is used as evidence o f  a basic anthropological principle; that for K ierkegaard 
obtaining a certain level o f  psychical-physical developm ent is a necessary requirem ent for any genuine 
attem pt at entering the religious way o f  life. Recall the description o f  K ierkegaard’s anthropology that 
w as discussed above (in section 3.3.1).
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Since church and state were so closely related, Danish citizens could mistakenly think 
themselves as being religious for having been born, having undertaking some almost 
compulsory ceremonies and frequenting church, and for being a good citizen and 
obeying the law. This notion o f religiosity lacks the stringent, inward demands that 
Kierkegaard believes to be a necessary aspect o f  spirituality, and hence o f  all 
genuinely religious endeavours in general (see: 3.3 above). Through Denm ark’s state 
church marriage (ungenuine) religion became intermingled with worldly, temporal 
necessity and gain. True religiosity for Kierkegaard is found by placing faith in 
something that lies beyond the finite, beyond worldly gain, and that is not necessitated 
by state sanctioned practices.133 The genuine criteria for being religious (inward 
appropriation and subjective choice) are ignored in a socio-political situation where 
the dominant ideology states that following state-sanctioned practices alone is a 
sufficient condition o f religiosity.
Kierkegaard thought that this scenario even eroded away at the genuine existential 
requirements o f religiosity and spirituality. In a world where aesthetic enjoyment and 
easy living are rewarded to those who conform to the state-church idea o f religiosity, 
ethical and religious laxity is subsidised and hence becomes prevalent. Indeed, 
echoing the characteristic deficiencies o f the ‘present age’ (examined in the previous 
chapter), Kierkegaard once more calls ‘[...] the defect o f the age... lack o f character’ 
(ibid., 93. See also: ibid.,. 162). ‘Character’ is precisely that criteria needed for a 
genuine confirmation o f the religious way o f life. Thus, Kierkegaard claims that ‘[...] 
people in our day are not even in what I would call the condition o f religion but are
133 Recall K ierkegaard’s description o f ‘second eth ics’ in section 5.2.1 above.
Page 232 o f  354. K ierkegaard’s Existential Theory o f  the Political. Thom as W olstenholme.
strangers too, unfamiliar with, the kind o f passion that every religion must require, 
without which one cannot have any religion at a ll’ (ibid., 208).134
It is surprising to see how Kierkegaard still attempts to put o ff political action as 
much as possible even at this most desperate point in his authorship. Instead, 
Kierkegaard limits him self to the task o f saying ‘what must be said’ and leaving it to 
the individual to choose whether they continue to endorse Christendom (the state- 
church marriage) or not (ibid., 73). In other words, part o f K ierkegaard’s task at the 
beginning o f the attack literature is still in modestly proclaiming the difference 
between state-church and New Testament Christianity; and the difference between 
ungenuine religion and authentic, existentially formative religion.
But Kierkegaard oscillates between this modest position and one where political 
action appears as not only acceptable but necessary. This is because Kierkegaard 
came to see his authorship as an increasingly less potent tool for solving the 
existential laxity that the age was nurturing. Kierkegaard laments the fact that an 
aesthetic attitude to life had become so ubiquitous that his own delineations o f this
134 N ote that this is one instance w here K ierkegaard opens his discussion to include religiosity in 
general. In another place, K ierkegaard pushes this point even further by despairingly proclaim ing that 
the age ‘[ ...]  is not even in the condition o f  being able to have relig ion’ (TM ; 259). 1 think that this is 
surely going too far. The idea that the age cannot possibly have religion not only contradicts 
K ierkegaard’s basic theoretical com m itm ent to the idea that any person can becom e spirit, but it even 
com es into contradiction with other com m ents in these writings, e.g., that Judaism  is the only religion 
genuinely preached in his contem porary situation (TM ; 213). N eedless to say, if  Judaism  is genuinely 
being practised then religion (o f  som e sort at least) exists. Perhaps K ierkegaard m eans that only ‘true 
C hristianity’, w ith its em phasis on grace and forgiveness, cannot exist in that situation? U nder this 
reading, socio-political changes would be necessary for a specitlc kind o f  religiosity to appear. Still, I 
find this expression to be irreconcilable with the anthropological view  o f  the se lf  that was exam ined 
above. Furtherm ore, if  Socrates could act religiously despite the paganism  at the heart o f  A thens (and 
on pain o f  death) then K ierkegaard has at least failed to justify  why a citizen o f  Christendom  could not 
engage in spiritual developm ent o f  some sort -  even to the degree o f  practising N ew  T estam ent 
C hristianity. Perhaps by ‘relig ion’, then, K ierkegaard only means ‘the religious practice o f  N ew  
Testam ent C hristianity’. Perhaps some religions can exist in such a state o f  affairs (i.e., Judaism ), and 
even som e religious individual’s (e.g., genuine C hristian’s), but not the ongoing practice o f  (even 
concessionary) C hristianity as a religion , by a com m union o f  genuinely interested individuals (rather 
than, say, as m erely separated instances o f  individuals who follow the Christian way of life).
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very phenomenon were listened to with merely aesthetic interest (ibid., 92, 260, 313) - 
if  listened to at all. K ierkegaard’s most detailed elucidation o f this comes close to the 
end o f his life. In the manuscript for the tenth issue o f The Moment (unpublished 
during his lifetime), he confesses:
[...] I stand surrounded by contemporaries who at most are interested in 
this matter [his church attack] in the capacity o f the public. In a fleeting 
mood one is perhaps gripped by what I say; in the next moment one 
judges it esthetically; in the next moment one reads what is written against 
me; then one is inquisitive about the outcome etc. etc.: in short, one is—  
the public (ibid., 313).
When all else has failed -  when Kierkegaard has attempted to elucidate the existential 
problems his potential reader might have, and when this communication fails because 
the proclamation itself is not engaged with in a serious m anner - then Kierkegaard 
resorts to political action.
In his Addendum to T h is  Must Be Said: So Let It Be Said’ (the final publication in 
an already established, political journal before Kierkegaard began his own with The 
Moment [Oiblikket]), Kierkegaard concludes:
Just as carefully as it has been hitherto concealed what my task could 
become, just as circumspectly as I have remained in impenetrable 
incognizance—just as decisively shall I now, when the moment has 
arrived, make it known.
The question about what Christianity is, including in turn the question 
about the state Church, the people's Church, which they now want to call 
it, the amalgamation or alliance o f Church and state, must be brought to
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the most extreme decision. It cannot and must not go on as it did year 
after year under the old bishop (ibid., 75, my emphasis)
This statem ent alone does not provide grounds for thinking that disestablishm ent is 
the only solution. As K ierkegaard’s ‘attack’ literature mounts, however, his 
inclination for disestablishm ent increases. Later on, in the second issue o f  The 
Moment, under the heading ‘That the Task Has a Double D irection’, K ierkegaard 
explains that the task o f introducing religion back into Christendom is twofold. The 
first part o f  the task is in elucidating the difference(s) between genuine religion and 
the religion o f  Christendom  (ibid., 107). As we have previously seen, this task takes 
up much o f the earlier K ierkegaard’s earlier authorship. In K ierkegaard’s own words, 
the first part o f  the task:
[ ...]  is d irected to w hat can be done to clear up people 's concepts, to 
instruct them , to stir them  by m eans o f  the ideals, through pathos to 
bring them into an impassioned state, to rouse them up with the gadfly 
sting o f  irony, scorn, sarcasm, etc. etc. (ibid.)
This could well describe K ierkegaard’s entire authorship, and Kierkegaard is 
undoubtedly both skilled at and fond o f this task. But there is a second part to the task 
o f introducing spirituality and religion back into the specific state o f Christendom  that 
Denmark was experiencing at that time. This second aspect o f the task, we are told, 
would not be required at all if  the notion that one was genuinely religious ‘[...] did not 
hang together with an enorm ously huge illusion that has a purely external aspect, the
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illusion that Christianity and the state have been fused together’ {ibid., cf. JP III, 
2904).
With regards to this second task, the conceptual clarification o f  K ierkegaard’s entire 
preceding authorship was not on its own a sufficient condition for re-introducing 
religiosity to Danish citizens. As Kierkegaard admits:
[ ...]  the work must be done in a different way; the state, after all, has the 
pow er to rem ove it. Thus the second aspect o f  the task is to w ork along 
the lines o f getting the state to remove this illusion.
*  * *
I f  I were to compare this task to something, I would say: It resem bles the 
medical treatm ent o f a mentally ill patient. The treatm ent m ust be 
psychical, says the physician, but that does not mean that there may not 
also be something physical to do (TM, 108).
The task o f  enabling the religious way o f life as an existential possibility, within 
Christendom at least, is thus twofold. AsJorgen Bukdahl recognises: ‘Kierkegaard's 
task during that decade o f great political and social movements was to propose both a 
worldly and a religious corrective’ to the Danish state’s inadvertent prom otion o f 
what Kierkegaard considered to be inauthentic ‘ethical’ and ‘religious’ ways o f  life 
(Bukdahl, 2001, 106, my emphasis).
Kierkegaard ‘diagnoses’ the ‘physical’ problem o f his age as the state-church 
marriage. Yet Kierkegaard is not him self either keen or sufficiently ‘trained’ in 
political affairs to take sole responsibility for the second part o f  this ‘dual task ’ (TM,
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60, passim). Still, K ierkegaard recognises that he has a personal responsibility to the 
existential im provem ent o f his fellows (see section 7.4 below), and he therefore 
assigns him self the task o f  ‘work[ing] along the lines o f getting the state to rem ove’ 
the obstacles to genuine religiousness {ibid., 108).
Kierkegaard m entions disestablishment so directly in only one other part o f  his 
‘attack’ literature. A little later, though still in the second issue o f  The Moment, 
Kierkegaard entertains a supposition:
Suppose... that what we understand by being a Christian is a delusion, 
that this whole machinery o f the state C hurch... [is] an enorm ous optical 
illusion that will not be the least help to us in eternity ... in that case let us 
(for eternity’s sake!) get rid o f it, the sooner the better {ibid., 121).
A few pages later, K ierkegaard states that it is precisely this ‘supposition’, that the 
religion o f  Christendom  is illusory and inauthentic, that had been elucidated in his 
entire preceding authorship:
[...]  anyone who has followed my entire work as an author is bound to 
have seen ... that it carries the m ark... that the whole m atter o f  
“Christendom ” is a criminal case corresponding to what is usually known
135as forgery and swindling {ibid., 129).
135 O ne is also rem inded o f  a section o f  The Point o f  View poignantly  entitled: ‘’’C hristendom ” is an 
enorm ous illu sion ’ (TPV ; 41-45).
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The terms ‘forgery’ and ‘swindling’ are also supplemented with the idea that, in 
Christendom, what passes for spirituality and religiosity is a ‘falsification’, a ‘fiction, 
poetry’ [ibid.). Proclam ations o f the state-church fostering the illusion o f authentic 
religion are abundant in the ensuing eight articles o f The Moment. The only 
conclusion the reader can draw is therefore: ‘let us (for eternity’s sake!) get rid o f  [the 
state-church marriage], the sooner the better’. Even here, it seems as though 
K ierkegaard’s justification o f this political change is spiritually-religiously oriented - 
for he supports disestablishmentarianism, after all, ‘for eternity’s sake!’
I hope to have shown that in The Moment literature, K ierkegaard suggested at least 
one political change -  disestablishment. Disestablishment might arguably be the only 
political change Kierkegaard ever sought; but this would only be a historically 
contingent fact. For in K ierkegaard’s attack literature, he offers a theoretical 
justification for ‘working alongside the state’ in bringing about political change as 
part o f an existential attempt to develop spiritual deepening in one’s neighbours. (This 
social dim ension o f  K ierkegaard’s existentialism will be the focus o f  chapter seven 
below.) In the next, concluding section o f this chapter we will briefly assess how 
Kierkegaard’s call for political change relates to the core tenets o f  his existential 
theory o f  the political.
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6.3 Conclusions of Kierkegaard’s ‘attack’.
I have sought to argue that Kierkegaard has an existential theory o f  the political that 
might justify  political change. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard does not seek political 
change for civic purposes. Throughout his authorship Kierkegaard had evidenced a 
reserved attitude to political reform. Not only did Kierkegaard avoid it when possible, 
but he also frequently sought to emphasise that his own comm ents about the sub- 
optimal conditions o f  his time were only part o f  an attempt at spiritual reformation. A 
change in externals, K ierkegaard had often stated, was not what the tim es had needed.
I also defended the view that K ierkegaard’s entire authorship is directed at the 
elucidation o f  existential categories -  the ‘aesthetic’, ‘ethical’ and ‘religious’. Part o f 
authentic, spiritual development will be in relation to one’s external environm ent; 
whether the latter is ideal for spiritual development or sub-optimal. Kierkegaard was a 
skilled author, and generally directed his efforts towards guiding the single individual 
to existential developm ent despite external hindrances. Furthermore, Kierkegaard 
frequently gave reasons for believing that spiritual reform is more effectively brought 
about by engaging with existential ideas rather than through political reformation.
All o f this is to admit, however, that Kierkegaard’s primary interest is existential. 
Kierkegaard only calls for the more radical method o f political change when his
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preferred authorial, existential approach to spiritual problems no longer works. In fact, 
K ierkegaard recognises that one o f his contemporaries, Nikolaj Frederik Severin 
Grundtvig (1783-1872), was seeking to separate the church from the state for civic 
reasons such as religious freedom o f expression. In response, Kierkegaard articulated 
his worry that whilst the political reform might well succeed, its intended effect on 
spiritual reformation could, nevertheless, only fail {ibid., 207). The external change 
would be taken as another justification that something ‘religious’ had {en masse) been 
achieved, and hence, the existential requirements o f  religion would still be as 
neglected as they were prior to the purely external, political m ovem ent.136
K ierkegaard’s stance in The Moment is arguably the only place in his authorship 
where he takes partial responsibility for bringing about external, political change. Our 
analysis o f  K ierkegaard’s ‘attack’ as well as o f his theory o f  the political more 
generally has shown that K ierkegaard’s theory o f policy change is prim arily based 
upon his existential interests. We could forgive the contemporary Kierkegaard scholar 
for incorrectly believing that Kierkegaard never advocated political change, since 
Kierkegaard does often condemn it as a legitimate m ethod o f  solving existential 
problems. Furtherm ore, a theory that policy change ought to be grounded in 
existential developm ent, rather than civic liberties for example, is surely one that is 
radically at odds with much o f the political thought from the Enlightenm ent period to 
our own.
136 For a sim ilar exam ple, see K irm m se (K irm m se, 2001b; xvii - quoted above) w here the ‘D anish State 
C hurch’ changed its nam e to the ‘D anish Peoples C hurch’. D espite the nam e change, the ‘p eo p le ’s ’ 
church continued to endorse only the conservative view s that the established ‘D anish State C hu rch ’ had 
preached prior to the political reform .
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In fact, it is hard to overstate the radical nature o f K ierkegaard’s existentially 
motivated political activism. A prime example o f  the way that K ierkegaard’s 
existential theory o f  the political might be radically at odds with an ‘Enlightenm ent’ 
or contem porary notion o f political activism could be on the issue o f  female 
emancipation. From K ierkegaard’s earliest publications to his latest, in both his 
pseudonym ous and his signed authorship, he advises against female em ancipation.137 
Kierkegaard recognised that female emancipation would benefit women in term s o f 
civil rights and liberties. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard argued that emancipation would 
do irreparable existential harm to women. W ithout going into too much detail about 
this vast and interesting area, Kierkegaard basically argued that female em ancipation 
would (at that time) risk making women into the secular-minded and politically 
overzealous men that were both existentially impoverished as well as the cause o f 
much existentially damaging socio-political activity.138 W ithout female emancipation, 
ironically enough, Kierkegaard believed that women had the best chance o f  becoming 
fully authentic, spiritual selves.
Just as the goal o f  K ierkegaard’s political activism is different to those o f 
contem porary notions, so too are Kierkegaard’s prescribed means. We have seen that
137 See: CO R, 54; E/O II, 22, 53, 311-13; EPW , 3 , passim.-, EUD, 143; SLW , 55-56, 124-25; W O L, 
138-140; JP  IV, 4992; VI, 6904.
138 This defence is at least the one given in: E/O II, 312-313; COR, 54; JP IV, 4992; and, JP  VI, 6904. 
This v iew  has also been defended by Julia W atkin (W atkin, 1997, pp. 69-82; 2000a, 75), and fits in 
well w ith the understanding  o f  K ierkegaard’s spiritual prioritarianism  and ‘concessionary ’ attitude w ith 
regards to securing civil liberties. For alternative views, see M ark, C., Taylor, w ho calls K ierkegaard ’s 
rejection o f  fem ale em ancipation  ‘unqualified’ (Taylor, 1997, 201, n.9). N ote that som e fem inist 
scholars, like C eline Leon, have convincingly argued that K ierkegaard’s rejection o f  fem ale 
em ancipation is based on a hidden m isogyny that K ierkegaard harbours, and is therefore theoretically  
unw arranted (Leon, 2008, 116-130). W hilst I agree w ith Leon that m any o f  K ierkegaard’s view s on the 
issue o f  em ancipation  suffer from an atypical lack o f  argum entation, thought, and evidence (that m ight 
suggest that o ther non-theoretical, psychological m otivations are w orking behind the scenes), I 
nevertheless believe that according to the im plications o f  his existential theory o f  the political 
K ierkegaard does have som e theoretical grounds for prioritising spiritual developm ent over the pursu it 
o f  secular liberties in general, and hence w ith fem ale em ancipation in particular. A sim ilar issue w ith 
K ierkegaard’s p rioritisation  o f  seeking ‘spiritual’ equality over social equality  is pursued in an 
exam ination o f  A dorno ’s w ell-know n critique o f  K ierkegaard below  (section 7.2).
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Kierkegaard does not recommend a positive policy alteration. We have also seen that 
K ierkegaard’s call for political reform is certainly a little idiosyncratic. K ierkegaard 
does not rally a group o f supporters; does not form a petition; does not protest with a 
political sit-in, or anything else o f the sort. Kierkegaard publishes polem ical pieces in 
a journal that he established for the task. Since not every person has the means or the 
ability to do this, what might Kierkegaard have to say about the legitimate means to 
political activism  more generally?
We have seen (in chapters three and five above) that Kierkegaard does not advocate 
the use o f political means which appeal to numerical force for spiritual matters. Hence, 
Kierkegaard would satirise the use o f balloting as a means for spiritually m otivated 
political reform. When it comes to activism with regards to spiritual matters, 
Kierkegaard instead advises each single individual to stand firm to his or her 
existential interests and commitments. Rather than rallying supporters, existentially 
fighting for spiritual reform will likely only ostracise the single individual from the 
majority. Recall also that in chapter five above we saw how being a single individual 
in ‘the present age’ would necessarily involve social ostracism, as well as hardship.
Despite the fact that the ‘present age’ reflects a rather specific type o f  society, it is 
important to note that political activism for spiritual reform will nonetheless most 
likely always involve an act o f suffering. Such are the legitimate means for which the 
single individual is equipped in the battle for spiritually motivated political reform. 
The single individual dares to stand firm in his or her beliefs in direct confrontation to 
the majority, or to the ‘established’ way o f doing things. It is highly likely that the act 
o f the single individual will offend members o f the majority who follow a
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comfortable and thoughtless way o f life, and that the majority will respond by 
inflicting m ockery and abuse upon the single individual. Being tyrannised for daring 
to be authentic, or for defending spiritual beliefs, might actually be the existential 
inspiration for enabling another individual to develop existentially; but there is no 
guarantee o f  it. The genuinely spiritual reformer will not be concerned with num bers, 
however, and so will nevertheless be happy if  he or she aids ju st one other single 
person in becom ing an authentic self.
If this notion o f  political activism is rather striking, I believe that it is intentionally so. 
The radical nature o f  K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f political activism is not only 
the direct result o f  his continual priority o f existential commitments to other ones but 
is also what makes his theory o f existential reform so forceful in the first place. Hence, 
any faithful description or reproduction o f K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f  political 
ought not to understate or distort the radically challenging nature o f the original 
thought.
K ierkegaard’s existential activism also shows that existential comm itm ents are 
essentially reflexive towards external change. Furthermore, we have seen that 
K ierkegaard’s task o f  developing spiritual development is always articulated in 
relation to real-w orld changes. Recall that Kierkegaard had criticized Luther’s reform 
for not being sufficiently informed and safe-guarded against external circumstances. 
From Luther’s reformation, Kierkegaard learned that spiritual reform must take 
externals into consideration; and this includes the political ram ifications that a 
(spiritual or political) reform might have on the existential developm ent o f  the typical 
individual.
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Throughout the majority o f his authorship Kierkegaard thought that he was able to 
counter-act the problem atic effects that a non-ideal socio-political setup created by 
directing the single individual towards spiritual development. W hether the single 
individual then achieved spiritual deepening would be another and separate matter. 
The im portant point was that Kierkegaard thought that it was possible to com m unicate 
to a single, individual reader, and to guide that reader around any hindering effects 
that an age m ight have on his or her spiritual development. In this way, the 
existentially harmful effects o f an age could be worked around and effectively 
nullified.
Yet K ierkegaard believed that Denm ark’s enforcement o f  Lutheranism  as the 
established religion and the social practices and ideological climate it produced was 
too great an obstacle to his previous task o f spiritual deepening. K ierkegaard’s views 
most likely changed when his call for a concession to be made by som eone from 
within the established Lutheran Church went unanswered. In fact, Kierkegaard gave 
up all hope o f  receiving an admission from a high-ranking official within D enm ark’s 
established Lutheranism  that the latter lowered the spiritual demands o f  the New 
Testament. The only way for Kierkegaard to continue his task o f spiritual deepening 
was to fight for the removal o f the external obstacle to his cause, even if  this risked 
being m istakenly took for an author primarily interested in securing civil liberties.
Hence, I have hoped to have shown not only that Kierkegaard existentialism  is 
constantly reflexive towards external change, but that external alterations are even 
sometimes justified  given K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political. This
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provides a response to some o f the contemporary response to K ierkegaard’s political 
thought that we had examined in chapter two. Since an analysis o f K ierkegaard’s most 
finalised theory o f  the political has been provided, it is worth re-evaluating some o f  
the views that are found in contemporary Kierkegaard scholarship. This will be the 
goal o f  the next, concluding sub-section.
6.3.1 K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political, and contem porary K ierkegaard scholarship 
reconsidered.
Now we are also in a position to contrast K ierkegaard’s theory o f  the political with 
contem porary interpretations o f K ierkegaard’s political thought. As we saw in chapter 
two above, many contemporary Kierkegaard scholars lam ented the fact that 
Kierkegaard offers little to no guidance with regards to what policies we ought to 
pursue. Let us offer our response to this concern.
As we have seen, Kierkegaard refrained from providing clues as to which policies he 
might have (positively) condoned. The only theoretical comm itm ent that appears to 
concern Kierkegaard, with regards to positive policies, is simply that they are 
‘genuine’; that is, they respect the boundaries that are appropriate to the political 
realm. K ierkegaard does not say anything more specific than this. W hether or not 
Kierkegaard would have condoned certain policies or not as conducive towards 
spiritual deepening is a difficult and herm eneutically problematic question. Given the 
difficulties involved in such a task, as well as the overwhelming evidence that
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Kierkegaard preferred avoiding such questions and saw them as potential liabilities to 
spiritual developm ent, I would suggest that Kierkegaard does not leave us with the 
theoretical basis for a positive programme o f policy change that could confidently be 
described as faithful to K ierkegaard’s key commitments. Kierkegaard does, however, 
provide us with an existential theory o f the political that can be used to endorse 
negative policy change (see ‘Figure 1.1: W orking Taxonomy o f  Key Political T erm s’ 
above, #4.3, for a description o f these and other terms and their differences).
The m ajority o f  contem porary literature has taken K ierkegaard’s political quietism 
(with regards to positive policy change) to be a response to a particular historical 
situation. As we saw above (e.g., in section 3.1), Kierkegaard went to extra efforts to 
guard his existential thought from being used by his perhaps politically overzealous 
contem poraries for political reform. As with many theorists that take K ierkegaard’s 
political quietism to be a ‘corrective’ to a specific, historical situation, this thesis has 
also em phasised that Kierkegaard was particularly worried about the impact he 
thought his philosophy might have had on contemporary issues. As we have seen, 
Kierkegaard had expressed the worry that his contemporaries had an unhealthily 
optimistic and philosophically unjustified belief that political entities could solve non­
political problems.
W hether K ierkegaard was personally fighting against a historically contingent trend, 
i.e., whether his work was really a corrective to what he saw as a particularly 
dangerous view o f  the political is not relevant here though. Kierkegaard provides an 
existential theory o f  the political, and the theoretical kernel o f it remains consistent 
throughout the authorship (see p. 139 above for the key tenets o f this). In other words,
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Kierkegaard maintains some basic theoretical commitments that respond to but are not 
irreducibly affected by any social and political change that he might have encountered. 
Included in those commitments is the refusal to provide suggestions for what positive 
policy change might aid spiritual development, because the political realm, properly 
speaking, ought to only regulate temporal affairs and not spiritual matters.
The fact that Kierkegaard was wary o f how his contemporaries might have interpreted 
his authorship is relevant with regards to understanding some aspects o f his thought. It 
might explain why, for example, only two fragments o f the sources that outline his 
theory o f the political (and which were examined in chapter three above) were printed
1 TO
during his lifetime. But the theory o f the political that Kierkegaard develops 
maintains a theoretical commitment to refraining from giving philosophical 
justifications for positive political suggestions. Not only does this abstention occur 
even in pieces that Kierkegaard kept private (such as the journal entries) but it also 
accords with the entirety o f K ierkegaard’s authorship. This implies that there is little 
reason to see these elements o f his thought as written with the intention o f serving as a 
corrective to a historically contingent situation.
Furthermore, it has hopefully become clear that an essential aspect o f K ierkegaard’s 
theory o f the political is that the worldly realm and the spiritual realm are quite 
radically separate. K ierkegaard’s key political commitment is simply in m aintaining 
the separateness o f the two spheres (and even then, he engages in more ostensibly 
political matters only reluctantly so). Hence, any attempt to ‘reconstruct’ from
139 The tw o w orks that w ere published by K ierkegaard are ‘An O pen L etter’ and ‘For-Self 
E xam ination’ -  both o f  w hich w ere published in 1851. The sections from The Poin t o f  View that we 
used w ere not prin ted  in K ierkegaard’s lifetim e; nor w ere the parts o f  K ierkegaard’s jou rnals that dealt 
with L u ther’s reform ; and neither w as ‘Judge For Y ourselves!’
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K ierkegaard’s existential commitments what positive policies Kierkegaard may have 
condoned will, I suggest, be necessarily ‘un-Kierkegaardian’. If  my interpretation is 
correct, K ierkegaard does not just happen to refrain from providing a positive policy 
programme just because he feared that his contemporary situation was one where this 
project would be misunderstood. K ierkegaard’s decision never to provide guidelines 
for a positive policy programme is, by way o f contrast, an essential aspect o f  his 
general theory o f  the political.
This conclusion, as we saw earlier, had been reached by Daniel Conway: though for 
very different reasons. Conway had simply stated that any reconstruction o f 
K ierkegaard’s political thought, with regards to positive policy making, ought to be 
considered ‘un-K ierkegaardian’: and I assumed that this was simply to denote that the 
‘reconstructed’ elements o f Kierkegaard’s thought include topics which Kierkegaard 
did not h im self explicitly engage in. In other words, Conway points out that as a 
matter o f  empirical fact Kierkegaard never gave positive political suggestions. I have 
argued instead that Kierkegaard could not even theoretically have combined his 
theory o f  the political with a programme o f positive policy suggestions, given the 
characteristics o f  the former (i.e., given that existential commitments are always to be 
prioritised over political ones).
To clarify, however: I do think that K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political can be used 
to condemn certain political activities. Kierkegaard’s theory o f  the political offers us 
an account o f what political actions might be illegitimate. If  political entities seek to 
control non-political areas o f life to the general detriment o f individuals then they are 
‘ungenuine’. This fact alone, however, does not justify external political change; for
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K ierkegaard’s principal interest in existential developm ent often overlooks the fact 
that political entities m ight be acting illegitimately.
Political failures in providing adequate temporal welfare for its citizenry is ultimately 
o f less importance for Kierkegaard than that o f improving the existential developm ent 
o f such individuals. Hence, resorting to political reform to solve existential problem s 
may well lead to an increase in the temporal welfare o f such individuals; but if  the 
spiritual aspect o f  the typical individual found in such a situation is put in jeopardy 
then the reform will have done more harm than good. Additionally, a tem poral, 
political change cannot be justified on existentialist grounds because this m ight lead 
political entities to wish to regulate spiritual wellbeing. Yet the two are logically 
incompatible and ought to be kept separate because they produce potentially 
disastrous consequences when erroneously mixed. Hence, a deficiency in the temporal 
aspect o f  the person ought to be solved for civic reasons and with political means, (as 
Kierkegaard may well agree); but this is not K ierkegaard’s project.
Kierkegaard, or one endorsing his existential theory o f the political, could not risk 
providing an existentially-m otivated programme for positive policy change; not even 
for the sake o f increasing temporal wellbeing. Such a programme would risk causing 
accidental existential impoverishment and this is worse, according to Kierkegaard, 
than a decrease in our temporal welfare. As long as an existentially based method o f 
improving the (existential) wellbeing o f our fellows is a viable alternative to 
proposing positive political changes, the former activity should therefore always be 
prioritised. Hence, Kierkegaard condones the use o f genuinely political means in 
securing civic liberties and in maximising the temporal wellbeing o f  the citizenry, but
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it is not clear that he would prioritise this task over that o f seeking to existentially aid 
one’s fellows. This is where many modern-day liberals (and perhaps even some 
contem porary Kierkegaard scholars) might part ways with K ierkegaard’s existential 
theory o f  the political.
So, if  political entities seek to control non-political areas o f life to the general 
detriment o f  individuals then they should be deemed ‘ungenuine’. As I have intimated 
at though, Kierkegaard would still not think that this is a sufficient justification for 
political activism. Given this integral aspect o f his thought, some Kierkegaard 
scholars m ight be worried that Kierkegaard’s existential theory o f  the political 
condones political quietism. Many contemporary scholars have neglected to consider 
K ierkegaard’s late authorship, however. If we recall that K ierkegaard’s late 
authorship provides the theoretical basis for justifying existentially motivated political 
activism then the notion that Kierkegaard was a political quietist becomes less tenable. 
For if  a political entity is both ‘ungenuine’ and renders one’s ability to existentially 
edify one’s fellows ineffective then we have existential grounds for calling for 
political reform.
Having now argued that K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political can be used 
to justify  negative policy change (in chapters five and six), let us return to some o f  the 
contem porary literature on Kierkegaard’s political thought (briefly examined in 
chapter two). Bruce Fletcher, let us recall, had given some pretty critical argum ents 
against K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political. Fletcher deemed K ierkegaard’s political 
thought ‘[ ...]  severely defective in its minimization o f the essential ingredient o f 
activism ’ (Fletcher, 1982, 72); an ‘idealistic and im practical’ ‘approach to concrete
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political and social problem s’ (ibid., 73); and a ‘quietistic philosophy o f resignation’ 
which is ‘im potent’ in response ‘to concrete realities’ (ibid., 71-2).
If  we judge K ierkegaard’s political activism from the view o f a liberal theory o f  the 
political then K ierkegaard’s thought might indeed be judged as overly (and perhaps 
even unduly) quietist with regards to some political issues. Even from this point o f  
view, however, it is hard to agree with Fletcher’s comments. K ierkegaard’s thought, 
we have argued, is not ‘quietistic’ or politically resigned. It is far from obvious as to 
why K ierkegaard’s theory o f  the political should therefore be deemed ‘defective’ with 
regards to the ‘m inim ization’ o f activism; and calling it ‘im potent’ with regards to 
‘concrete realities’ is also surely overstating the case. As K ierkegaard’s polemical 
attack on D enm ark’s established state religion shows, a theory o f  political activism  is 
entirely consistent with Kierkegaard’s theory o f the political.
Furthermore, we must rem ember that though Kierkegaard does not pretend to provide 
guidelines for policy-making he does see it as an important and legitimate task. Even 
from the existential point o f view, a healthy political system is conducive towards 
existential development. After all, it just might be that one’s task o f  spiritual 
deepening m ight become less burdensome and obstructed if  one’s temporal welfare is 
in order (i.e., neither overly indulged nor neglected). Kierkegaard simply leaves this 
specific task to those who are skilled at it. All this is to say that Kierkegaard sets out 
to provide a theory o f the political rather than a positive policy program. Yet 
K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political is fully complimentary to this latter task. If 
anything, K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political serves as an important tool for ensuring
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that political activity is kept within its legitimate scope, which may even lead to the 
temporal im provement o f  citizens being more efficiently catered for.
Kierkegaard provides arguments as to why the political and the existential aspects o f  
life ought to be kept separate and seeks to ensure that policy-making does not trespass 
upon the individuals’ engagement with spiritual development. Hence, political reform 
is not itse lf the target o f Kierkegaard’s criticism. Kierkegaard only criticises political 
reform that illegitim ately attempts to solve spiritual problems with political means 
where alternative existential options are still viable. In response to a perceived over­
enthusiasm with regards to the ability o f the political realm to solve all o f  life’s 
problems, K ierkegaard might have voiced complaints concerning political activism  on 
more than one occasion. Yet his call for the separation o f church and state shows that 
Kierkegaard is not completely averse to keeping political entities in check. As such, 
Kierkegaard establishes a standard for judging which policy changes m ight be 
existentially acceptable and which should be openly protested against. Furthermore, 
one might even regard K ierkegaard’s theory o f political activism as a vital aspect o f 
spiritual deepening -  both at the individual as well as the social level (a view which 
will be argued for in the next chapter).
This chapter has hopefully challenged the claim that K ierkegaard’s political thought is 
quietistic and/or incompatible with political reform/activism. This, nevertheless, only 
addresses one o f  the two perennial arguments for believing that Kierkegaard has 
nothing politically interesting to say. The second argument is that even if  we accept 
that Kierkegaard has a theory o f political activism and reform, his philosophy is still 
essentially individualistic nonetheless (being, as it is, directed towards the existential
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developm ent o f  the ‘single individual’). Perhaps the best and most well-known 
articulation o f this claim is to be found in the work o f Theodor Adorno. A dorno’s 
critique o f  K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political will therefore be the focus o f  the next 
chapter. In outlining the specifically social aspect o f K ierkegaard’s existential theory 
o f the political, however, we will also see what Kierkegaard believes the ideal 
relationship between the political and the non-political should be. Hence, we will 
highlight w hat K ierkegaard’s vision o f ‘genuine’ politics is, a term which m ight have 
otherwise eluded us hitherto.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
‘Genuine’ Politics and ‘Genuine’ Sociability.
Introduction.
Two prim ary argum ents have often been levelled against K ierkegaard’s political 
thought. Both criticisms would also challenge Kierkegaard’s existential theory o f the 
political as I have outlined it thus far. In the previous chapter I responded to one o f the 
two common argum ents for thinking that Kierkegaard ought to be considered an 
apolitical theorist. I argued that Kierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political is 
responsive to real-world policy making and provides a theoretical justification for 
fighting for the amendm ent or abolition o f certain ‘ungenuine’ and existentially 
harmful governm ental policies.
In this final chapter I will address another strong challenge to K ierkegaard’s political 
thought via a criticism that was popularised by Theodor A dorno’s work Kierkegaard: 
Construction o f  the Aesthetic and pursued throughout A dorno’s literary career. 
Adorno argues that Kierkegaard has a political ideology, but that it supports a kind o f 
political conservatism. Adorno might have been willing to accept that Kierkegaard 
has an existential theory o f the political. Nevertheless, Adorno argues that
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K ierkegaard’s philosophical outlook is shaped by an individualistic m entality that 
(inadvertently or not) supports a particular political stance - namely, bourgeoisie 
quietism. As such, it could be argued that A dono’s criticism o f K ierkegaard’s political 
thought is not so much that the latter is ‘im potent’ with regards to real-world changes, 
for Adorno could well accept that Kierkegaard’s the theory o f  the political justifies 
external change. A dorno’s criticism, however, would be that the type o f  external 
change that K ierkegaard’s individualistic philosophy justifies could only be one that 
supports a reactionary, conservative political stance. As such, any o f  K ierkegaard’s 
justifications for negative policy changes could still ultimately only condone the 
bourgeoisie status quo and any inequalities entrenched within it. Hence K ierkegaard’s 
theory o f  the political is not impotent with regards to worldly change but is still 
nevertheless powerless at combating class-based inequalities.
A dorno’s criticism  is one prominent and well-argued articulation o f  the charge that 
K ierkegaard’s philosophy is essentially individualistic. As we have seen throughout 
this thesis, K ierkegaard’s emphasis on existential and spiritual developm ent has 
indeed constantly been addressed to the single individual. Furthermore, Kierkegaard 
frequently advises the single individual to stand aside from relations with ‘o thers’ and 
from an engagem ent with externalities in order to undertake spiritual deepening. 
Given that the foundation o f Kierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political is an 
unwavering regard for the spiritual development o f the single individual, it might be 
perfectly plausible to suggest that the only policy alterations it could justify  would 
also be necessarily individualistic by nature. Most scholars that take an individualistic 
reading o f  K ierkegaard’s authorship do not even recognise that Kierkegaard has any 
social or political thought, let alone a theory o f the political. Nevertheless, the claim
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that an existentially based theory o f the political must be defectively individualistic is 
certainly one that must be answered. This chapter aims to provide a response.
I will argue that Kierkegaard addresses the criticism o f neglecting social inequalities 
when his theory o f  the political is combined with other aspects o f his work; his 
anthropology and his social theory, for example (7.2). In doing so, I will outline an 
additional facet o f  K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political, an aspect that I 
have called ‘concessionary politics’. This additional element also provides further 
evidence for refuting the charge that Kierkegaard’s theory o f the political is impotent 
with regards to real-world changes. Furthermore, I will argue that K ierkegaard’s ideal 
vision o f  sociability, as elucidated in detail in the book Works o f  Love [hereafter 
simply; W OL], is fully complimentary to his existential theory o f  the political (7.3). 
In fact, I shall argue that the individual’s task o f becoming a se lf is necessarily 
interpersonal (7.4). This will create a bridge between Kierkegaard’s theory o f the 
political and his social thought: for genuine sociability is in fact only possible when 
K ierkegaard’s theory o f  the political is respected, and when the existential 
developm ent o f each and every individual has been safeguard against (7.5). N ot only 
are K ierkegaard’s social theory and existential theory o f the political thus inexorably 
interlinked but also neither o f them permits an individualistic interpretation.
An analysis o f  K ierkegaard’s piece Works o f  Love will therefore be central to both 
this chapter and to my thesis. Adorno, as well as many other contem porary scholars, 
uses Works o f  Love to support an individualistic reading o f Kierkegaard where I will 
use it (along with some o f Kierkegaard’s journal entries) to outline K ierkegaard’s
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social theory. An examination o f this text, as well as o f Adorno’s general criticism o f 
Kierkegaard will thus be the central focus o f this chapter.
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7.1 Theodor Adorno’s critical involvement with Kierkegaard
7.1.1 A dorno’s: Kierkegaard: Construction o f  the Aesthetic
Theodor Adorno developed an early interest in Kierkegaard that stayed with him
throughout his life. This interest led Adorno to write three principle texts which
explicitly address aspects o f K ierkegaard’s thought: Kierkegaard: Construction o f  the 
Aesthetic [1933]; On Kierkegaard's Doctrine o f  Love [1939]; and Kierkegaard Once 
More [1963]. Aside from these works, Adorno also maintained a lifelong interest in 
his contem poraries’ reception o f Kierkegaard; by both existentialists and theologians 
alike.
Kierkegaard: Construction o f  the Aesthetic is undoubtedly A dorno’s most extensive 
treatm ent o f K ierkegaard’s thought. In it, Adorno pursues compelling and novel 
critiques o f  some o f the most fundamental principles o f K ierkegaard’s thought. 
A dorno’s charge that Kierkegaard’s philosophy is essentially individualistic is so 
authoritative that it has informed many contemporary scholars who defend the same 
basic position. Similarly, Adorno’s (Marxist-influenced) jo in t critique o f 
Kierkegaard’s political position as essentially aligned with bourgeois conservatism, 
and (hence) o f being little use for fighting against real-world inequality, is a critique
that is still voiced by some contemporary scholars.
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Adorno never rescinds the critique o f Kierkegaard’s political thought that is so 
thoroughly developed in Kierkegaard: Construction o f  the Aesthetic. On the contrary, 
A dorno’s later works build upon the arguments o f his debut piece. Nevertheless, I will 
primarily focus on the second o f Adorno’s principle works on Kierkegaard: On 
Kierkegaard's Doctrine o f  Love. The reasons for focussing on this piece in particular 
are firstly because I think that it is Adorno’s strongest articulation o f the argum ent 
that K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political is unavoidably individualistic; and secondly, 
because in responding to A dorno’s analysis o f Works o f  Love I shall also outline why 
I think the same text presents Kierkegaard’s social theory. This outline will therefore 
also make some progress in showing how Kierkegaard’s theory o f the political is 
ultimately tied to genuine sociability.
7.1.1.2 My interpretation o f Kierkegaard’s authorship
Throughout this thesis I have tacitly worked with an understanding o f K ierkegaard’s 
authorial project. I have assumed that if  a quote from Kierkegaard’s signed works (or 
in extraordinary and extenuating circumstances pseudonymous authorship) coheres 
with sim ilar views or philosophical principles that are articulated in other areas o f  his 
authorship then there is good reason for believing the former to be ‘K ierkegaard’s 
view ’. A strict reliance on what the signed works alone reveal would yield a rather 
limited account o f what Kierkegaard’s own views might have been. Kierkegaard often 
develops some o f  his most important concepts in great depth in his pseudonymous 
works. Typically, however, Kierkegaard separates his own view(s) from those o f the
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pseudonyms in his ‘signed’ journal entries. Even when Kierkegaard fails to explicitly 
state that he personally endorses one o f the pseudonymous views, it can sometimes be 
safely inferred that he does anyw ay.140 Sometimes, for example, it is clear from 
K ierkegaard’s signed writings that he shares the same underlying commitments o f  one 
or more o f  the pseudonymous views (in a similar context, at least); and sometimes the 
views o f  the latter authorship help clarity and make coherent the philosophical 
principles o f  the signed authorship. In such cases, and always with close attention 
paid to the time and context that an idea is articulated in, it m ight be that a statement 
which is voiced by a pseudonym is arguably Kierkegaard’s own view o f  the matter.
Hence, in contrast to an interpretation that only takes K ierkegaard’s signed works to 
actually express his ‘real’ views, I advocate a more interpretive understanding o f  
K ierkegaard’s authorship. On the other hand, however, I do not advocate the position 
that all, or (what comes to the same) none o f K ierkegaard’s texts can be said to reveal 
K ierkegaard’s own personal views. Kierkegaard wrote letters, for example, to his 
contem poraries and to his friends. These letters often contained insights into his own 
personal views; views that can also be verified by journal entries.141 To believe that 
K ierkegaard’s letters to his real-life friends might have been part o f an elaborate 
exercise in post-m odern irony (friends who visited him on his deathbed no less!) is 
surely supposing too much.
140 To be fair, I do not think that there are any occurrences o f  this in this thesis. N evertheless, I w ould 
not be against it in principle.
141 See, fo r exam ple, Letters 186, 187, and 188, in K ierkegaard’s Letters and D ocum ents (pp. 260-261, 
pp. 265-266, and p. 270, respectively). In these letters to his contem porary and friend, J.L .A . K olderup- 
R osenvinge [1792 -  1850], K ierkegaard gives additional defence o f  the existential theory o f  the 
political that I have argued runs through and inform s the w hole authorship. For scholarly  literature on 
the political v iew  that these letters advocate, see: Tilley, 2008a; and K irm m se, 1995.
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In his Kierkegaard: Construction o f  the Aesthetic, Adorno argues that K ierkegaard’s 
real-world (conscious or unconscious) philosophical views (including his 
philosophical individualism) are inadvertently voiced by his pseudonyms. Adorno 
then goes on to examine some of the views o f the pseudonyms and, working 
backwards, discovers what he takes to be Kierkegaard’s own views. Kierkegaard 
explicitly writes about his relation to the pseudonymous authorship, however, in some 
o f his later journal entries and in the full version o f The Point o f  View. In Kierkegaard: 
Construction o f  the Aesthetic though, Adorno advises the reader not to take 
K ierkegaard’s word at this and instead argues that all o f the material o f the authorship, 
pseudonymous and non-pseudonymous alike, represents K ierkegaard’s own 
viewpoint (Adorno, 1989, 13; cf. 11, and 40-51).
As it stands, I think that A dorno’s methodology (in Kierkegaard: Construction o f  the 
Aesthetic, at least) is weak, and even philosophically untenable. For example, Adorno 
frequently examines the views o f the pseudonym ‘A ’ in order to conclude that 
Kierkegaard, like the pseudonym, must be a philosophical individualist. Later in his 
(signed) authorship, however, Kierkegaard explicitly states that he desired this 
particular pseudonym  to be archetypal o f a particular kind o f reflective aestheticism. 
A chief characteristic o f this particular reflective aesthete is that he is predom inantly 
individualistic. In fact, if  in Either/Or I we are presented with a character who does 
not want to have any long-term social commitments at all, Either/Or II features a 
character with the completely opposite world-view. These opposing world views, 
furthermore, are arguably as detailed and coherent as each other. Taking all o f  
K ierkegaard’s pseudonyms to be representatives o f his own beliefs would only results 
in a plethora o f logically inconsistent beliefs. (To his credit, I think that Adorno might
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see this as the intended effect o f Kierkegaard’s literary methodology. See, for 
example; ibid., 11.)
To make my point in another way, many authors purposely design individualistic 
characters in order to highlight the latter’s loneliness and sometimes their downfall. 
The moral m essage intended might be that friendship and inter-personal relationships 
are an intrinsically valuable aspect o f life. The character ‘Ralph N ickleby’ from 
Charles D ickens’ The Life and Adventures o f  Nicholas Nickleby is one such example 
o f a character that is depicted as lonely, since Ralph only cares about h im self and in 
stockpiling money. His crass individualism ultimately leads him to become ostracised 
from those around him and at the end o f the novel he commits suicide. It is rather 
clear, from the plot if nothing else, that Charles Dickens does not personally advocate 
the radical individualism or money-fetishism that his character ‘Ralph N ickleby’ 
embodies. (If nothing else, a happy ending meets those who fight for social justice 
and camaraderie, hinting at the fact that this is more likely what Dickens personally 
endorses.) If  Dickens had, furthermore, written in a journal entry or a letter to a friend 
that he purposely used the fictive character o f Ralph Nicklby to highlight how those 
who ignore (or perpetrated) social injustices led less fulfilling lives, we would have 
very good grounds for suspecting that Charles Dickens personally believed that 
money-fetishism  leads to unhappiness.142
This example might be seen as a poor analogy in contrast to both K ierkegaard’s 
highly complex authorship and to Adorno’s equally multi-layered critique.
142 O ne m ight think that even i f  Charles D ickens did happen to exhibit an obviou s fetishism  for m oney  
in his real life, this fact w ould  still not bear on whether the v iew s o f  his characters are correct or not. 
Therefore, one m ight w onder whether A dorno’s exam ination ot K ierkegaard s personal life  to see  
w hether they affect his publications is not a version o f  the genetic fallacy. Philosophers ought on ly  to 
assess the truthfulness and valid ity o f  K ierkegaard’s argum ents, irrespective o f  their origins.
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Nevertheless, I believe that the methodology employed in Kierkegaard: Construction 
o f the Aesthetic is flawed due to the fact that Adorno is, after all, primarily examining 
the philosophical thought o f Kierkegaard’s most asocial (perhaps even anti-social) 
character(s). For a fairer treatment o f K ierkegaard’s authorship, one would at least 
expect Adorno to examine K ierkegaard’s more social works. Thankfully, this is 
precisely what Adorno does with his second major piece on Kierkegaard, for in his 
Kierkegaard’s Doctrine o f  Love, Adorno takes a very close reading o f K ierkegaard’s 
signed work on social theory, Works o f  Love.
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7.2 Adorno’s critique of Works o f Love.
Adorno makes two major criticisms against Kierkegaard’s doctrine o f  love. Firstly, 
Adorno presses the charge that Kierkegaard’s doctrine o f love is ultimately ‘im potent’ 
with regards to socio-political recommendations concerning the temporal wellbeing o f 
each hum an being. K ierkegaard’s doctrine o f love, Adorno argues, ultimately leads to 
an advocating o f  abstention from socio-economic and political affairs. Despite 
K ierkegaard’s apparent support o f political quietism, the ironic result is that this 
actually endorses a political position; one which supports a reactionary, conservative 
defence o f  the bourgeois status quo. In other words, professing that one ought not to 
involve oneself in political affairs when class oppression is system atically being 
enforced and when one is a member o f the ruling class is nevertheless taking a 
(bourgeois) political stance.
Secondly, Adorno accuses Kierkegaard o f treating the people that one encounters in 
the world, one’s neighbour, as merely an instrument for one’s own spiritual 
development. A further aspect o f Adorno’s critique is that the people we meet come to 
be stripped o f  their particularities, so that Kierkegaard’s doctrine o f neighbour-love is 
ultimately ‘callous[ness]’ (Adorno, 1939, 10, 16).
Adorno ostensibly criticises Kierkegaard’s doctrine o f love. Nevertheless, A dorno’s 
criticism also relates to numerous aspects o f Kierkegaard’s thought. For Adorno
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recognises that K ierkegaard’s doctrine is based upon a wider interest in prioritising 
spiritual over temporal welfare, a prioritisation that Adorno critiques.143 Furthermore, 
Kierkegaard’s doctrine o f love underlies his social (and at least for Adorno, political) 
thought. Hence, A dorno’s critical assessment o f Kierkegaard’s doctrine o f love is 
based upon a wider critique o f the philosophical individualism that allegedly underlies 
K ierkegaard’s entire authorship.
The second argum ent that Adorno raises against Kierkegaard, one that has 
subsequently been re-stated by contemporary scholars, is that K ierkegaard’s emphasis 
on the importance o f God as a kind o f mediating aspect o f one’s relations with others 
leads to real-w orld individuals being ignored. Adorno’s argument for this does appear 
to directly follow from Kierkegaard’s doctrine o f love, as it were. W hy do, or ought 
we love people, Kierkegaard asks? Or, what are the grounds (if there are any) for 
loving another person? Often we give preferential love to someone, as a Mover’ or as a 
friend, because we value the traits that the person owns. We might have sim ilar or 
contrasting traits as these but the important part is that we value them. Additionally, 
we might find the traits pleasant or perhaps intriguing. Perhaps in this regard each 
person is different. In any case, such aspects o f preferential love do not primarily 
concern Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard argues that unless one loves another because o f  the
143 From  hereafter I w ill refer to the idea that K ierkegaard prioritises the spiritual to the tem poral 
‘p rioritarianisnT . T his has nothing to do with the consequentialist, ethical view . The term is inspired by 
Bruce K irm m se’s argum ent that K ierkegaard’s political view  is best thought o f  as ‘p r io r ita r ia n ism ]’ 
(K irm m se, 1990b: 295, and 339). ‘P rioritarianism ’, K irrm se argues, is a stance w here one first relates 
to God and only then to social or political issues. K irm m se bases this view  on K ierkegaard’s reading o f  
M athew  6:24-34, w here one is told to ‘Seek fir s t  the K ingdom o f  G od’ then political/social concerns 
(1990b: 295, and 339, original em phasis). Hence, K irm m se concludes that for K ierkegaard, concerns 
w ith ‘w orldly a ffa irs’ (and here he m eans ‘social and political responsibilities’) ‘[...| m ust be seen as 
subordinate to the ind iv idual’s relation to G od’ {ibid., 295).
W hilst 1 am inspired by K irm m se’s argum ent and will also em ploy the term ‘p rio ritarian ism ’ to 
describe K ierkegaard ’s political view , 1 will differ from K irm m se’s original use slighlty. For w here 
K irm m se used the term  to describe one relating first and forem ost to G od  before political issues, 1 
argue instead that K ierkegaard prioritises spiritual developm ent in any form  (i.e., a developm ent from 
the aesthetic to the ethical) to political concerns.
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fact that the other contains a spiritual, infinite element, all other reasons for loving (or 
perhaps more accurately, ‘preferring’) another person will ultimately be based on 
attributes that are finite. Hence, one can love another person because o f an eternal trait 
that the other has (such as the spiritual aspect o f the self), or because o f  a temporal 
trait.
Kierkegaard spends a great deal o f the book Works o f  Love showing how preferential 
love (love based on certain temporal features o f the other) is, by itself, necessarily 
fickle and susceptible to destruction (e.g.; WOL, 8, 31-37). Since the finite aspects o f 
a person are finite by nature, they are perpetually susceptible to both external 
fluctuations as well as internal change. A love that is established upon such traits can 
only be as long-lasting and contingent as the temporal traits themselves. K ierkegaard 
believes that this is exactly what characterises preferential love such as friendship 
and/or erotic love.
A love that is based on the eternal aspect o f the other is, by contrast, one that escapes 
the contingent nature o f temporally-based love. Kierkegaard argues that the Christian 
concept o f  neighbour-love is an example o f love that is based upon an infinite, 
unchanging aspect o f the ‘other’, and thus avoids the otherwise inherent fickleness o f 
temporal love.
We might still wonder how it is that we could love another person in this way. 
Christian neighbour-love cannot be based on contingent, temporal characteristics (not 
alone at least), or it is no better than preferential love. Yet even if  we love the infinite 
aspect o f  the neighbour, is maintaining this love not also contingent upon our own
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finite ability to do so? If  so, w on’t neighbour-love be just as problematic (i.e., ‘fickle’) 
as preferential love? We saw above that humans are partly temporal beings who often 
fail to fully exercise their spiritual capacity. It is also plausible, then, for one to find 
the psychical-physical aspects o f the neighbour quite unlovable. We would prefer not 
to love such a person - and so why should we?
In order to make our (neighbour-)love secure, love must stem from  the infinite, 
spiritual aspect o f the self and to the spiritual aspect o f the other. We have already 
seen Kierkegaard argue that our design and task in this life is to become as much o f  a 
spiritual being as possible; to have the spiritual aspect o f the se lf regulate the 
psychical-physical aspects in all matters. We have also seen how and why this might 
be incredibly difficult. Ultimately then, it cannot simply be up to us, each one 
individually, as to whether we want to love our neighbour or not, since Kierkegaard 
recognises that we are a being which is tasked with spiritual development but which is 
also liable to fall into spiritual laxity. Human efforts and desires alone would not be 
an adequate basis for love o f one’s neighbour. Hence, the demand to love one’s 
neighbour is given to us from an external, eternal source. It is a command, and it is 
comm anded to us by God. The individual is under the duty o f obeying G od’s 
comm and to love the neighbour (and it is hence sinfulness not to) even if  one lacks 
the preferential, temporal reasons for doing so.
Adorno emphasises that for Kierkegaard, securing spiritual wellbeing is prioritised 
over obtaining temporal welfare. I think that Adorno is correct to highlight this feature 
o f K ierkegaard’s thought, a feature that (modifying Bruce K irm m se’s original use o f 
the term, see n.143 above) I shall call ‘prioritarianism ’. For Adorno, K ierkegaard’s
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prioritarianism  implies that one’s duty and love towards God will always outweigh 
the care that one affords to the temporal welfare o f one’s fellow beings. Adorno also 
argues that this prioritarianism turns love o f one’s neighbour into a mere means for 
the subjective, inward experience o f the lover to God. Adorno recognises that the love 
we give to the neighbour is based upon faith in the belief in God, and also correctly 
notes that the love o f  the neighbour is not based upon any other, hum anly 
understandable rationale. Basing love o f the neighbour on a desirable or human 
rationale rather than on a divine commandment would ultimately only risk making the 
foundation(s) o f  such love as contingent as those o f preferential-love. (One might 
come to find the ‘rationale’ no longer intuitive or desirable, for example. As soon as 
one’s mind is changed, the foundation for the love disappears too). Hence, the 
‘rationale’ for loving one’s neighbour must be in the form o f a divine commandment, 
and a duty owed to God; or to each other because o f G od’s will.
Adorno recognises, however, that if  the love o f the neighbour is not based upon a 
humanly understandable rationale, nor on any temporal features that the neighbour 
possesses, then the ‘other’ is in fact ignored, or at least ‘abstract’ to some extent. 
Adorno correctly points out that the temporal features o f a specific person, the 
psychical and physical facts that make a person who he or she really is, are deemed 
irrelevant with regards to the (neighbourly) love we offer them. O ne’s love is 
ultimately not directed towards the external facts about a person but by the eternal 
aspect that he or she partakes in. The spiritual aspect o f the other is, furthermore, 
eternal, unchanging, and hence we might assume the same in all people. There is 
really nothing special or unique about the other qua neighbour at all then, Adorno 
argues. As Adorno puts it: “In spite o f all the talk o f the neighbour, the latter is
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nothing but the stum bling-block to prove one’s own [...] spiritualization o f  love” (ibid., 
1 1 ).
This criticism  is probably Adorno’s most influential refutation o f  K ierkegaard’s 
doctrine o f  love in particular, but also consequently o f his prioritarianism as well as 
his theory o f  genuine sociability. As such, I shall dedicate the sub-section after the 
next to assessing the criticism (7.3). For now I shall turn to the first criticism Adorno 
makes about K ierkegaard’s doctrine o f love — that it necessitates an ‘im potence’ with 
regards to suggesting real-world changes.
7.2.1 A dorno’s first critique: Kierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political is 
impotent with regards to social inequality. Response -  ‘concessionary’ politics.
Kierkegaard emphasises that the true nature o f neighbour-love is that is must also be 
practised. M ore accurately, in fact, Kierkegaard says that faith itself necessarily leads 
the believer to practising works o f love (JP III, 2423). Any definition o f  love that does 
not entail works (such as love as a feeling, or an abstract love o f humanity) is most 
likely evidence o f an ‘aesthetic’, non-spiritual understanding o f love (ibid . ) . 144 
Kierkegaard argues that truly loving one’s neighbour must manifest itself in particular 
works o f  neighbour-love. The real-world manifestation o f neighbour-love might
144 For the latter definition o f  love, perhaps it is useful to think o f  Ivan K aram azov, from D ostoyevsky’s 
Brothers K aram azov. Ivan claim s to love hum anity despite adm itting to have never loved a single, 
particular hum an being (not even his good-natured brother A loysha). O bviously, such an abstract love 
o f  hum anity is ra ther defective i f  it cannot possibly be m anifested into a single, real instance of loving a 
neighbour. T he fact that Ivan fails to prevent the m urder o f  one o f  his fellow  hum an beings (his father, 
no less) m ight also h ighlight the deficiency o f  his abstract concept o f  love (o f  hum anity).
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involve giving some time to a fellow contemporary; listening to them to see if  they 
have any worries or doubts; perhaps attempting to develop them spiritually; perhaps 
just showing them compassion, mercy, understanding, empathy.
Despite understanding the notion that, for Kierkegaard, neighbour-love necessarily 
leads to works o f  love Adorno criticises Kierkegaard’s doctrine o f love for prioritising 
works that are ‘im potent’ with regard to real-world changes over more politically 
direct activism. Adorno correctly points out that one o f the ‘works o f love’ that 
Kierkegaard endorses is the act o f showing mercy. Kierkegaard’s example o f an act o f 
mercy is, at face value at least, admittedly liable to the charge that his doctrine o f love 
leaves class inequalities intact, and perhaps even inadvertently justifies them. For in 
his discussion o f mercifulness, Kierkegaard recommends that poor people show 
mercy to those who are rich. Furthermore, Kierkegaard advises the poor not to envy 
the rich for their wealth, nor to become wrapped up in a political campaign for 
economic equality (WOL, book II, section VII). Adorno takes such advice to be a 
self-serving defence o f class inequalities by a member o f the bourgeoisie. It cannot be 
denied that Kierkegaard was fortunate to have received an exceptional upbringing and 
was certainly not poor. Furthermore, Kierkegaard’s recommendation o f the poor to 
show mercy to the rich is also a direct result o f the prioritarianism that underlies his 
doctrine o f love, as well as his theory o f the political more generally.
In responding to A dorno’s worries we can highlight some features o f K ierkegaard’s 
thought that reduce the radical appearance o f these comments somewhat. For one 
thing, Jamie Ferriera has noted that this particular section o f Works o f  Love is
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explicitly directed to those who are poor (Ferriera, 2000, 5 0 ).145 Kierkegaard has 
already em phasised that exercising neighbour-love will necessarily lead to acts o f  love, 
and real-world changes. Hence, Kierkegaard had already stated that when love o f the 
neighbour is genuine, generously giving one’s means to those less fortunate than 
oneself will necessarily ensue. But Kierkegaard does not want those without the 
sufficient means to give charitably to feel as though they are thereby unable to 
practice works o f love. Kierkegaard’s message is hence partly intended to be edifying; 
whatever one’s temporal, economic situation, one can still act spiritually and can 
practice neighbour love by having mercy for one’s neighbours. The conceptual point 
is that spiritual development is equally and fairly accessible to all, irrespective o f the 
tem porally given facts o f one’s situation, which include one’s class, but also one’s 
creed, sex, or race.
Ferriera’s point is excellent, but it still does not fully address all o f  A dorno’s worries.
I shall try and highlight some additional features o f K ierkegaard’s thought that go 
some way to doing so. Firstly, I do believe that Kierkegaard prioritises the spiritual 
aspect o f  the person’s wellbeing to the temporal. Nevertheless, we saw in the previous 
chapter that when the former was endangered Kierkegaard’s prioritarianism did  
justify political intervention. For obvious reasons, if someone is in a situation where 
their very existence is threatened, or where temporal pressures (such as terrible 
standards o f  living) are making spiritual development close to untenable then we have 
a spiritual justification for political intervention.
14:1 O ne does have to w onder how  such an audience could have access to this work, how ever.
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As a spiritual human being, we each have the duty o f crying out against such 
conditions. K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political does not necessarily equip 
us with either the means or the requisite knowledge o f making positive policy 
recom m endations for what exactly ought to be done to best remedy the given situation. 
Nevertheless, K ierkegaard’s theory provides us with the justificatory force for 
pressuring those who do have the knowledge and means to make such decisions to 
enact external change (for ‘working with the state’...). Each individual human being 
ought to call for such changes to be brought about, even at the risk o f persecution and 
m artyrdom. Similarly, each has the responsibility o f personally alleviating the 
situation with whatever means one has. Perhaps it is also worth noting that, following 
K ierkegaard’s peculiar example o f mercifulness in discussion, if  we were in a 
situation where some people were so rich that their spiritual development was put at 
risk, then we would have equal grounds for fighting for political change to alter this 
too.
Now, fighting for political change is admittedly restricted to whether or not spiritual 
developm ent is risked. Hence, if  there was a situation where obvious class inequalities 
existed, which resulted in the perennial economic and social oppression o f  one class 
by another, but which nevertheless did not put spiritual development at risk, 
K ierkegaard’s doctrine o f love would presumably be ‘im potent’ with regards to 
fighting for external change. Perhaps it is precisely here that Adorno is in such stark 
disagreem ent with Kierkegaard. Nevertheless, I will suggest two more possible ways 
o f defending K ierkegaard’s doctrine o f love from the charge that it is ‘im potent’ with 
regards to external change.
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The first thing I wish to re-emphasise is that in such a situation, Kierkegaard would 
most likely believe that the political realm is failing. The political realm, as we have 
highlighted above, is supposed to ensure that the temporal wellbeing o f its citizenry is 
catered for. We could conceive of a peculiar situation where widespread class 
inequalities happens to be both in the interest o f the majority, as well as the optimal 
way o f  m aximising the overall wellbeing o f the citizenry -  but this is most frequently 
not the case (as I think that a M arx-inspired social critique would undoubtedly have to 
ag ree ).146 Any ideological reason for maintaining a class inequality that clearly 
violates one or both o f these principles is a case o f ‘ungenuine’ politics. According to 
K ierkegaard’s view o f ethics, the ethical action in such a situation is to fight for 
political change.
The spiritual thing to do, admittedly, might be to practice sympathy and mercy. 
Adorno is certainly correct to worry that at the epitome o f existential developm ent 
K ierkegaard’s individual would, if  she or he was acting spiritually, apparently refrain 
from the battle for political change that an ethically-minded individual might be 
tempted to engage in. Once more, however, we should note that Kierkegaard only 
admonishes political engagement that jeopardises spiritual development. Throughout 
his authorship, Kierkegaard articulated his worry o f engaging in political activity for 
civic reasons (his refusal to advocate civic marriage, for example [section 3.1]) 
because it risked causing existential impoverishment. All things being equal, (i.e., as 
long as spiritual development is not threatened) a religious person could still plausibly
146 T hough M arx does (typically) argue that the interests o f  the num erically dom inant class represent 
the universal interests o f  the race (e.g., Marx & Engels, 2008, 45), this sam e class is notably alw ays 
^ re p re se n te d  by the state (e.g., ibid., 9; see also Marx, 2008, 100). Engels had also argued the sam e 
point (Engels, 2004, 140), though he had noted that when the means o f  production were shifting from 
one class to another, the state might tem porarily cease to represent the interests o f  either the ru ling  or 
the oppressed class {ibid., 154).
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be ethically comm itted to fighting for political change in the interest o f increasing the 
temporal welfare o f  a minority group.
One final thing to note is that Kierkegaard understands Christianity as a discipline that 
asks the single individual to become entirely spirit. This is presum ably the spiritual 
ideal. Nevertheless, a central aspect o f K ierkegaard’s thought (primarily, perhaps, 
because it explains the Christian doctrine o f original sin, as well as grace) is that no 
human being could ever be expected to live the life o f pure spirit that Christianity 
ideally demands o f  us (e.g., CD, 299; UDVS, 151; WOL, 132, 190). We are part flesh 
and blood, not just spirit (JP IV, 4336). Furthermore, flesh and blood, and spirit are 
opposites (JP IV, 4354). If we were the type o f being that did not have a temporal 
aspect, the task o f becoming pure spirit might even be pleasurable (JP IV, 4336). As 
we are not, however, “ [...] we are [barely] able to endure being spirit” (JP IV, 4341) 
and so concessions are made for us.
According to Kierkegaard, Christianity recognises that human weakness frequently 
puts the ideally spiritual life at risk. Rather than being seen as a failure, however, 
Kierkegaard believes that recognising one’s distance from the spiritually ideal path is 
evidence that one is genuinely concerned with spiritual development. Hence 
Kierkegaard writes that:
No religious person, even the purest, has sheer, purified, subjectivity or 
pure transparency in willing solely what God wills, so that there is not a 
residue o f his original subjectivity [...] But as the old devotional literature 
rightly teaches, the individual is completely innocent in this. Far from 
being something to be charged against him, these thoughts that try the 
spirit prove that he has really become thoroughly involved and engaged 
(JP IV, 4384).
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So being tem pted into spiritual laxity is something we, as beings who are not wholly 
spirit, should only expect (JP IV, 4336). We might argue, however, that we should 
still devote all o f  our effort in striving towards becoming pure spirit. Again, however, 
Kierkegaard makes many remarks that are more accommodating to ethical and 
aesthetic interests than we might have supposed. Kierkegaard does think that we must 
frequently lapse in our task o f becoming pure spirit and that, Christianly viewed, this 
is sin (JP IV, 4352). Nevertheless, Kierkegaard’s interest is not to attempt to make us 
the kinds o f  beings that are never tempted into aesthetic or ethical indulgence, only to 
make sure we honestly confess that in such cases we must ask God for His good grace 
and forgiveness (JP III, 2881). 147 The following journal entry exemplifies 
K ierkegaard’s acceptance o f spiritual concessions:
If  we, in our present way o f life, are to be truthful before God, we would 
have to talk like this: I understand very well that to become spirit is really 
the requirem ent, but could you not grant me a little indulgence, perm it me 
the grace o f not having such thoughts come too close to me, for I would so 
m uch like to enjoy the things o f this earth, and, Lord God, I do not pretend 
to be stronger than I am-I am only a child. (JP IV, 4339)
147 In ano ther jou rna l entry, K ierkegaard seem s to deny the possibility (or desirability) o f  leading a 
w holly sp iritually  life. H ence, K ierkegaard uses the fact that we ‘do not have a direct and im m ediate 
relationship to G o d ’, and that ‘betw een the G od-m an and the ordinary hum an there lies a qualitative 
d ifference’ to show  the necessity  o f  requiring G od’s good grace (JP III, 2897). A dditionally , the N ew  
T estam ent is ‘not literally regulative for us ordinary hum an beings’, because it apparently  addresses 
those w ho had a m ore im m ediate relationship to God (the apostle Paul, for exam ple) than w e currently  
do. This leads K ierkegaard  to conclude that ‘an ordinary man cannot or dare not (even though he ever 
so honestly  w ou ld )’ base his life on striving to im itate Jesus C hrist {ibid.).
The fact that the N ew  Testam ent is not strictly regulative for us also em phasises that o n e ’s G od- 
relationship  is ultim ately based on one’s own fallible interpretation o f  the Bible, and hence that it is 
one’s ow n responsibility , as well as one’s own task. Since an existential attem pt at developing a God 
relationship  w ill alw ays be at least partially based upon one’s lim ited and fallible know ledge, the 
ultim ate need to resort to G od’s grace is also em phasised.
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Perhaps, one might object, the advice from this journal entry is directed at a specific 
situation only; one where spiritual laxity is widespread and yet unrecognized. After all, 
K ierkegaard does state that if  ''we, in our present way o f  life' want to be honest before 
God, then this is what we ought to do. Kierkegaard might, therefore, not be m aking 
recom m endations that are applicable to each and every person.
Nevertheless, Kierkegaard does also state elsewhere that any human being can 
become too engrossed in the task o f whole-heartedly becoming pure spirit. Not to 
recognise that, due to one’s inevitable weaknesses, one could never be pure spirit, is 
not to pay attention to the fact that one is partly temporal. Furthermore, 
overzealousness with regards to becoming pure spirit can even be a way o f 
inadvertently denying an aspect o f G od’s love (JP IV, 4373). Either such a person 
recognises that the task o f becoming pure spirit must inevitably seek G od’s good 
grace, or one believes that the ideally spiritual can be attained by human effort alone 
(i.e., autonom ously).148 The latter is a sin because it neglects to recognise that true 
freedom and spiritual endeavouring is made possible only because o f God. But the 
former also puts one into a sinful relation to God as well.
In one’s spiritual striving, one must fail and hence seek G od’s forgiveness and love.
To overzealously strive to become spirit will only imply that one demands ‘too much
of G od’ by asking for His love and forgiveness too frequently and on one’s own terms
{ibid.). In response to such a person, Kierkegaard recommends him or her not to ‘[...]
presume too much [of God, or o f one’s ability to fulfil one’s spiritual demand(s)],
[and] not become a self-torm entor’ {ibid.). Furthermore, Kierkegaard advises a little
148 See also: “ Even w hen I sacrifice m ost [which can be read: ‘all ] for a good cause, I still depend on 
G od’s help ing me to see it through, and therefore I still have not done it for God s sake but at best have 
acted in re liance upon G od, w ith him  in reserve” (JP III, 2424).
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later in the same entry to ‘take care [with regards to spiritually submitting 
‘unconditionally to everything’ and asking for G od’s help, because] you are not 
completely sp irit’ {ibid., my emphasis. Cf. JP III, 2898: “ [...] the New Testam ent is 
not literally regulative for us ordinary human beings”). As a dialectical response to 
this potentiality for excessive spiritual zeal, Kierkegaard even recommends “ [...]  
innocent human aids (diversion, physical recreation, etc.) which a man dare not 
disregard  w ithout demanding too much o f God” {ibid., my em phasis).149
In order to be rem inded o f one’s humility in the face o f God, and o f one’s need for 
His continual love and forgiveness, it is quite natural for the human being to give in to 
tem ptations towards ethical and aesthetic action. It may be, therefore, that one 
recognises that one’s spiritual task is to constantly practice works o f love, such as 
mercy. It is only natural and expectable, however, that the human being is distracted 
by sights that demand his or her ethical action (or aesthetic fancy, for that matter). 
Giving in to these tem ptations might appear to imply failing one’s spiritually ideal 
task. It m ight seem peculiar (and perhaps even perverse, to the ‘natural m an’) to think 
that helping one’s fellows in times o f gratuitous oppression, and in a situation that 
Kierkegaard has explicitly termed ‘ungenuine’ politics, m ight be ‘giving in to
149 W e should note that the recom m endation o f  diversionary aids to such people are “ [ .. .]  so rare that 
they can be handled  appropriately as exceptions. The norm , therefore is: in a few  exceptional cases 
recom m end d iversionary  aids, but as a rule prescribe aids o f  the spirit, for men [usually] use 
diversionary aids all too prom iscuously o f  their own accord.” {ibid.). On this note, see also: JP IV, 
4161, w here K ierkegaard  argues that the natural relationship betw een a child and an adult is a 
beneficial ‘co rrec tive’ to ‘a person becom ing pure spirit or from becom ing too serious e tc .’ See also: JP 
III, 2428 -  “ [ .. .]  i f  you discern that God overstrains you, then accept these hum an aids [erotic love and 
friendship] as an a id .[ ...]  God is no cruel creditor and m ortgage holder, nor should a hum an being 
presum e to w ant to be m ore than a hum an being, a dem on or G od-m an.” A ll K ierkegaard asks is that 
the person becom e ‘h um bled’ by the fact that he or she receives all ‘hum an aid[s] [ ...]  as som ething 
beautiful w hich G od b lesses’, and in recognition o f  the fact that to becom e ‘enam oured w ith it [the 
a ids]’ is to risk fo rgetting  ‘w hat is truly the earnestness o f  life’.
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tem ptation that is also, spiritually speaking, ‘sinful’. 150 Despite this judgem ent, 
however, there is nothing in Kierkegaard’s theory o f spirituality and/or his 
anthropology that rules out such ethical actions, even in an individual who is 
dedicated to spiritual development. Hence, ‘sinful’ engagements such as political 
campaigning for economic equality are expectable consequences o f a human being’s 
quest for spirituality. Engagement in such tasks, furthermore, is even evidence o f the 
fact that the single individual is not presuming too much o f God or o f  his or her own 
capacities. Finally, if  one openly admits that, spiritually speaking, these ethical 
excursions are sinful, and are hence evidence o f the fact that the human being is in 
constant need o f  G od’s grace, Kierkegaard would take such a concession as evidence 
that one is genuinely practising spiritual development (JP IV, 4234).
If  one recognises that we should only expect the genuinely spiritual person to 
occasionally give in to ethical temptations, then one cannot say that K ierkegaard’s 
doctrine o f  love and his theory o f prioritising spiritual over ethical wellbeing will 
unconditionally result in an ‘im potent’ response to social inequality. W hilst it might 
be true that K ierkegaard’s doctrine o f love as an ideal preaches ‘im potence’ with 
regards to economic equality (given the host o f caveats and conditions that we have 
outlined above), it would still not justify the claim that in actual practice (by temporal 
beings) the doctrine leads to a defence o f bourgeois quietism.
150 In arguing this, I am aw are that K ierkegaard clearly believes that the C hristian life requires relating 
each and every one o f  one’s actions with God in mind. The single individual cannot sim ply act 
C hristianly in localised instances (JP IV, 4937). This would be ‘double-m indedness’(see ‘Purity o f  
H eart’, in U D V S [pp. 7-154]), and ‘serving tw o m asters’ (U DV S, 205-08). My argum ent is that though 
‘concessionary  po litics’ is, strictly speaking sinful, it is only natural to expect hum an beings to becom e 
tem pted into sinful activities. H ence, we ought to expect concessionary political activity, even horn 
spiritual individuals w ho seek to exem plify N ew  Testam ent Christianity.
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In responding to A dorno’s claims, I recognise that there is much truth in some o f 
A dorno’s critical remarks about Kierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political. 
K ierkegaard’s spiritual prioritarianism is a radically different way o f  theorising about 
the political. Nevertheless, I have no intention o f removing the radically challenging 
nature o f  K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political. Reducing the revolutionary force o f 
Kierkegaard could risk altering it to the extent that it ceases to be spiritual 
prioritarianism  altogether. Spiritual prioritarianism necessarily strikes the ‘natural 
m an’ (or, the person who does not endorse ‘spiritual prioritarianism ’ at any rate) as 
radical. I think that Kierkegaard would want the radical nature o f  his doctrine to 
remain som ething to be reckoned with.
W ithout trying to tone down the profoundly novel and challenging characteristics o f 
K ierkegaard’s thought, nevertheless, I hope to have challenged some o f A drono’s 
arguments. I have given additional justifications to the claim that K ierkegaard’s 
existential theory o f the political does not necessarily lead to ‘im potence’ with regards 
to external reform. I have also argued that the practice o f  K ierkegaard’s spiritually 
ideal life still does not entail, or even recommend the complete abstention from 
economic and political concerns. Such concerns can be fundamentally tied in to a 
prior, spiritual commitment. Additionally, Kierkegaard’s spiritual prioritarianism is 
implem ented by partly temporal humans who could never possibly attain the level o f 
spirituality that the spiritual ideal nevertheless demands. Hence, one cannot say that 
the real-w orld consequences o f Kierkegaard’s spiritual prioritarianism will be the 
level o f  abstention from socio-economic affairs that Adorno charges K ierkegaard’s 
doctrine o f  love with necessitating.
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Figure 7.2.1 -  Flow chart depicting Kierkegaard’s prioritarianism and its real-world 
implications
Would political activism put 
spiritual deepening at risk?
Could political activism reduce 
the (temporal) harm?
No (nothing can be done then) 
Yes
No (nothing can be done then) 
Yes
Would political activism put 
spiritual deepening at risk?
Spiritual Temporal
Could political activism reduce the 
(spiritual) harm?
No -  then we have a sp i r i tua l  
justification for political activism.
Yes-then one should not 
advocate political activism but 
should seek a remedy elsewhere.
No -  then we have an e t h i c a l  
justification for political 
activism.
Yes-then one should not 
advocate political activism. It 
is a sin/concession.
A policy is harming an individual, with policy-makers apparently not 
interested in doing anything about it. Is the individual's temporal or 
spiritual wellbeing being threatened?
Anthropologically speaking, we will always be tempted into ethical 
action, and will inevitably give in some times. Hence, 
'concessionary' political activity is to be expected.
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As the diagram  above shows [‘Figure 7.2.1’], there are two ways in which 
K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political might lead to external change. The 
first was examined in the previous chapter, and is a direct consequence o f 
Kierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political. The second way in which 
K ierkegaard’s thought might justify political change, however, is when his existential 
theory o f  the political is combined with his understanding o f his anthropology. As 
imperfect individuals, as beings who inevitably make concessions for themselves and 
who are tem pted into sin, Kierkegaard does not deny that humans will undertake 
political action o f a ‘concessionary’ kind. Kierkegaard certainly wishes to warn 
against the spiritual jeopardy that over-indulgence in ‘concessionary politics’ can 
cause. Indeed, we have seen above (in chapters three and five) that Kierkegaard 
expends a great deal o f effort in highlighting the spiritual damage that misinformed 
and overzealous political activism might incur. Kierkegaard is undoubtedly interested 
in m aking us become aware o f the spiritual ramifications o f our actions. Even still, 1 
think it is only to be expected that even a spiritually-minded individual might engage 
in ‘concessionary’ political activism. This is a direct consequence o f both 
K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political as well as his anthropology.
In conclusion, I hope to have shown that Kierkegaard’s defence o f a spiritual theory 
of the political is quite some way from being an intentional, self-serving, class-based 
defence o f the status quo. Furthermore, I have argued that there is little in 
K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political that suggests that it necessitates political 
quietism and/or conservatism. In fact, our examination o f one direct result o f 
K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political, his attack on the Danish state-church
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marriage (exam ined in chapter six above), was perceived at the time as quite radically 
challenging the bourgeois status quo.
Perhaps an atheistic M arxist will doubt some o f the premises that are fundamental to 
K ierkegaard’s thought; that we have a God-given, spiritual aspect, for example. My 
defence o f  Kierkegaard cannot go beyond a potential disagreement with his basic, 
starting premises. Kierkegaard might well view a M arxist atheist as sinfully turning 
his or her back on God by defiantly attempting to establish an ethical and political 
system that, from Kierkegaard’s point o f view, is ultimately imminentalist and 
nihilistic.151 The M arxist might, in return, see Kierkegaard as investing too much hope 
in the, what they would see as, delusory belief that that ‘true’ equality, spiritual 
equality, will be provided for in the afterlife by a beneficent God. I have only sought 
to show that K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political does not necessitate quite 
the level o f political quietism that Adorno charges it with. Ultimately, it might well be 
that Adorno believes that more secular political activism is required than what 
Kierkegaard offers us; whilst Kierkegaard might blame this very attitude for causing a 
level o f m isery that far outweighs the temporal benefits o f social equality. 
K ierkegaard m ight even believe that A dorno’s well-intended social activism might 
even bring about more temporal turmoil than practising his own spiritually motivated 
theory o f  the political.
151 In fact, K ierkegaard  turns the ‘M arxist-inspired’ critique on its head: he blam es certain social and 
com m unistic m ovem en ts’ as encouraging a sociability that over-em phasises the tem poral equality 
betw een hum an beings and is ultim ately contrary to true sociality (see; JP IV, 4185, for exam ple, cl. 
TA, 106). T his ‘low er’ form  o f  com m unity (being based on tem poral rather than spiritual equality) only 
leads to ‘crow ds’ that ultim ately stifles genuine sociability and pays insufficient respect to the dignity 
o f persons. I w ill argue this point in more details shortly (see section 7.4 below).
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Still, A dorno’s highly influential criticism o f Kierkegaard has another aspect to it. 
Adorno argues that Kierkegaard’s doctrine o f love, the backbone o f the latter’s theory 
o f sociality, results in an instrumentalist way o f viewing the other, and is thus 
inherently rw/7-social. Additionally, Adorno argues that since Kierkegaard does not 
pay sufficient attention to the worldly differences between individuals, K ierkegaard’s 
vision o f  sociability fails to recognise, let alone respond to, worldly inequalities. This 
second aspect o f A dorno’s criticism o f Kierkegaard’s social and political thought will 
be the focus o f  the next sub-section.
7.2.2 A dorno’s second critique: Kierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political leads 
to instrum entalist social relations and is thus is anti-social. Response -  the relations 
between hum an beings are ‘mutually informative’, not ‘instrum entalist’.
A dorno’s charge that Kierkegaard is an ‘individualist’ re-iterates a claim that has been 
placed against Kierkegaard from as early on as his immediate contemporaries, to as 
late as our own. Typically, this charge goes hand in hand with seeing Kierkegaard as 
‘asocial’ (or even ‘antisocial’). Contemporary Kierkegaard scholars have identified, 
however, that K ierkegaard’s thought contains both ‘individualistic’ and ‘social’ 
dimensions. How do we square these two claims? Furthermore, can we do so in such 
a way that will also refute Adorno’s highly influential criticism o f Kierkegaard’s 
theory o f  the political as essentially individualistic? This will be our focus in what 
follows.
Page 283 ot 354. K ierkegaard’s Existential Theory o f the Political. Thom as W olstenholme.
Firstly, I will dedicate the next sub-chapter to examining contemporary debates as to 
whether K ierkegaard’s thought is primarily individualistic or social (7.3). Then 1 will 
give my own interpretation o f some o f the issues o f these debates, as well as 
K ierkegaard’s social theory, with the help o f an examination o f some crucial passages 
from K ierkegaard’s journal entries (7.4). I hope to show that K ierkegaard’s existential 
theory o f the political does not involve instrumentalist or individualistic social 
relations. On the contrary, I will argue that Kierkegaard’s existential theory o f the 
political is a necessary condition for ‘genuine’ sociability.
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7.3 The ‘Kierkegaardian self.
7.3.1 The Kierkegaardian self: ‘Individualist’.152
M erold W estphal, has recently argued that an overly social reading o f K ierkegaard’s 
thought risks deifying the kinds o f temporal, communal values that Kierkegaard had 
expressly fought against. To counter the trend, Westphal interestingly asks scholars to 
take seriously K ierkegaard’s subjectivism and individualism, for it is precisely here 
that K ierkegaard’s social and political contribution is to be found. Thus, W estphal 
concludes his chapter ‘Kierkegaard’s Politics’ by reminding us that ‘[...]  Kierkegaard 
seeks to un-socialize the individual in order to un-deify society’ (W estphal, 1992, 34: 
original em phasis).153 W estphal’s account argues that Kierkegaard’s individualism 
was a corrective to the particular one-sided, communal based theory o f politics that 
K ierkegaard’s contemporaries espoused.
Many other scholars have argued that Kierkegaard’s individualism is an essential part 
o f providing a genuinely social theory. Mark Dooley emphasises that K ierkegaard’s 
individualism allows the political and ethical individual to step back from his or her 
given social environm ent in order to make well-informed ethical and political
b2 It is im portant to note that in the follow ing section the term ‘individualistic’ denotes a m ethodology. 
Rene D escartes w as not a sceptic but fam ously pursued philosophical scepticism  in order to ground a 
theory o f  know ledge. In a sim ilar m anner, individualistic readings o f  K ierkegaard argue that he 
advocated a m ethodology  w here to becom e the kind of person who is suited for genuine sociability one 
must first undergo existential developm ent, the latter of which requires a degree o f  solitary and 
personal ( ‘ind iv idualis tic ’) striving. In a sim ilar manner, ‘individualism ’ will refer to the com bination 
o f  those ph ilosophical com m itm ents which em phasise separating the individual, in his or her existential 
striving, from  social determ inants.
153 Elsew here W estphal had argued that though Kierkegaard is an individualistic thinker, he is not a 
‘lonely’ th inker (W estphal, 1980, 321).
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decisions. Once more, in this case, the individuated subject is better equipped for 
social responsibility than the social conformist (Dooley, 1998, 139-40).154 And 
Stephen Backhouse has recently argued, on similar grounds to W estphal, that:
[ ...]  while it is true that Kierkegaard is a profoundly political writer with a 
deep concern for other human beings, it is also true that he remains an 
individualist. [...] Kierkegaard's individualism [however] offers a route to 
healthy inter-personal relationships and an alternative to the idolatrous 
deification o f the nation or o f the group [...] (Backhouse, 2011, 162)
Backhouse believes that it is only after the individual has worked through a 
necessarily individualistic God relation that he or she will be able to be truly social at 
all. Perhaps the quote above does not put the point across as well as when Backhouse 
later argues that: ‘Authentic becoming is an inward process with an outward direction, 
for true communal relations can only exist between concrete persons, and not 
amorphous groups’ (ibid., 186).155 Far from being antithetical to sociability, then, 
K ierkegaard’s individualism is in fact a necessary condition for it.
154 See also: D ooley (2001, 43, 93-107). M ark D ooley’s individual does not necessarily  relate to ‘G o d ’, 
how ever. For D ooley, the individual can relate to som e other, secular goal. As long as he or she relates 
to som ething that transcends w hat is im m ediately given (i.e., his or her culture, biology, political 
situation, etc.) then he or she is afforded the necessary distance to authentically relate to any one o f  
those givens in an existentially  responsible manner. In fact, Dooley prefers  to translate K ierkegaard’s 
religious view s into secular, political language (e.g., ibid., 142, 144). Stephen B ackhouse convincingly 
argues, how ever, that rem oving the religious aspect o f  K ierkegaard’s political thought underm ines the 
project itse lf (B ackhouse, 2011, p. 25, n.124, and pp. 202-207).
153 Soltoft m akes a sim ilar point: “ In order, according to K ierkegaard, for the individual to ‘feel at
hom e’ w ith others, [s/]he m ust first ‘feel at home with h im [/her]se lf ” (Soltoft, 1999, 124). Though
Soltoft later argues that: ‘[ ...]  the personal relation o f  the individual to God can form the fixed point for 
the dizzy eye and thus be the source o f  the individual's renewed ethical relation to him self and to 
o thers’ the prim acy o f  the ind iv idual’s relation to God is not argued for. In fact, the opposite appears to 
be the case. Soltoft correctly  sees this process as a rem edial procedure after w hat she takes to be the 
prerequisites for authentic existence — proper ethical relations and sociability — have been rendered 
unavailable or ineffective by social movem ents. I align myself more with Soltoft s position than the 
individualists, especially  w ith the idea that the individual’s relation to God is not entirely  static. I shall 
soon critique B ackhouse’s ‘indiv idualistic’ position on precisely these grounds (in sub-section 7.5).
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For W estphal, K ierkegaard’s individual first relates to God, then to ‘others’. This 
specifically religious relation to the other is achieved by loving them as a neighbour. 
Though Backhouse argues this point as well (ibid.), he puts forward the further claim 
that the individual relates to God and then to society. For both thinkers, however, a 
relation to God is the first requirement for any form o f sociability. For Backhouse, an 
individual’s relation to God gives him or her an eternal focal point that transcends all 
social norms, and allows for a standpoint to be taken whereby those cultural norms 
can authentically be questioned and appropriated (or rejected). Since this God- 
relationship is both ‘eternal’ and equally available to all, its supposition marks a 
universal test for authentic appropriation o f one’s social background, and so for 
authentic selfhood and genuine sociability.
Bruce Kirmm se also advocates an ‘individualist’ reading o f Kierkegaard. For 
Kirmmse, the individual relates first to God and then to a social or political issues.156 
(Kirmmse calls this political view ‘prioritarianism’. See: Kirmmse, 1990b, 295, ff. 
See also: M athew 6:24-34). Flence, Kirmmse argues that, for Kierkegaard, concerns 
with ‘social and political responsibilities [...] must be seen as subordinate to the 
individual’s relation to G od’ (ibid., 295).
The ‘individualists’ positions can be backed up using quotes directly from 
K ierkegaard’s signed works. In a journal entry, for example, Kierkegaard notes that:
[ ...]  on the occasion o f my new upbuilding discourses they will probably 
bawl out that [...] I know nothing about sociality. You fools! Yet on the
b6 W e highlighted  K irm m se’s ‘p rioritarian’ understanding o f  K ierkegaard s political outlook above 
(n.143).
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other hand I owe it to m yself to confess before God that in a certain sense 
there is some truth in it, only not as men understand it — namely, that 
when I have first presented one aspect clearly and sharply, then the other 
manifests itself even more strongly. [...] Now I have the theme o f my next 
book: it will be called Works o f  Love (JP V, 5972).157
As Begonya Tajafiierce recognises: “One could say that this ‘other side’, ‘sociality’, is 
already implicit in a reading o f the ‘first side’, i.e. ‘individuality’.” 158 Furthermore, the 
journal entry implies that Kierkegaard attempted to deal more directly with the 
concept ‘sociality’ in Works o f  Love. Thus, Works o f  Love could be read as 
K ierkegaard’s theory o f sociality, following directly on from his earlier 
‘individualistic’ works. Note once more, however, that the chronological order o f 
K ierkegaard’s authorship - f i r s t  individualistic writings, then a social theory -  appears 
to faithfully represent the ‘individualists’ claim that one must firs t distance oneself 
from sociality in order to become an authentic self, before one can then become a 
social self.
In fact, Works o f  Love is often also used as evidence o f Kierkegaard’s ‘individualistic’ 
theory o f  socia lity .159 For example, Westphal quotes from Works o f  Love where 
Kierkegaard writes that: ‘Ultimately, love for God is the decisive factor; from this 
originates love for the neighbor... the Christian love commandment commands loving
157 A nother im portant w ork in this respect is Sickness Unto Death. There K ierkegaard’s pseudonym ous 
author A nti-C lim acus argues that becom ing a fully-fledged self requires first relating to the ‘pow er that 
established it’. A nti-C lim acus explicitly links this ‘pow er’ with God (SUD: Part 2). See also TA, 
w here K ierkegaard  links the rem oval o f  the individualistic aspect o f  his thought to herd m entality: 
‘Rem ove the relation to oneself, and we have the tum ultuous self-relating of the mass to an idea (63).
158 T ajafuerce (1998b, 62). T ajafuerce goes on to argue against this position, how ever, despite 
adm itting that doing so is contrary to w hat Kierkegaard wrote.
1:0 The textual evidence for understanding human relations as necessarily going through God first 
includes the follow ing: W OL, 77, 121, 140, 149, 160; JP III, 2428. That God is described as the 
‘m iddle te rm ’ o f  hum an relationships is also stated in the following: W OL, 57-58, 67, 103, 106-07, 
1 19, 121, 142, 303, 395, 437-39, 450; JP I, 595; JP IV: 4110, 4148 . That G od’s description as a 
‘middle te rm ’ need not im ply an individualistic interpretation o f  K ierkegaard s social thought, 
how ever, is h ighlighted  by ‘m utually inform ative’ readings examined shortly below  ( 7 .3 .) .
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God above all else, and then loving the neighbor’ (WOL, 57 ).160 Importantly, for 
W estphal s account, the statement is literally read to imply the chronological order 
that one comes to love one’s neighbour: firs t  God, then other. W estphal concludes 
from this that God is the middle term in a triadic relation. Diagrammatically, the 
account w ould look ‘Figure 7.3.1’ below:
Figure 7.3.1: The ‘Individualist’s ’ account - Individual God N eighbour.161
God
Individual Neighbour
The idea o f  a true love relationship being triangular is also found in K ierkegaard’s 
own words. In Works o f  Love Kierkegaard writes that: “The love-relationship is a 
triangular relationship o f  the lover, the beloved, [and] love- but love o f God” {ibid..,
160 C om m enting on the relationship betw een the first com m andm ent ( ‘You shall love the Lord your 
God w ith all your heart, and w ith all your soul, and with all your m ind’) and the second ( ‘You shall 
love your neighbour as y o u rse lf) , W estphal also concludes that the latter com m andm ent is second in a 
chronological w ay too, precisely because it relies on the first (W estphal, 2004, 220. The biblical 
passage quoted is: M atthew  22:37-39). See also W estphal (2008, 37) w here, contrasting K ierkegaard 
with L evinas, W estphal concludes that for K ierkegaard ‘[..] God alw ays stands betw een me and my 
neighbor’.
161 The term  ‘o th e r’ could be used here but it risks secularising K ierkegaard’s specifically religious 
term.
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181). Nevertheless, Kierkegaard then goes on to express even stronger sentiments. On 
the same page he writes: The world can never get through its head that God in this 
way [as a part o f  the triangular love-relationship] not only becomes the third party in 
every relationship o f love but essentially becomes the only loved object” {ibid.). Such 
quotations have spurred anti-social readings o f Kierkegaard’s works such as 
A dorno’s. “ As we saw above, Adorno would take this quote to imply that according 
to K ierkegaard’s doctrine o f love, loving one’s neighbour becomes merely an 
instrumental way o f loving God.
7.3.2 -  The Kierkegaardian self: ‘Instrumentalist’.
As we briefly outlined above (e.g., at the end o f section 7.2), Adorno argues that 
K ierkegaard’s thought is essentially individualistic. Adorno claims that there is 
nothing inherently unique or even distinguishing about ‘the other’ when he or she is 
loved as a neighbour, according to Kierkegaard’s theory. Kierkegaard advises us to 
ignore the temporal aspect o f the ‘other’ and to love them for the eternal and 
presum ably unchanging spiritual aspect that they partake in. The real object o f love, 
Adorno concludes, is God; and hence the neighbour ultimately only simply serves as a 
medium for one’s relationship to God (Adorno, 2002, pp. 9 & 11). The disregard for 
the actual, worldly conditions o f ‘the other’, coupled with the seemingly only self- 
serving relation that the lover has with God whilst practising neighbour-love, has led
162 Instances w here K ierkegaard suggests that one’s love of God has priority, or that love of God is the 
ultim ate end o f  all relations o f  genuine love, include: W OL, 19,77, 121-22, 140, 149, 181, 264, UDVS, 
129-130, (w here o n e ’s relationship to God is argued as more intimate than one s relationship with 
one’s w ife[/spouse/partner]), 335, JP III, 2428.
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Adorno to call Kierkegaard s doctrine o f love ‘callous’, and is taken as evidence o f 
K ierkegaard’s secret ‘m isanthropy’ {ibid., 16), his true ‘hatred o f m an’ {ibid., 11).
This charge is probably the most influential criticism o f Kierkegaard’s thought that 
Adorno levelled, and versions o f it are still found amongst contemporary scholarship. 
In fact, an examination o f some o f the contemporary articulations o f what I shall call 
an ‘instrum entalist’ reading o f Kierkegaard’s doctrine o f love will show precisely how 
influential A dorno’s original criticism has been.
Knud Ejler Logstrup is one o f the most recent scholars to have shared in A dorno’s 
‘instrum entalist’ reading o f Kierkegaard’s theory o f sociability. 163 The 
‘instrum entalist’ reading is deeply challenging because it uses Kierkegaard’s own text 
to support it. Part o f  Logstrup’s view is that Kierkegaard’s Christianity, contrary to 
what Kierkegaard might have intended, ignores the ethical dimension o f the 
neighbour completely. Summarising Logstrup’s view, Povl Gotke writes that
To get the beloved to love God is the highest good indeed, since God is 
for the believer the only one who, strictly speaking, is worthy o f being the 
object o f concern. But this, to get the beloved to love God and not 
himself, demands o f course that one distract the beloved's attention and 
love away from him self as the beloved and direct it toward God. Seen 
from a Christian perspective, one should [...] let everything be oriented 
towards God. (Gotke, 1998, 232).
163 See for exam ple: L ogstrup (1997, 218 onwards). Sim ilar view s as Logstiup s and A dorno s has also 
put forw ard by Levinas - see: Soltoft (1998, 133-34).
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Such words could have come from the writings o f Adorno. Logstrup’s own 
‘instrum entalist’ reading has dominated discussions o f Kierkegaard’s theory o f 
sociability, especially Danish scholarship o f Works o f  Love. In fact, in an article 
concerning the ‘Recent Scandinavian Literature on Works o f Love’ Povl Gotke 
outlines L ogstrup’s instrumentalist reading o f Works o f  Love before going on to assess 
what he simply calls the ‘post-Logstrupian history o f reception’ (Gotke, 1998, 232).164
Logstrup’s view is a contemporary re-statement o f Adorno’s basic arguments. The 
neighbour is not loved for his/her own sake, but simply for the ‘Godly’ element that 
each person invariably contains within them. This appears to entail, as Logstrup 
emphasises, that K ierkegaard’s prioritarian treatment o f spirituality involves 
undervaluing or even ignoring ethical interaction with the other. Kierkegaard, 
Logstrup argues, advises us to oversee ethical facts about the other so that we can 
focus on the purely spiritual aspect o f loving our neighbour.
Diagram matically, an instrumentalist reading o f Kierkegaard would be more akin to 
this:
164 W hich includes the K ierkegaard scholars Bukdahl, N ordentoft, M uller, M alantschuk, and Gron
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Figure 7.3.2: An ‘Instrum entalist’ account - Individual Neighbour God.
Neighbour
God
According to the instrumentalist reading, the relation to the neighbour is only a 
necessary means to one’s individual and subjective relation to God. This is unlike the 
above case where God is loved for His own sake, and then the neighbour for theirs; 
for here, loving the neighbour is a mere means to loving God.
Even if  we understand Kierkegaard’s work to represent the relation shown in ‘figure 
7.2’ above, however, we still might not have to read this as an ‘instrum entalist’ 
relation between the individual, the neighbour, and God. Louise Carroll Keeley, for 
example, appears to hold the above view when she writes that: ‘K ierkegaard’s 
conception o f  love divinely understood is formulated with geometric rigor: to love 
oneself is to love God; to love another is to assist that other in loving God; to be loved 
by another is to be helped by that other to love G od’ (Keeley, 1992, 100). Yet Keeley 
argues that the other is not loved instrumental!)? in order to love God. In fact, the 
relationship is described in the opposite way of Adorno and Logstrup s
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instrumentalism: loving God is itself the side-effect (though a necessary one) o f truly 
loving the other as a neighbour. Keeley, and I think Kierkegaard, would undoubtedly 
agree with Logstrup, et., al. that the very inclination to use the other as a means for 
establishing a relationship with God is both unethical and un-Christian. Yet Keeley 
highlights that loving the neighbour first and then God need not imply an 
instrumentalist relationship to one’s neighbour. Instead, one genuinely loves the 
neighbour for his or her spiritual qualities and then consequently comes into a loving 
relationship to God through the same act.
In fact, both Adorno and Logstrup’s interpretation is challenged by the fact that at 
times K ierkegaard treats love for the neighbour and love for God as synonymous. In 
one place, for example, love between a lover and a loved is said to be conscientious 
only when ‘[ ...]  either God or the neighbour is the middle term ’ (WOL, 142, my 
em phasis).165
7.3.3 -  The Kierkegaardian self: ‘G od’ and ‘other’ as ‘M utually informative’.
If ‘neighbour love’ is synonymous with ‘love o f G od’, as Kierkegaard sometimes 
claims (W OL, 160, 161; JP III, 2434) then, diagrammatically, the relation is simply:
This point w as brought to my attention by Ferreira (2009, 49).
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Figure 7.3.3: A ‘M utually informative’ account - Individual G od/N eighbour.166
— ►
Individual 4 , _ God /neighbour
Loving the neighbour is inextricably tied with loving God, and vice versa. This 
reading goes against both the instrumentalist readings, but also the individualistic 
readings o f  Kierkegaard too. This is because the individualists, as I have called them, 
believe in the prim acy o f the individual’s relation to God, and then to the neighbour. 
In the ‘m utually inform ative’ interpretation o f Kierkegaard’s doctrine o f love, it is not 
the case that one must enter into a God-relation before in inter-personal relation. If the 
relation above was perm itted (Figure 7.3.3), one could conceivably fully concentrate 
on loving one’s neighbour and still fulfil ones duty to God (and vice-versa).
166 Scholars that appear to take this view  include Stacey Elizabeth Ake (1998), and Sylvia W alsh 
Perkins (1995). A ke, for exam ple, at one place w rites that: ‘For K ierkegaard, then, love o f  God and 
love o f  persons are integrally connected; one cannot have the one w ithout the o ther’ (1998, 188). Such 
a sentence does not seem  to prioritise either one or the other chronological m ovem ent outlined in the 
interpretations above (i.e., from God then to O ther [figure: 7.3.1], or from O ther to G od [figure: 7.3.2]). 
For a critique o f  the ‘m utually  inform ative’ view o f  the relations between self, neighbour, and God, see 
Elrod (1981, 183), and Lee (2006, 93-94).
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7.3.4 -  The Kierkegaardian self: social then individual.
Regardless o f  which view o f the self scholars hold, there is a further question o f 
whether the individual is partly socially constructed or not. The question o f whether 
one is a social being before an individual, or vice-versa, can therefore be raised.
In this sense, for example, Michael Plekon might be a scholar who holds to a 
‘mutually inform ative’ idea o f the relation between the individual and society. Plekon 
argues, for example, that Kierkekaard’s writings contain ‘[...] a sociological focus 
which is inextricably entwined with his theology' (Plekon, 1981, 46). Elsewhere, 
Plekon argues the reverse o f this relationship, namely that: ‘Kierkegaard’s theological 
optimism is essentially communal or social’ (Plekon, 1992, 11). Finally, in describing 
the situation that the self is grounded in, Plekon notes the social and communal ties 
but neglects m entioning the individual’s grounding to God, presumably because he 
believes that K ierkegaard’s theological views permeate his social ones:
[...]  the individual is always located or grounded within the confines o f an 
array o f  relationships, ranging from those o f the biological species to the 
social bonds o f the family, church, and nation." (Plekon, 1982, 70. See 
also pp. 71 and 80).
Likewise, Robert Perkins argues that the insights derived from Kierkegaard s stance 
on ethico-religious subjectivity ‘[...] show that the ethics o f religious inwardness is
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laden with political consequences and insights’ (Perkins, 1995, 174). For Perkins and 
Plekon, K ierkegaard’s religious focus is part and parcel o f his political and social 
insights, and vice-versa. But Perkins’ conglomeration o f Kierkegaard’s religious and 
political positions leads him to think that Kierkegaard’s writings espouse a great deal 
more emphasis on political matters than Kierkegaard would have cared for, him self 
most frequently being interested primarily in the religious and only secondarily and 
infrequently in the political. Perkins him self notices this disparity. After arguing that 
Kierkegaard ought to be placed ‘[...] on the side o f those [for] whom the universal 
would provide an ideal model o f the state and who demand and expect a humane and 
rational politics’ Perkins directly follows on by recognising that: ‘Such a conclusion 
would no doubt come as a surprise to Kierkegaard, for there is absolutely no 
indication that he drew this conclusion’ {ibid., 174).
Apart from arguing that Kierkegaard’s religious views are inextricably entwined with 
his social thought, Perkins later argues that Kierkegaard’s individual is also ‘situated’, 
culturally or historically. ‘W henever Kierkegaard writes about the outer, the political, 
the economic, or the social, he ponders how this flows out o f human inwardness and 
how these various aspects o f the age (any age) impinge upon the individual’ (Perkins, 
1999a, 177).
Daniel Conway takes this line o f thought further by arguing that K ierkegaard’s 
individual is in fact inherently situated. For Conway, Kierkegaard ‘[...] submits that 
prevailing social conditions always influence —  indeed, make possible or not the 
individual's quest for an authentic existence’ (Conway, 1999, 26). According to 
Conw ay’s reading o f Kierkegaardian reflexivity, the individual must lefer their
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existential developm ent to the incumbent social organizations. Thus, for individuals: 
The stamp o f the age is thereby imprinted onto their very understanding o f 
themselves [ . . . ] ’ {ibid., 24).
In the writings o f  those who see Kierkegaard’s individual as inherently situated, it 
would appear as if  the very notion o f radical individualisation is questioned. For if  by 
‘individual’ we mean some entity that can be completely separated from societal 
influences when engaging in relations with God or neighbour (as Dooley and 
Backhouse would seem to suggest -  see 7.3.1 above), authors such as Conway would 
argue such a notion is actually un-Kierkegaardian.
7.3.5 -  Conclusions regarding the Kierkegaardian self.
One final aspect o f Kierkegaard’s doctrine of love should be mentioned. Adorno often 
accuses Kierkegaard o f ignoring the particular qualities that help constitute who that 
person is. Adorno correctly identifies that for Kierkegaard, the term ‘neighbour’ has 
the Christian usage o f  referring to all human be ings.167 O ne’s neighbour is, in a sense 
after all, anybody -  the first person one encounters. In fact, Kierkegaard explicitly 
emphasises that no person in particular, nor any person’s particularities, is the object 
o f Christian love. Integral to Kierkegaard’s notion o f neighbour-love is the idea that it 
contains no grounds for partiality or for preferential treatment. Within the concept ol
167 See also; W O L, 19, 49-52, 61, and 129.
Page 298 o f  354. Kierkegaard s Existential Theory o f  the Political. Thomas Wolstenholme.
the neighbour then is the notion that no one person is to be loved more than any 
other, but all equally.
It should be noted, however, that in both Danish and English, the word ‘neighbour’ 
also has the connotations o f an actual person in close proximity. The Danish word for 
‘neighbour’ is Nceste which can also be more literally translated as ‘next’.168 In the 
context o f  loving one’s neighbour, Kierkegaard maintains both aspects o f the term 
‘neighbour’ - the general, Christian concept o f any and every person (as constituted 
spiritually), as well as the local case o f the single individual one encounters when 
performing works o f  love (with his or her psychical-physical particularities). As I 
argued above, one can only empathise, for example, from one single individual to 
another. That is to say, a spiritual or religious love o f each single individual can and 
surely m ust be compatible with paying special attention to the concerns o f the single 
individual one is empathising with. Empathy would not be possible if  it was a matter 
o f instrum entally using the other as a means o f relating to God; nor if one practised 
empathy on masse with all humans simultaneously yet none in particular.
Furthermore, it could be argued that the entire point o f Kierkegaard’s work is to give 
preferential love an adequate grounding -  not to eradicate it completely and replace it 
with the practice o f neighbour-love instead. Hence, Kierkegaard does give an account 
o f preferential love (friendship, marriage, etc.) that, he argues, is compatible with his 
doctrine o f  neighbour-love. The grounding o f love o f one’s spouse ought to primarily 
be because he or she is a spiritual individual, a creation o f G od’s, and(/or) a being
168 H ence, K ierkegaard scholars have often noted that after K ierkegaard em phasises practising 
‘b lindness’ w ith regards to the particular features o f  the neighbour (as a means of establishing genuine 
neighbour-love), he re-em phasises loving the particular neighbour that we im m ediately see (see for 
exam ple, W O L, 154-174, 269; for the scholarly literature, see Ferreira, 2001, 55-62; Keeley, 1999, 
215; Lee, 2006, 97-99).
Page 299 of 354. Kierkegaard s Existential Theory o f  the Political. Thomas Wolstenholme.
with the potential to become an authentic and spiritually harmonious single individual. 
Once that groundwork has been established, however, there is nothing that prevents 
one from also loving the psychical-physical qualities that are a vital aspect o f one’s 
friends 01 spouse. Love based solely on these latter features will be precariously 
conditioned on the contingent fact o f whether or not those qualities, as well as one’s 
preference for them, remain the same. Kierkegaard’s warning message is that these 
temporal qualities are in fact a lot more fickle than people think. Hence, friendship 
and love based solely on psychical-physical attraction risks becoming ruinous. In 
addition to this, the knowledge o f the insecurity inherent within temporally-based 
relationships means that they will be defined by anxiety {ibid., 40-43), and perhaps 
jealousy.
Nevertheless, a human being is partly temporal, and so affectionate preference for the 
psychical-physical aspects o f another person is also an ordinary and probably 
inescapable aspect o f human life. (Additionally, friendship and affection can be 
joyous aspects o f  life too. Recall above that Kierkegaard praised them as a blessed gift 
from God [n. 149].) Kierkegaard merely wants to combine preferential love with 
neighbour-love, and hence secure the former from the inherent volatility that 
otherwise defines it.
Hence, there is nothing in Kierkegaard’s doctrine o f love that suggests that the 
contingent aspects o f  one’s neighbour (their class or relative economic standing, for 
example) are ignored. In respect o f grounding one’s love for the other in neighbour-
l6; K ierkegaard also uses the word Ncernieste (as a noun) ten times in Works o f  Love (and as a verb, 
five). Ncermeste literally m eans som ething like ‘the next’ (em phasis added), but can also be literally 
translated as ‘n ea res t’. H ence it is quite sim ilar to the concept ol neighbour in that K ierkegaard gives 
it a C hristian usage to mean loving ‘any person’ (i.e., whoever happens to be the next ), as well as a 
more particu lar m anifestation  o f  that love, by loving ‘the next person that one encounters.
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love, they are not taken into account. But Kierkegaard’s anthropology presses the fact 
that we are not completely spiritual beings. A flourishing human regulates his or her 
psychical-physical preferences by spirit but never attempts to extirpate the former, 
which would, in any case, be impossible. Hence, Kierkegaard’s doctrine o f love is 
fully com patible with pursuing relations that take into account the particular features 
o f each person one expresses neighbour-love tow ards.170
170 O ther scholars w ho have argued that K ierkegaard’s doctrine o f  love is defective because it treats the 
neighbour too abstractly , include G eorge (1998 71-81), and M ackey (1986, 141-5 ).
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7.4 Kierkegaard: ‘genuine’ politics and ‘genuine’ sociability.
In providing some possible rebuttals to Adorno we have seen that there is good 
evidence to suggest that the neighbor is not merely loved as a necessary means to 
one’s relation to God. Our examination o f ‘mutually inform ative’, ‘socially 
encum bered’, and even ‘individualistic’ readings o f Kierkegaard’s doctrine o f love 
highlighted many social aspects o f Kierkegaard’s view o f the human self and o f
17 1
neighbour-love. It is still not quite clear, however, whether this justifies calling 
K ierkegaard’s thought a ‘social’ theory. Not all inter-personal interactions are 
‘social’, let alone constitutive o f a social theory. Furthermore, even if  Kierkegaard 
does have a social theory, is it a good one? Or are there better alternatives? Finally, 
we have not yet tied Kierkegaard’s spiritual theory o f the political with his social 
thought. Are the two necessarily linked? Or does Kierkegaard happen to have both an 
existential theory o f  the political that emphasises becoming an individual, as well as 
an unrelated social theory as well?
In answering such questions, we will need to outline what Kierkegaard means by 
‘sociality’. In many journal entries Kierkegaard quite explicitly states that sociality is 
an ‘anim al’ qualification (JP III, 2968, 2970; JP IV, 4126, 4231, 4234, 4341). By this, 
Kierkegaard means that the natural human desire for company and for others is a 
consequence o f  the fact that the human being is an animal, and specifically a social
171 All o f  the theorists exam ined above all, bar only Conway, Logstrup, and Adorno accept that 
K ierkegaard’s thought contains valuable insights to a social theory.
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animal (JP IV, 4231). “ The desire for sociality therefore satisfies basic psychical 
and/or physical needs o f the human. Such comments about sociality might appear to 
lend them selves to an individualistic understanding o f the human. We might wonder 
why, for example, Kierkegaard does not ever say that we have a spiritual need to 
engage in the company of others. Furthermore, the ‘psychical-physical’ characteristics 
o f sociality make it sound as if it is something that the spiritually individuated subject 
must ultim ately separate him or herself from.
Given our examination o f Kierkegaard in the preceding chapters, it should hopefully 
have become clear that, for Kierkegaard, there must be at least one sense in which we 
have a spiritual interest in sociability. For recall that according to K ierkegaard’s basic 
anthropological view, the psychical and the physical aspects o f the self must be 
regulated by the spiritual. Hence there should be a way for the spiritual aspect o f the 
self to regulate sociability -  despite the fact that the latter might originally only be 
determined by a psychical-physical need. Given that the spiritual must (always) 
regulate the psychical and the physical, a spiritual account o f sociability must be 
possible. W hether Kierkegaard gives such an account is another question, and will be 
examined below. Even if  Kierkegaard does not describe a spiritual basis for sociality, 
however, it would still follow from his anthropological commitments there must be a 
way o f  spiritually regulating the psychical-physical desire for community.
172 See also: JP  IV, 4341, w here Kierkegaard explicitly states that “ [...]  sociality is related essentially 
to the m ind-body synthesis” ; JP III, 2970 where K ierkegaard says that: [...] th e  anim al-definition o f  
w hat it m eans to be a hum an being, corresponds exactly to the animal s notion of being safe when it is 
in a flock” , and; “ [ .. .]  ‘the m ass’ [ ...]  corresponds to the ‘anim al-m an’” ; and finally: JP III, 2968, 
w here K ierkegaard  says “ Man is by nature an anim al-creation. All human effort is therefore in the 
direction o f  running  together in a herd [ . . .] ” (original emphasis).
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As it happens, I believe that Kieikegaard does provide such a theory o f sociability. 
Before looking at his view of true sociality, however, it is worth examining 
K ierkegaard’s view o f spiritually wwregulated community. In fact, we have already 
touched upon a particular manifestation o f ungenuine sociability above (Chapter five). 
We saw that one o f Kierkegaard’s defining characteristics o f ‘The Present A ge’ was 
that ethical action was rendered ineffectual. In the present age individuals either live 
amongst the numerical mass o f human beings that Kierkegaard called ‘the public’, or 
else they extract themselves from the public. But we also saw that the numerical and 
oppressive force o f the crowd led Kierkegaard to believe that being an individual in 
the present age can only be undertaken by one who has religious strength. In the 
present age, then, humans can either live socially in a psychical-physical, animalistic 
way, or in a spiritual way that entails suffering.
Perhaps this is a key to understanding Kierkegaard’s view o f genuine, spiritually 
regulated sociability? In his journal entries, Kierkegaard does speak o f a ‘low er’, 
animalistic form o f sociability, and a spiritually higher one. Furthermore, Kierkegaard 
dedicates m uch o f  the work Two Ages in describing the pernicious effects o f having 
social relations that are only regulated by psychical-physical qualifications. When no 
individual person is spiritually regulated, when one only relates to others in a 
psychical-physical way, Kierkegaard argues that envy must ultimately ensue (cf., JP 
III, 2986). In such a situation, the practice o f seeing each other person as an individual 
fit for spirituality, along with the recognition that his or her distinct psychical-physical 
characteristics are important but not wholly defining aspects o f that person, is lost.
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When the spiritual aspect o f relations between single individuals is ignored, the only 
things that characterise the associations are psychical-physical features.173
W ithout the ability to respect each person as a spiritual being, individuals relate to 
others by way o f  the other’s psychical-physical characteristics alone. Relations 
become defined by comparisons, and these in turn cause anxieties such as: ‘Do the 
psychical-physical characteristics of the other or o f the majority meet my standards? 
And are my psychical-physical characteristics the same as everyone else’s?’ In such a 
state, a recognition o f basic human dignity (i.e., that each human is equally equipped 
for being a representative o f the spiritual ideal) is ignored; people are defined, instead, 
in terms o f  psychical-physical qualifications alone. Deviating from the norm, 
furthermore, might inadvertently invite social ostracism, and so the desire for 
conformity can become forceful. Hence, in a situation where relations are built upon 
psychical-physical comparisons, envy best characterises the way that people who have 
not exercised spiritual individualism relate to others.
It is clear from both Kierkegaard’s journal entries as well as his comments about 
sociality in the present age that this way of relating to others is the ‘lower’ form o f 
sociality. I have also suggested that there must be a higher form o f sociality, where the 
animalistic impulses for relationships with others are regulated by spiritual 
qualifications. Perhaps we will find Kierkegaard’s view of genuine community by 
looking at the single individuals who, in the present age, are able to emerge from the 
process o f  levelling as authentic selves.
173 Surprisingly enough, K ierkegaard m ade conclusions regarding the need for spiritual reciprocity in 
love [read: friendship  also] as early as in 1837 (JP III, 2380, 2o81).
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One o f  the scholars examined above who takes an ‘individualistic’ reading o f
K ierkegaard’s view o f sociability has argued for such a claim. Stephen Backhouse
argues that:
Truly authentic existence [is] predicated upon an encounter with other 
Christians, which implies a neighbourhood of believers. [...]
Kierkegaard's suggestion is that no one is an individual unless they are in
a relation to this community. (Backhouse, 2011, 221, original emphasis).
Perhaps there could be a society o f religious people who each individually have the 
strength and courage to refuse to be governed by the psychical and physical aspects o f 
the present age? Backhouse seems to believe so. In support o f his claim, Backhouse 
argues that genuine sociability is dependent upon each single individual first 
becoming authentic. To become an authentic individual, in turn, it is necessary to go 
through the process o f levelling. In fact, Backhouse argues that: ‘[...] it is only by 
going through the levelling process o f the present age that the individual comes to 
have an apprehension o f the authentically religious.’174 Since leveling is required for 
an apprehension o f  the religious, and since ‘no one is an individual unless they are in 
a relation to [a] com m unity’ o f Christians [read: religious individual’s], then it does 
appear as if  the only way for a spiritually regulated community to form is by a society 
o f those who have emerged through the process of levelling.
Nevertheless, I do not entirely agree with Backhouse’s reading. Leveling, Backhouse 
argues, is a phenomenon which can affect any age, and here he might be correct. It is
174 I should also note that Backhouse uses the term ‘levelling’ [double-L-ing], where the standard 
translation o f  N iveilering  is ‘leveling’ [one-L-ing]. I shall stick to the standard, if only to maintain the 
difference betw een K ierkegaard’s term and the English term levelling .
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also im portant to bear in mind the varying extent to which leveling occurs in differing 
times, however. In some ages the leveling process is limited so that relating to others 
is still an ethical possibility (e.g., in the ‘age o f revolution’, which was discussed 
above in chapter five). In other circumstances, however, Kierkegaard believes that the 
effect o f leveling is so extensive that ethical action becomes ineffectual (e.g., in the 
‘present age — also discussed in chapter five.) Finally, in his latest writings, 
Kierkegaard even advocates negative political reform as a possible solution to 
combatting the levelling process (chapter six). Backhouse’s recognition that leveling 
is an ever-present phenomenon, coupled with his stress that one’s individual relation 
to God is also fundamental, irrespective o f time period, leads to an interpretation o f 
K ierkegaard that is not reflexive enough o f social and political changes. Flence, 
Backhouse appears to believe that the arguments that Kierkegaard had defended in 
1846 are his final word on the topic o f sociability (for example).
B ackhouse’s socially inflexible reading leads to a contradiction, however. 
Kierkegaard explicitly says that the people who have ‘divinely understood the 
diabolical principle o f the levelling process [...] will be unrecognizable’ (TA, 107, 
original emphasis). Such ‘unrecognizable ones’ will be unable to ‘give direct help, 
speak plainly, teach openly, [or] assume decisive leadership’ {ibid., 108). The closest 
to any sort o f  community these ‘unrecognizable ones’ have, apart from the fact that 
they each individually endure constant suffering submission to the process of leveling 
out o f a love o f  humanity, is when Kierkegaard concedes that an unrecognizable one 
might be able to ‘suspect’ a fellow ‘unrecognizable one of also having (or attempting 
to) overcom e the leveling process. At best, however, they will have only a vague
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idea that a fellow contemporary is suffering in this way {ibid., 109). Kierkegaard 
explicitly states, however, that no person could ever be sure o f this:
But they [both those who are not fighting leveling and those who are, the 
preceding paragraph indicates] will not be certain [that another person is 
also fighting against the leveling process], because certainty could only 
come from him [the unrecognizable one who is fighting against the 
leveling process], and if he provides one single man with that [information] 
directly, it means he is dismissed, for he would be unfaithful to God and 
would be assuming authority, because he would not in obeying God learn 
to love men infinitely by constraining him self [...] {ibid., 109.)
Given what Kierkegaard says about them, the prospect o f a community o f 
‘unrecognizable ones’ appears untenable. In any case, this example o f ‘spiritual’ 
sociality appears to be greatly at odds with the social theory that we examined in 
Works o f  Love . There it seemed as if it was a real prospect to love one’s neighbour; 
not secretly by an act o f suffering but quite openly through works o f love.
Attention must also be brought to the fact that ‘Works o f Love’ was written one year 
after Two Ages. Hence, despite the fact that Kierkegaard had specifically argued in the 
earlier work that ‘works o f love’ would have no effect in the present age (or even 
have the adverse effects o f being understood as pride/insolence: [ibid., pp. 90/104]) 
Kierkegaard nevertheless authored a piece the following year in which arguing for the 
undertaking o f (successful) works o f love is the central focus. In order to explain this 
discrepancy (and as even a cursory examination o f the former and latter text will 
highlight) Kierkegaard must be assuming a different kind o f society in Works o f  Love 
than in the ‘present age’ o f Two Ages.
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I propose that in Works o f  Love, but not in Two Ages, Kierkegaard is describing a state 
o f affairs where political and social entities are acting genuinely. I shall argue that it is 
only when genuine politics is practised that there can be a true community o f 
individuals; as opposed to a ‘crow d’ or a ‘public’. In an insightful journal entry, 
K ierkegaard spends great efforts at distinguishing a community from a crowd in 
multiple ways. Hence, I quote it at length:
In the 'public' and the like the single individual is nothing; there is no 
individual; the numerical is the constituting form [...]; detached from the 
'public' the single individual is nothing, and in the public he is, more 
basically understood, really nothing at all. In community [.Menighed] the 
single individual is; the single individual is dialectically decisive as the 
presupposition for forming community, and in community the single 
individual is qualitatively something essential and can at any moment 
become higher than “community” [...] In community the single individual 
is the microcosm who qualitatively repeats the macrocosm [...] In a 
public there is no single individual and the whole is nothing [...] 
Com m unity is certainly more than a sum, but yet it is truly a sum o f ones 
(JP III, 2952).
Kierkegaard quite clearly says that in order to form a true community (i.e., not just a 
crowd), the m em bers must be single individuals. By ‘single individuals’ Kierkegaard 
means those individuals who have undergone spiritual deepening; not just individuals 
who are in some sense ‘singled out’ by psychical-physical qualities.175 Hence a 
comm unity based solely on the latter will not be a genuine community; and in fact 
will be a ‘crow d’, a ‘public’.
175 In ano ther inform ative journal entry about specifically religious comm unities, K ierkegaard extends 
this point: “ [ . . .]  “the single individual” must have intervened[...] as the middle term in order to make 
sure that “com m unity” and “congregation” are not taken in vain as synonyms with public, the crowd, 
e tc .;[...F u rtherm ore , the single individual’s] relationship to God [determines] his relationship to the 
congregation [not the other way around]” (JP I, 595 -  originally intended to be part of The 
A ccounting’ from  The Point o f  View. See also: JP IV, 4110 ).
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Now we can see why Kierkegaard’s theory o f the political, as well as his spiritual 
justification for negative policy change, is a necessary aspect o f his social thought. 
For in conditions where the prospect o f undertaking spiritual deepening and becoming 
a single individual is jeopardised, true community is also put at risk. Unless such a 
situation is rebutted, we risk entering a state where the only possibilities of social 
interaction are either an animalistic immersion in a crowd, or else religiously suffering 
as an isolated, single individual. In neither case is the ‘genuine’ social interaction o f 
Works o f  Love possible; nor does it seem possible for a ‘genuine community’ in 
accordance with the definition in the above journal entry. Hence, the practice of 
genuine politics is a necessary condition for genuine sociability.
Furthermore, an analysis o f some of Kierkegaard’s scattered and short but 
nevertheless inform ative journal entries shows that no person can become an authentic 
self alone. These entries show that authentic spiritual development is necessarily 
inter-personal. Hence, these entries provide additional reasons for arguing that an 
instrumentalist or asocial reading o f Kierkegaard’s thought is untenable.
In one journal entry, for example, Kierkegaard quite explicitly states that a relation 
from one hum an to another, without God as a ‘middle-term’, is terrible (originally: 
“The reason w hy the world does not advance but goes backwards ) (JP IV, 4148). 
This might at first seem to support an instrumentalist interpretation of Kierkegaard s 
social theory, for Kierkegaard says that God must be a ‘middle term. In other words, 
one must work ‘through’ a relationship with God before one can properly relate to 
another.
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In a slightly later entry, however, Kierkegaard explicitly criticises what he perceives 
to be the instrumental way in which individuals relate to each other in Christendom. 
Kierkegaard states that “To ‘achieve actuality’ also means [to be] willing to exist for 
every man, as far as one reaches” (JP IV, 4163). Limiting one’s understanding o f 
loving others to a Sunday sermon, however, implies a situation where “ [...] every 
man as such has a certain relativity in which he lives; others do not essentially exist 
for him ” {ibid.). This is strikingly similar to the instrumentalist’s criticism of 
K ierkegaard’s doctrine o f love. In direct contrast to this, however, Kierkegaard 
continues on to write that “From a Christian point o f view I do not have the right to 
ignore existentially one single man. I have the right to ignore an anonymous writer, to 
ignore the public and all such fantasies, but not [an] actual man” {ibid.). In other 
words, K ierkegaard first criticises the idea that we only relate to others in a relative, 
instrumental way, and then re-affirms his own view that we have an absolute duty to 
never existentially ignore one single human being. This entry therefore provides very 
strong, if  not conclusive reasons for suggesting that Kierkegaard’s own existentially- 
motivated comm itm ents to the other would reject an instrumentalist relation 
altogether.
W hilst Kierkegaard suggests that we separate ourselves from being totally defined in 
terms o f the traits that characterise a crowd - the psychical and the physical — this does 
not thereby imply that we ignore another fellow human — his or her temporal traits, or 
his or her existential (spiritual) wellbeing. On the contrary, each one o f us has the task 
o f m aintaining a spiritual relationship with every other person. Undertaking this task, 
furthermore, is part o f our own project o f becoming an authentic self.
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Another journal entry, chronologically later still, supports a mutually exclusive 
reading o f Kierkegaard s theory of sociability. Kierkegaard states in quite simple 
terms that “ Love to God and love to neighbour are like two doors that open 
sim ultaneously, so that it is impossible to open one without opening the other, and 
impossible to shut one without also shutting the other” (JP III, 2434). Hence, no 
person can genuinely engage in a relationship with God without also treating one’s 
neighbour as a spiritual being in his or her own right. To treat ‘the other’ as a relative 
means to one’s own God-relationship is a sinful engagement that is inherently 
destined to fail. Furthermore, this entry suggests that the attempt at becoming an 
authentic, spiritual being, an individual with a healthy relationship to God, must 
inescapably be joined with some kind o f relation to the other. I suggest that the 
spiritual aspect o f  this jo in t endeavour will include practising works o f love for one’s 
neighbour(s). Once again, however, we must conclude that becoming an authentic self 
is an inter-personal affair.
7.4.1 Concluding Remarks.
In conclusion, we have seen that for Kierkegaard we are part animals, and that as 
animals we have psychical and physical needs. The natural tendency towards 
sociability and preferential love is such a psychical-physical desire. Left spiritually 
unregulated, however, this desire becomes animalistic and is degrading to ourselves 
and to others, since the human being is capable o f developing above and beyond mere 
psychical-physical characterisation. We might add that ungenuine associations appeal
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to the psychical-physical aspects o f hum an life which, as we saw above, are the most 
sensually pleasurable (3.3.1). Ungenuine sociality which is based upon pshychical- 
physical characteristics alone m ight also serve as one m ore constant tem ptation for the 
individual into spiritual forfeiture.176
W e have also seen, however, that socio-political institutions and their decisions can 
inadvertently affect the spiritual developm ent o f  the typical individual found in those 
circum stances. W hen spiritual progression is affected to the extent that it is rendered 
unobtainable, and when non-political m eans are also an ineffectual remedy to these 
socio-political problem s, then K ierkegaard’s spiritual theory o f  the political justifies 
calling for negative policy change. K ierkegaard’s ultim ate goal is to enable 
individuals to progress spiritually. But this also implies enabling individuals to be the 
kinds o f  people that can constitute true com m unities, and become potential 
participants o f  genuine sociability.
Hence, I have argued that K ierkegaard provides a theory o f  sociability that is not only 
non-instrum ental but that also seeks to treat other hum an beings as worthy o f the 
dignity that they deserve. I have also argued that the possibility o f being a truly 
sociable individual is one o f the outcom es o f K ierkegaard’s spiritual theory o f the 
political, and its existential justification o f  negative alterations to policy-decisions. 
Finally, an analysis o f  K ierkegaard’s journal entries revealed that the individual’s 
authentic spiritual developm ent is a necessarily inter-personal and social enterprise.
176 T hus in ano ther journal entry, K ierkegaard  w rites that: “All these pastoral conventions, general 
assem blies, societies, in short, all the sociality  in our age, are [ . . .]  m anifestations o f  the need tor 
m ean ing lessness and im m aturity  [ . . .]  (JP IV, 4126). A little later, K ierkegaard  also argues that people 
create and m aintain  ‘low er’ form s o f  society  because they do not w ant to be confronted  w ith ‘ideals’ 
(i.e., ideal standards o f  sp irituality) {ibid., 4190).
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
Conclusion.
The prim ary argum ent o f  this thesis is that K ierkegaard developed a theory o f the 
political which is grounded in existentialist concerns. This central argument has been 
pursued in each and every one o f  the preceding chapters, in varying ways. In the 
opening chapter, I argued for a definition o f a ‘theory o f  the political’ and 
distinguished the latter from other sim ilar concepts such as a ‘political theory’. In 
chapter two, I assessed some o f  the leading contem porary opinions o f  the literature on 
K ierkegaard’s political thought. In this recent scholarship, m any claims are made that 
I endorse throughout this thesis: that K ierkegaard does not present a positive 
program m e for policy recom m endations, for example. Building on these observations, 
I contributed a theoretical justification for this absence and dem onstrated that rather 
than being an unintended flaw in K ierkegaard’s writing, it is a necessary consequence 
o f  K ierkegaard’s unique theory o f  the political. There was m uch in the recent 
scholarship that I questioned, however.
There were some philosophical positions in the contem porary Kierkegaard 
scholarship that I agreed with only after some qualifications have been admitted. It 
has been argued, for example, that K ierkegaard’s thought lacks the essential 
ingredient o f ‘political and social activ ism ’ (Perkins, 1997, 154). From the
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exam ination o f  K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f  the political we see that this claim 
is only partially true. If by ‘political activ ism ’ we mean fighting for political rights for 
their own sake and neglecting to consider the existential effects o f our actions, then 
our analysis o f K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f  the political shows that, ideally 
speaking, ‘political activ ism ’ o f  this kind is indeed condemned. Nevertheless, 
K ierkegaard endorses a different type o f  activism  than this, an existentially-m otivated 
political activism , which is com bined with an existential interest in the development 
o f  others. This rather unique form o f  political activity was hinted at in Two Ages 
(chapter five), but becam e a central concept in The Moment literature (chapter six). 
Furtherm ore, it could be argued that K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political and his 
anthropology also provide us with reasons to expect the kind o f  ‘concessionary’ 
political activism  that was exam ined above (7.2.1). Hence, the claim that 
K ierkegaard’s thought lacks political activism  is only som ew hat correct.
Other claims from recent K ierkegaard scholarship were com pletely rejected, however. 
For exam ple, I have sought to argue throughout this thesis that the claim that 
K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f  the political is ‘im potent’ with regards to real- 
w orld changes (e.g., Adorno, 1989, 49-51; 2002; Fletcher, 1982, 71-2) is unfounded. 
Both the genuinely existential, as well as the ‘concessionary’ political activism  that 
was m entioned im m ediately above, can be seen as evidence against these claims. 
W hilst the contem porary scholarship on K ierkegaard’s political thought was outlined 
in the second chapter, I considered my relation to this literature only later on in the 
thesis when the m ajority o f K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f  the political had been 
outlined (6.3.1).
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The textual evidence for K ierkegaard’s theory o f  the political is provided in two 
distinct ways. Firstly, three bodies o f texts from K ierkegaard’s authorship were 
exam ined because they explicitly outlined K ierkegaard’s categorisation o f ‘political’ 
and ‘non-political’ entities, as well as detailed how the two ought to relate to each 
other (chapter three). These three works were signed in K ierkegaard’s own name and 
tie in with m any o f  his central interests especially, o f  course, his basic existentialist 
com m itm ents. Therefore, I consider the views expressed in these three works to be 
K ierkegaard’s own theory o f the political (i.e., not a pseudonym ous viewpoint; I 
outlined my reasons for taking these claim s to be K ierkegaard’s own, as well as my 
general m ethod for interpreting the authorship, in section 7.1.1.2).
Aside from the explicit articulation o f his theory o f  the political, however, I also 
argued that the form er informs m any key concepts throughout K ierkegaard’s 
authorship. I backed this claim up by taking close, political readings o f three o f 
K ierkegaard’s diverse works: From the Papers (chapter four), Two Ages (chapter 
five), and The Moment w ritings (chapter six).
I argued that the first work, From the Papers, closely exam ined the relationship 
between the socio-political conditions o f  a specific time period, and an individual that 
is deeply, existentially affected by those conditions, Hans Christian Andersen. 
Ultim ately, I claim ed that the central argum ent o f  the work, the aesthetic critique of 
A ndersen, fails. This failing o f K ierkegaard’s aesthetic critique could, however, be 
taken as evidence that K ierkegaard had not thoroughly worked out a comprehensive 
and coherent philosophical system. As Julia W atkin has argued, From the Papers, like 
much o f the authorship that preceded the publication o f Either/Or, could be seen as
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evidence o f  K ierkegaard ‘experim enting’ with concepts and literary devices that 
becom e vital aspects o f his later, com prehensively worked out philosophical thought 
(W atkin, 1990, vii; see also: W estfall, 2006, 47). I suggested that evidence o f 
K ierkegaard’s early interest in the relationship betw een the socio-political movements 
o f  an age and the existential developm ent o f  its typical individual is found early on in 
K ierkegaard’s authorship, in From the Papers.
This interpretation opens up m ultiple interesting readings o f  From the Papers. In this 
thesis, for example, I pursued a political reading o f  From the Papers (4.3). The 
im plications o f  reading From the Papers as an early, exploratory work in theorising 
about the political is that it enables us to see K ierkegaard’s ensuing pseudonymous 
works as ways o f  portraying various im poverished existential life-views. A political 
reading o f  From the Papers, in conjunction with the existential theory o f  the political 
that is developed in K ierkegaard’s signed authorship, opens up the possibility o f 
finding out the extent to which the existentially im poverished pseudonym s might also 
be typical products o f  existentially harm ful socio-political phenom ena. A political 
reading o f  From the Papers also suggests that K ierkegaard m ight have been interested 
in exam ining the relationship between the socio-political and the existential in the 
entirety o f his authorship. I hope to have helped open the way for such a reading. I 
could not have hoped to pursue the full ram ifications o f interpreting K ierkegaard’s 
authorship in this way within the restraints o f  this thesis, but I hope to have 
encouraged future research in this area.
If  the analysis o f  From the Papers provided us with a case study o f  a particular person 
(Andersen) in a particular age, the work Two Ages exam ines what kinds o f  existential
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ram ifications will affect the person typically encountered in a later, different age. 
There is a noticeable change in the socio-political conditions that backdrop the two 
works. I have argued that Kierkegaard responds to these (and elsewhere, other) 
externalities by shifting the focus o f  his theory o f  the political, his understanding o f 
his existential, authorial task and responsibility, and the advice he gives to his reader 
about his or her existential developm ent. This change highlights the fact that 
K ierkegaard’s thought in general, and his theory o f  the political more specifically, is 
responsive to external changes in socio-political conditions. This in turn reveals that 
Kierkegaard is not as politically quietist as has often previously been thought.
In the work Two Ages, Kierkegaard focusses on the effects that an age will have on 
the ‘typical’ person. In doing so, K ierkegaard com pares and contrasts one age with 
another. Our analysis o f  K ierkegaard’s com parison shows that socio-political 
alterations can actually have a rather dom inating effect on the existential development 
o f  the individual to the extent that following one o f the three typically Kierkegaardian 
‘ways o f  life’ becom es a pointless venture (5.2). The fact that K ierkegaard recognises 
this is additional evidence that he was acutely aware o f  the significance that socio­
political factors have with regards to existential concerns.
In response to the unique conditions o f  the ‘present’, ‘aesthetic’ age, we saw that 
Kierkegaard began outlining his view o f  justified  political activism. In Two Ages, the 
conditions are so extreme that existentially m otivated political activism involves 
suffering at the hands o f  the num erically strong and dispassionate majority. Despite 
the fact that the type o f  existential, political activism  described in the work might 
represent an extrem e form o f  it, Two Ages nevertheless begins K ierkegaard’s
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involvem ent with the question o f justified  political activism. Generally speaking, any 
justified , existentially m otivated political activism  will put the single individual in 
opposition with (num erical) forces that undoubtedly cause some (temporal) 
discom fort to the activist. I f  Two Ages expressly articulated the possibility o f  
existential activism , it also distinguished this activism  from purely political activism -  
the latter being an attem pt at securing civic liberties in order to serve a non-spiritual 
interest in the tem poral w ellbeing o f  the majority. K ierkegaard warns us that an over­
engagem ent in the latter m ight even cause further existential impoverishment. This 
im portant distinction should serve as a constant rem inder, then, that K ierkegaard’s 
existential theory o f  the political enforces specifically existential limitations on an 
involvem ent with political issues in general (and political activism  more specifically).
I interpreted The Moment literature as a case study o f  K ierkegaard’s theory o f 
existential activism . Hence, I judged  the cam paign for disestablishm ent that 
K ierkegaard pursued in the work as an exam ple o f  existentially justified political 
activism. Furtherm ore, The Moment literature outlines additional conditions that 
K ierkegaard gave for defending such activism. K ierkegaard explicitly states that 
actively fighting for political change should only be encouraged when the spiritual 
developm ent o f  the individual is put at more risk by failing to act than by standing out 
and protesting. Furtherm ore, political activism  is only endorsed when other possible 
m ethods o f  helping one’s fellows have been exhausted (such as K ierkegaard’s own 
authorial activity).
Finally, The Moment literature shows that K ierkegaard is not com pletely averse to 
suggesting negative policy alterations. W hilst K ierkegaard m ight not leave us with a
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positive program m e for policy-im plem entation, he does outline the conditions for 
genuine existential activism. Hence, K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the political 
provides a theoretical justification for fighting against certain illegitim ate government 
actions and policies. As such, I argue that one cannot claim that K ierkegaard’s theory 
o f  the political is ‘qu ietist’, or ‘im potent’ with regards to external change.
In the final chapter, I analysed Theodor A dorno’s central criticism  o f  the inherently 
individualistic nature o f  K ierkegaard’s thought. Adorno had also claimed that 
K ierkegaard’s individualism  implied a theory o f  the political that was impotent with 
regards to external action -  nam ely, to alleviating econom ic and social inequality. As 
I have interpreted Kierkegaard, the concern for the econom ic wellbeing o f one’s 
fellow hum an beings is prim arily an ethical concern. Thus, I understand A dorno’s 
criticism  to be connected with K ierkegaard’s constant priority o f  the spiritual 
w ellbeing o f the neighbour over their ethical or tem poral wellbeing. I responded to 
this criticism  by showing once m ore that according to K ierkegaard’s anthropology, an 
ethical interest in the econom ic w ellbeing o f  one’s fellows is not necessarily cancelled 
out by a spiritual interest in the neighbour. Furtherm ore, it is only natural for us to 
expect human beings to engage in what I called ‘concessionary’ political activism 
(7.2). U ltim ately, however, Adorno is correct in claim ing that K ierkegaard’s 
existential theory o f  the political is prim arily com m itted towards the spiritual 
w ellbeing o f  each hum an being, and only to econom ic (K ierkegaard m ight say 
‘tem poral’) w ellbeing secondarily.
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A dorno’s second principal objection to Kierkegaard is that the latter has no true social
177theory. K ierkegaard’s spiritually ideal human, Adorno argues, fails to pay sufficient 
attention to the particularities o f his or her contem poraries. Relations in K ierkegaard’s 
social ideal are hence characterised by each single individual using the other as a 
m edium  for potential com m unication with God. The particularities o f the person one 
relates to are thought to be irrelevant and are possibly even distractions to one’s God- 
relationship, which has ultimate priority. Hence, Adorno claim s that according to 
K ierkegaard’s view, we are encouraged to ignore the particularities o f our fellows, 
and this includes their socio-econom ic status in society.
In response to A dorno’s argum ent, I highlighted that for K ierkegaard social relations 
ought to be grounded  upon, but not lim ited to, spiritual reciprocity. Contrary to 
A dorno’s reading, K ierkegaard does not believe that spiritual reciprocity will be the 
only defining factor o f  social relations betw een beings who are partly spiritual, partly 
tem poral. Once the genuinely social person recognises the essential, spiritual worth o f 
each o f  his or her neighbours (and for Kierkegaard, the Christian concept o f 
neighbour-love is the most ideal form o f this), those relations can also include shared 
interests and com m itm ents that m ight be largely based upon tem poral differences and 
sim ilarities.
Furtherm ore, I argued that an instrum entalist reading o f  the relationship one has with
one’s neighbours is untenable. Far from being a viable m eans to one’s God-
relationship, treating the other in this way will only distance oneself from God (and is
therefore, strictly speaking, a sin for Kierkegaard). ‘G od’ and ‘neighbour’ are
177 T his claim  has been reiterated , for d ifferen t reasons, by o ther contem porary  scholars, e.g., Conw ay 
(“ [•••] he [K ierkegaard] offers no th ing  resem bling  a coherent, fully articulated  social theo ry” (1999; 
2 2 )).
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som etim es interchangeable concepts in K ierkegaard’s authorship. Hence, an 
instrum ental relation to one’s neighbour necessarily implies an inauthentic relation to 
God.
Finally, I presented an alternative picture o f K ierkegaard’s view o f  the self, and o f  his 
or her authentic relationship to God and to others. In fact, we saw that existential 
developm ent necessarily required pursuing healthy social engagem ents with others. 
Only when one loves his or her neighbour as neighbour (and then as a specific 
individual) can one potentially develop into the spiritual and existential ideal that 
K ierkegaard believes Christianity desires o f  each hum an being.
This account o f  the se lf and sociality links K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the 
political with the vision o f  genuine sociability that he portrays in Works o f  Love. For 
genuine sociality requires existentially developed individuals. Individuals must first 
arrive at a religious understanding o f the other as an essentially spiritual equal before 
genuine sociality can becom e possible. But K ierkegaard has also highlighted how 
socio-political actions can negatively affect the existential developm ent o f the person. 
I f  the existential developm ent o f  the individual is jeopardised by ‘ungenuine’ policies, 
then genuine sociability is also endangered. Hence, in works like Two Ages, we see 
the direct link betw een the existential im poverishm ent that an ‘age’ can inadvertently 
foster, and the inauthentic and seriously deficient social relations that might occur as a 
result o f  the former.
All this is to say that K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f  the political perfectly informs 
a vision o f  genuine sociability. Furtherm ore, we have seen how K ierkegaard’s
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existential theory o f  the political can justify  political activism that pressures policy- 
change. Hence, I have argued that K ierkegaard outlined a rather comprehensive, 
existentially m otivated theory o f the political.
I have also argued that K ierkegaard’s theory o f  the political is: system atically laid out; 
detailed; consistent throughout the authorship (and with key concepts within 
K ierkegaard’s philosophy); and finally, that it is non-trivially responsive to external 
change. The ‘spiritual prioritarianism ’ that underlies K ierkegaard’s theory o f the 
political (/social) m ight be perceived by some contem porary scholars, Kierkegaard 
scholars and non-K ierkegaard scholars alike, as quite ‘rad ical’. Nevertheless, I hope 
to have shown that the radical nature o f  K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f the 
political is a direct consequence o f  the ground-breaking presuppositions that were 
developed throughout K ierkegaard’s original authorship.
To what extent K ierkegaard’s existential theory o f  the political might inform 
contem porary political debates is a question that I could not hope to answer in this
178thesis. I hope, nevertheless, that this thesis inspires future research into this area. I 
would urge any future scholarship in this area to rem em ber that K ierkegaard’s social 
and political views, as with all aspects o f  his thought, keep his existential interests at 
the fore. This existential elem ent makes K ierkegaard’s theory o f the political both 
wonderfully novel, uniquely inform ative to contem porary m ethods o f  theorising about 
the political, and ineludibly challenging. W hilst I have prim arily sought to have 
contributed to K ierkegaard scholarship, this thesis also seeks to inspire research into 
contem porary political and philosophical debates. I hope to have facilitated further
178 A lison A ssite r’s rather recent book Kierkegaard, M etaphysics an d  P o litica l Theory: Unfinished  
Selves m akes a good start in this d irection  (A ssiter, 2009).
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research into, for example; how an existential theory o f  the political m ight be 
developed and applied in our contem porary situation; how theorising about the 
political in this intriguing and novel way m ight challenge and/or inform contem porary 
political debates; and whether an existentially-based theory o f  the political m ight be a 
preferable and feasible, or substandard and im practical, alternative to m ainstream , 
contem porary theories o f  the political.
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